JUDGMENT : The second appeal is filed by the unsuccessful defendant in the suit. The suit is filed for specific performance of agreement of sale dated 01.12.1992 directing the defendant to execute the sale deed infavour of the plaintiff in respect of the suit schedule property after receiving balance sale consideration of Rs.35,000/-. 2. The defendant is the owner of the suit schedule house property bearing door number 24/78 situated in block no.24 in Chilakaluripet town. Inview of the offer made by the defendant to sell the same to the plaintiff, the plaintiff agreed to purchase the same for an amount of Rs.1,80,000/-. Considering the negotiations, the defendant had executed a registered agreement of sale under document no.3704 dated 01.12.1992 infavour of the plaintiff by receiving an amount of Rs.1,45,000/-as part payment of the consideration and the balance of sale consideration of Rs.35,000/-is to be paid on or before 31.3.1993. The defendant has agreed to execute the sale deed on receipt of balance sale consideration at the cost of the plaintiff and further agreed to deliver both the documents relating to title before the above said date. After securing the balance consideration by the plaintiff, called upon the defendant to execute a sale deed infavour of the plaintiff, as he was ready with the balance sale consideration. Despite that, the defendant, for the reasons best known to him, has been postponing the execution of the sale deed. Hence for breach of agreement, this suit is filed. 3. As per the averments in the written statement, the defendant never executed the said agreement of sale as alleged in the plaint and the agreement of sale is forged document and it was fabricated for the purpose of the present litigation. The defendant has no right in the suit schedule property and further contended that the defendant’s father has executed the same on 25.4.1981 which is his last will. As per the said will Majeti Sampoornamma, mother of the defendant is the absolute owner of the schedule property. The said Sampoornamma has executed hypothecation deed infavour of the Vijaya bank, Chilakaluripet, as guarantee to the debt of the defendant’s company. So this defendant has no manner of right or title to the suit schedule property. As per the said will Majeti Sampoornamma, mother of the defendant is the absolute owner of the schedule property. The said Sampoornamma has executed hypothecation deed infavour of the Vijaya bank, Chilakaluripet, as guarantee to the debt of the defendant’s company. So this defendant has no manner of right or title to the suit schedule property. And the plaintiff has no capacity to pay earnest money of Rs.1,45,000/-and to purchase the property of Rs.1,80,000/-and he further stated that the plaintiff styling himself as an Auditor was collecting huge amount from the parties and cheating the public therein. Hence there are certain criminal cases pending against the plaintiff under section 420 IPC. The plaintiff has also acted as an auditor to the defendant’s company. He obtained the signatures of defendant on white papers and also on stamp papers for submitting returns to the authorities with an evil idea in his mind to grab the property of the plaintiff. Hence the said agreement of sale cannot be enforceable as the defendant has no manner of right over the schedule property. Thus the suit is liable to be dismissed with exemplary costs. 4. Basing on the said pleadings of the respective parties, the lower court has formulated the following issues: (1) Whether the agreement of sale dated 01.12.1992 is true, valid and binding on the defendant? 2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of specific performance against the defendant as sought for? 3) To what relief? 5. To answer the said issues PW1 to PW3 are examined and Ex.A1 to A3 are marked on behalf of the plaintiff and DW1 is examined and no documents are marked on behalf of the defendant. 6. The trial court while examining Ex.A1 agreement, found that the attestors of the said document was Majeti Ratnam (wife of defendant), Jarugula Mallikarjunarao and J.Srinivasa Rao a document writer. The said J.Srinivasa Rao was examined as PW2, the second attestor Jarugula Mallikarjuna Rao was examined as PW3 and it was admitted by Majeti Ratnam that the first attestor of Ex.A1 agreement of sale is none other than the wife of the defendant herein and the signature and thumb impression of the executants were obtained on the reverse of the first page of Ex.A1 at the time of registration. PW1 to PW3 supported the schedule property for Rs.1,80,000/-on 01.12.1992 under agreement of sale by paying Rs.1,45,000/-as advance. PW1 to PW3 supported the schedule property for Rs.1,80,000/-on 01.12.1992 under agreement of sale by paying Rs.1,45,000/-as advance. PW1 deposed that he got bank account and that there is documentary evidence with him to show that he was in possession of Rs.1,45,000/-by the date of Ex.A1 and he has sold away his landed property, house property and tractor for Rs.3,00,000/-prior to the date of Ex.A1. Apart from that he has also sold away cotton produce prior to the date of Ex.A1 and thus he was having Rs.3,00,000/-by the date of Ex.A1. And thus, it will not be considered that the defendant is not challenging the above facts, so the evidence of PW1 on that aspect is acceptable. 7. During the course of further examination PW1 stated that Majeti Ratnam, the first attestor of Ex.A1, is the wife of the defendant. And he denied the suggestion that Majeti Ratnam did not attest Ex.A1, agreement of sale and the signature of first attestor on Ex.A1, is not that of the signature of Majeti Ratnam. It is an admitted fact that Ex.A1 is a registered document and the defendant did not take any steps to send Ex.A1 to Expert to prove that his wife Ratnam did not attest the Ex.A1 agreement of sale. Infact the defendant has not given any explanation as to how a signature on the reverse of first page was found and he was also not given any explanation about the thumb impression obtained at the time of registration. And at the time of evidence, the defendant has admitted in his evidence that the signature of executant found on the reverse side of Ex.A1 document is that of his signature and it was obtained when his signatures were obtained, at the end of the sheets. 8. Further he did not give any explanation for the thumb mark obtained at the time of registration. Thus, the above facts will give rise to any amount of doubt in his defense. Apart from that PW2 and PW3 the scribe and attestor have supported the evidence of PW1 on execution of Ex. A1 by the defendant and passing of the advance amount of Rs.1,45,000/-to the defendant from the plaintiff. It is no doubt that the independent witnesses have no interest towards the plaintiff or inimical towards the defendant. 9. Apart from that PW2 and PW3 the scribe and attestor have supported the evidence of PW1 on execution of Ex. A1 by the defendant and passing of the advance amount of Rs.1,45,000/-to the defendant from the plaintiff. It is no doubt that the independent witnesses have no interest towards the plaintiff or inimical towards the defendant. 9. Further the defendant has stated that he has no right in the schedule property and that it belongs to his mother on account of a will executed by his father. Except the said assertion he has not chosen to file the said alleged will in support of his case, he has not chosen to examine his mother i.e. Majeti Sampoornamma. So, there is no material available on record for defendant to show that the schedule property does not belong to him. Apart from that he has not placed any material to show that the plaintiff has acted as an auditor to the defendant’s company. Hence the evidence of DW1 is not acceptable as it was not consistent and corroborated by the material evidence to support his defense. The evidence of PW1 to PW3 in suit transaction is acceptable as it was sustainable and corroborative to one another and there was no doubtful circumstance to disbelieve their evidence. By considering the entire record and evidence, the suit is decreed with costs for specific performance of agreement of sale dated 01.12.1992 infavour of the plaintiff and against the defendant. 10. As against the said orders, the defendant has filed the first appeal A.S.No.108 of 2004 on the file of the X Additional District Judge, Narasaraopet on the following grounds. (i) The trial court ought not have given much weight to the financial capacity of the plaintiff for advancing the amount under Ex.A1. (ii) The trial court failed to observe that PW1 failed to secure the balance sale consideration within the stipulated date of Ex.A1 sale agreement and the same was clearly deposed by PW1 in mis-chief, which shows that PW1 is not ready and willing continuously to perform his part of the contract? 11. Considering the above grounds, the appellate court has framed the following issues. 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of specific performance? 2. Whether the judgment and decree of the trial court is suffering from any illegalities and irregularities and liable to be set aside or modified? 3. 11. Considering the above grounds, the appellate court has framed the following issues. 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of specific performance? 2. Whether the judgment and decree of the trial court is suffering from any illegalities and irregularities and liable to be set aside or modified? 3. To what relief? 12. Considering the contentions of both the parties and re-appreciation of entire evidence, the said appeal also dismissed. The main contention in the appeal of the defendant is that Ex.A1 registered sale agreement is forged and fabricated and came to existence in the circumstances stated in his written statement. The defendant contended that the plaintiff has no capacity to pay Rs.1,45,000/-and to purchase the property for Rs.1,80,000/-. Even according to the defendant, the plaintiff is working as sales tax auditor in Chilakaluripet Town which is a commercial center and it may not be difficult for a sales tax auditor to purchase property of Rs.1,80,000/-during the year 1992. Infact the defendant’s wife herself has attested Ex.A1 sale agreement and the defendant had also admitted his thumb impression on the reverse side of Ex.A1 which is proving the due registration of Ex.A1 sale agreement. When the defendant’s signature is there on Ex. A1 sale agreement and also the signature of wife of defendant as attestor, he could have examined his wife as witness when he is disputing the signature of his wife in Ex.A1. And it is noted that any person connected with the contention of the defendant were not examined by the defendant. Hence the lower appellate court came to the conclusion that Ex.A1 sale agreement was executed and got registered by the defendant after having received the advance sale consideration of Rs.1,45,000/-. And with the concurrence of the findings of the decree and judgment of the trial court and came to conclusion that the trial judge has discussed the oral and documentary evidence in correct and perspective manner by allowing the said suit. Hence the appeal suit is dismissed. 13. As against, the present second appeal is filed with the following substantial questions of law. 1. Hence the appeal suit is dismissed. 13. As against, the present second appeal is filed with the following substantial questions of law. 1. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the courts below have committed a grave legal error in not taking into consideration that the respondent/plaintiff did not issue any notice prior to suit demanding the appellant to execute a registered sale deed, which is mandatory under Section 16(c) of Specific Relief Act, which is sufficient for dismissing the suit of the plaintiff for specific performance? 2. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the courts below were wrong in passing a decree for specific performance of agreement of sale infavour of the respondent as a mater of course by ignoring the legal position that the grant of relief of specific performance is always discretionary under Section 20 of Specific Relief Act and the courts are not bound to grant the same in all cases? 14. To support the questions of law, the counsel has relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh in between Baddam Prathap Reddy v. Chennadi Jalapathi Reddy and another, 2008(5) ALD 200 , wherein it is observed that: “This court, however, hastens to add that, in law, oral demand by the buyer of immovable property, as such, being sufficient compliance with requirements of Form Nos.47 and 48 cannot be totally ruled out. In such circumstances, the proof of oral demand should be strong and unimpeachable and mere allegation, that too, in a passing manner would not be sufficient compliance with the requirement of law. This aspect of the mater, however, has to be gone into a little deeper in an appropriate case, but it would be sufficient to leave the issue with the observations as made hereinabove. A study of four decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the appellant would show that if the requirement of sending a communication or notice demanding execution of sale deed is not complied with prior to filing of the suit, it would weaken the case of plaintiff for enforcing specific performance of contract in respect of immovable property. It a notice is issued by the plaintiff, it itself would – to a large extent, might lead to an inference that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. It a notice is issued by the plaintiff, it itself would – to a large extent, might lead to an inference that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. Mere allegation that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract would not be sufficient for enforcement of the contract. In Pushparani S.Sundaram’s case it was held: …Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act requires that not only there be a plea of readiness and willingness but it has to be proved so. It is not in dispute that except for a plea there is no other evidence on record to prove the same except the two circumstances. It is true that mere absence of a plaintiff coming in the witness box by itself may not be a fact to conclude that he was not ready and willing in a given case as erroneously concluded by the High Court. But in the present case, not only the plaintiff has not come in the witness box, but not even sent any communication or notice to the defendant about his willingness to perform his part of the contract. In fact no evidence is led to prove the same. It is no doubt that the ratio laid down is that the suit for Specific performance must comply requirements prescribed under section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act and section 47 and 48 of appendix ‘a’ of CPC and averments should be proved. 15. But in the instant case, the contention of the plaintiff in the suit is that he repeatedly requested the defendant to receive the balance sale consideration of Rs.35,000/-and to register the sale document. He accepted that he has not issued any notice requesting the defendant to comply the conditions of the sale agreement. And there was no denial by the defendant, that he was never requested by the plaintiff, to comply the conditions in the agreement. His main focus in the written statement itself is that the plaintiff has no financial capacity to purchase the property for a value of Rs.1,80,000/-apart from denying the execution of Ex.A1 and when he has not denied about the oral demand made by the plaintiff, now he is not entitled to contend, that the plaintiff has not complied section 16(c) of Specific Relief Act. The ratio laid in the above judgment is not applicable to the facts of the present case. And there is no illegality, in the decree and judgment of both trail court and first appellate court, I see no ground more specifically no substantial question of law in present appeal. 16. Alternatively, the appellant has relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in between Satya Jain (dead) through Lrs and others vs. Anis Ahmed Rushidie (dead) through Lrs and others, (2013) 8 SCC 131 wherein it was observed that: “The discretion to direct specific performance of an agreement and that too after elapse of a long period of time, undoubtedly, has to be exercised on sound, reasonable, rational and acceptable principles. The parameters for the exercise of discretion vested by Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 cannot be entrapped within any precise expression of language and the contours thereof will always depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The ultimate guiding test would be the principles of fairness and reasonableness as may be dictated by the peculiar facts of any given case, which features the experienced judicial mind can perceive without any real difficulty. It must however be emphasized that efflux of time and escalation of price of property, by itself, cannot be a valid ground to deny the relief of specific performance. Such a view has been consistently adopted by this Court. By way of illustration opinions rendered in P.S. Ranakrishna Reddy v. M.K. Bhagyalakshmi[14] and more recently in Narinderjit Singh v. North Star Estate Promoters Ltd.[15] may be usefully recapitulated. The twin inhibiting factors identified above if are to be read as a bar to the grant of a decree of specific performance would amount to penalizing the plaintiffs for no fault on their part; to deny them the real fruits of a protracted litigation wherein the issues arising are being answered in their favour. From another perspective it may also indicate the inadequacies of the law to deal with the long delays that, at times, occur while rendering the final verdict in a given case. From another perspective it may also indicate the inadequacies of the law to deal with the long delays that, at times, occur while rendering the final verdict in a given case. The aforesaid two features, at best, may justify award of additional compensation to the vendor by grant of a price higher than what had been stipulated in the agreement which price, in a given case, may even be the market price as on date of the order of the final Court. Having given our anxious consideration to all relevant aspects of the case we are of the view that the ends of justice would require this court to intervene and set aside the findings and conclusions recorded by the High Court of Delhi in R.F.A.No.11/1984 and to decree the suit of the plaintiffs for specific performance of the agreement dated 22.12.1970. We are of the further view that the sale deed that will now have to be executed by the defendants in favour of the plaintiffs will be for the market price of the suit property as on the date of the present order. As no material, whatsoever is available to enable us to make a correct assessment of the market value of the suit property as on date we request the learned trial judge of the High Court of Delhi to undertake the said exercise with such expedition as may be possible in the prevailing facts and circumstances” 17. In view of the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the said judgment and after considering the relevant facts of the present case, I am of the opinion that the sale deed has to be executed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff will be on par with the market value of the suit property as on the date of the execution of the sale deed. Accordingly, the appeal is disposed off. 18. In view of the disposal of the above second appeal, the miscellaneous applications if any, which are pending, are also closed. No costs.