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2020 DIGILAW 302 (UTT)

Ravindra Singh v. State Of Uttarakhand

2020-08-10

RAVINDRA MAITHANI

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JUDGMENT Ravindra Maithani, J. - Petitioners have filed the instant petition for quashing the charge-sheet dated 24.11.2015 and cognizance and summoning order dated 09.02.2016, passed in Criminal Case No. 565 of 2016, State of Uttarakhand Vs. Ravindra Singh and others, by the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dehradun (for short "the case"). 2. Heard learned counsel for the parties through Video Conferencing and perused the record. 3. Facts, necessary for disposal of the instant petition briefly stated are as hereunder:- Respondent no. 2 filed an FIR on 06.06.2015, under Sections 376, 354, 294 and 504 IPC against petitioner no.1 Ravindra Singh and another. According to it, both petitioner no. 1 and respondent no.2 were engaged on 07.07.2014. But, since thereafter, respondent no.2 was tortured and harassed for not giving enough jewellery at the time of engagement. On 19.12.2014, according to the FIR, the petitioner no.1 Ravindra Singh persuaded the respondent no.2 to come and meet him. Respondent no.2 was reluctant, but, he was threatened to break the marriage. Therefore, both agreed to stay at a place called Srinagar, and in the night, petitioner no.1 Ravindra Singh established physical relations with respondent no.2. Thereafter, petitioner no.1 started black-mailing respondent no.2 and had sexual relations with her on multiple occasions. Consequently, the conduct of petitioner no. 1 Ravindra Singh changed, he and his family members started ignoring her. After investigation in the matter, charge-sheet was submitted and proceedings of the case were instituted. 4. On 09.02.2016, petitioner no.1 Ravindra Singh has been summoned to answer accusations under Sections 376, 504 IPC and 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act. 1961. Respondent no.2 Dhuma Devi was summoned under Sections 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Aggrieved by it the instant petition has been filed. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that FIR is delayed; respondent no.2 reached Srinagar on her own. The relations were not under any compulsion, they were consensual. It is argued that both the parties have married on 06.07.2015, and now, whatever is the dispute, it may be in the category of matrimonial discord; there is no case made out against the petitioners. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent no.2 would submit that the petitioner no.1 exploited the respondent no.2 under the pretext of marriage. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent no.2 would submit that the petitioner no.1 exploited the respondent no.2 under the pretext of marriage. For the first time, after the engagement on 19.12.2014, the petitioner no.1 Ravindra Singh called the respondent no.2 at a place called Srinagar and forcibly established physical relations with her and continued it thereafter. Subsequently, he ignored her. It is argued that when FIR was filed just to save himself from the clutches of law, the petitioner no.1 Ravindra Singh married the respondent no.2, but, he had no intention to continue the relationship. He further started ignoring the respondent no.2. Learned counsel would argue that the crux of such matter is intention at the inception. In the instant case, it is argued that the intention of petitioner no.1 Ravindra Singh since inception was not good. He just wanted to exploit sexually the respondent no.2 and that is what he did. 7. Learned counsel place reliance on the principles of law as laid down in the case of Anurag Soni vs. State of Chattisgarh, (2019) 13 SCC 1 and especially para 10.3 in which Hon'ble Court referred the judgment in the case of Yedla Srinivasa Rao Vs. State of A.P., (2006) 11 SCC 615 . In the case of Yedla Srinivasa Rao (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court inter alia held as hereunder: "9. The question in the present case is whether this conduct of the accused apparently falls under any of the six descriptions of Section 375 IPC as mentioned above. It is clear that the prosecutrix had sexual intercourse with the accused on the representation made by the accused that he would marry her. This was a false promise held out by the accused. Had this promise not been given perhaps, she would not have permitted the accused to have sexual intercourse. Therefore, whether this amounts to a consent or the accused obtained a consent by playing fraud on her. Section 90 of the Penal Code says that if the consent has been given under fear of injury or a misconception of fact, such consent obtained, cannot be construed to be a valid consent. Section 90 reads as under............" 8. Therefore, whether this amounts to a consent or the accused obtained a consent by playing fraud on her. Section 90 of the Penal Code says that if the consent has been given under fear of injury or a misconception of fact, such consent obtained, cannot be construed to be a valid consent. Section 90 reads as under............" 8. Referring to para 10 in the case of Yedla Srinivasa Rao (supra), learned counsel for the respondent no.2 would submit that, in fact, in the instant case, it is established that right from the beginning, the intention of petitioner no.1 Ravindra Singh was not honest and he kept on promising that he would marry the respondent no.2. 9. Learned State counsel would submit that he has nothing to argue because respondent no.2 has herself admitted that she and petitioner no. 1 are married now. 10. There is no dispute to the principles of law that under Section 90 of the Indian Penal Code, a consent should be free from any interference internal or external; a person should have a choice to weigh the consequences and then take conscious decision, if it is so, the consent is free, if it is not so the consent must be held to be polluted by influences or misconception under which it is obtained. 11. In the instant case, what is being argued on behalf of the respondent no.2 is that under the promise of marriage, the petitioner no.1 Ravindra Singh established sexual relations with her. But, this whole argument falls down because according to respondent no.2 herself, she and petitioner no.1 married on 06.07.2015. If under the promise of marriage, relations were established, the promise has been fulfilled by petitioner no. 1. He married respondent no.2. Now, if the parties still have some dispute between them that does not relate back to the consent which was given by the respondent no.2, for the first time, when she established relations with petitioner no.1 Ravindra Singh. It may fall, in some category of matrimonial discord, if any. But, it cannot be said that the consent which was given by respondent no.2, for the first time, was in any manner influenced or were given under misconception of fact. Therefore, this Court is of the view that, in fact, no case is made out in the instant case and the instant petition deserves to be allowed. 12. But, it cannot be said that the consent which was given by respondent no.2, for the first time, was in any manner influenced or were given under misconception of fact. Therefore, this Court is of the view that, in fact, no case is made out in the instant case and the instant petition deserves to be allowed. 12. The petition is allowed. The charge-sheet dated 24.11.2015 and cognizance and summoning order dated 09.02.2016, passed in the case, are set aside.