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2020 DIGILAW 326 (MP)

Ranjeet Singh Yadav v. State Of M. P. And Another

2020-02-28

RAJEEV KUMAR SHRIVASTAVA, SHEEL NAGU

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JUDGMENT Rajeev Kumar Shrivastava, J. - This writ appeal under Section 2(1) of Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya Ko Appeal Adhiniyam, 2005, has been filed against the order dated 10.1.2020 passed in Writ Petition No. 23664/20193, whereby the petition filed by the petitioner has been dismissed with cost. 2. During the course of argument, learned counsel for the appellant at the outset has submitted that he is not pressing the writ appeal on merits and he is only praying that the direction given by the learned Writ Court to deposit cost be waived as the appellant is class-4 employee and he has already joined at the transferred place of posting and working there. 3. Since the appellant has confined his prayer to the cost part of the direction given by learned Writ Court, therefore, it is not necessary to state entire facts of the case to unnecessarily burden the judgment. 4. From perusal of the impugned order, it is apparent that the learned Writ Court has observed in its order that the appellant/petitioner was transferred from Gram Panchayat Dangorafut, Ashoknagar to Gram Panchayat Bhariyakhedi, Chanderi. Now it is stated by learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant has joined at the new place of posting, i.e. Gram Panchayat Bhariyakhedi, Chanderi. Learned Writ Court has imposed the cost upon the petitioner on the following grounds:- "7. Further, the respondents have filed the application made by the petitioner for grant of leave, which was sanctioned by the Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat Ashoknagar and the remark under clause 14 of the said application reads as under:- "14- Order of the sanctioning authority Lohd`fr nsus okys vf/kdkjh ds vkns'k eŒÁŒ vodk'k ys[kk fu;e 1977 ds fu;eksa ds Áko/kku vuqlkj Jh jathr flag ;kno lfpo xzke iapk;r MaxksjkQwV dk fnukad 2-8-2019 ls 20-8-2019 rd dqy 19 fnol dk vftZr vodk'k Lohd`r fd;k tkrk gSA buds vodk'k ys[ks esa 180 fnol dk LoRo gS 180 fnol esa ls 19 fnol de dj 'ks"k 161 fnol 'ks"k LoRo jgkA fnukad 2-09-2019A** 8. In this remark also the petitioner has been shown to be the Secretary of Gram Panchayat Dangorafut. In this remark also the petitioner has been shown to be the Secretary of Gram Panchayat Dangorafut. It is undisputed fact that Gram Panchayat Dangorafut falls within Janpad Panchayat Ashoknagar, whereas Gram Panchayat Manheti falls within the Janpad Panchayat Ishagarh, District Ashoknagar, therefore, it is clear that the petitioner never submitted his joining in Gram Panchayat Manheti, District Ashoknagar and with an intention to create a false ground of frequent transfer not only the petitioner has filed the concocted and created joining report dated 21/7/2019, Annexure P/4, but has also made a specific pleading in the writ petition. This conduct of the petitioner is a clear attempt to mislead this Court and he had also succeeded in the same, as relying upon the pleadings as well as the documents filed by the petitioner, this Court by order dated 8/11/2019 had stayed the operation of the impugned order dated 25/10/2019. It is well settled principle of law that one who approaches the Court must come with clean hands. In view of the fact that the petitioner has not disputed the specific stand taken by the respondents to the effect that the petitioner had never submitted his joining in Gram Panchayat Manheti and in view of the fact that false pleading has been made and false and created document of joining has been filed by the petitioner as Annexure P/4, this Court shall later on consider the following question:- 'As to whether any cost be imposed on the petitioner and whether the contempt proceedings should be initiated against the petitioner or not?' However, the further grounds which have been raised by the petitioner shall be considered first. 9. It is the next contention of the petitioner that since in the present order it is merely mentioned that the petitioner has been transferred on the orders of the incharge Minister, District Ashoknagar, therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner has been transferred because of administrative exigency and further the impugned order dated 25/10/2019 is bad because the same has been passed under the orders of a politician. 10. Considered the submissions made by the counsel for the petitioner. 11. As per the transfer policy, under some circumstances concurrence of the incharge Minister is required. The petitioner has not challenged the transfer policy on the ground that the politician has no role to play in the service matter of the State employees. 10. Considered the submissions made by the counsel for the petitioner. 11. As per the transfer policy, under some circumstances concurrence of the incharge Minister is required. The petitioner has not challenged the transfer policy on the ground that the politician has no role to play in the service matter of the State employees. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Masood Ahmad Vs. State of U.P. and others reported in (2007) 8 SCC 150 has held as under:- '8. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the impugned transfer order of the appellant from Muzaffarnagar to Mawana, District Meerut was made at the instance of an MLA. On the other hand, it has been stated in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 that the appellant has been transferred due to complaints against him. In our opinion, even if the allegation of the appellant is correct that he was transferred on the recommendation of an MLA, that by itself would not vitiate the transfer order. After all, it is the duty of the representatives of the people in the legislature to express the grievances of the people and if there is any complaint against an official the State government is certainly within its jurisdiction to transfer such an employee. There can be no hard-and-fast rule that every transfer at the instance of an M.P. or MLA would be vitiated. It all depends on the facts & circumstances of an individual case. In the present case, we see no infirmity in the impugned transfer order." 12. Thus, even if a person has been transferred on the recommendation of a politician, then that by itself would not vitiate the transfer order because it is the duty of the representatives of the people to express the grievances of the people. The petitioner has not pointed out as to when he was posted for the first time in Gram Panchayat Dangorafut, District Ashoknagar. Thus, it is clear that the petitioner must have completed more than five years of his regular tenure. 13. The petitioner has not pointed out as to when he was posted for the first time in Gram Panchayat Dangorafut, District Ashoknagar. Thus, it is clear that the petitioner must have completed more than five years of his regular tenure. 13. So far as the submissions of the counsel for the petitioner that since it is not mentioned in the transfer order that the petitioner has been transferred in administrative exigency, therefore, it cannot be said that the transfer of the petitioner is in administrative exigency and since the petitioner had never requested for his transfer, therefore, his transfer order is bad are concerned, the same cannot be accepted. Since the transfer of the petitioner has not been passed on his own request, therefore, it has to be presumed that in the light of the orders issued by the incharge Minister, District Ashoknagar, the petitioner has been transferred in administrative exigency." The Supreme Court in the case of Bhaskar Laxman Jadhav v. Karamveer Kakasaheb Wagh Education Society, reported in [ (2013) 11 SCC 531 ] has held as under: 'Suppression of fact 42. While dealing with the conduct of the parties, we may also notice the submission of the learned counsel for Respondent 1 to the effect that the petitioners are guilty of suppression of a material fact from this Court, namely, the rejection on 2-5-2003 of the first application for extension of time filed by the trustees and the finality attached to it. These facts have not been clearly disclosed to this Court by the petitioners. It was submitted that in view of the suppression, special leave to appeal should not be granted to the petitioners. 43. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that no material facts have been withheld from this Court. It was submitted that while the order dated 2-5- 2003 was undoubtedly not filed, its existence was not material in view of subsequent developments that had taken place. We cannot agree. 44. It is not for a litigant to decide what fact is material for adjudicating a case and what is not material. It is the obligation of a litigant to disclose all the facts of a case and leave the decision-making to the court. True, there is a mention of the order dated 2- 5-2003 in the order dated 24-7-2006 passed by the JCC, but that is not enough disclosure. It is the obligation of a litigant to disclose all the facts of a case and leave the decision-making to the court. True, there is a mention of the order dated 2- 5-2003 in the order dated 24-7-2006 passed by the JCC, but that is not enough disclosure. The petitioners have not clearly disclosed the facts and circumstances in which the order dated 2-5-2003 was passed or that it has attained finality. 45. We may only refer to two cases on this subject. In Hari Narain v. Badri Das stress was laid on litigants eschewing inaccurate, untrue or misleading statements, otherwise leave granted to an appellant may be revoked. It was observed as follows: (AIR p. 1560, para 9) '9. It is of utmost importance that in making material statements and setting forth grounds in applications for special leave care must be taken not to make any statements which are inaccurate, untrue or misleading. In dealing with applications for special leave, the Court naturally takes statements of fact and grounds of fact contained in the petitions at their face value and it would be unfair to betray the confidence of the Court by making statements which are untrue and misleading. That is why we have come to the conclusion that in the present case, special leave granted to the appellant ought to be revoked. Accordingly, special leave is revoked and the appeal is dismissed. The appellant will pay the costs of the respondent." 46. More recently, in Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India the case law on the subject was discussed. It was held that if a litigant does not come to the court with clean hands, he is not entitled to be heard and indeed, such a person is not entitled to any relief from any judicial forum. It was said: (SCC p. 51, para 21) '21. The principle that a person who does not come to the court with clean hands is not entitled to be heard on the merits of his grievance and, in any case, such person is not entitled to any relief is applicable not only to the petitions filed under Articles 32, 226 and 136 of the Constitution but also to the cases instituted in others courts and judicial forums. The object underlying the principle is that every court is not only entitled but is duty-bound to protect itself from unscrupulous litigants who do not have any respect for truth and who try to pollute the stream of justice by resorting to falsehood or by making misstatement or by suppressing facts which have a bearing on adjudication of the issue(s) arising in the case." 47. A mere reference to the order dated 2-5-2003, en passant, in the order dated 24- 7-2006 does not serve the requirement of disclosure. It is not for the court to look into every word of the pleadings, documents and annexures to fish out a fact. It is for the litigant to come upfront and clean with all material facts and then, on the basis of the submissions made by the learned counsel, leave it to the court to determine whether or not a particular fact is relevant for arriving at a decision. Unfortunately, the petitioners have not done this and must suffer the consequence thereof." The Supreme Court in the case of Manohar Lal v. Ugrasen, reported in (2010) 11 SCC 557 has held as under: '48. The present appellants had also not disclosed that land allotted to them falls in commercial area. When a person approaches a court of equity in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, he should approach the court not only with clean hands but also with clean mind, clean heart and clean objective. 'Equally, the judicial process should never become an instrument of oppression or abuse or a means in the process of the court to subvert justice.' Who seeks equity must do equity. The legal maxim 'Jure naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem' means that it is a law of nature that one should not be enriched by the loss or injury to another. (Vide Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India, K.R. Srinivas v. R.M. Premchand and Noorduddin v. Dr. K.L. Anand at SCC p. 249, para 9.) 49. Similarly, in Ramniklal N. Bhutta v. State of Maharashtra this Court observed as under: (SCC p. 140, para 10) '10. The power under Article 226 is discretionary. It will be exercised only in furtherance of interests of justice and not merely on the making out of a legal point. the interests of justice and the public interest coalesce. Similarly, in Ramniklal N. Bhutta v. State of Maharashtra this Court observed as under: (SCC p. 140, para 10) '10. The power under Article 226 is discretionary. It will be exercised only in furtherance of interests of justice and not merely on the making out of a legal point. the interests of justice and the public interest coalesce. They are very often one and the same. The courts have to weigh the public interest vis-a-vis the private interest while exercising any of their discretionary powers." (emphasis added) 50. In Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, State of Haryana v. Karnal Distillery Co. Ltd. and Sabia Khan v. State of U.P. this Court held that filing a totally misconceived petition amounts to abuse of the process of the court. Such a litigant is not required to be dealt with lightly, as a petition containing misleading and inaccurate statement, if filed, to achieve an ulterior purpose amounts to abuse of the process of the court. A litigant is bound to make 'full and true disclosure of facts'. 51. In Abdul Rahman v. Prasony Bai, S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar and Oswal Fats & Oils Ltd. v. Commr. (Admn.) this Court held that whenever the court comes to the conclusion that the process of the court is being abused, the court would be justified in refusing to proceed further and refuse relief to the party. This rule has been evolved out of need of the courts to deter a litigant from abusing the process of the court by deceiving it." 5. In para 17 of the impugned order learned Writ Court has observed that 'since the petitioner is a Panchayat Secretary, therefore, this Court is of the considered opinion that it may be harsh in case if he is prosecuted for committing contempt of Court, however, if a person, howsoever rich or poor may be, makes an attempt to mislead the Court by filing false, created and concocted document and makes a false pleading before the Court, then he cannot be allowed to go scot free by showing leniency to him. 6. Learned Writ Court has already taken lenient view and considered the appellant on compassionate ground and has imposed cost only instead of prosecuting him under Contempt of Courts Act. 6. Learned Writ Court has already taken lenient view and considered the appellant on compassionate ground and has imposed cost only instead of prosecuting him under Contempt of Courts Act. It is apparent from the impugned order itself that the appellant made an attempt to mislead the Court by filing false, created and concocted document and made a false pleading before the learned Writ Court. Therefore, cost of Rs.20000/- has been imposed, which appears to be appropriate in the present case and warrants no interference. 7. In the result, writ appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.