ORDER VIJAY KUMAR SHUKLA, J. – Regard being had to the similitude of the issues involved in the above writ petitions, they are being disposed of by this common order. For the sake of convenience, the facts are noted from W. P. No. 18677/2019 (Gram Panchayat Singhoda, Janpad Panchayat Bairasia, Zila Panchayat Bhopal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and others). Following reliefs are sought in the said petition : – “(i) Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to set aside and quash impugned order dated 22-8-2019, passed by respondent No. 2 contained in Annexure P/1. (ii) That this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the respondent authorities concerned to consider and decide the representation of the petitioner by a speaking and reasoned order within a time bound frame. (iii) Any other writ, order or direction, which this Hon’ble Court deems fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, my also kindly be passed, in the interest of justice.” 2. By way of instant petition, petitioner is challenging the legality and validity of the impugned notification dated 22-8-2019 passed by the Collector, Bhopal whereby Gram Panchayat Singhoda has been merged with Gram Panchayat Peepakhedi by separating it from village Sahodara in exercise of the powers under sections 3 and 125 of the Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Raj Avam Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam, 1993 (in short, hereinafter referred as “Adhiniyam”). Challenge is made on the ground that the competent authority neither called objection before issuing final notification from Gram Panchayat nor granted an opportunity of hearing to the local habitants of the concerned Gram Panchayat. 3. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that despite the fact that objections were submitted by some of the local habitants to the competent authority but the same were not taken into consideration. It is further stated that the Gram Panchayat Singhoda and their Village is situated only at distance of 2 kilometers and there is no approach road from Village Sahodara to Village Singhoda. 4. Respondents have filed the reply and raised a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the petition. In view of the constitutional bar under Article 243(O) of the Constitution of India, they have also placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of State of U. P. and others vs. Pradhan Sangh Kshetra Samiti and others, (1995) Supp. 2 SCC 305. In view of the constitutional bar under Article 243(O) of the Constitution of India, they have also placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of State of U. P. and others vs. Pradhan Sangh Kshetra Samiti and others, (1995) Supp. 2 SCC 305. However, it was stated that the procedure prescribed under the provisions of section 3 and 125 was followed and the objections raised by the residents of the concerned Villages were considered by the Sub Divisional Officer and thereafter taking into consideration the comments of the said authority, the final notification has been issued by the Collector. The respondents have placed on record preliminary publications, the record relating to considerations and objections and thereafter issuance of the final notification. 5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. It is not in dispute that Collector is the competent authority under the provisions of sections 3 and 125 of the Adhiniyam. Apart from that, there is no allegation of mala fide on the part of the respondents. 6. The issue raised in this petition has been decided by Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of U. P. and others vs. Pradhan Sangh Kshetra Samiti and others, (1995) Supp. 2 SCC 305 wherein it is held : “45. What is more objectionable in the approach of the High Court is that although clause (a) of Article 243-O of the Constitution enacts a bar on the interference by the Courts in electoral matters including the questioning of the validity of any law relating to the delimitation of the constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies made or purported to be made under Article 243-K and the election to any Panchayat, the High Court has gone into the question of the validity of the delimitation of the constituencies and also the allotment of seats to them. We may, in this connection, refer to a decision of this Court in Meghraj Kothari vs. Delimitation Commission, (1967) 1 SCR 400 . In that case, a notification of the Delimitation Commission whereby a city which had been a general constituency was notified as reserved for the Scheduled Castes. This was challenged on the ground that the petitioner had a right to be a candidate for Parliament from the said constituency which had been taken away. In that case, a notification of the Delimitation Commission whereby a city which had been a general constituency was notified as reserved for the Scheduled Castes. This was challenged on the ground that the petitioner had a right to be a candidate for Parliament from the said constituency which had been taken away. This Court held that the impugned notification was a law relating to the delimitation of the constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies made under Article 327 of the Constitution, and that an examination of sections 8 and 9 of the Delimitation Commission Act showed that the matters therein dealt with were not subject to the scrutiny of any Court of law. There was a very good reason for such a provision because if the orders made under sections 8 and 9 were not to be treated as final, the result would be that any voter, if he so wished, could hold up an election indefinitely by questioning the delimitation of the constituencies from Court to Court. Although an order under section 8 or section 9 of the Delimitation Commission Act and published under section 10(1) of that Act is not part of an Act of Parliament, its effect is the same. Section 10(4) of that Act puts such an order in the same position as a law made by the Parliament itself which could only be made by it under Article 327. If we read Articles 243-C, 243-K and 243-O in place of Article 327 and sections 2(kk), 11-F and 12-BB of the Act in place of sections 8 and 9 of the Delimitation Act, 1950, it will be obvious that neither the delimitation of the Panchayat area nor of the constituencies in the said areas and the allotments of seats to the constituencies could have been challenged or the Court could have entertained such challenge except on the ground that before the delimitation, no objections were invited and no hearing was given. Even this challenge could not have been entertained after the notification for holding the elections was issued. The High Court not only entertained the challenge but has also gone into the merits of the alleged grievances although the challenge was made after the notification for the election was issued on 31st August, 1994.” 7. Even this challenge could not have been entertained after the notification for holding the elections was issued. The High Court not only entertained the challenge but has also gone into the merits of the alleged grievances although the challenge was made after the notification for the election was issued on 31st August, 1994.” 7. Similar challenge vide Public Interest Litigation came up for consideration in Pranay Gupta vs. State of M. P. and others, 2005(1) JLJ 295 wherein the relief was negatived. It was held by their Lordships : “22. To conclude, we have desisted from interfering in the matter in spite of the absurdity of notifications dated 3-7-2004 requiring objections to be filed by 8-7-2004, being published in the Gazette dated 9-7-2004, for the following reasons : (i) No resident of any of the villages/areas which are the subject-matter of the notifications under section 125(1) has challenged the notifications on the ground that he did not have notice of the proposals or on the ground that he did not have opportunity to file objections/suggestions. On the other hand several persons who had notice of the proposal on account of its display on the notice-boards of the Gram Panchayats and in conspicuous places of the affected areas, appear to have filed objections and those objections are stated to have been considered; (ii) The petitioner though espousing a public cause does not say nor in a position to assert that proposals were not published by affixture on the notice boards of the respective Gram Panchayats and in other conspicuous places, (iii) The Publication of the proposal by affixture at Gram Panchayat Notice Board and other conspicuous places, if properly done with sufficient time to file objections/suggestions, it would amount to substantial compliance in regard to the requirement of the publication; and (iv) the question whether there was such substantial compliance or not, in any given case, does not arise for our consideration in this Public Interest Litigation. The assumption of the petitioner that mere defect in publication of the proposals in the Gazette would be sufficient to nullify the entire process of effecting alterations under section 125(1) is however incorrect and baseless. The assumption of the petitioner that mere defect in publication of the proposals in the Gazette would be sufficient to nullify the entire process of effecting alterations under section 125(1) is however incorrect and baseless. There is, therefore, no need to direct re-initiation of the process of publication of proposal inviting objections/suggestions under the proviso to section 125(1), nor any ground to quash the notification under section 125(1), on the ground of defect in publication of the proposals in the Gazette.” 8. Thus, unless it is established that the objections were not invited and that no hearing has been given to the objectors, order of delimitation cannot be interfered with. However, in the case at hand, evident it is from cogent material document on record that before passing the impugned order Collector invited objections and after taking decision thereon issued the impugned notification. Further, no allegation of mala fide is alleged in the writ petition. 9. In view whereof we do not perceive any illegality in passing the impugned order as would warrant an indulgence. 10. Consequently, petition fails and is dismissed. No costs.