JUDGMENT : Kailash Prasad Deo, J. Heard, learned counsel for the appellants and learned counsel for the respondents. 2. The instant letters patent appeal has been listed before this Court on remand by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in terms of order dated 18.07.2011 passed in Civil Appeal No. 5789 of 2011 setting aside the judgment dated 19.08.2010 in L.P.A. No. 125 of 2010. 3. The original writ petitioner Sant Lal Sahni preferred a writ application bearing W.P. (S) No. 1952 of 2003 before this Court against the Resolution dated 26.08.2000, whereby a penalty of censure was entered in his service book in the year 1999-2000 besides withholding of one annual increment as also against the resolution of the Bihar State Electricity Board dated 13.12.2002 (Annexure-7), whereby a decision was taken for recovery of amount received by the petitioner paid as salary for the period from 01.02.1999 to 15.09.2000 in one installment from his gratuity and also to deduct 5% of his pension, as the writ petitioner had unlawfully remained in service and committed forgery with the Board. The Writ Court vide order dated 09.12.2009 allowed the writ petition and quashed the resolution dated 13.12.2002. Thereafter, Board preferred L.P.A. No. 125 of 2010, which was dismissed by Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 19.08.2010. Aggrieved thereby, the Bihar State Electricity Board preferred Civil Appeal No. 5789 of 2011 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which was allowed in terms of order dated 18.07.2011 by setting aside the order of the Division Bench and remitting the matter to this Court for disposal on merits. Thus, this appeal is listed before this Bench. 4. During pendency of this appeal, the original writ petitioner Sant Lal Sahni died and in his place, his two sons namely, Anil Kumar and Sunil Kumar have been substituted as respondent nos. 1 (a) & 1(b). 5. The facts of the case in nut shell is that the original writ petitioner namely, Sant Lal Sahni was appointed on 10.02.1973 as Junior Electrical Engineer in the office of Electrical Executive Engineer, Electric Division, Chaibasa. Pursuant thereto, original writ petitioner was granted benefits of Time Bound Promotion and thereafter, on 06.04.1996, he joined on the post of Additional Electrical Engineer in Electric Supply Sub-Division, Giridih. By letter no. Pursuant thereto, original writ petitioner was granted benefits of Time Bound Promotion and thereafter, on 06.04.1996, he joined on the post of Additional Electrical Engineer in Electric Supply Sub-Division, Giridih. By letter no. 1015 dated 15.09.2000, the Electrical Executive Engineer, Electric Supply Division, Giridih (South) asked the original writ petitioner to stop his work as his date of superannuation was 31st January, 1999. In the meantime, vide resolution dated 26.08.2000, the original writ petitioner was imposed a penalty of censure to be entered in his service book for the year 1999-2000 and one Annual Increment was also withheld. By resolution dated 29.11.2000, the original writ petitioner was served with a charge-sheet for his alleged continuation in service after the actual date of retirement. 6. The original writ petitioner preferred a writ application being C.W.J.C. No. 1744 of 2001 for a direction upon the respondent General Manager-cum-Chief Engineer, Dhanbad Area, Electricity Board, Dhanbad to dispose of the representations filed by the petitioner, last being 08.03.2001, as the petitioner has already retired in August, 2000. The learned Single Judge of this Court vide order dated 30.04.2001 disposed of the writ application with a direction to the General Manager to dispose of the representation of the original writ petitioner by speaking order in accordance with law. 7. The original writ petitioner submitted his explanation on 15.11.2002 with a statement that he has never misrepresented nor committed any fraud and he was paid in lieu of the work performed during the period from 01.02.1999 to 15.09.2000. 8. On conclusion of the departmental proceeding, the Inquiry Officer submitted a report vide letter no. 1688 dated 01.01.2002. The petitioner was served with second show cause notice along with inquiry report and proposed punishment of realization of payment of salary made during 01.02.1999 to 15.09.2000 and to deduct 5% from his pension vide resolution issued under Memo No. 1293 dated 05.11.2002. The original writ petitioner Sant Lal Sahani submitted his show cause reply on 15.11.2002. The Disciplinary Authority vide order contained in Memo No. 492 dated 08.03.2003 directed deduction of sum of Rs. 85,565/-from the sanctioned gratuity amount of Rs. 96,135/-. The same was assailed in the writ court in W.P. (S) No. 1952 of 2003, which was heard and allowed in terms of order dated 09.12.2009. 9. The Disciplinary Authority vide order contained in Memo No. 492 dated 08.03.2003 directed deduction of sum of Rs. 85,565/-from the sanctioned gratuity amount of Rs. 96,135/-. The same was assailed in the writ court in W.P. (S) No. 1952 of 2003, which was heard and allowed in terms of order dated 09.12.2009. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the learned Single Judge has not considered Rule 43(b) of Bihar Pension Rules, 1957 in correct prospective and has not taken notice of Regulation No. 78 of Bihar State Electricity Board Service Regulation, 1976. Rule 43(b) of Bihar Pension Rules, 1957 reads as under: 43(b) The State Government further reserve to themselves the right of withholding or withdrawing a pension or any part of it, whether permanently or for specified period, and the right of ordering the recovery from a pension of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to Government if the pensioner is found in departmental or judicial proceeding to have been guilty to grave misconduct; or to have caused pecuniary loss to Government by misconduct or negligence, during his service including service rendered on re-employment after retirement: Provided that - (a) such departmental proceedings, if not instituted while the Government servant was on duty either before retirement or during re-employment; (i) shall not be instituted save with the sanction of the State Government; (ii) shall be in respect of an event which took place not more than four years before the institution of such proceedings; and (iii) shall be conducted by such authority and at such place or places as the State Government may direct and in accordance with the procedure applicable to proceedings on which an order of dismissal from service may be made; (b) judicial proceedings, if not instituted while the Government servant was on duty either before retirement or during re-employment, shall have been instituted in accordance with sub clause (ii) of clause (a); and (c) the Bihar Public Service Commission, shall be consulted before final orders are passed. Explanation.- For the purposes of the rule - (a) departmental proceeding shall be deemed to have been instituted when the charges framed, against the pensioner are issued to him or, if the Government servant has been placed under suspension from an earlier date, on such date; and (b) judicial proceedings shall be deemed to have been instituted:- (i) in the case of criminal proceedings, on the date on which a complaint is made or a charge-sheet is submitted, to a criminal court; and (ii) in the case of civil proceedings, on the date on which the complaint is presented, or as the case may be, an application is made to a civil Court. Regulation No. 78 of Bihar State Electricity Board Service Regulation, 1976 reads as under: “78. Superannuation -(i) All employees in the categories of Appendix 'A' shall automatically retire on attaining the age of 58 years; and all employee in Appendices 'B' and 'C' shall retire automatically at the age of 60 years : Provided, however, that the Board may, in any general or special case, extend the age of superannuation in respect of any particular employee or a particular category of employee upto the age of 60 years. (ii) (a) On the date an employee reaches the age of superannuation, he shall demit office immediately on his own even without being asked or directed to do so. (b) Failure to demit office on reaching the age of superannuation shall not entitle an employee to any pay and allowances beyond the date of superannuation.” 10. Mr. Manoj Tandon, learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that there is no illegality and irregularity in the proceeding initiated by the Electricity Board in compliance of the Board's Resolution as the Board is deemed to be competent authority in the matter of the disciplinary action to be initiated against retired employees. So, there was no illegality and irregularity in the departmental proceeding initiated against the original writ petitioner and imposition of punishment in view of the Regulation No. 78 of Bihar State Electricity Board Service Regulation, 1976. So, there was no illegality and irregularity in the departmental proceeding initiated against the original writ petitioner and imposition of punishment in view of the Regulation No. 78 of Bihar State Electricity Board Service Regulation, 1976. It is further submitted that the original writ petitioner, Sant Lal Sahni, who joined as a Junior Electrical Engineer, was granted benefit of Time Bound Promotion and promoted to the post of Additional Electrical Engineer and he was expected to demit office immediately on his own even without being asked or directed to do so, as he was not a Class-IV employee, rather being an officer, he had to follow Regulation No. 78 of Bihar State Electricity Board Service Regulation, 1976. As such, the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. (S) No. 1952 of 2003 is bad in law and the same may be set aside. Mr. Manoj Tandon has further submitted that the Hon'ble Apex Court has considered this aspect of the matter and set aside the order dated 19.08.2010 passed by the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No. 125 of 2010 and remitted the matter before this Court for disposal. 11. Learned counsel for the substituted writ petitioners Mr. A.K. Sahani has submitted that the judgment passed by learned Single Judge is in accordance with law and does not warrant any interference by this Court. To buttress his argument, learned counsel has placed reliance on the provisions of Rule 43(b) proviso (a) i.e. such departmental proceedings, if not instituted while the Government servant was on duty either before retirement or during re-employment; (i) shall not be instituted save with the sanction of the State Government; as such the departmental proceeding, which has been initiated against the respondent (original writ petitioner) Sant Lal Sahani, is bad in law and cannot be sustained in the eyes of law as there was no sanction. As such, this Court may not interfere with the same. 12. Heard, learned counsel for the appellants Mr. Manoj Tandon and learned counsel for the substituted respondents Mr. A.K. Sahani and perused the records. The main contention between the parties is that whether Rule 43 (b) of the Pension Rules has been adopted by the Bihar State Electricity Board or not and in absence thereof, the sanction of State Government is required or not? 13. Manoj Tandon and learned counsel for the substituted respondents Mr. A.K. Sahani and perused the records. The main contention between the parties is that whether Rule 43 (b) of the Pension Rules has been adopted by the Bihar State Electricity Board or not and in absence thereof, the sanction of State Government is required or not? 13. It is not disputed that Rule 43(b) of the Pension Rules has been framed by the State Government and the said Rule has been adopted by the Board. As has been held by the Apex Court in the case of the writ petitioner that the Rule 43 (b) of the Pension Rules will be deemed to be applicable to the employees of the Board with corresponding change in terms and expression like “State Government”, “Government Servant”, “Bihar Public Service Commission”. The Board will be deemed to be competent authority in matters of disciplinary action to be initiated against the retired employee. There is no provision under Electricity Supply Act, 1948, which contemplates sanction of the State Government as a condition precedence for initiation of disciplinary inquiry against the employee of the Board. Therefore, absence of sanction by the State Government is not fatal to initiate a disciplinary proceeding against the original writ petitioner Sant Lal Sahni (father of the substituted respondent nos. 1 & 2). 14. Under the aforesaid circumstance and the statutory provisions, it appears that the original writ petitioner, Sant Lal Sahni, has worked even after attaining the age of superannuation and being an officer has not demitted the office. As per Regulation No. 78 (ii) (a) of Bihar State Electricity Board Service Regulation, 1976 i.e. on the date the employee reached the age of superannuation, he shall demit office immediately on his own even without being asked or directed to do so. The Board has adopted Rule 43(b) of the Pension Rules framed by the State Government. Nothing has been shown before us that there was any illegality or irregularity in the departmental proceeding initiated by the Board. The principles governing interference in Departmental proceedings have been well settled by the decisions of the Apex Court. In the case of State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. v. S. Sree Rama Rao reported in AIR 1963 SC 1723 at para-7, it has been held:- “7. The principles governing interference in Departmental proceedings have been well settled by the decisions of the Apex Court. In the case of State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. v. S. Sree Rama Rao reported in AIR 1963 SC 1723 at para-7, it has been held:- “7. …The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence….” 15. Further, in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India & Ors. reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749 , the Apex Court has held in para 12 & 13 as follows: “12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. 13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented. The appellate authority has co-extensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [(1964) 4 SCR 781], this Court held at page 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence, reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.” 16. In the case of High Court of Judicature of Bombay through its Registrar v. Shashikant S. Patil & Anr. reported in (2000) 1 SCC 416 it was held that if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, then adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter for canvassing before the High Court in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. reported in (2000) 1 SCC 416 it was held that if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, then adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter for canvassing before the High Court in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the case of State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya reported in (2011) 4 SCC 584 , the Apex Court has held at para-7 as under:- “7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. Courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. (vide B. C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India 1995 (6) SCC 749 , Union of India vs. G. Gunayuthan - 1997 (7) SCC 463 , and Bank of India vs. Degala Suryanarayana - 1999 (5) SCC 762 , High Court of Judicature at Bombay vs. Shahsi Kant S Patil – 2001 (1) SCC 416). The same principle has been reiterated in the case of Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610 , the Apex Court has held in para-13 the parameters for interference with the disciplinary proceedings, which reads as under: “13. The same principle has been reiterated in the case of Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610 , the Apex Court has held in para-13 the parameters for interference with the disciplinary proceedings, which reads as under: “13. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) re-appreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” The Apex Court in the case of Allahabad Bank v. Krishna Narayan Tewari reported in (2017) 2 SCC 308 has held that the discrepancies in the evidence will not make it a case of no evidence. Once the evidence has been accepted by the departmental authority, in exercise of power of judicial review, the High Court could not interfere with the findings of facts recorded by reappreciating evidence. 17. In view of the discussions made above, we do not find any illegality or irregularity in the departmental proceeding initiated by the Board. Nothing has been argued before us with regard to violation of principles of natural justice or non-compliance of procedure in conduct of Departmental Proceeding, so as to vitiate the decision making process and make it amenable to judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution by this Court. 18. Accordingly, we set aside the order dated 09.12.2009 passed in W.P. (S) No. 1952 of 2003 by the learned Single Judge. 19. The appeal is hereby allowed.