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2020 DIGILAW 308 (UTT)

Jajvinder Singh v. State Of Uttarakhand

2020-08-19

LOK PAL SINGH

body2020
JUDGMENT Lok Pal Singh, J. - By means of present writ petition, petitioner has sought a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing of F.I.R. No. 353 of 2019 under Sections 420 & 506 of I.P.C. lodged at Police Station-Kichha, District Udham Singh Nagar. 2. This is the second writ petition for quashing of impugned F.I.R.. Alongwith the writ petition a compounding application (CLMA 5756 of 2020) has been filed by the petitioner and respondent no.3 stating therein that petitioner and respondent no.3 have settled their dispute amicably. Earlier the petitioner filed criminal writ petition no. 1098 of 2020 alongwith compounding application no. CLMA 5198 of 2020 for the same relief. The first petition was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to the petitioner to file the compounding application before the Magistrate concerned by this Court vide order dated 27.07.2020. Thereafter, the roaster changed and the jurisdiction of WPCRL was assigned to some another bench. 3. The coordinate bench passed the following order : "Mr. Vikas Kumar Guglani, Advocate for the petitioner. Mr. P.S. Bohra, AGA for the State. Mr. Shubham Chhabra, Advocate for the respondent. This matter is heard through Video conferencing. List this matter before the Bench, which earlier decided the similar writ petition on 27.07.2020." 4. Thereafter, the writ petition is nominated to this Court by Hon'ble the Acting Chief Justice. 5. It is contended in the compounding application that the petitioner and respondent no.3 have now settled their dispute amicably and the complainant has received his amount back from the petitioner. It is further contended that the petitioner and respondent no.3 have no other alternative efficacious remedy except to approach this Court. It is further contended that the dispute between the petitioner and respondent no.3 is of civil in nature and first information report was lodged on the pretext that the petitioner is not returning the money to the respondent and now the petitioner has return the money to respondent no.3. On the aforesaid contents, the second criminal writ petition has been filed. Second writ petition has been filed after its withdrawal with the same averments. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that no charge sheet has been submitted in the matter as yet, therefore, the present petition has been filed alongwith the compounding application. On the aforesaid contents, the second criminal writ petition has been filed. Second writ petition has been filed after its withdrawal with the same averments. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that no charge sheet has been submitted in the matter as yet, therefore, the present petition has been filed alongwith the compounding application. He would further submit that the investigation is going on in the matter and the allegations levelled by the respondent no.3 in aforesaid F.I.R. are cognizable offences. 7. To this, learned Standing Counsel would submit that the present writ petition cannot be entertained as it is not permissible in law to file the second writ petition for the same cause of action. 8. This Court on several occasion noticed that in most of the cases where the first information report has been lodged and when the court took cognizance against the accusedpetitioner, thereafter usually some reconciliation take place between the parties and the parties seek compounding of the offences complained against the accused-petitioner before the court. It is further observed that it is a practice prevailing to file the compounding application straightaway before this Court bypassing the trial court, which is the first court to compound the offence, as envisaged under the scheme of Section 320 Cr.P.C.. 9. While exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India I have no hesitation in saying that it is a practice prevailing in this Court to file the compounding application straightaway before this court, bypassing the trial court, which is the first court to compound the offence, as envisaged under the scheme of Section 320 Cr.P.C. and because of these type of cases, the High Court instead of adjudicating the cases of those litigants whose cases are pending since long and who have no other alternative efficacious remedy, is engaged in deciding the compounding applications. The Central Government as well as State Government has created several tribunals/courts for the purpose to reduce the overburden of the High Court. 10. This Court is of the view that if the petitioner and respondent no.3 have amicably settled the dispute they should have approached to the Investigation Officer by filing an affidavit that the investigation be concluded in view of the fact that the respondent no.3 has no grievance against the petitioner and the offences are compoundable. 11. 10. This Court is of the view that if the petitioner and respondent no.3 have amicably settled the dispute they should have approached to the Investigation Officer by filing an affidavit that the investigation be concluded in view of the fact that the respondent no.3 has no grievance against the petitioner and the offences are compoundable. 11. The writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to the petitioner to approach the Magistrate concerned but the petitioner and respondent no.3 have not approached the Magistrate concerned. When the first information report is lodged in a cognizable offence, the copy of the same is to be sent within 48 hours to the Magistrate concerned. It cannot be said that the Magistrate concerned is not aware about pendency of the present investigation. It is legal preposition in law that when the first writ petition on the same cause of action is dismissed as withdrawn, subsequent writ petition for the same relief is not maintainable. 12. Filing of subsequent writ petition on the same cause of action is an abuse of process of law, such practice is not permissible under the law, as it wastes the valuable judicial time of the Court at the cost of genuine cases. 13. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of T. Arivandandam V. T. Satyapal and Anr, (1977) AIR SC 2421 has held that the Court should remind itself Section 35A CPC and take deterrent action if it is satisfied that the litigation was inspired by vexation motives. In Dr. Buddhi Kota Subbarao v. K Parasaran and Ors., (1996) AIR SC 2687 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under : "No litigant has a right to unlimited drought on the Court time and public money in order to get his affairs settled in the manner he wishes. However, access to Justice should not be misused as a licence to file misconceived and frivolous petitions." 14. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of S.P. Sawhney Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India, (1991) 2 SCC 318 has held that multiple proceedings adopted by the petitioner for claiming the same relief arising out of the same cause of action, amounts to abuse of process of Court. 15. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Suraz India Trust Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India, (1991) 2 SCC 318 has held that multiple proceedings adopted by the petitioner for claiming the same relief arising out of the same cause of action, amounts to abuse of process of Court. 15. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Suraz India Trust Vs. Union of India, (2017) 14 SCC 416 has held that a frivolous litigation should be declined and be tackled with iron hands. In the said case, the Hon'ble Apex Court has imposed a cost of Rs. 25 lakhs on the petitioner and issued direction to the Registry of the High Court and other High Courts that no P.I.L should be entertained in the name of Suraz India Trust. 16. Taking note of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgments, this Court is of the considered view that the petitioner has no reason to approach this Court again for the same relief when the earlier writ petition has been dismissed as withdrawn. 17. In view of this Court, it is a clear cut case of forum shopping. Such practice is against the judicial discipline. The act of bench-hunting or bench shopping or bench-avoiding is not permissible under the law. No litigant can play hide and seek with the courts or adopt pick and choose. Another settled canon of administration of justice is that no litigant should be permitted to misuse the judicial process by filing frivolous petitions. No litigant has a right to unlimited drought upon the Court time and public money in order to get his affairs settled in the manner as he wishes. In any event there is no justifiable reason in such a case to permit the petitioner to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution once again seeking similar relief. In various judgments, the Apex Court has heavily come on and criticized the bench hunting. Bench hunting has been deprecated by the Apex Court in the case of Sarguja Transport Service Vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior, (1987) 1 SCC 5 and in M/S. Upadhyay & Co vs State Of U.P. & others, (1999) 1 SCC 81 . 18. In view of the forgoing discussion, this Court is of the view that the present writ petition is nothing but an abuse of process of law at the hands of the petitioner. 18. In view of the forgoing discussion, this Court is of the view that the present writ petition is nothing but an abuse of process of law at the hands of the petitioner. Wide jurisdiction of the court should not become a source of abuse of the process of law by the disgruntled litigant. Careful exercise is also necessary to ensure that the litigation is genuine, not motivated by extraneous considerations and imposes an obligation upon the litigant to disclose the true facts and approach the court with clean hands. The criminal writ petition is not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Same is hereby dismissed. An exemplary cost of Rs. 1,00,000/- is saddled upon the petitioner, which shall be deposited by him before Uttarakhand State Legal Services Authority within two months. In case of failure in depositing the amount of cost, the said amount shall be recovered as an arrears of land revenue.