JUDGMENT : Heard the parties. 2. Petitioner has approached this Court with a prayer for quashing the orders of Suspension dated 09.05.2019 (Annexure-6) and 06.08.2019 (Annexure-10) as well as the entire disciplinary proceeding initiated vide Charge Memo dated 26.07.2019 (Annexure-8) as well as subsequent appointment of Inquiring Authority vide Order dated 02.09.2019 (Annexure-14) and Notice of Inquiry issued by Inquiring Authority vide Memorandum dated 06.09.2019 (Annexure-15). Petitioner has further prayed that after quashing of the aforesaid orders, petitioner may be granted all consequential benefits. 3. The facts of the case in short is that petitioner was appointed by the Executive Council vide letter dated 18.11.2011 and was serving as Medical Officer under the respondent-University. It is the case of the petitioner that he was discharged from service of the respondent-University vide letter dated 16.09.2013, without giving any reason. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred W.P.(S). No. 6163 of 2013 before this Court challenging the order of discharge and this Court, after hearing the parties, allowed that writ petition holding the action of the respondents as illegal and unlawful and directed the respondents to reinstate the petitioner. Thereafter, respondent-University vide its letter dated 23.02.2016, reinstated the petitioner treating the period between the date of removal and the date of reinstatement as on duty for all purpose and the petitioner was allowed full pay and allowances for that period. It is the further case of the petitioner that inspite of the aforesaid letter, when respondents withheld the salary of the petitioner w.e.f. June, 2018, the petitioner again preferred W.P.(S). No. 3449 of 2018, wherein this Court vide order dated 11.09.2018, passed an interim order directing the respondents to pay the current salary of the petitioner. In view of repeated harassment and ill treatment, finding no other way petitioner instituted an online FIR before the SC/ST Police Station, Ranchi bearing No. 03/2019, dated 20.02.2019, against the respondent Nos. 2 & 3. Thereafter, on 09.05.2019, an order dated 09.05.2019 was issued by respondent No. 3, stating that a disciplinary proceeding is contemplated against the petitioner and subsequently, the respondent No. 2 put the petitioner under suspension by exercising his powers conferred under Statute 25(1) read with Section 11(3) of Central Universities Act, 2009 and Rule 19(1) of Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. Subsequently, vide order dated 23.05.2019, respondent-University issued direction for payment of subsistence allowance to the petitioner. Subsequently, vide order dated 23.05.2019, respondent-University issued direction for payment of subsistence allowance to the petitioner. On 26.07.2019, the memorandum of charges was served upon the petitioner and it was directed to the petitioner to submit his written explanation in defence within 10 days from the date of receipt of memorandum of charges. The petitioner, vide his letter dated 01.08.2019 requested the respondent to amend the memorandum of charges dated 26.07.2019, since as per CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, 15 days’ time is desirable for submitting the reply in respect of memorandum of charges. Thereafter, on 06.08.2019, under the signature of respondent No. 3, another order was issued mentioning that disciplinary proceedings is yet to complete and as such, the respondent No. 2, in exercise of powers conferred upon him under Statute 25(1) of Central Universities Act, 2009 read with rule 19(6) of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 and on recommendation of a review committee, has further extended the suspension of the petitioner for another period of 180 days. Aggrieved by the aforesaid action of the respondents, the petitioner has preferred this writ application. 4. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, submits that the respondents are acting in a vindictive and biased manner against the petitioner. The order of suspension visits the employee with serious civil consequences and loss of reputation and prestige and monetary loss and hence, cannot be passed without following the principle of natural justice and without application of mind. Learned counsel further argues that the respondent No. 3, who has passed the order of suspension of the petitioner is not having the jurisdiction to issue order under the Statute 25(1) of the Central Universities Act, 2009. The Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 is not applicable in the matter of disciplinary action/ suspension against the employee of the University, when Section 26(f) of the Central Universities Act, specifically speaks with regard to disciplinary action/ suspension. Learned counsel further argues that the Executive Council/ Disciplinary Authority has not issued any orders under CCS Pension Rules, 1972 for institution of departmental proceedings against the petitioner and to hold an inquiry thereto by the Inquiring Authority. The respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have acted maliciously with an oblique motive, in order to wreck vengeance against the present petitioner. Learned counsel further argues that the Executive Council/ Disciplinary Authority has not issued any orders under CCS Pension Rules, 1972 for institution of departmental proceedings against the petitioner and to hold an inquiry thereto by the Inquiring Authority. The respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have acted maliciously with an oblique motive, in order to wreck vengeance against the present petitioner. The order of suspension which has been signed by the Registrar of the University is not valid in the eyes of law under the Statute 25(1) of the Central Universities Act, 2009 and as such, the respondents, who are the creators of the Statute cannot act beyond the four corners of the Central Universities Act, 2009. To buttress his arguments, learned counsel places heavy reliance on the following judgments: (I) State of Punjab Vs. V.K. Khana & Ors. [ (2001) 2 SCC 330 ]; (II) Abdur Rasheed Vs. Govt. of India [W.P.(C). Nos. 21883 and 25651 of 2013]; (III) Tea Board and Ors. Vs. Rasamoy Roy and Ors. [G.A. No. 1997 of 2004]. 5. Per contra, counter-affidavit has been filed. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents vehemently opposes the contention of the petitioner and argues that for putting the petitioner under suspension and initiating the departmental proceeding, the principle of natural justice is not required to be followed. A departmental proceeding has already been initiated and the memo of charge has been served upon the petitioner, but despite several dates fixed, the petitioner is not appearing in the departmental proceeding. Since the petitioner has committed misconduct, he is required to face the departmental proceeding. Learned counsel further argues that the order of suspension and initiation of departmental proceeding, both are within the jurisdiction of the Authority, who has passed the order. The appointment of Enquiring Authority is also within the jurisdiction of the answering respondents and as such, the respondents have neither acted maliciously nor with an oblique motive and the allegation that respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have played fraud upon the power, is absolutely baseless. 6. Be that as it may, on a consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case as also the submissions made across the bar, this Court is of the considered opinion that case of the present petitioner needs consideration. 2 and 3 have played fraud upon the power, is absolutely baseless. 6. Be that as it may, on a consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case as also the submissions made across the bar, this Court is of the considered opinion that case of the present petitioner needs consideration. The issues to be decided in this writ petition are as follows: (I) Whether the order of suspension in contemplation of disciplinary proceeding is at all sustainable in the eyes of law? (II) Whether the Vice Chancellor has the power under Statute 25(1) read with Section 11(3) of the Central Universities Act, 2009 and Rule 10(1) of the CCS Rules, 1965 for initiating departmental proceeding? (III) Whether the charge memo and initiation of departmental proceeding are at all sustainable in view of several judicial pronouncements rendered by this Court as well as by the Hon’ble Apex Court? 7. The order of suspension dated 09.05.2019 issued by the Registrar with the approval of Vice Chancellor is wholly without jurisdiction on the ground that the suspension order must be issued by Appointing Authority which is admittedly, the Executive Council which is apparent from appointment letter dated 18.11.2010. The said letter reads as under: “On the recommendation of the Selection Committee the Executive Council of the University in its 9th meeting held on 14.11.2011 has been pleased to appoint you as Medical Officer of Central University of Jharkhand.” 8. The Registrar after the getting the approval of the Vice Chancellor had issued the Order of Suspension but as per Statute 25(1) of the Act, they are not the Appointing Authority of the petitioner and as such, order of suspension is wholly without jurisdiction and fit to be quashed and set aside. The Hon’ble High Court of Kerala, in case of Abdur Rasheed vs.. Government of India (W.P.C. Nos. 21883 and 25651 of 2013) has held that: “21. …The 1st respondent is not the authority to pass orders of suspension and to issue it on the approval of the Visitor. The Visitor exercises his power vested on him under the provisions of the Central Universities Act, 2009. The 1st respondent has no role in discharging the duties of the Visitor by the President of India. …The 1st respondent is not the authority to pass orders of suspension and to issue it on the approval of the Visitor. The Visitor exercises his power vested on him under the provisions of the Central Universities Act, 2009. The 1st respondent has no role in discharging the duties of the Visitor by the President of India. Therefore, the orders of the 1st respondent issued in the name of the President or in his capacity as Joint Secretary to the Government of India are without any authority and hence, unsustainable.” 9. Admittedly, Vice Chancellor has power under Section 11(3) of the Act which can be exercised when unforeseeable event has taken place. It has to be exercised sparingly. However, nothing has been brought on record to show that unforeseeable or unpredictable event has taken place on 09.05.2019, compelling the Vice Chancellor to exercise option or powers under Section 11(3) of the Act and as such, exercise of power under Section 11(3) was illegal. Argument of the learned counsel for the respondents that since Registrar is the Appointing Authority as the appointment letter has been issued by him and as such, he was competent to issue order of suspension under Statute 25(1) of the Act, is not acceptable to this Court on the ground that Statute 25(1) of the Act mandates that suspension order is required to be issued only by Appointing Authority i.e. the Executive Council and that too in writing and as such, order of suspension and the approval of Vice Chancellor on the same, is without any authority and hence, unsustainable. Regarding applicability of the CCS Rules, 1965, the same has no application in Central Universities in view of ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court, in case of Suchitra Mitra & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors. (Writ Petition No. 4178 of 2015). Para-23 of the said judgment is quoted herein below: “23. It appears that the letter dated 7 August, 2014 has placed reliance on certain orders issued by the Government of India which provide that the Law Ministry has advised that an officer appointed to perform the current duties of an appointment can exercise administrative or financial powers vested in the full-fledged incumbent of the post but he cannot exercise statutory powers. It is in continuation of the letter dated 7 August 2014 that the subsequent communication dated 9 October 2014 has been sent by the Ministry of Human Resources and Development to the Vice Chancellors of all the Central Universities that an Acting Vice-Chancellor of the University cannot make permanent appointment. As the CCS (CCA) Rules have no application to Central Universities, any reliance placed on Rule 12(2) of the Rules or the Government Orders referred to will have no application.” From perusal of the records it appears that Enquiry Officer was appointed even before issuance of charge memo which clearly speaks of malice and biasness at the instance of the respondents. Though the same was countered by the respondents’ counsel but it is evident that Enquiry Officer and Presenting Officer were appointed on 03.06.2019 even before initiation of disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner by issuing charge memo dated 26.07.2019. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of State of Punjab vs. V. K. Khanna & Ors., reported in (2001) 2 SCC 330 , has held that: “33. While it is true that justifiability of the charges at the stage of initiating a disciplinary proceeding cannot possibly be delved into by any court pending inquiry but it is equally well settled that in the event there is an element of malice or malafide motive involved in the matter of issue of a charge-sheet or the concerned authority is so biased that the inquiry would be a mere farcical show and the conclusions are well known then and in that event law courts are otherwise justified in interfering at the earliest stage so as to avoid the harassment and humiliation of a public official. It is not a question of shielding any misdeed that the Court would be anxious to do, it is the due process of law which should permeate in the society and in the event of there being any affectation of such process of law that law courts ought to rise up to the occasion and the High Court in the contextual facts has delved into the issue on that score. On the basis of the findings no exception can be taken and that has been the precise reason as to why this Court dealt with the issue in so great a detail so as to examine the judicial propriety at this stage of the proceedings. 34. On the basis of the findings no exception can be taken and that has been the precise reason as to why this Court dealt with the issue in so great a detail so as to examine the judicial propriety at this stage of the proceedings. 34. The High Court while delving into the issue went into the factum of announcement of the Chief Minister in regard to appointment of an Inquiry Officer to substantiate the frame of mind of the authorities and thus depicting bias - What bias means has already been dealt with by us earlier in this judgment, as such it does not require any further dilation but the factum of announcement has been taken note of as an illustration to a mindset viz.: the inquiry shall proceed irrespective of the reply- Is it an indication of a free and fair attitude towards the officer concerned? The answer cannot possibly be in the affirmative. It is well settled in Service Jurisprudence that the authority concerned has to apply its mind upon receipt of reply to the charge-sheet or show-cause as the case may be, as to whether a further inquiry is called for. In the event upon deliberations and due considerations it is in the affirmative - the inquiry follows but not otherwise and it is this part of Service Jurisprudence on which reliance was placed by Mr. Subramaniam and on that score, strongly criticised the conduct of the respondents herein and accused them of being biased. We do find some justification in such a criticism upon consideration of the materials on record.” The division bench of High Court of Andhra Pradesh in case of Appala Reddy Vs. Eastern Power Distribution Company of A.P. Ltd. and Ors. (W.A. No. 491 of 2005) has held that: “6. In any disciplinary proceedings, the necessity to appoint an Enquiry Officer arises only when the appointing authority points out certain acts of indiscipline on the part of the delinquent employee and the explanation offered by the employee is not satisfactory. On the other hand, where the explanation is found to be satisfactory, the necessity to proceed further does not arise or remain. In V.K. Khanna's case (supra), the Supreme Court reinstated this position of law and held that appointment of an Enquiry Officer even before a show-cause notice or charge-sheet is served upon an employee is unknown to service jurisprudence. On the other hand, where the explanation is found to be satisfactory, the necessity to proceed further does not arise or remain. In V.K. Khanna's case (supra), the Supreme Court reinstated this position of law and held that appointment of an Enquiry Officer even before a show-cause notice or charge-sheet is served upon an employee is unknown to service jurisprudence. It was further observed that in such an event, an element of bias exists vis-a-vis the Enquiry Officer. 7. The appointing authority would be in a position to apply his mind to the facts of the case only when he calls upon an employee to explain as to the acts of misconduct, noticed by him. Depending on his satisfaction, on consideration of the explanation, he may have to choose either to proceed further or to drop the proceedings. Even in a case, where he proposes to proceed further, but his inclination is only to impose a minor penalty, the necessity to appoint an Enquiry Officer may not arise. Conversely, the need to appoint an Enquiry Officer would arise if only the appointing authority is not satisfied with the explanation offered by the employee and that he proposes to inflict a major penalty.” The Apex Court in Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. District Collector Raigad & Ors., reported in (2012) 4 SCC 407 , has held that: “The State is under an obligation to act fairly without ill will or malice - in fact or in law. Where malice is attributed to the State, it can never be a case of personal ill- will or spite on the part of the state. “Legal Malice” or “malice in law” means something done without lawful excuse. It is a deliberate act in disregard to the rights of others. It is an act done wrongfully and wilfully without reasonable or probable cause, and not necessarily an act done from ill feeling and spite. It means exercise of statutory powers for “purposes foreign to those for which it is in law intended”. Passing an order for unauthorized purpose constitutes malice in law.” 10. As a sequel to the aforesaid observations, rules, guidelines, legal propositions and judicial pronouncements, Orders of Suspension dated 09.05.2019 (Annexure-6) and 06.08.2019 (Annexure-10) as well as the entire disciplinary proceeding initiated vide Charge Memo dated 26.07.2019 (Annexure-8) are hereby quashed and set aside. 11. Passing an order for unauthorized purpose constitutes malice in law.” 10. As a sequel to the aforesaid observations, rules, guidelines, legal propositions and judicial pronouncements, Orders of Suspension dated 09.05.2019 (Annexure-6) and 06.08.2019 (Annexure-10) as well as the entire disciplinary proceeding initiated vide Charge Memo dated 26.07.2019 (Annexure-8) are hereby quashed and set aside. 11. From the aforesaid observations, it appears that there has been gross violation of principles of natural justice and entire proceeding is full of procedural laches. However, for the ends of justice it would be desirable to remit the matter back to the respondents with a liberty to initiate a fresh proceeding, in accordance with law, against the petitioner and conclude the same within a period of three months thereafter. Let it be made clear that petitioner shall participate in the departmental proceeding and co-operate with the respondent-authorities and if he fails to do so, the respondents may proceed exparte. 12. With the aforesaid observations and directions, writ petition stands disposed of. 13. Pending I.As., if any, also stands disposed of.