JUDGMENT : A.P. THAKER, J. 1. The present Letters Patent Appeals have been taken out under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent by the original petitioners – appellants herein against the common judgment and order dated 28.03.2018 passed by the learned Single Judge in captioned Special Civil Applications as well as the order dated 27.11.2018 passed in respective review applications, whereby the learned Single Judge has dismissed the petitions as well as review applications filed by appellants herein. 2. Brief facts of the case of the appellants is that respondent No.3 was serving as Assistant Teacher in the school run by appellant No.1 – School. That the respective teachers have made applications before respondent No.1 and the appellants herein remained present before it and pointed out him that the issue raised by the teachers was pertaining to the service condition and, therefore, it should be decided by the then Primary Education Tribunal constituted under the provisions of the Bombay Primary Education Act. 2.1 It is the case of the appellants that they have relied upon the judgment of this Court passed in Special Civil Application No.8404 of 1998 and Special Civil Application No.9292 of 2000 wherein it was observed that in a dispute between the employees and employer pertaining to the service conditions of the employee, the Controlling Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 has no power or authority to deal with such cases. It is contended that however, by common judgment and order dated 31.01.2014, the Controlling Authority has come to the conclusion that the teachers are entitled to gratuity. It is contended that the Appellate Authority has not considered the judgment relied upon by the appellants. It is contended that instead of relying upon the judgment of this Court, the Competent Authority has relied on the amendment. It is contended that the judgment relied upon by the Controlling Authority does not apply to the facts of the present case and the order passed by the Controlling Authority is bad and erroneous in law since without deciding the issue of jurisdiction, it has straightway come to the conclusion that respective teachers are entitled to get gratuity. It is contended that the judgment relied upon by the Controlling Authority does not apply to the facts of the present case and the order passed by the Controlling Authority is bad and erroneous in law since without deciding the issue of jurisdiction, it has straightway come to the conclusion that respective teachers are entitled to get gratuity. 2.2 It is further the case of the appellants that thereafter, the appellants approached the Tribunal under Section 11 of the Gujarat Primary Education Act, 1947 by way of filing Applications No.40 to 43 of 2015 which came to be decided by the Tribunal by common order dated 05.08.2016. Against which the appellants preferred Special Civil Applications No. 19221 of 2016 to 19224 of 2016 before this Court wherein this Court has pointed out that before approaching this Court, the appellants should have preferred appeal before the Tribunal and accordingly the Special Civil Applications came to be withdrawn and this Court has disposed of those petitions by order dated 18.11.2016. 2.3 The appellants have also contended that they have preferred appeal before the Appellate Authority, which came to be rejected rejected by the Appellate Authority vide order dated 08.11.2017 and upheld the order of the Controlling Authority. Against that order of the Appellate Authority, the appellants have preferred captioned Special Civil Applications relying upon the provisions containing that the Competent Authority has no jurisdiction to entertain the claim of the teachers and the Competent Authority ought to have directed the concerned teachers to approach the Tribunal. It is contended that the Tribunal cannot act beyond its jurisdiction. It is contended that the dispute raised by the teachers pertains to non-payment of gratuity. It is further contended that the gratuity is a part and parcel of conditions of service and when there is specific Court / Forum which has been established to determine the dispute pertaining to the service conditions of teachers serving in the Educational Institutions, no other court or authority can exercise jurisdiction to decide the issue raised by the teachers. It is contended that prior to 03.04.1997, the teachers were not covered under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 and the same has been retrospectively made applicable. In addition to this point, the appellants have also raised many questions before this Court in captioned Special Civil Applications which came to be dismissed by the learned Single Judge. It is contended that prior to 03.04.1997, the teachers were not covered under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 and the same has been retrospectively made applicable. In addition to this point, the appellants have also raised many questions before this Court in captioned Special Civil Applications which came to be dismissed by the learned Single Judge. It is contended that as their contention regarding the jurisdiction was not dealt with by the common judgment and order dated 28.03.2018, they have preferred review application before the learned Single Judge which came to be dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 27.11.2018. It is contended that the learned Single Judge has relied upon the judgment of this Court rendered in Letters Patent Appeal No.1202 of 2012. But in that case, there was no contention regarding Section 11A of the Gujarat Educational Institutions Services Tribunal Act, 2006 which provides that the Tribunal shall not entertain an application referred to in Section 11 unless it is satisfied that the applicant had availed of all the remedies available to him under any law or under the relevant service rules as to the redressal of grievances. The appellants have also relied upon the provisions of Section 40-E of the Gujarat Primary Education Act, 1947 which provides that only the Tribunal can decide the question connected with the conditions of service of the teachers. It is contended that in view of the provisions contained in Section 40-G, the other Court / Forum has no jurisdiction to decide the dispute relating to the service conditions of the teachers and the management. According to the appellants, the Controlling Authority has no authority to decide the same which is functioning under the Payment of Gratuity Act. While referring to the various decisions, it has been contended that the learned Single Judge has committed serious error of law and facts in passing the impugned common judgment and order and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. 3. Heard Mr. Mukund M. Desai, learned counsel for the appellants, Ms. Krina Calla, learned Assistant Government Pleader for respondents No.1 and 2 and Ms. Mamta Vyas, learned counsel for respondent No.3. Perused the materials placed on record. 4. Mr. Mukund M. Desai, learned counsel for the appellants has submitted the same facts which are narrated in the memo of appeals. Heard Mr. Mukund M. Desai, learned counsel for the appellants, Ms. Krina Calla, learned Assistant Government Pleader for respondents No.1 and 2 and Ms. Mamta Vyas, learned counsel for respondent No.3. Perused the materials placed on record. 4. Mr. Mukund M. Desai, learned counsel for the appellants has submitted the same facts which are narrated in the memo of appeals. While referring to the impugned common judgment and order of the learned Single Judge, he has submitted that the learned Single Judge has relied upon the judgment and order rendered in Letters Patent Appeal No.1202 of 2012 and has dismissed the captioned Special Civil Applications which is erroneous. While inviting the attention of this Court to the judgment and order of the Court rendered in Letters Patent Appeal No.1202 of 2012, he has submitted that there was no relating to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and, therefore, the question has not been finally decided by this Court. He has also submitted that the management has already deposited the amount before the Competent Authority and the Competent Authority has not paid the same to the teachers and for that purpose, no fault could be found with the appellants. While referring to the orders of the Controlling Authority as well as Appellate Authority and the Tribunal, it is submitted by the learned counsel that they have not considered the amendment under Section 11A of the Act wherein it is specifically provided that the concerned person has to exhaust all other available remedies and, thereafter, could file appropriate proceedings before the Tribunal. While assailing the original order of the Controlling Authority, learned counsel for the appellants has also submitted that the observations made by the Controlling Authority regarding its jurisdiction is erroneous. Learned counsel for the appellants has conceded that the primary teachers are, now, included under the Payment of Gratuity Act and, therefore, the teachers are entitled to get the gratuity. But for that purpose, they should have filed the appropriate proceedings before the Tribunal and not before the Controlling Authority. Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the question regarding jurisdiction is legal question and has to be decided and the appellants are only challenging the fact that the Controlling Authority has no jurisdiction and, therefore, the orders passed by the Controlling Authority, Appellate Authority as well as the learned Single Judge are not sustainable in the eyes of law. 4.1 While relying upon the following decisions, Mr. Mukund M. Desai, learned counsel for the appellants has prayed to allow the present appeals. (i) State of Gujarat and others Vs. Saurashtra University Karmachariy Parivar and others rendered in Special Civil Application No.8408 of 1998 dated 09.04.2004. (ii) State of Punjab Vs. Kailash Nath, AIR 1989 SC 558 . 4.2 During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the appellants has also produced the Notification regarding applicability of the Payment of Gratuity Act in Educational Institutions bearing Notification No.5-42013/1/95-SS II dated 03.04.1997 of the Central Government which provides that the Payment of Gratuity Act would be applicable to the Educational Institutions. 5. Ms. Krina Calla, learned Assistant Government Pleader for respondents No.1 and 2 has submitted that there is no perversity or error in the impugned judgment and order of the learned Single Judge and the exercise of jurisdiction by the Controlling Authority and Appellate Authority are legal and valid and, therefore, the present appeals are devoid of merits and the same may be dismissed. 6. Per contra, Ms. Mamta Vyas, learned counsel for respondent No.3 has submitted that the impugned judgment and order of the learned Single Judge is proper and it is not erroneous. She has submitted that the institution though has deposited the amount, has stopped the payment to the teachers and yet though the order was passed in 2011, they are not able to get the gratuity. She has submitted that the appellants are trying to delay in making payment of gratuity to the concerned teachers. She has submitted that the Payment of Gratuity Act is code in and, therefore, the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act would be applicable in the present case and it has been properly considered by the Controlling Authority and Appellate Authority as well as the learned Single Judge and, therefore, the present appeals may be dismissed. 7. It is worthwhile to refer to Section 11(1) and 11(A) of the Gujarat Educational Institutions Services Tribunal Act, 2006 which reads as under:- “11 (1) An employee aggrieved by an original order or appellate order or decision of the educational institution which is connected with the conditions of service of such employee or, as the case may be, the educational institution, may, within a period of sixty days from the date of such order or decision, appeal to the tribunal.” 8. It is worthwhile to refer to Section 40-E and 40-G of the Gujarat Primary Education Act, 1947 which reads as under:- “40-E. Dispute to be decided by Tribunal. - Where there is any dispute between the manager of a recognised private primary school and teacher in service of such school, which is connected with the conditions of service of such teacher, the manager or, as the case may be, the teacher may make an application to the Tribunal constituted under Sec. 40-F for the decision of the dispute. 40-G. Bar of jurisdiction of courts. - (1) No civil court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Chapter required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Tribunal. (2) All suits and proceedings between the manager of a recognised private primary school and a teacher in service, of such school relating to disputes connected with the conditions of service of such teacher, which are pending in any civil court on the date of the commencement of the Bombay Primary Education (Gujarat Amendment) Ordinance, 1986 (Guj. Ord. 6 of 1986), shall be transferred to and continued before the Tribunal : Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to execution proceedings and appeals arising out of decrees or order passed by such court before the commencement of the Bombay Primary Education (Gujarat Amendment) Ordinance, 1986 (Guj. Ord. 6 of 1986) and such execution proceedings and appeals shall be decided and disposed of as if the Bombay Primary Education (Gujarat Amendment) Ordinance, 1986 (Guj. 24 of 1986), had not been passed.” 9. Considering the submissions made on behalf of the parties and the material placed on record, it appears that there is no dispute regarding the following facts :- (i) The respective private respondent in each appeals were the teachers in the school managed by the trust. (ii) After their retirement, no gratuity is paid to them. (iii) They have approached the Controlling Authority as provided in the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, for their redressal. (iv) Vide Notification No.5-42013/1/95-SS II dated 03.04.1997, the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, made applicable to the Educational Institutions. (v) The Competent Authority has, vide order dated 31.04.2014, allowed the applications of the teachers and directed the appellants herein to pay gratuity amount with 10% interest. (iv) Vide Notification No.5-42013/1/95-SS II dated 03.04.1997, the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, made applicable to the Educational Institutions. (v) The Competent Authority has, vide order dated 31.04.2014, allowed the applications of the teachers and directed the appellants herein to pay gratuity amount with 10% interest. (vi) The said order was assailed by the present appellants by filing Applications No.40 to 43 of 2015 before the Gujarat Institution Services Tribunal at Ahmedabad which came to be dismissed on various grounds, one of which includes non-application of Section 11 of the Gujarat Primary Education Act, 1947 with observation that it is not Appellate Authority over the Controlling Authority in view of the provisions of Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. (vii) The order of the Tribunal has been assailed by the present appellants before this Court by filing Special Civil Applications No.19221 of 2016 to 19224 of 2016 which came to be disposed of as withdrawn by the appellants on 18.11.2016 for seeking appropriate alternative remedy before the Competent Authority. Thereafter, in the said petitions, a speaking to minutes was filed for necessary order to the effect that the liberty, to approach the Appellate Authority under Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 read with Rule 18 of the Rules framed thereunder, was sought to be added in the order dated 11.11.2016. The speaking to minutes was allowed on 01.03.2017. (viii) Thereafter, the present appellants have approached the Appellate Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 by filing Appeals which came to be dismissed, upholding the order of the Competent Authority. Being aggrieved by the order of the Appellate Authority, the present appellants have filed captioned Special Civil Applications which came to be dismissed by common order dated 28.03.2018 by the learned Single Judge. 10. The Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 is a complete code for redressal of the grievance, if any, of the either side. It is also an admitted fact that in case of non-payment of gratuity then the person concerned is entitled to move the Controlling Authority. Any person, who is aggrieved by the order of the Controlling Authority, may prefer an appeal before the Appellate Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. It is also an admitted fact that in case of non-payment of gratuity then the person concerned is entitled to move the Controlling Authority. Any person, who is aggrieved by the order of the Controlling Authority, may prefer an appeal before the Appellate Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. Now, in this case, it is admitted by both the sides that the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 is applicable and the private respondents, who were teachers, are entitled to get the gratuity under the provisions of the Act. The only question raised by the appellants herein is that in view of the provisions of the Gujarat Educational Institutions Services Tribunal Act, 2006, the remedy available to the teachers is to approach the Tribunal and they cannot take recourse to the authority prescribed under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. In this connection, it is pertinent to note that the substantive right to get gratuity is available to the retired teachers under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. The right to receive gratuity is neither created under the provisions of the Gujarat Educational Institutions Services Tribunal Act, 2006 nor it is specifically available under the Gujarat Primary Education Act, 1947. The authority which is competent to grant relief regarding payment of gratuity is available under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. The provisions contained in the Gujarat Educational Institutional Services Tribunal Act, 2006 is in the nature of procedural aspect. Whereas, the substantive right to get gratuity emanates from the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. Of course, the provisions of the Gujarat Primary Education Act, 1947, deals with creation of the Tribunal and the dispute regarding service conditions can be entertained by the Tribunal. However, the provisions contained therein which has been referred to hereinabove i.e. Section 40E and 40G, provides for recourse to the Tribunal. Now, it is well settled principles of interpretation of statute, that if there are two statutes wherein identical provisions are made pertaining to any subject, then both the Acts are to be interpreted in harmoniously. 11. It is pertinent to note that the appellants herein have heavily relied on Section 11A of the Gujarat Educational Institutions Services Tribunal Act, 2006 which reads as under:- 11A. 11. It is pertinent to note that the appellants herein have heavily relied on Section 11A of the Gujarat Educational Institutions Services Tribunal Act, 2006 which reads as under:- 11A. Application not to be entertained unless other remedies exhausted - (1) The Tribunal shall not entertain an application referred to in Sec. 11 unless it is satisfied that the applicant had availed of all the remedies available to him under any law or under the relevant service rules as to the redressal of grievances. (2) For the purposes of Sub-Sec. (1), the applicant shall be deemed to have availed of all the remedies available to him. (a) if a final order has been made by the authority competent to pass such order rejecting any representation made or appeal preferred by such applicant in connection with the grievances; or (b) where no final order has been made by the authority competent to pass such order with regard to the representation made or appeal preferred by such applicant, if a period of six months from the date on which such representation was made or appeal was preferred has expired: Provided that such period of six months, in case of appeal or representation which is pending before the concerned authority for decision on the date of commencement of the Gujarat Educational Institutions Services Tribunal (Amendment and Validation) Act, 2014, shall commence from the date of coming into operation of the said Act.” 12. Now, in view of the aforesaid provisions, it is specifically provided therein that there is bar to entertain any application under Section 11 thereof unless the party concerned has availed the remedy available to him under “any law” or “under the relevant service rules” as to redressal of the grievance. Now, admittedly, the retired teachers have sought for payment of gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, which is substantive statute, which provides for payment of the gratuity to the teachers. As such, the entire issue would be covered under the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. The words used in Section 11(A(1) referred to above are “under any law” or “under the relevant service rules”. Therefore, the exercise taken under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 is required to be exhausted by the primary teachers and accordingly, they have approached the Controlling Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act which is substantive Act. The words used in Section 11(A(1) referred to above are “under any law” or “under the relevant service rules”. Therefore, the exercise taken under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 is required to be exhausted by the primary teachers and accordingly, they have approached the Controlling Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act which is substantive Act. When the teachers have approached the Controlling Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act then the provisions of Payment of Gratuity Act would be applicable and the procedure thereof has to be followed. Therefore, the contentions raised by the appellants that the teachers should have approached the Tribunal is not acceptable. 13. So far as the reliance placed on the decision of this Court in the case of State of Gujarat and others Vs. Saurashtra University Karmachariy Parivar (supra) is concerned, it appears that the matter was relating to the Industrial Disputes Act and it was not under the Payment of Gratuity Act and, therefore, the reliance placed on this decision of the learned Single Judge is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 14. So far as the reliance placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab Vs. Kailash Nath (supra) is concerned, it relates to the criminal matter. In that case, the question was whether Rule 2.2 of the Punjab Civil Service Rules can be interpreted as placing embargo in judicial proceedings against a person for prosecution in respect of cause of action which arose or an even which took place more than four years before such institution or not. It was on a different factual aspects. Therefore, it is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 15. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the private respondents – teachers that though the amount has been deposited before the concerned authority by the appellants, they have stalled the payment to the teachers. Against this, it has been submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that they have not stalled the payment, but they have only requested the concerned authority not to disburse the amount immediately. Against this, it has been submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that they have not stalled the payment, but they have only requested the concerned authority not to disburse the amount immediately. At this juncture, it is pertinent to note that in the memo of appeal, the appellants have categorically stated on page No.Q as under:- “It is submitted that said observation is out of context because from page-74, it is clear that payment is already made and amount is deposited with the State Government and therefore, there is no control over the disbursement of that amount with the appellants, however, legal remedy is available by way of Appeal and further Appeal and if the appellants would be successful in pointing out to the Hon’ble Court that authority has committed an error in passing the order, then, it would be difficult for the appellants to recover the amount and therefore, it was requested to withhold the disbursement of the amount” 16. From these averments, it is clearly found that the appellants have stalled the payment of amount deposited by them, which was meant for respective teachers. It is unfortunate that though there was no stay order from any Court, the payment of gratuity before the concerned authority ought not to have been stalled. The attitude of the appellants is also not proper on this aspect as they have accepted the fact that the primary teachers are entitled to get the gratuity. Thus, when they have accepted the right of the teachers to get the gratuity, merely for technical reasons as to before whom an aggrieved teacher shall approach for his or her redressal on technical ground only is nothing but a delay tactics on the part of the appellants. 17. It is crystal clear that the Payment of Gratuity Act deals with the point of gratuity only, whereas, the Gujarat Primary Education Act, 1947 deals with the matter relating to the primary education in the State. Further, Section 11A of the Gujarat Institutions Services Tribunal Act, 2006 specifically provides that before approaching the Tribunal, the person concerned has to exhaust all the remedies available under the statute or any other relevant service rules. Further, Section 11A of the Gujarat Institutions Services Tribunal Act, 2006 specifically provides that before approaching the Tribunal, the person concerned has to exhaust all the remedies available under the statute or any other relevant service rules. Therefore, even if we read Section 11A of the Gujarat Institutions Services Tribunal Act, 2006, as submitted by learned counsel for the appellants, in that case also, the person concerned for his or her redressal regarding payment of gratuity has to approach under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, as it is a special Act governing field of the gratuity to be payable to the employee. 18. In view of the above, it is crystal clear that the dispute raised by the present appellants is devoid of merits. On perusal of the impugned common judgment and order dated 28.03.2018 passed by the learned Single Judge in captioned Special Civil Applications as well as the order dated 27.11.2018 passed in respective review applications are sustainable in the eyes of law and no interference is warranted. It is pertinent to note that by taking technical pleas, the appellants have stalled the process of making payment of gratuity amount to the teachers since 2014 and they have also fight the matter by filing Special Civil Applications earlier as well as approaching the Tribunal and, thereafter, filing the captioned Special Civil Applications and has dragged the teachers in legal battle. Considering all these facts, we are of the considered opinion that the cost is required to be imposed upon the appellants herein. 19. In view of the above, the present appeals are dismissed. The appellants are directed to pay Rs.25,000/- in each appeals as cost to each private respondents i.e. each teachers individually. The concerned authority is also directed to release the amount immediately lying with it, which has been deposited by the present appellant. Notice is discharged. 20. Since the appeal is dismissed, the Civil Applications shall not survive and hence, it is disposed of, accordingly. Notice is discharged.