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2020 DIGILAW 307 (TS)

Rasula Ravi v. State of Andhra Pradesh

2020-02-25

A.ABHISHEK REDDY, R.S.CHAUHAN

body2020
JUDGMENT : R.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. The appellant, Rasula Ravi, has challenged the legality of the judgment dated 14.11.2012, passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Wanaparthy, whereby the learned Trial Court has convicted the appellant for offence under Section 302 IPC, and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life, imposed a fine of Rs. 500/- and further directed to undergo a simple imprisonment of two months in default thereof. 2. Briefly, the facts of the case are that on 18.4.2010, around 7:30 a.m. Avula Mallaiah (PW-1) submitted a report (Ex.P1) at the Kollapur Police Station, wherein he stated that on 17.4.2010, at about 10:00 p.m. while his younger brother, Avula Srinivasulu (hereinafter referred to as ‘the deceased’) and one Thonda Raghu chitchatting by sitting on drainage platform, the accused Rasula Ravi S/o Muthyalu came along the road and abused the brother of complainant. Then his brother asked Ravi “why abusing me” later both have quarreled and Raghu separated them. After a while, Rasula Ravi came again with spear (Ballem), which is used for killing animals, stabbed near left armpit of Srinivasulu for killing due to previous enmity. As a result, Srinivasulu sustained severe bleeding injury and shifted to Government Hospital, Kollapur through 108 Ambulance, after first aid, he was shifted to Government General Hospital, Kurnool, as his condition was critical, again shifted to NIMS Hospital, Hyderabad. Hence, the complainant requested to take necessary legal action against the accused.” 3. On the basis of the said report, the police chalked out a FIR, namely FIR No. 44 of 2010 (Ex.P7) for the offence under Section 307 IPC. The investigation commenced. However, while undergoing treatment at NIMS Hospital, Hyderabad, the deceased died on 18.4.2010 at 4:15 p.m. Hence, S. Raghava Rao, Sub-Inspector of Police (PW-10) altered the section of law from Section 307 IPC to Section 302 IPC, and issued alteration memo (Ex.P10). During the course of investigation, S. Raghava Rao, (PW-10) arrested the appellant on 28.4.2010. He was put up for trial. 4. In order to support its case, the prosecution examined eleven witnesses, submitted thirteen documents, and produced five material objects. On the other hand, the defense neither examined any witness, nor submitted any document to buttress its case. After appreciating the evidence, by judgment dated 14.11.2012, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the appellant as aforementioned. Hence, the present appeal before this Court. 5. Mr. On the other hand, the defense neither examined any witness, nor submitted any document to buttress its case. After appreciating the evidence, by judgment dated 14.11.2012, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the appellant as aforementioned. Hence, the present appeal before this Court. 5. Mr. S. Madhava Rao, the learned Counsel for the appellant, has raised the following contentions before this Court. 6. The entire conviction is based on the sole testimony of Raghu (PW-6). However, the said witness is not of “sterling worth.” For, although he claims to be the friend of the deceased, although he claims that the appellant had stabbed the deceased, but he neither reported the case to the police, nor accompanied the deceased to the hospital. Thus, his very conduct, as a friend, is against human nature. 7. Secondly, his testimony is contradicted by the medical evidence. For, according to him, the appellant had attacked the deceased with a baku (a dagger); according to M. Mallaiah (PW-1), he was informed by R. Venkatswamy (PW-3) that the accused has stabbed the deceased with a ballem (a spear). Moreover, the police had recovered a spear at the instance of the accused. Thus, there is a discrepancy as to the weapon used for commission of the crime. 8. Thirdly, there is a discrepancy between the ocular and the medical evidence. For, according to Raghu (PW-6), the accused had hit the deceased only once with a dagger. Yet, according to Dr. S. Mohan Singh (PW-9), there were two fatal injuries on the body of the deceased, and the other injuries discovered on the body were not even recorded as they were minor injuries. Furthermore, according to Dr. S. Mohan Singh (PW-9), the second injury, namely horizontal injury of 1 x 1 cm present on left anterior auxiliary line 6 cm. below the apex of axilla could not have been caused by the baku (spear) recovered by the police. Further, since injury No. 1 was a sutured injury, the witness could not testify whether the said injury could be caused by the baku (spear) recovered from the accused. Thus, clearly there is a contradiction between the medical and the ocular evidence. below the apex of axilla could not have been caused by the baku (spear) recovered by the police. Further, since injury No. 1 was a sutured injury, the witness could not testify whether the said injury could be caused by the baku (spear) recovered from the accused. Thus, clearly there is a contradiction between the medical and the ocular evidence. Relying on the case of Abdul Sayeed vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2010) 10 SCC 259 , the learned Counsel has further pleaded that where the medical evidence belies the ocular evidence, the ocular evidence should not be believed, and the testimony of such a witness should not be accepted. 9. Fourthly, Raghu (PW-6) nowhere says that it is the police, who had examined him after the incident. In fact, he claims that the Sub-Inspector did not examine him. Thus, this witness was never even examined by the police. Yet, he has been produced as an eye-witness. Thus, he is a fabricated and planted witness. 10. Fifthly, there is a contradiction between the testimony of Raghu (PW-6), the alleged eye-witness and the Crime Details Form (Ex.P2). While the witness claims that the accused had stabbed the deceased with a dagger, in the Crime Details Form (Ex.P2) it is mentioned that the method of killing was stabbing with a spear. The said Crime Details Form (Ex.P2) has been proved by S. Raghava Rao (PW-10). Thus, there is an utter confusion as to the weapon used for the commission of crime. 11. Sixthly, there are large number of lapses committed by the investigating agency. For, the police has not bothered to collect the first set of medical record from the hospital where the deceased was taken in an injured condition. According to Dr. S. Mohan Singh (PW-9), by the time he had carried out the autopsy, on the dead body, injury No. 1 was a sutured injury. Thus, obviously, the injury No. 1 was examined and sutured by another doctor. Hence, the wound certificate could have been given by the said doctor. Yet, the wound certificate has neither been collected by the police, nor produced by the prosecution. 12. Furthermore, the police has not recorded the statement of the deceased despite the fact that the deceased was carried first to the Kollapur Government Hospital, then to the Government General Hospital, Kurnool, and finally, to MMS Hospital, Hyderabad. Yet, the wound certificate has neither been collected by the police, nor produced by the prosecution. 12. Furthermore, the police has not recorded the statement of the deceased despite the fact that the deceased was carried first to the Kollapur Government Hospital, then to the Government General Hospital, Kurnool, and finally, to MMS Hospital, Hyderabad. Thus, obviously, the deceased had not died on the spot, but was alive for some time. But despite the fact that he was alive, the police has not bothered to record the statement of the deceased. 13. Further, the prosecution is, in fact, unsure of the place where the crime had occurred. For, according to Raghu (PW-6) while this witness and the deceased were talking together near a Mori (a narrow culvert, where the drainage water flows), the accused came and quarreled with the deceased; during the quarrel, he tore the shirt of the deceased; while this witness and the deceased were near the chicken shop of Shabbir (PW-5), the accused stabbed the deceased with a balm (dagger). Thus, the blood should have been found near the shop belonging to Shabbir (PW-5). Yet, according to the details mentioned in the site plan, blood has been discovered at two different places, namely (i) near the chicken shop belonging to Shabbir (PW-5) and (ii) thirty yards away near a Dhaba, where there is a drainage culvert. Hence, it is unclear where the appellant had attacked the deceased. 14. Seventhly, according to A. Radha (PW-2), the wife of the deceased, there was a professional rivalry and jealousy for the accused against the deceased as both of them were working as Carpenters in the same village. Thus, there was a fierce competition between them. It is for this reason the appellant had killed her husband. But, the said statement is belied by her own cross-examination. For, in her cross-examination, she admits that there were fifteen Carpenters in the village. And sufficient work existed for all of them to eke out their living. Thus, the very element of motive is conspicuously missing in the present case. 15. Eighthly, there is a great confusion as to which weapon has been recovered at the instance of the accused. For, according to the Confession and Recovery Panchanama of the accused (Ex.P5), a dagger had been recovered from the house of the accused. Thus, the very element of motive is conspicuously missing in the present case. 15. Eighthly, there is a great confusion as to which weapon has been recovered at the instance of the accused. For, according to the Confession and Recovery Panchanama of the accused (Ex.P5), a dagger had been recovered from the house of the accused. Yet, according to Samad (PW-8), the police had recovered a spear (ballem) from the house of the accused. Moreover, according to the F.S.L. Report (Ex.P13), they had received a spear, marked as Item No. 6. According to the prosecution, they had produced a baku (MO1), which is described as a spear. Although the word ‘baku’ means a dagger in Telugu language and a ‘ballem’ is a spear consisting of a shaft, usually of word, with a pointed sharp-edged iron head. Yet, the learned Trial Court has described the ‘baku’ as a spear. Hence, the prosecution is unsure as to the weapon used for commission of the crime. 16. Lastly, the learned Counsel has pleaded that since it is a case of single injury, and that, too, caused when there was a heated exchange between the accused and the deceased, the case does not fall within the scope of Section 302 IPC. But it squarely falls within the scope of Section 304 Part-II IPC. Therefore, the conviction can be altered from the offence under Section 302 IPC to one under Section 304 Part-II IPC. And the sentence should be reduced from life imprisonment to the period already undergone by the accused. 17. On the other hand, Ms. Sridevi, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor has vehemently contended that Raghu (PW-6) is a witness of sterling worth. According to A. Radha (PW-2), Raghu (PW-6) had accompanied the deceased to the hospital. Therefore, the contention that Raghu (PW-6) did not accompany the deceased to the hospital is belied by the testimony of A. Radha (PW-2). 18. Secondly, even if there is some confusion with regard to the weapon used, whether it is a dagger (baku), or a spear (ballem), the fact remains that the deceased had suffered an incised wound. According to the testimony of Dr. 18. Secondly, even if there is some confusion with regard to the weapon used, whether it is a dagger (baku), or a spear (ballem), the fact remains that the deceased had suffered an incised wound. According to the testimony of Dr. S. Mohan Singh (PW-9), he had discovered (i) sutured injury of 12 cm., present over inner surface of left arm extending from axilla to the junction of upper third and middle third portions of arm approximated with stitches and (ii) horizontal injury of 1 x 1 cm., present on the left anterior auxiliary line 6 c.m. below the apex of axilla. On cut section, it is pierced into 4th inter costal space and left lower lobe of lung. Edges of injury were regular. The said injuries could be caused by a pointed end of a blunt object. This witness has also proved the Post-Mortem Report (Ex.P6). Thus, through this witness, and through the medical evidence, the prosecution has succeeded in proving that the death of the deceased was homicidal, and that the deceased suffered an incised wound caused by a sharp-edged weapon. Hence, it is immaterial whether the sharp-edged weapon was a dagger, or a spear. Moreover, the spear had blood group ‘B’ on it, the blood group of the deceased. 19. Thirdly, the learned Counsel for the appellant has misread the testimony of Raghu (PW-6). For, in his examination-in-chief, he clearly states that the police examined him. He further states in his cross-examination that “Inspector of Police recorded my statement.” Therefore, it is in these circumstances that he denied in his cross-examination, and claimed that “Sub-Inspector of Police had not examined me.” Since this witness was examined by the Inspector and not by the Sub-Inspector, he has clearly stated that the Sub-Inspector did not examine him. But merely because he claims that Sub-Inspector did not examine him, it does not mean that the police did not examine him. Therefore, the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is misconceived. 20. Fourthly, there is no contradiction between the ocular evidence, and the medical evidence. In fact, the former evidence is supported by the latter evidence. For, according to Raghu (PW-6), the appellant came all of a sudden, and stabbed the deceased on his left armpit with baku (a dagger). The accused went away immediately after stabbing the deceased. 20. Fourthly, there is no contradiction between the ocular evidence, and the medical evidence. In fact, the former evidence is supported by the latter evidence. For, according to Raghu (PW-6), the appellant came all of a sudden, and stabbed the deceased on his left armpit with baku (a dagger). The accused went away immediately after stabbing the deceased. According to the Inquest Report (Ex.P4) and according to T. Hanmanthu (PW-7), there was a stab injury on the left armpit of the deceased. Moreover, according to Dr. S. Mohan Singh (PW-9), the deceased had suffered an incised wound on the inner surface of left arm extending from axilla to the junction of upper third and middle third portions of arm, and had also suffered a horizontal injury of 1 x 1 cm. on left anterior auxiliary line 6 cm., below the apex of axilla and the injury pierced into fourth inter costal space and the left lower lobe of lung. Therefore, the testimony of Raghu (PW-6) is duly corroborated by the medical evidence. 21. Fifthly, mere lapses on the part of the investigating agency cannot buttress, and support the case of the defense. Therefore, even if the police did not obtain the wound certificate of the deceased, or did not record his statement, it would not strengthen the case of the defense. Moreover, since the defense was of total denial, the lapses on the part of the police do not strengthen the case of the defense. 22. Sixthly, the lack of motive is immaterial in a case of direct evidence. Therefore, in the case of direct evidence, the prosecution is not even required to establish the existence of a motive. 23. Seventhly, the learned Counsel for the appellant is unjustified in claiming that the prosecution is unsure about the scene of crime. According to Raghu (PW-6), the offence had taken place near the chicken shop of Shabbir (PW-5). The investigating agency did discover blood there. Although, according to the Crime Details Form (Ex.P2) and the Scene of Crime (Ex.P3), blood was also discovered near a Dhaba, whether the said blood belonged to the deceased or not, has not been established by the prosecution. Therefore, the presence of blood near the Dhaba is an irrelevant fact. 24. Lastly, the learned Counsel for the appellant is unjustified in claiming that the murder was committed at the spur of the moment. Therefore, the presence of blood near the Dhaba is an irrelevant fact. 24. Lastly, the learned Counsel for the appellant is unjustified in claiming that the murder was committed at the spur of the moment. For, according to Raghu (PW-6), initially, there was a quarrel between the deceased, and the accused. But the accused had gone away. It is subsequently that the accused re-appeared at the scene of the crime and stabbed the deceased. Therefore, he had gone away, and brought a deadly weapon with him. Using a sharp-edged weapon, he had caused the injury on a vital part of the body. The injury was so deep as to puncture the lungs. Therefore, the appellant had both the intention, and the knowledge that by causing such an injury, he would definitely cause the death of the deceased. Hence, the case does not fall within the scope of Section 304 Part-II IPC, but squarely falls within the scope of Section 302 IPC. In order to support this plea, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor has relied on the case of State of Rajasthan vs. Leela Ram alias Leela Dhar, 2019 (1) ALD (Crl.) 607 (SC) : (2019) 13 SCC 131 . Therefore, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor has supported the impugned judgment. 25. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties, perused the impugned judgment, and examined the record produced before this Court. 26. Raghu (PW-6) is, indeed, the star witness of the prosecution as the case is based solely on his testimony. In his examination-in-chief, he informs the Court that “I know accused, deceased, PWs. 1 to 5. The accused and the deceased are carpenters....On 17.4.2010, at about 10:00 p.m. myself and the deceased were talking together near Mori, situate near the chicken shop of PW-5. My house is also situated at near Mori. While we were talking the accused came and abused the deceased. Both the accused and the deceased quarreled and in the said quarrel, the shirt of the deceased torn and I intervened, separated the accused and the deceased. The accused went away. The deceased removed the torn shirt and placed the same by the side of chicken shop of PW-5. Again the accused came all of a sudden and stabbed the deceased on his left armpit of the (sic) with Baku. The accused stabbed the deceased with MO1. The accused went away immediately after stabbing the deceased. The accused went away. The deceased removed the torn shirt and placed the same by the side of chicken shop of PW-5. Again the accused came all of a sudden and stabbed the deceased on his left armpit of the (sic) with Baku. The accused stabbed the deceased with MO1. The accused went away immediately after stabbing the deceased. I informed the same to the wife, brother and uncle of the deceased. The deceased sustained severe bleeding injury and fell down. PWs. 1 to 3 came to the scene of offence and they took the deceased to Government Hospital, Kollapur. From there, they took the deceased to Government General Hospital, Kurnool. On the same day, the deceased was shifted to NIMS Hospital, Hyderabad. The deceased died on the next day of the incident. There was professional rivalry, jealousy and grudges between the accused and the deceased. Police examined me.” 27. In his cross-examination, he admits that he was close friend of the deceased. He further admits that he has told the police that the accused had stabbed the deceased with a ‘ballem’ (a spear). “Inspector of Police recorded my statement....We were sitting near Mori. I stated before police that on 17.4.2010 while myself and the deceased were talking by sitting near Mori, the accused came, picked up quarrel and went away and came all of a sudden and stabbed the deceased.” He further admits that “the Sub-Inspector of Police had not examined me.” He further claims that he stated to the police that he knows the incident. 28. A bare perusal of his testimony clearly reveals that according to him, even before the deceased was killed, there was an altercation between the accused and the deceased. For, both of them had quarreled. During the quarrel, the shirt of the deceased was torn, and this witness had intervened and separated the two. After the quarrel, the accused had gone away. But, aimed with a baku (a dagger), he had come back, and suddenly stabbed the deceased on his left armpit. Having stabbed the deceased, he went away. It is this witness who informed the wife of the deceased, the brother of the deceased and the uncle of the deceased. After the quarrel, the accused had gone away. But, aimed with a baku (a dagger), he had come back, and suddenly stabbed the deceased on his left armpit. Having stabbed the deceased, he went away. It is this witness who informed the wife of the deceased, the brother of the deceased and the uncle of the deceased. In his cross-examination, he further informs the Court that his statement was recorded by the police, and he told the police that the accused had stabbed the deceased with a ballem (a spear). Since his statement was recorded by the Inspector, he denied the fact that his statement was recorded by the Sub-Inspector of Police. Even in his cross-examination, he narrates the same set of facts that there was a quarrel prior to the killing of the deceased, and the accused, came back and suddenly stabbed the deceased. Since this witness has not been shattered in the cross-examination, he is a trustworthy witness. 29. According to the Confession and Recovery Panchanama of the accused (Ex.P5), it is the accused, who had taken the police team to his house, and had a dagger recovered from there. According to the F.S.L. Report (Ex.P13), the F.S.L. had received a spear (ballem). But, according to the Trial Court, MO1 is a baku, although in English translation, it has been shown as a spear. However, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor has submitted that baku is actually a “dagger” and not a “spear.” Even if there is some discrepancy with regard to the nature of the weapon used, even then, there is a commonality between a dagger and a spear (a baku and a ballem). For, both the weapons are sharp-edged weapons which are used to cause incised wound on the victim. 30. In the case of Bastiram vs. State of Rajasthan, (2014) 5 SCC 398 , the Apex Court, while dealing with the aspect whether the medical evidence should be believed, or whether the testimony of the eyewitnesses should be preferred, has opined that ocular evidence should be accepted unless it is completely negated by the medical evidence. Therefore, the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that since the medical evidence belies the ocular evidence, the ocular evidence should not be believed is unacceptable. 31. Therefore, the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that since the medical evidence belies the ocular evidence, the ocular evidence should not be believed is unacceptable. 31. Moreover, according to the Post-Mortem Report (Ex.P6), the deceased had suffered two injuries, namely (i) sutured injury of 12 cm., present over inner surface of left arm extending from axilla to the junction of upper third and middle third portions of arm approximated with stitches and (ii) horizontal injury of 1 x 1 c.m. present on the left anterior auxiliary line 6 c.m. below the apex of axilla. On cut section, it is pierced into 4th inter costal space and left lower lobe of lung. Furthermore, injury Nos. 1 and 2 are ante-mortem in nature caused by a pointed edge blunt object. Blood and blood clots were present. The cause of death is shown as due to complications of penetrating injury on chest, and injury to blood vessels in arm. Dr. S. Mohan Singh (PW-9) proves the said Post-Mortem Report (Ex.P6). In his cross-examination, he clearly admits that it is not possible to mention the depth of a wound in surgical intervened injury, as the injury would get modified due to surgery. He further claims that the second injury in Post-Mortem Report (Ex.P6) is not possible with MO1. “I cannot say whether the 1st injury is possible with MO1 or not as the wound is intervened by the surgery. Injury No. 1 may be possible by fall and the injury No. 2 is not possible by fall.” Thus, even the upshot of the medical evidence is that the deceased had suffered an incised wound caused by a sharp-pointed object. The injury was deep enough that it pierced through the fourth inter costal space, and left lower lobe of lung. Hence, the said evidence corroborates the testimony of Raghu (PW-6). It further establishes the fact that the death of the deceased is homicidal in nature. Therefore, even if there is some confusion with regard to the actual weapon used, yet, the confusion is not fatal to the case of the prosecution. Therefore, the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant that there is sufficient confusion with regard to the nature of the weapon used, which would be fatal to the prosecution case, is unacceptable. 32. Therefore, the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant that there is sufficient confusion with regard to the nature of the weapon used, which would be fatal to the prosecution case, is unacceptable. 32. A. Radha (PW-2) clearly states in her examination-in-chief that “on 17.4.2010 night at about 9:00 p.m. while I was at my house, Raghu (LW-5) came and informed me that the accused stabbed the deceased at new bus stand of our village near the shop of Shabbir. On that, myself, Krishnaiah (LW-3), Raghu (LW-5) and others went to the scene of offence, there we noticed the deceased with bleeding injuries. We took the deceased to Kollapur Government Hospital. From there, we took the deceased to Government General Hospital, Kurnool. On the same day, we took the deceased to NIMS Hospital, Hyderabad and the deceased died at NIMS Hospital, Hyderabad on the evening of 18.4.2010 while undergoing treatment. The accused and the deceased are doing carpentry work and there was professional rivalry and jealousy for the accused against the deceased.” Thus, according to her, Raghu (PW-6) had also accompanied the deceased to the hospital. 33. Of course, in his testimony, Raghu (PW-6) does not claim that he went to the hospital with A. Radha (PW-2). But even if, he had not accompanied the deceased to the hospital, it would not dilute the veracity of his testimony. For, different people behave differently in the same situation. Therefore, the learned Counsel for the appellant is unjustified in claiming that the conduct of the witness, Raghu (PW-6) is an unusual one. 34. It is a settled principle of law that any lapses committed by the investigating agency do not support the defense [Ref. Krishnegowda vs. State of Karnataka, 2017 (2) ALD (Crl.) 42 (SC) : (2017) 13 SCC 98 ]. Even if the police had not collected the medical records from Kollapur Government Hospital, and had produced merely the Post-Mortem Report (Ex.P6) from Gandhi Medical Hospital, Secunderabad, it would not weaken the case of the prosecution and would not go in favour of the accused. 35. Similarly, even if the police has not recorded the statement of the deceased, despite the fact that he had survived for few hours, it is an immaterial fact. 35. Similarly, even if the police has not recorded the statement of the deceased, despite the fact that he had survived for few hours, it is an immaterial fact. For, none of the witnesses, such as A. Radha (PW-2), R. Venkata Swamy (PW-3), Raghu (PW-6), claim that after the deceased was stabbed, he was in conscious state. Therefore, even the said contention raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is unsustainable. 36. Of course, the learned Counsel for the appellant has argued that there is lack of motive in the present case. According to the learned Counsel, A. Radha (PW-2) contradicts her own statement. For, in her examination-in-chief, she claims that there is professional rivalry between the accused and the deceased, as both of them are carpenters in the village. But, in her cross-examination, she admits that there are about fifteen carpenters in the village, and each one of them has sufficient work to eke out their living. However, it is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that in a case of direct evidence, motive need not be established. The existence of, or non-existence of a motive is essential in a case of circumstantial evidence. Since the present case is a case of direct evidence, even if the motive has not been established by the prosecution, the prosecution cannot be faulted. 37. Similarly, even if there is some confusion with regard to the scene of the offence, the confusion is not fatal to the case of the prosecution. For, according to Raghu (PW-6), the stabbing had taken place near the chicken shop of Shabbir (PW-5). This statement was further corroborated by the testimony of A. Radha (PW-2), who claims that Raghu (PW-6) had informed her that her husband was stabbed near the shop of Shabbir (PW-5). Similarly, R. Venkata Swamy (PW-3) claims that he heard the galata (fight) near the chicken shop of Shabbir (PW-5). He further claims that Raghu (PW-6) informed him that accused stabbed the deceased near the chicken centre. Therefore, he too rushed to the scene of the crime. Even Shabbir (PW-5) claims that he closed the shop at 8:30 p.m. and went to the house of his senior paternal uncle, situated near his shop. He further claims that “My elder sister informed me that the accused stabbed the deceased near my chicken centre. Therefore, he too rushed to the scene of the crime. Even Shabbir (PW-5) claims that he closed the shop at 8:30 p.m. and went to the house of his senior paternal uncle, situated near his shop. He further claims that “My elder sister informed me that the accused stabbed the deceased near my chicken centre. On that, I went to the scene of offence, there at the scene of offence, I noticed the deceased with bleeding injuries on his left armpit. Raghu (LW-5) informed me that the accused stabbed the deceased. There is electricity pole nearby shop and there is Panchayat street light nearby my shop.” Moreover, according to the Crime Details Form (Ex.P2/P8), the blood was, indeed, discovered near the chicken shop of Shabbir (PW-5). The said fact is further corroborated by the testimony of S. Raghava Rao (PW-10). Therefore, even if some blood is discovered at another place, which is shown in the Crime Details Form (Ex.P2/P8), it would not be fatal to the case of the prosecution. For, all the witnesses mentioned hereinabove, unanimously claim that the deceased was stabbed in front of the shop of Shabbir (PW-5). 38. Furthermore, even if there is some variation with regard to the scene of offence, it is not fatal to the case of the prosecution. As long as the substratum of the prosecution case has ring of truth and is, thus, believable, the conviction can be recorded against the accused. The Apex Court in the case of Bhagwati Prasad vs. State of M.P. (2010) 1 SCC 697 , has opined that when the location of place of incident was fixed by evidence, the evidence becomes immediately acceptable, and minor discrepancy whether it was spot A, or spot B, is pushed to background. Such minor discrepancy cannot affect the whole prosecution story. It is only when the defence is able to establish that the change of the spot was deliberate and such a change was so substantial as would affect the whole prosecution story, that such discrepancies assume importance. However, in the present case, there is no change of the place, as all the witnesses are consistent that the appellant had attacked the deceased near the chicken shop of Shabbir (PW-5). 39. However, in the present case, there is no change of the place, as all the witnesses are consistent that the appellant had attacked the deceased near the chicken shop of Shabbir (PW-5). 39. According to Samad (PW-8), it is “at the instance of the accused, police recovered MO1 (baku) from the house of the accused under the cover of panchanama.” Ex.P5 is the Confessional and Recovery Panchanama. According to Ex.P5, the accused not only made a confessional statement while he was in custody of the police, but also informed the police that he can take them to his house where he had hidden the dagger. The dagger was recovered from the house of the appellant. Moreover, the dagger had bloodstains on it. According to the description of the weapon, it is a four corners' iron rod. Its length is about fifteen inches, and one side extremity (point) having two inches, in a split order in the length of about one inch, and thickness of the rod is eight millimeters. Thus, there is no confusion with regard to the recovery of the dagger, although the learned Counsel for the appellant pleaded that there is some confusion. 40. It is not necessary that in every case of a single injury, the offence will automatically fall within the ambit and scope of Section 304 Part-II IPC. In order to appreciate whether a single injury case falls within the scope of Section 302 IPC, or within the scope of Section 304 Part-II IPC, the Courts have to appreciate the circumstances in which the single injury is caused, the weapon used by the accused, the nature of the injury, and most importantly, the place of the injury. In the case of Mahesh Balmiki @ Munna vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2000 (1) ALD (Crl.) 108 (SC) : (2000) 1 SCC 319 , where the accused had caused a single stab wound on the chest on the left side of the sternum of the deceased with a knife, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was of the opinion that since the stab wound has been caused on a vital part of the body, it is a case under Section 302 IPC, and not under Section 304 Part-II IPC. 41. Similarly, in the present case, there was an altercation between the accused and the deceased the accused went away. 41. Similarly, in the present case, there was an altercation between the accused and the deceased the accused went away. Yet, he came back with a lethal weapon, a dagger and assaulted the deceased on a vital part of his body, namely the left side of the chest. The injury was deep enough to go through the fourth costal area, and puncture the lower lobe of lung. The fact that the accused went away and came back armed with a lethal weapon, the fact that he attacked on the vital part of the body, the fact that he thrust the dagger deep enough to injure the left lower lobe of lung, all these three factors clearly reveal his intention to cause the death of the deceased. In an injury of such a nature, both intention and knowledge are writ large. Therefore, it is clearly a case, which would fall within the ambit and scope of Section 302 IPC. Hence, the argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the offence should be altered from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part-II IPC is clearly unsustainable. 42. For the reasons stated above, this Court does not find any merit in the present appeal; it is, hereby, dismissed. The judgment of the Trial Court dated 14.11.2012 is hereby confirmed. Consequently, the appellant shall continue to serve the sentence as imposed by the learned Trial Court. 43. Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, pending shall stand dismissed.