ORDER With consent, heard finally. 1. This criminal revision is preferred by the petitioners against the order dated 20th November, 2019 passed by the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Morena, whereby the revision preferred by respondent No. 1 has been allowed and the order of trial Court dated 28.3.2019 rejecting the private complaint preferred by respondent No. 1/complainant has been set aside. 2. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that respondent No. 1 is a woman of doubtful integrity. He referred a case vide Crime No. 252/18 registered at police Station, Bamore, for alleged offence under sections 419 and 420 of IPC in which she is facing investigation/trial for misrepresentation of herself as police officer and trying to get undue benefits from the shopkeepers. It is further submitted that she was earlier married to one Sanjay Jainwar and later on she took divorce vide divorce deed dated 11.9.17. In the said divorce case, she referred date of her marriage as 22.1.2014, whereas in the private complaint filed against the petitioner she referred her date of marriage as 10.3.2016. Therefore, she took divorce in respect of marriage held on 22.1.2014 and not in respect of marriage of 10.3.2016. Said dichotomy amounts to contradictions and omissions. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners also referred the complaint which was filed by the complainant against Naval Singh before the authorities (Special Armed Force) and Adjutant enquired the matter and found no allegations as substantiated. Now to extract money, private complaint has been filed. Learned counsel referred the arrest memo dated 11.9.18 of respondent No. 1 to submit that in her arrest memo she referred her status as wife of Sanjay Jainwar, whereas she took divorce from Sanjay Jainwar earlier in 2017 itself. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners further referred, schism crept into her testimony when she says in a complaint filed under section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 against her own father and brother denoting the reason for her divorce to be her father and brother, whereas in her private complaint she referred the reason for divorce as present petitioners. Said dichotomy exonerates the petitioners from the clutches of implication. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners also raised the point that revisional Court remanded the matter and caused illegality. Said dichotomy exonerates the petitioners from the clutches of implication. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners also raised the point that revisional Court remanded the matter and caused illegality. Either matter should have been decided by the revisional Court full-fledgedly, or direction would have been given to take fresh evidence and proceed further. In the instant case, revisional Court directed the trial Court to review its own order which is not permissible in law. 6. Learned counsel for respondent No. 1/complainant opposed the prayer and submitted that petitioners have caused registration of a false case against respondent No. 1 when she demanded her right and threatened them to implicate when Naval Singh did not turn up for marriage. Several reports/complaints have been made to the police authorities ventilating her grievance. Since no affirmative steps have been taken, therefore, this case has been filed. He prayed for dismissal of the petition. 7. Learned counsel for respondent No. 2 /State also opposed the prayer and prayed for dismissal of the petition. 8. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 9. In the case in hand, private complaint was earlier filed by the complainant, i.e., respondent No. 1 for the alleged offence under sections 376/34, 506B and 498A of IPC read with sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Trial Court, after taking the report from the police authority [under section 156 (3) of CrPC], found the case not befitting for taking cognizance. When matter went into revision at the instance of the complainant, then it considered the facts and circumstances of the case and found the case befitting for taking cognizance in respect of sections 376 and section 506 Part II/34 of IPC. 10. So far as allegation regarding dowry demand is concerned, same has not found favour with the trial Court as well as revisional Court and same has not been challenged by the complainant, therefore, order of the trial Court so far as it relates to offence under section 498A of IPC and sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act stood affirmed. 11. 11. So far as offence under sections 376 and 506 Part II/34 of IPC is concerned, in her private complaint respondent No. 1 has referred the allegation in respect of the said offences in the following manner: ^^¼2½ ;g fd] vkjksih uoyflag lasxj dks ifjokfn;k djhc rhu o"kZ ls tkurh Fkh uoy flag lsaxj o ifjokfn;k ,d nwljs ls I;kj djrs Fks uoyflag lasxj }kjk ifjokfn;k dks 'kknh dk vk'oklu nsdj ifjokfn;k ds lkFk dbZ ckj 'kkjhfjd laca/k cuk, Fks rFkk uoyflag lsaxj ifjokfn;k dks 'kknh djus ds fy, dgrk Fkk vkSj dgrk Fkk fd FkksM+k #d tkvks eSa vius ?kjokyksa ls ckr dj rqels 'kknh d:axk ysfdu vfHk;qDr uoyflag 'kknh djus dh ckr dks Vkyrk jgrk Fkk rFkk dgrk Fkk fd rqEgkjh vHkh lxkbZ gqbZ gS vkSj o"kZ 2016 ls lat; tSuokj iq= xksihyky tSuokj ds lkFk 'kknh r; gqbZ Fkh vkjksih uoyflag dgrk Fkk fd igys eSa vius ?kjokyksa dks euk ywa rc rqEgkjs lkFk 'kknh d:axkA ¼3½ ;g fd ifjokfn;k dh 'kknh fnukad 10-3-2016 dks lat; tSuokj ds lkFk r; gks xbZ Fkh vkSj ?kj esa 'kknh dh rS;kjh gksus yxh Fkh rHkh uoyflag lasxj ifjokfn;k ls eksckby uEcj 8602345418] 7047489189] 9685275370 ls ifjokfn;k ls ckr djrk Fkk ifjokfn;k us uoy dks Qksu yxk;k rks uoy us dgk fd eSa ,lŒ,Œ,QŒ ukSdjh ij 17 cVkfy;u fHk.M esa gw¡ eq>s NqV~Vh ugha fey jgh gS NqV~Vh feyrs gh eSa vkdj 'kknh dj ywaxkA ysfdu uoy flag }kjk viuk eksckby can dj fy;kA ¼5½ ;g fd] vkjksih uoyflag lsaxj ifjokfn;k dks vius xkao flyk;Fkk ysdj tkrk Fkk vkSj dbZ ckj viuh ekSlh ds ?kj xksikyiqjk feyokus ds fy, ysdj vkrk Fkk vkSj vius ekek ds ?kj clS;k Hkh ysdj x;k Fkk nhokuflag lsaxj eq>s o uoy dks dejs esa vanj NksM+k nsrs Fks vkSj dgrs Fks fd rqe nksuksa ets djks nhokuflag dejs dh dqanh yxkdj ckgj [kM+k jgk Fkk vkSj uoyflag lsaxj us eq>ls tcju voS/k laca/k cuk, vkSj esjs lkFk cykRdkj fd;kA ¼6½ ;g fd mlds mijkar uoy flag lsaxj ifjokfn;k ds ?kj vk;k vkSj cksyk fd rqe fpark er djks eSa rqels 'kknh d:axk vkSj ifjokfn;k ds lkFk iqu% tcju voS/k laca/k cuk,A** On the basis of these facts, she sought implication of present petitioners. Later on, her statement along with her mother has been taken in which this fact again surfaced that she was in love with petitioner Naval Singh and wanted to marry him and on his allurement to marry, she surrendered herself and both shared physical intimacy. Same is the version of her mother. 12. On close scrutiny, it appears that respondent No. 1 is aggrieved by the refusal of petitioner No. 2-Naval Singh to marry her when she divorced her husband Sanjay Jainwar. Therefore, judgments passed by the apex Court in the case of Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra [ AIR 2019 SC 327 ] and in the case of Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra [(2019) SCC Online SC 1073] can be profitably followed here to exonerate the petitioners from the clutches of investigation. Only on the basis of false promise of marriage, petitioners if shared physical proximity, then it is not a culpable act as defined under section 375 of IPC. 13. On other counts also, case of the complainant loses its sheen because omnibus allegations have been levelled in private complaint and she nowhere referred the dates or time of incidents occurred against her. Even otherwise, if the rape has been committed prior to 2016, then what restrained her to wait till December 2017 to lodge complaint is a mystery which has not been successfully addressed by the counsel for the complainant. It is not the case where petitioner No. 2-Naval Singh forced himself over respondent No. 1 without her wish, rather because of emotional intimacy, physical intimacy was shared by the parties, therefore, at belated stage complaint regarding loss of vanity, modesty or integrity of respondent No. 1 cannot be raised as it appears to be an afterthought of relationship which turned soured because of attitude of the parties. 14. In her complaint under section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 she referred the fact that cause of her divorce is her father and brother and in private complaint she attributes the allegation over petitioner, that too in casual style without submitting proper documents and without establishing the role of petitioners in outraging her modesty or committing rape. 15. In her complaint under section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 she referred the fact that cause of her divorce is her father and brother and in private complaint she attributes the allegation over petitioner, that too in casual style without submitting proper documents and without establishing the role of petitioners in outraging her modesty or committing rape. 15. In the considered opinion of this Court, trial Court rightly declined to take cognizance in the matter and rightly passed the order and revisional Court erred in taking cognizance so far as section 376 read with section 34 of IPC is concerned. One interesting aspect in the case is that she took money as alimony of Rs. 2.25 lac from her earlier husband to whom she gave divorce under section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, and therefore, possibility cannot be ruled out that reason for taking divorce was not exactly the same as tried to be projected. 16. Resultantly, the petition is allowed and the order of the revisional Court so far as offence under section 376 read with section 34 of IPC is concerned is set aside. Consequently, private complaint stands rejected.