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2020 DIGILAW 283 (JHR)

Deo Narayan Manjhi, S/o Late Ganga Ram Manjhi v. Central Coal Fields Limited

2020-02-12

RAVI RANJAN, SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD

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ORDER : We have heard learned counsel for the appellant as well as the respondents. 2. This intra-court appeal is directed against the order dated 19.03.2018 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(S) No.6133 of 2008 whereby the aforesaid writ petition filed by the writ petitioner/appellant was dismissed chiefly on the ground of delay and laches in filing the writ petition at belated stage. 3. The facts in brief which would be necessary for consideration of lis stand enumerated as under. The appellant/writ petitioner’s father Ganga Ram Manjhi, during the period of employment under the CCL, died on 30.04.1996. The mother of the appellant/writ petitioner died on 06.11.1997 and brother died on 17.12.1999 and none of them were offered any appointment on compassionate ground by the CCL. It is the case of the appellant/writ petitioner that according to the service excerpts of his father, his age was recorded as six years on 01.04.1987 and as such at the time of his father’s death on 30.04.1996 he was 15 years and 29 days old. After attaining majority, i.e., on 01.04.1999 he purportedly filed an application for appointment in view of the provisions contained in National Coal Wages Agreement (NCWA)-V in particular, Clause 9.3.2 read with 9.5.0 (iii). Admittedly he filed such application after eight months and six days and according to the existing circular the application was required to be filed within six months. Obviously there was delay of two months and six days. However, the CCL refused to consider such employment of the appellant/writ petitioner for the reasons mentioned in the letter dated 13.02.2003 (Annexure-6). It emanates from the letter that the ground of non-consideration was delay of about three years while the time fixed for filing such application was six months. Reason for such delay is given that on 22.07.2008, the Circular was revised and the time period for filing such application was extended from six months to one and a half years then he filed the writ application. However, that does not appear to be very plausible explanation for the reason that his application was rejected on the ground of delay of three years which according to the appellant/writ petitioner was not a factual position rather the delay was only of two months and six days. However, that does not appear to be very plausible explanation for the reason that his application was rejected on the ground of delay of three years which according to the appellant/writ petitioner was not a factual position rather the delay was only of two months and six days. However, during the pendency of the writ petition, the JCC in its meeting dated 24.10.2011 again dealt with the issue of belated cases of compassionate appointment and vide minutes recorded, as contained in Annexure-9, it appears that the decision dated 22.07.2008 extending the period of limitation for filing application from six months to one and a half years was given a retrospective effect from 12.12.1995. This definitely brings the case of the appellant/writ petitioner within the consideration zone as according to the appellant/writ petitioner, the delay was merely of two months and six days. 4. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the CCL submits that the delay was three years as the death of the father of the appellant/writ petitioner took place on 30.04.1996 and the application was filed on 06.12.1999. A question was put to the learned counsel as to whether consequent to the death of the father of the appellant/writ petitioner any of the dependant was kept on live roster in terms of Clause 9.5.0(iii) of the NCWA-V or not. Learned counsel on instruction has informed us that nobody was kept on live roster including the appellant/writ petitioner. 5. Now, for better appreciation the relevant provision from NCWA-V is required to be quoted and the same is extracted and reproduced as under: “9.3.2 Employment to one dependant of the worker who dies while in service. 9.3.3. xxxx 9.3.4 xxxx 9.4.0 xxxx 9.5.0 xxxx (i) xxxx (ii) xxxx (iii) In case of death either in mine accident or for other reasons or medical unfitness under Clause 9.4.0, if no employment has been offered and the male dependant of the concerned worker is 15 years and above in age, he will be kept on a live roster and would be provided employment commensurate with his skill and qualifications when he attains the age of 18 years. During the period the male dependant is on live roster, the female dependant will be paid monetary compensation as per rates at paras (i) & (ii) above.” 6. During the period the male dependant is on live roster, the female dependant will be paid monetary compensation as per rates at paras (i) & (ii) above.” 6. The aforesaid NCWA-V is obviously an agreement between the employer and the workers’ union and it has got a statutory fervor as both the sides have reached to such agreement as per the provisions contained in Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act and, as such, it would bind both the parties to the agreement. 7. It would be evident from perusal of the aforesaid agreement that upon death of the worker while in service, employment to one of his dependants has to be given. It has further been laid down in Clause 9.5.0(iii) that in case of such death if no employment could be offered to the male dependant of the concerned worker who is 15 years or above in age, he will be kept on live roster and would be provided employment commensurate with his skill and qualification when he attains the age of 18 years. In the case of the appellant/writ petitioner, he was also required to be kept on live roster which was obligatory on part of the respondents as they are also bound by the NCWA-V. But now it is admitted position that they failed in their duty as appellant/writ petitioner was never kept on live roster as per the information given today by the learned counsel for the respondent. In case of the dependant who was a minor at the time of the death of his father and was required to be given employment after he attains the age of 18 years which he attained on 01.04.1999, since immediately he could not have been given appointment, the period of limitation will start for filing an application for getting appointment on compassionate ground from the day on which he attains majority and not on the day when his father died as he was not qualified for any employment at that point of time but was required to be kept on live roster to be offered appointment after attaining the age of 18 years. 8. Thus, in our considered view, the delay was merely of two months and six days and not of three years. On that count itself, the order passed by the authority contained in Annexure-6 is liable to be quashed and set aside. 8. Thus, in our considered view, the delay was merely of two months and six days and not of three years. On that count itself, the order passed by the authority contained in Annexure-6 is liable to be quashed and set aside. Further, when the JCC in its meeting dated 24.10.2011 (minutes of which has been appended as Annexure-9) has itself taken a decision that the extension of time limit for filing application which was provided vide its earlier decision dated 22.07.2008 by extending it from six months to one and a half years would be effected retrospectively w.e.f. 12.12.1995, then the appellant/writ petition automatically came within the reconsideration zone during the pendency of the writ petition even though the case of the appellant/writ petitioner that such reconsideration was required after the earlier decision of JCC dated 22.07.2008, cannot find favour of this Court because that was obviously applicable prospectively and for that reason again a decision has been taken by the JCC to make it effective with a retrospective date. 9. In such a situation, in our view, since the delay was merely of two months and six days there was no occasion why the appellant/writ petitioner’s case would not be reconsidered for employment by the CCL under Clause 9.5.0(iii). Of course, there appears to be delay in filing the writ petition but the learned counsel has submitted that the appellant/writ petitioner only thought it proper to file a writ petition when the JCC took a decision on 22.07.2008 by extending the period of limitation from six months to one and a half year. That apart, the appointment under NCWA can be easily distinguished from the compassionate appointments which are made by the State Government or the Central Government under the executive instructions whereas this employment flows from the statutory agreement between the employer and the employee which says that even if the male dependant was minor he would be kept on live roster and will be offer appointment when he attains majority. It is clearly distinguishable from the other provisions of compassionate appointments as the NCWA provisions bring it under the canopy of benevolence being beneficial provision. It is clearly distinguishable from the other provisions of compassionate appointments as the NCWA provisions bring it under the canopy of benevolence being beneficial provision. As such, rejecting or dismissing the writ petition on the ground of such delay, in our opinion, would be very harsh upon the appellant/writ petitioner as the earlier period of limitation extended from 06 months to 18 months vide the circular dated 22.07.2008 was extended retrospectively till 12.12.1995 vide Annexure-9 dated 24.10.2011. 10. In the result, this appeal and writ petition both are allowed. The impugned decision of the authority contained at Annexure-6 is quashed and set aside. 11. The respondent authorities are directed to consider the appointment of the appellant/writ petitioner in view of the provisions contained in Clause 9.5.0 (iii) of the NCWA-V under which they are obliged to offer him appointment as per the modified JCC decision and the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Mohan Mahto Vs. Central Coal Field Ltd. and others reported in (2007)8 SCC 549 . 12. Such decision would be required to be taken within a period of three months from the date of receipt/production of the copy of this order.