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2020 DIGILAW 295 (KAR)

Mehboob S/o Mohammed Gous Nippani v. Deputy Commissioner, Dharwad

2020-01-31

SURAJ GOVINDARAJ

body2020
ORDER : 1. The present writ petition has been filed challenging the order dated 15.02.2010 passed by 1st respondent in LNA/CR/176/201/2009-10, whereunder the 1st respondent had refused the de-alienation/diversion or conversion of land belonging to the petitioner under Section 95 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity) pursuant to an application by the petitioner seeking for conversion of agricultural land belonging to the petitioner to non-agricultural-industrial purposes. 2. The refusal made by 1st respondent is on the ground that there is no approach or access to the property belonging to the petitioner. 3. The petitioner states that the subject land comes within the urban developed area within the jurisdiction of Hubli-Dharwad Urban Development Authority. The said land finds place in Comprehensive Development Plan issued by the said authority and has been reserved for industrial purposes in the said Comprehensive Development Plan. The petitioner states that both his land as also the land belonging to his neighbour has an approach road of 12 meters width and infact the land belonging to his neighbour has been converted from agricultural to non-agricultural purposes on the basis of the said road. Therefore, non conversion of the land belonging to the petitioner is discriminating in nature. 4. It is submitted that the lands covered under Sy. Nos. 25, 26, 27 were renumbered as Block No. 50. Out of said land, the petitioner has acquired 4 acres 9 guntas in Block No. 51A-3 and 2 acres 3 guntas in Block No. 50A-3. 5. The petitioner contends that a perusal of Comprehensive Development Plan itself would disclose that there is an access to the erstwhile Sy. No. 27 and therefore, the application filed by the petitioner ought to have been allowed on that basis and the contention that the petitioner has no access to his land is misplaced. 6. The application having been filed on 02.05.2006, it is only on 29.03.2006 vide Annexure-H1 that 1st respondent informed the petitioner that the application cannot be considered since there was no approach road. The petitioner therefore requested the 1st respondent to reconsider the same. On 20.07.2006, 1st respondent refused to grant permission stating that only if the petitioner were to apply fresh application by providing a road connection, then the fresh application would be considered. 7. The petitioner therefore requested the 1st respondent to reconsider the same. On 20.07.2006, 1st respondent refused to grant permission stating that only if the petitioner were to apply fresh application by providing a road connection, then the fresh application would be considered. 7. The petitioner preferred an appeal before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as ‘KAT’ for brevity) in Appeal Nos. 919-920/2006. KAT was pleased to set aside the order dated 20.07.2006 of 1st respondent in No. LNA/CR/201/05-06 and LNA/CR/176/05-06 by holding that there is an approach road to the land in question and such refusal for conversion by 1st respondent was illegal. The KAT taking into consideration that the lands have been earmarked for industrial purposes directed the 6th respondent to pass appropriate orders for conversion of the land for industrial purposes in accordance with law. 8. In view of the said order of KAT, the petitioner submitted a fresh application on 20.01.2008 enclosing the orders of KAT and requested for necessary conversion of land for industrial purposes. There was no action taken with regard thereto. Hence, invoking Section 95(5) of the Act, the petitioner deeming it that the application for conversion has been allowed since the respondents had not rejected the application within the period of four months from the date of application approached the 1st respondent and sought for issuance of challan for payment of requisite conversion fee. Subsequently another application was filed by the petitioner on 10.09.2009. However on 15.02.2010, 1st respondent rejected the application of the petitioner once again stating that there is no approach road to the lands of the petitioner. Being aggrieved by the said order, petitioner is before this Court. 9. Sri. J.S. Shetty, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the order passed by 1st respondent is not only contrary to law but also contrary to the facts. Being aggrieved by the said order, petitioner is before this Court. 9. Sri. J.S. Shetty, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the order passed by 1st respondent is not only contrary to law but also contrary to the facts. 1st respondent has no option or discretion to refuse permission in view of Section 95(2) proviso of the Act, which is hereunder reproduced for easy reference: “95(2) If any occupant of land assessed or held for the purpose of agriculture wishes to divert such land or any part thereof to any other purpose, he shall [notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force] apply for permission to the Deputy Commissioner who may, subject to the provisions of this section and the rules made under this Act, refuse permission or grant it on such conditions as he may think fit.” 10. Relying on the above provision, Mr. Shetty contends that once the land comes under the Urban Development and becomes part of the developed area and an application has been made by the land owners for approval of the land for the same purpose as that contained in the Comprehensive Development Plan, the Deputy Commissioner cannot refuse the permission. He further contends that the finding of the 1st respondent that there is no access to the lands of the petitioner is also contrary to the finding already arrived at by the KAT in its order dated 20.07.2006 wherein the KAT has categorically held that there is an approach road to the petitioner’s land. Basing his arguments on the above, Sri. J.S. Shetty, learned counsel contends that the impugned Annexure-A is required to be quashed and the application filed by the petitioner is required to be allowed. 11. Learned HCGP appearing for the respondent Nos.1 and 2 submits on instructions that there is no access to the lands of the petitioner therefore the refusal of the 1st respondent to divert the land of the petitioner is proper and valid. 12. Having heard both the counsel and having perused the documents on record, the questions that would arise for determination of this Court is: (i) Whether the 1st respondent-Deputy Commissioner can refuse diversion of the land from agricultural to the purpose classified under the Comprehensive Development Plan? (ii) What is the time period in which the application of such conversion is required to be considered? (ii) What is the time period in which the application of such conversion is required to be considered? (iii) Can an authority who has not acted within the time period under Section 95(5), thereafter reject the application for conversion? (iv) What order? Point No. 1: 13. The Town and Country Planning Act being a special enactment has been promulgated for the purpose of proper and effective planning and development of urban areas and provides for formulation of Comprehensive Development Plan under Section 14 thereof by the concerned Urban Development Authority. In the present case, the concerned Urban Development Authority is the Hubballi-Dharwad Urban Development Authority namely respondent No. 3 herein. The respondent No. 3 has formulated the Comprehensive Development Plan 2021. The petitioner has produced a certified copy of the Planning District No. 13 issued on 24.09.2005 by the respondent No. 13 relating to the lands in question. A perusal of the said Comprehensive Development Plan establishes that his land covered under Sy. No. 26 and 27 have been marked in purple which denotes the classification of Industrial Land. Thus the lands having been classified for Industrial purpose, the petitioner applied for diversion of his agricultural land to Industrial purpose. Suffice to say that the application made by the petitioner was in terms of satisfied the requirements of Section 95(2) proviso which would not provide for any discretion on the part of the 1st respondent to refuse permission, if the permission sought for or diversion sought for is in accordance with the purpose of land use specified in respect of the land in the Comprehensive Development Plan. Thus, this Court holds that when such an application is made, the 1st respondent-Deputy Commissioner would not have any discretion to refuse diversion of the land to the same classification as that made in the Comprehensive Development Plan. Point No. 2: 14. Subsequent to the remand made by the Tribunal, the petitioner had submitted his application on 30.10.2008 for such diversion. The records indicate that there has been no correspondence thereafter and it is only after the petitioner approached the 1st respondent on 22.08.2009 seeking for details of the payments to be made towards conversion fine i.e. on 15.02.2010, the 1st respondent has rejected application of the petitioner. 15. Section 95(5) prescribes the time period in which the 1st respondent is required to act. 15. Section 95(5) prescribes the time period in which the 1st respondent is required to act. It specifically makes it clear that within a period of 4 months from the date of receipt of the application, if no action is taken by the Deputy Commissioner, the permission applied for is deemed to have been granted. Admittedly, the application having been made on 30.10.2008. No action was taken thereon until 15.02.2010, when the rejection order was passed. This order was definitely passed beyond the period of four months from the date of application. 16. There is reason and purpose for fixing time lines under an enactment including that under Section 95(5). It is not expected for the general public to apply for and wait for the officers to act and perform their duties as per their own time lines, if at all the authority concerned and in this case the 1st respondent had any queries, classifications etc. the same ought to have been raised within that period of four months as prescribed under Section 95(5). No action having been taken more so when the application was filed in pursuance of a remand order of the Tribunal as indicated above. The application of the petitioner is deemed to have been allowed on the expiry of four months of the date of application i.e. by 28.02.2009. Point No. 3: 17. Once the prescribed time of four months under Section 95(5) is over, and no action is taken by the authorities within the said period of four months. Subsequent thereto there is no power or authority available with the respondent No. 1 either to rejection or even seek for any clarification thereafter. The deeming provision comes into operation and respondent No. 1 becomes functus officio, except to complete the formalities pursuant to such deemed conversion. In the above circumstances, order dated 15.02.2010 passed by the 1st respondent after the period prescribed by the act and as on that date the 1st respondent not having the power or jurisdiction to reject the application filed by the petitioner, the order dated 15.02.2010 impugned herein is not sustainable and is liable to be quashed. 18. In view of the findings as regards the above points for consideration, the impugned order dated 15.02.2010 of the 1st respondent-Deputy Commissioner is quashed. 18. In view of the findings as regards the above points for consideration, the impugned order dated 15.02.2010 of the 1st respondent-Deputy Commissioner is quashed. It is held that the application filed by the petitioner being in accordance with the classification of lands and the Comprehensive Development Plan not having been rejected within the statutory period of four months as prescribed under Section 95(5) of the Act is deemed to have been allowed on 28.02.2009. The 1st respondent-Deputy Commissioner is directed to issue necessary challan and collect the conversion fee as applicable on 28.02.2009 from the petitioner. The said challan shall be issued to the petitioner within a period of four weeks from the receipt of certified copy of this order. The petitioner is also permitted to furnish a certified copy of the order on the 1st respondent-Deputy Commissioner with a request to do the needful. 19. Accordingly, the petition is allowed as per the above directions.