ORDER : 1. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioners aggrieved against the order dated 6/3/2018 passed by the Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’), whereby, the appeal filed by the respondent has been allowed and petitioner herein have been directed to calculate the pensionable service of her husband and grant family pension to her within a period of three months along with arrears with interest @ 6% p.a. The respondent has been directed to refund the amount of C.P.F. paid to her along with interest @ of 6% p.a. Further direction has been granted for payment of family pension month by month. 2. The respondent wife of one Kemi Chand filed an appeal with the averments that her husband was appointed on work charge basis on 5/4/1973 on the post of ‘Kuli’, he was declared semi permanent w.e.f. 4/4/1977 and while in service died on 15/10/1986. It was claimed that her husband had completed qualifying service for grant of pension and, therefore, she was entitled to family pension. 3. A response was filed by the petitioners, wherein, while the averments pertaining to appointment, semi permanent status and getting regular pay by respondent’s husband were admitted, it was indicated that he was a member of C.P.F. and after his death the entire amount payable under the C.P.F. was paid and the respondent has been granted compassionate appointment w.e.f. 17/11/1986 as Sweeper, therefore, she is not entitled for family pension. Objection was raised regarding delay in filing appeal. 4. After hearing the parties, the Tribunal relying on the judgment of this Court in Mangi Devi vs. State of Rajasthan, S.B.Civil Writ Petition No.4753/2006 decided on 30/7/2008, State of Rajasthan vs. Mangi Devi, D.B.Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No.545/2010 decided on 6/1/2012 came to the conclusion that the respondent was entitled to payment of family pension w.e.f 16/10/1986 and the various pleas raised by the petitioners have no effect and consequently allowed the appeal and gave directions as indicated hereinbefore. 5. Feeling aggrieved the present writ petition has been filed by the petitioners. 6. During the pendency of writ petition, the writ petition was amended for raising plea in relation to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. 7. 5. Feeling aggrieved the present writ petition has been filed by the petitioners. 6. During the pendency of writ petition, the writ petition was amended for raising plea in relation to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. 7. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to deal with the appeal inasmuch as the Tribunal could deal with the matters affecting the Government servant in terms of Section 4 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Service Matter Appellate Tribunals) Act, 1976 (‘the Act, 1976’). The respondent does not fall within the definition of Government servant as defined under Section 2(c) and also in the definition of ‘Service Matter’ as defined in Section 2(f) of the Act, ‘pension’ alone is included and not ‘family pension’ and pension & family pension have been differently defined under Rule 3(f) and Rule 3(p) of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1996 (‘the Rules, 1996’), therefore, the appeal filed by the respondent seeking family pension was not maintainable and the writ petition deserves to be allowed on this ground alone. 8. Further submissions have been made that the respondent had approached the Tribunal after a passage of 28 years, which delay has not been explained and the Tribunal has not dealt with the said aspect appropriately and on this count also the writ petition deserves to be allowed. 9. Submissions have also been made that once the respondent received the amount payable under the C.P.F., she cannot turn around and claim family pension and, therefore, the order passed by the Tribunal deserves to be quashed and set aside. 10. Learned counsel for the respondent vehemently opposed the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioners. It was submitted that the plea pertaining to jurisdiction sought to be raised has no substance. It was submitted that the legal representative of a Government servant is included in the definition of ‘Appellant’ under Rule 3(iii) of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Service Matters Appellate Tribunals) Rules, 1976 (‘the Rules, 1976’) and, therefore, the plea raised in this regard has no substance. 11. Further submissions were made that family pension is also a kind of pension and for interpreting the provisions of Section 2(f) (v) of the Act, the definition under the Rules, 1996 cannot be invoked. 12. 11. Further submissions were made that family pension is also a kind of pension and for interpreting the provisions of Section 2(f) (v) of the Act, the definition under the Rules, 1996 cannot be invoked. 12. Further submissions were made that for all practical purposes once granted, pension & family pension are one and the same thing. Reliance was placed on Rule 77 of the Rules, 1996. 13. Further submissions were made that the case is squarely covered by the judgment of this Court in Mangi Devi’s case (supra), which has been upheld by the Division Bench. 14. It is submitted that the aspect pertaining to delay also stands covered by the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.K. Mastan Bee vs. General Manager, South Central Railway & Anr., (2003) 1 SCC 184 and Smt. Santosh Kaur vs. Central Administrative Tribunal, Jodhpur & Ors., D.B.Civil Writ Petition No. 6662/2005 decided on 4/8/2006 and, therefore, the plea raised in this regard also has no substance. 15. It was submitted that vide circular issued by the State on 15/7/1994 (Annex.A/8), the petitioners have clarified that in all cases where the work charged employees are not alive, option for family pension be assumed in such cases and in future also if option is not given by the work charged employee, the option of pension only would be deemed and, therefore, the fact that the respondent’s husband had not given option for family pension loses its significance. 16. It was vehemently denied that the respondent has been paid the C.P.F. and documents produced by the petitioners in this regard were denied/disputed. However, it was submitted that the respondent is prepared to follow the directions in relation to refund of the amount of C.P.F. Further submissions were made that the respondent has been deprived of her legitimate dues for decades now and, therefore, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 17. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the material available on record. 18. The fact are not in dispute insofar as the employment of respondent’s husband as work charged employee with the petitioner Department is concerned and once the fact of employment is established, his right to get regularization on completion of 10 years’ service in terms of Work Charge Service Rules and consequent entitlement to pension/family pension is also not in dispute. The fact are not in dispute insofar as the employment of respondent’s husband as work charged employee with the petitioner Department is concerned and once the fact of employment is established, his right to get regularization on completion of 10 years’ service in terms of Work Charge Service Rules and consequent entitlement to pension/family pension is also not in dispute. The Tribunal accepted the appeal and passed the order as noticed hereinbefore. 19. The State has questioned the judgment inter alia on the ground of jurisdiction and delay. 20. Section 4 of the Act of 1976 reads as under: “4. Duties of the Tribunal.-(1) The Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal shall hear an appeal against the order passed by any officer or authority on any service matter or matters affecting a Government servant in his personal capacity. (2) The Tribunal shall have power to confirm, vary or reverse the order against which the appeal is preferred or to remand the matter for fresh decision in accordance with the directions given by it.” 21. Section 4 of the Act provides that the Tribunal shall hear the appeal against the order passed by any officer or authority on any service matter affecting the Government servant in his personal capacity. 22. While service matter as defined under Section 2(f) of the Act, 1976 includes matters relating to seniority, promotion, confirmation, fixation of pay and denying or varying pay, allowances, pension etc., as already noticed hereinbefore, the plea raised by the petitioners is that the service matter includes ‘pension’ only and not ‘family pension’ and that the respondent is not a Government servant. 23. Though, it is true that the respondent is not a Government servant, however, Rule 3(iii) of the Rules, 1976 defines ‘appellant’ as under: “3(iii) “Appellant” means a Government servant who is entitled under the Act to file an appeal and in case of death of such Government servant his legal representative;” 24. A perusal of the above definition reveals that the appeal can be filed by a legal representative of a Government servant as well. Admittedly, the respondent is legal representative of the deceased Kemi Chand, who was a Government servant and, therefore, insofar as the eligibility of the respondent to file appeal is concerned, the same stands established. 25. A perusal of the above definition reveals that the appeal can be filed by a legal representative of a Government servant as well. Admittedly, the respondent is legal representative of the deceased Kemi Chand, who was a Government servant and, therefore, insofar as the eligibility of the respondent to file appeal is concerned, the same stands established. 25. Insofar as the distinction sought to be made between ‘pension’ and ‘family pension’ and the fact that under Section 2(f) of the Act only ‘pension’ is indicated, as Section 4 of the Act does not confine the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to service matter but extends the same to ‘matters affecting a Government servant’, it cannot be said that the matter pertaining to family pension cannot be raised before the Tribunal and in view thereof the plea raised by the petitioners has no substance. 26. Insofar as the subject matter of the dispute is concerned, the same stands covered by the order of this Court in the case of Smt. Mangi Devi (supra), wherein, after dealing with the entire issue, it was directed as under: “In this view of the matter, petitioner is entitled for family pension and other pensionary benefits because her husband had completed ten years of service which is minimum required service for grant of pension, therefore, denial of family pension to petitioner is totally illegal and unconstitutional. While following the law laid down in Sujjan Singh's case (supra) and Ismail Khan's case supra) and other judgments mentioned above, this writ petition is allowed. Order Annex.7 dated 18/2/2005 is hereby quashed and set aside and respondents are directed to allow family pension to petitioner and other retiral benefits as available within a period of three months from the receipt of certified copy of this order. Respondents are further directed to pay 6% simple interest on the amount of family pension from the date of entitlement of petitioner. It is also made clear that amount paid to petitioner under CPF Scheme shall be adjusted from the arrears of family pension and arrears shall be paid within stipulated time. No order as to costs.” 27. Respondents are further directed to pay 6% simple interest on the amount of family pension from the date of entitlement of petitioner. It is also made clear that amount paid to petitioner under CPF Scheme shall be adjusted from the arrears of family pension and arrears shall be paid within stipulated time. No order as to costs.” 27. The Division Bench upheld the said judgment, dealt with the ground of delay also and directed as under: “In an overall comprehension of the matter, we are satisfied that the learned Single Judge has rightly upheld the claim made by the writ petitioner for grant of family pension and other retiral benefits. The learned Single Judge has also taken care to direct that the amount paid to the petitioner under CPF shall be adjusted against the arrears and family pension. However, so far the question of award of interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of entitlement of the petitioner is concerned, we are unable to uphold the directions in this regard. In the present case, the appellants cannot be said to have deliberately delayed the disposal of case of the writ petitioner and it cannot be said that they had intentionally harassed the petitioner. The appellants appear to have entertained bonafide doubts about the entitlement of the writ petitioner particularly for CPF amount having already been paid. In the given fact situation, awarding of interest to the writ petitioner before the date of order of the learned Single Judge does not appear justified. In the fact situation of the present case, we are of opinion that interest of justice shall be served if the directions regarding interest are modified in the manner that the payable amount shall carry interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of order of the learned Single Judge. Accordingly, this appeal is partly allowed only to the extent of modification regarding directions for payment of interest as indicated above. The other part of the order impugned and the directions as issued by the learned Single Judge are upheld. The parties are left to bear their own costs of this appeal.” 28. In view thereof, insofar as the entitlement of the respondent is concerned, the same is also well established. 29. The other part of the order impugned and the directions as issued by the learned Single Judge are upheld. The parties are left to bear their own costs of this appeal.” 28. In view thereof, insofar as the entitlement of the respondent is concerned, the same is also well established. 29. Insofar as the ground pertaining to delay is concerned, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mastan Bee (supra), where the husband of the petitioner therein had died in the year 1969 and the petitioner made an application in the year 1991 and the claim was restricted by the Court while granting relief, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while setting aside the order of Division Bench, observed as under: “It is on record that the appellant is an illiterate who at the time of her husband’s death did not know of her legal right to family pension and the remedy to enforce her such right. On the death of the husband of the appellant, it was obligatory for her husband’s employer viz. The Railways, in the present case to compute the family pension payable to the appellant and offer the same to her without her having to make a claim or without driving her to a litigation. The very denial of her right to family pension amounted to a violation of the guarantee assured to the appellant under Article 21. The factum of the appellant’s lack of resources to approach the legal forum timely is not disputed by the Railways. In view of the said obligation of the Railway s and also in view of the fact that her husband was only a Gangman in the Railways who might not have left behind sufficient resources for the appellant to agitate her rights and also in view of the fact that the appellant is an illiterate, the Single Judge was justified in granting the relief to the appellant from the date which it became due to her, that is date of the death of her husband. The Division Bench fell in error in restricting that period to a date subsequent to 1-4-1992.” 30. The Division Bench fell in error in restricting that period to a date subsequent to 1-4-1992.” 30. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Santosh Kaur (supra), wherein, the application filed before the Central Administrative Tribunal seeking family pension was rejected as barred by time, while allowing the writ petition inter alia laid down as under: “We are of the opinion that the claim of family pension is not one time claim but is a recurring claim to which being widow of late Lal Singh, petitioner Smt. Santosh Kaur would be entitled to with effect from each date of accrual of the cause of action for receiving family pension as widow of Lal Singh and, therefore, if the genuineness of the claim of Smt. Santosh Kaur, petitioner is established, in our opinion, the claim could not be refused on the ground of limitation and it ought to be entertained on merit itself. It is altogether different matter that if it is treated to be money claim what ultimate relief can be granted and the money claim which has not become barred by time whether that could have been denied by the Tribunal is a different matter but the fact remains that the law of limitation may destroy a remedy but it does not destroy the substantive right. If a person has current right of recovery from the respondents on the basis of which in our opinion a widow of an employee who had pensionable service and scheme contains provisions for family pension, has subsisting right, the Tribunal was not justified in refusing the inquiry into the claim of the petitioner on merit on the ground of limitation.” 31. In view of the judgments in the case of Mastan Bee (supra) and Santosh Kaur (supra), the plea raised pertaining to delay also has no substance. 32. Insofar as the claim of the petitioners regarding amount of C.P.F. having been paid to respondent is concerned, apparently the material in this regard was not placed before the Tribunal, which is now sought to be relied on by the petitioners. Further, the judgment in the case of Mangi Devi (supra) takes care of the said plea, wherein also the amount was ordered to be refunded. Further, the judgment in the case of Mangi Devi (supra) takes care of the said plea, wherein also the amount was ordered to be refunded. Therefore, even if, the plea in this regard is accepted, the said aspect is taken care of by way of direction given by the Tribunal regarding refund of the amount along with similar interest which the respondent has been held entitled to. 33. In view of the above discussion, the order passed by the Tribunal does not call for any interference. The writ petition has no substance and the same is, therefore, dismissed.