JUDGMENT : Assailing the order and decree dated 26.06.2006 in O.P. No.501 of 2005 passed by the Motor Vehicle Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-V Additional District Judge, Karimnagar (for short ‘the Tribunal’), the appellants filed the present appeal. 2. Vide the aforesaid order, the Tribunal has awarded an amount of Rs.2,23,460/- (Rupees two lakhs twenty three thousand four hundred and sixty only), after deducting an amount of Rs.50,000/- claimed under no fault liability, towards compensation with proportionate costs and interest at 6% per annum thereon from the date of petition till the date of realization against respondent Nos.1 and 2 jointly and severally as against the claim of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees five lakhs only) laid by the appellants. 3. Heard Mr. Kandi Ramachandra Reddy, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. A. Ravi Babu, learned Standing Counsel for T.S.R.T.C. appearing on behalf of respondent No.2 4. It is relevant to note that on consideration of the entire evidence, the Tribunal gave a specific finding that the accident had occurred due to rash and negligent driving of RTC bus bearing registration No.AP 10Z 4821 driven by respondent No.1 belongs to respondent No.2. Respondents did not prefer any appeal challenging the said finding and, therefore, the finding with regard to occurrence of accident on account of rash and negligent driving of respondent No.1 has attained finality. 5. The only issue that falls for consideration before this Court is with regard to the quantum of compensation. 6. It is not in dispute that appellant No.1 is the husband and appellant No.2 is daughter of the deceased. According to the appellants, the deceased was aged 30 years as on the date of accident and used to do beedi work and tailoring. According to them, the deceased used to earn a sum of Rs.3,000/- per month. However, the appellants did not file any document in proof of the age of the deceased as 30 years. In Ex.A3 - postmortem examination report, age of the deceased is mentioned as 35 years and in Ex.A7 - death certificate, her age is mentioned as 30 years. However, this Court is of the considered view that the age of the deceased mentioned in Ex.A3 - postmortem examination report shall be considered. In Ex.A3 - postmortem examination report, age of the deceased is mentioned as 35 years and in Ex.A7 - death certificate, her age is mentioned as 30 years. However, this Court is of the considered view that the age of the deceased mentioned in Ex.A3 - postmortem examination report shall be considered. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also categorically held that in the absence of any documentary evidence in proof of age of the deceased, the age mentioned in the post-mortem examination report shall be considered. In view of the same, the age of the deceased shall be considered as 35 years as mentioned in Ex.A3 - postmortem examination report. 7. According to the learned counsel for the appellants, the deceased used to do beedi work and tailoring work and used to earn an amount of Rs.3,000/- per month. In proof of the same, the appellants filed Ex.A10 - salary certificate and examined PW.3 and filed Exs.A11, copy of registration certificate of PW.3 and A12, Labour License of PW.3 to prove the monthly earning capacity of the deceased. However, the learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the accident had occurred on 31.12.2003. The learned counsel for the appellants by relying upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Laxmidhar Nayak v. Jugal Kishore Behera, 2018 (2) ALD 80 (SC) would contend that the Apex Court considered the monthly earning capacity of a house-hold as Rs.4,500/-. By relying upon decision of the Apex Court in Ramachandrappa v. The Manager, Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance Company Limited, (2011) 13 SCC 236 wherein the monthly earning capacity of the deceased coolie was considered as Rs.4,500/-, the learned counsel for the appellants would contend that though the appellants claimed the monthly earnings of the deceased as Rs.3,000/- as the amount of Rs.4,500/- per month can be considered as monthly earnings since in the present case the deceased was doing tailoring work as well as beedi work. 8. On perusal of the above said decisions, the Apex Court has considered the monthly earning capacity of a house-hold as Rs.4,500/- and so also to a coolie. 8. On perusal of the above said decisions, the Apex Court has considered the monthly earning capacity of a house-hold as Rs.4,500/- and so also to a coolie. Therefore, in the absence of any contra evidence and since respondent No.2 failed to elicit from the cross-examination of PW.1 and PW.3 to disprove the earning capacity of the deceased, this Court is of the considered view that the monthly earning capacity of the deceased shall be considered as Rs.4,500/-. 9. There are ‘2’ dependants and as per the decision of the Apex Court in Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation, (2009) 6 SCC 121 1/3rd has to be deducted from the income of the deceased towards personal and living expenses. On such deduction of Rs.1500/- (1/3rd of Rs.4,500/-), an amount of Rs.3,000/- per month or Rs.36,000/- per annum would be earning capacity of the deceased. The relevant multiplier for the age groups of 31-35 years is ‘16’ as per the decision of the Apex Court in Sarla Verma. Therefore, the appellants are entitled for Rs.5,76,000/- (Rs.3,000 x 16) towards loss of dependency. An addition of 40% of the income should be awarded to the appellants towards future prospects as per the principle held by the Apex Court National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 for the persons below 40 years and the same would work out to Rs.2,30,400/- (40% of Rs.5,76,000/-). 10. As per the principle held by the Apex Court in Magma General Insurance Company Limited v. Nanu Ram alias Chuhru Ram, (2018) 18 SCC 130 the appellants are entitled to Rs.15,000/- towards funeral expenses and Rs.15,000/- towards loss of estate. 11. Appellant No.1 is husband of the deceased, he is entitled for spousal consortium, while appellant No.2 being daughter of the deceased, she is entitled to parental compensation. Therefore, they are entitled to Rs.40,000/- each under the said heads as per the principle held in Magma General Insurance Company Limited, (supra). An amount of Rs.5,000/- is awarded towards transportation charges and Rs.1,000/- towards damages to clothes. 12. The appellants claimed an amount of Rs.2,10,000/- towards medical expenses and in support of the same, they have examined PW.4, the doctor, who treated the deceased apart from appellant No.1 examining himself as PW.1 and filed Ex.P6 - bunch of medical bills 9 in number. 12. The appellants claimed an amount of Rs.2,10,000/- towards medical expenses and in support of the same, they have examined PW.4, the doctor, who treated the deceased apart from appellant No.1 examining himself as PW.1 and filed Ex.P6 - bunch of medical bills 9 in number. The Tribunal on careful scrutiny of the said documents gave a finding that the hospital authorities obviously issued mechanical bills to satisfy the appellants for getting compensation and that the said practice on the part of hospital authorities in issuing bills in the name of a dead person should be deprecated. The Tribunal on scrutinizing the entire bills filed by the appellants held that the hospital authorities issued the bills in the name of the deceased that too after the death of the deceased. The Tribunal has awarded only an amount of Rs.1,03,460/- as against the claim of Rs.2,10,000/- on the ground that being a doctor of Poulomi Hospital, Hyderabad, PW.4 ought not to have given a statement without verifying the records that too when he was examined by a Commissioner at his convenient place. The respondent No.2 did not prefer any appeal challenge the said finding and award of Rs.1,03,460/- towards medical expenses. In the said circumstances, there is no error in granting the said amount and, therefore, the same is confirmed. 13. The appellants claimed an amount of Rs.15,000/- under the head of pain and suffering and the Tribunal declined to grant the same on the ground that after accident, the deceased was unconscious and died. 14. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the accident had occurred on 31.12.2003 and in the said accident, the deceased sustained grievous injuries. She was shifted to Area Government Hospital, Jagtial and, on the advice of the doctors the deceased was shifted to NIMS and again to Poulomi Hospital, Hyderabad on 01.01.2004 wherein she was survived for about 15 days. According to the appellants, the deceased died on 13.01.2004. The appellants have also examined PW.4, the doctor of Poulomi Hospital who treated the deceased. According to PW.4, the deceased was brought in unconscious condition to their hospital and that the deceased was unconscious till 12.01.2004 and died at 7.30 a.m. on 13.01.2004. According to the appellants, the deceased died on 13.01.2004. The appellants have also examined PW.4, the doctor of Poulomi Hospital who treated the deceased. According to PW.4, the deceased was brought in unconscious condition to their hospital and that the deceased was unconscious till 12.01.2004 and died at 7.30 a.m. on 13.01.2004. Except PW.4’s evidence that the deceased was brought to their hospital in unconscious condition, there is no other evidence to show that the deceased was in unconscious state immediately after the accident. It is also relevant from the deposition of PW.4 the deceased was admitted in Poulomi Hospital on 01.01.2004 at 5.00 a.m., whereas the accident had occurred on 31.12.2003 at 9.30 p.m. As stated supra, there is no evidence and respondent No.2 failed to elicit anything from PW.1 and PW.2 during cross-examination that immediately after the accident, the deceased went in coma or was in unconscious condition. 15. It is contended by the learned counsel for respondent No.2 that immediately after the accident i.e., 31.12.2003 at 9.30 p.m., the deceased went in coma/unconscious condition and therefore, the appellants are not entitled for any amount under the head of ‘pain and suffering. According to him, the Tribunal rightly came to the conclusion that the deceased was in unconscious condition after the accident and, therefore, the appellants are not entitled for any amount under the said head. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for respondent No.2 relied on a decision in H. West & son Ltd. v. Shephard, (1963) 1 WLR 1359 wherein the House of Lords had an occasion to deal with the issue of awarding compensation under the head of ‘pain and suffering’. In the said decision, the House of Lords have also dealt with the origination of awarding compensation under the head of ‘pain and suffering’ and referred about 118 cases on the said issue and finally held that by reason of an injury someone is made unconscious either for a short or for a prolonged period with the result that he does not feel pain then he needs no monetary compensation in respect of pain because he will not have suffered it. It was also held that apart from actual physical pain it may often be that some physical injury causes distress or fear or anxiety. It was also held that apart from actual physical pain it may often be that some physical injury causes distress or fear or anxiety. If for example personal injuries include the loss of a leg there may be much physical suffering, there will be the actual loss of the leg (a loss the gravity of which will depend upon the particular circumstances of the particular case) and there may be (depending upon particular circumstances) elements of consequential worry and anxiety. One part of the affliction (again depending upon particular circumstances) may be an inevitable and constant awareness of the deprivations which the loss of the leg entails. These are all matters which judges take into account. In this connection also the length of the period of life during which the deprivations will continue will be a relevant factor. 16. It was also further held that to the extent to which any of these last-mentioned matters depend for their existence upon an awareness in the victim it must follow that they will not exist and will not call for compensation if the victim is unconscious. An unconscious person will be spared pain and suffering and will not experience the mental anguish which may result from knowledge of what has in life been lost or from knowledge that life has been shortened. The fact of unconsciousness is therefore relevant in respect of and will eliminate those heads or elements of damage which can only exist by being felt or thought or experienced. The fact of unconsciousness does not, however, eliminate the actuality of the deprivations of the ordinary experiences and amenities of life which may be the inevitable result of some physical injury. 17. It was further held by the House of Lords that the compensation should be for pain and suffering actually experienced. Loss of consciousness, however caused, whether by the injury itself or produced by drugs or anesthetics, means that physical pain is not experienced and so has not to be compensated for; and this must be true also of mental pain. Then there is or may be a temporary or permanent loss of a limb, organ or faculty. Whether it is the limb itself that is lost or the use of it is immaterial. What is to be compensated for is the loss of use and the deprivation thereby occasioned. Then there is or may be a temporary or permanent loss of a limb, organ or faculty. Whether it is the limb itself that is lost or the use of it is immaterial. What is to be compensated for is the loss of use and the deprivation thereby occasioned. It is also further held that this deprivation may bring with it three consequences. Firstly, it may result in loss of earnings and they can be calculated. Secondly, it may put the victim to expense in that he has to pay others for doing what he formerly did for himself; and that also can be calculated. Thirdly, it produces loss of enjoyment, loss of amenities as it is sometimes called, a diminution in the full pleasure of living. This is incalculable and at large. This deprivation with its three consequences is something that is personal to the victim. Putting an arbitrary value on the loss of a limb as is commonly done in an accident insurance policy is not proper. Must ascertain the use to which the limb would have been put so as to ascertain what it is that the victim has actually been deprived of. 18. The House of Lords also further held that where there is no knowledge of the deprivation, nothing more than a conventional sum of the same order as that assessed on the Benham v. Gambling principle should be awarded for deprivation of faculties. Indeed, where, as in Wise v. Kaye, the injury causes total unconsciousness which lasts until death, it can see no justification for two awards,- one for deprivation, which although inflicted on a living victim is not experienced by him, and the other, for loss of expectation of life that is also not experienced. To its mind there is then only one deprivation and the passing of unconsciousness into death does not make a second one. 19. The House of Lords by referring a case in Wise v. Kaye, (1962) 1 Q.B. 638 held that where a plaintiff became and remained unconscious over the years with no prospect of regaining consciousness should be equated to a living death and should fall within the principle of Benham. Although it is tempting and easy to make that equation, it does not think that it is necessary or just to do so, and it agrees with the majority decision in Wise to that effect. Although it is tempting and easy to make that equation, it does not think that it is necessary or just to do so, and it agrees with the majority decision in Wise to that effect. Benham artificially and drastically limited the liability of defendants in respect of loss of expectation of life. But it would not extend that artificial limitation to any claims for loss of some or even all of the amenities of living during a plaintiff's life however low that life may have been brought. 20. Finally, the House of Lords held that the Courts have to analyze critically with regard to the evidence, both oral and documentary for assessing the award of compensation under the head ‘pain and suffering’. The Courts have to consider on a fact-situation where the deceased fell unconscious immediately after the accident or suffered pain and suffering and thereafter fell unconscious. The Courts have also to assess the shocking received by the deceased due to the accident. Finally, in the said case, the House of Lords held that award of compensation under the head ‘pain and suffering’ should be on a critical scrutiny of evidence, both oral and documentary. 21. The learned counsel for respondent No.2 has also relied on the principle held by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in K. Sapana v. B. Appa Rao, 1987 (2) ALT 349 wherein this Court by considered its earlier decisions reported in P. satyanarayana v. P. Babu Rajendra Prasad, 1987 (2) ALT 328 and Bhagwandas v. Mohd. Arif, 1987 (2) ALT 137 with regard to awarding compensation under the head ‘pain and suffering’. This Court in the said judgments have also considered the origination of award of compensation under the head ‘pain and suffering’ by referring various judgments including the judgments of English Courts and finally held that in the case of ‘pain and suffering’, only moderate damages on the theory that an unconscious plaintiff could not feel pain and suffering. In Australia and Canada, unfortunately for all these three types of non-pecuniary damages, the award is made on a 'functional' basis and not on a full compensation basis, the theory being that the money must serve a useful function and is not meant to enrich the victim's legal representatives at the end of his life. 22. In Australia and Canada, unfortunately for all these three types of non-pecuniary damages, the award is made on a 'functional' basis and not on a full compensation basis, the theory being that the money must serve a useful function and is not meant to enrich the victim's legal representatives at the end of his life. 22. This Court has also held that the deceased is conscious and is in a position to experience all these three types of losses including pain and suffering, shock, loss of amenities of life, loss of expectation of life, disfigurement, discomfort and inconvenience etc. (both past and future), substantial damages have to be awarded for all these three types of non-pecuniary damages. It was also held that non-pecuniary damages for 'loss of expectation of life', 'loss of amenities of life' and for 'pain and suffering' are awarded both in cases of injured as well as in cases by dependants of a person dying in a fatal accident. In the latter type of cases, i.e., fatal cases, the damages awarded for these non-pecuniary losses go into the award towards loss to the 'estate'. In the said judgment, this Court has also considered with regard to shock including nervous shock accompanies physical injuries, it too qualifies for damages as a part of 'pain and suffering'. The shock may give rise, at a later stage, to adverse physical effects. It was also held that large damages have been granted for shock and consequent neurosis when a wife saw her husband killed. This Court has also discussed with regard to the pain and suffering and damages to be awarded and finally held that the Tribunals/Courts have to consider the award of compensation under the head ‘pain and suffering’ on the critical analysis of the entire evidence, both oral and documentary on the basis of fact-situation of that particular case. 23. The learned counsel for respondent No.2 has also relied upon the principle held by the Apex Court in Raman v. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. (2014) 15 SCC 1 , wherein the Apex Court relying upon the decision in Balram Prasad v. Kunal Saha, (2014) 1 SCC 384 and other cases held that the Courts/Tribunals have to award compensation by analyzing the fact-situation on consideration of evidence, both oral and documentary. In the said judgment, the Apex Court held that even though the claimant may die from his injuries shortly after the accident, the evidence may justify an award under this head. Shock should also be taken account of as an ingredient of pain and suffering and the claimant's particular circumstances may well be highly relevant to the extent of her suffering of the deceased. It was further held in the said decision that by considering the nature of amenities lost and the injury and pain in the particular case, the court must assess the effect upon the particular claimant. In deciding the appropriate award of damages, an important consideration show long will he be deprived of those amenities and how long the pain and suffering has been and will be endured. If it is for the rest of his life the court will need to take into account in assessing damages the claimant's age and his expectation in life. With the said findings, the Apex Court held that the Courts/Tribunals shall assess the compensation under the head ‘pain and suffering’ on a fact-situation of a particular case. 24. The learned counsel for the appellants have also relied upon the very same judgment and would contend that in the said decision, the Apex Court considered the issue of ‘shock’ on account of the accident received by the deceased shall be taken into consideration for awarding compensation under the head ‘pain and suffering’. Whereas, the learned counsel for respondent No.2 would contend that the deceased went in coma/unconscious condition immediately after the accident and she did not suffer any pain and, therefore, the appellants are not entitled for any compensation under the head ‘pain and suffering’. The learned counsel for the appellants would further contend that there is no evidence to show that the deceased went in coma/unconscious condition immediately after the accident except the evidence of PW.4 that the deceased was in unconscious condition when she was admitted in their hospital on 01.01.2004 at 5.00 a.m. According to him, the deceased received shock and, therefore, she had suffered pain. Therefore, considering the entire facts including deposition of PW.4, doctor, the appellants are entitled for the compensation under the head ‘pain and suffering’. 25. Therefore, considering the entire facts including deposition of PW.4, doctor, the appellants are entitled for the compensation under the head ‘pain and suffering’. 25. The House of Lords, the Apex Court and this Court categorically held that the Tribunals/Courts have to assess ‘pain and suffering’, ‘shock’ received by the deceased while awarding compensation under the head ‘pain and suffering’ in a fact-situation. The Tribunals/Courts have to examine each case with cogent evidence, both oral and documentary of a particular case. 26. As discussed supra, in the present case, admittedly, the accident had occurred on 31.12.2003 at 9.30 p.m. and the deceased was immediately shifted to Area Government Hospital, Jagtial and on the advice of the doctors, she was shifted to NIMS and thereafter to Poulomi Hospital, Hyderabad on 01.01.2004 for better treatment. There is no evidence that the deceased went in coma/unconscious condition immediately after the accident. The respondents did not elicit anything during cross-examination of PWs.1 to 4 that the deceased went in coma/unconscious condition immediately after the accident. The deceased received grievous injuries. She was in shock and suffered pain due to the injuries sustained by her in the accident. Ultimately 15 days thereafter she died. 27. On the analysis of the entire evidence, as discussed supra, the appellants in the present case are entitled for compensation under the head ‘pain and suffering’. Therefore, the appellants are entitled for Rs.20,000/- as against the claim of Rs.10,000/- sought by the appellants. 28. The Tribunal has awarded the rate of interest at 6% per annum. The learned counsel for the appellants relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Sube Singh v. Shyam Singh (dead), 2018 (1) HLT 302 (SC) wherein the rate of interest was enhanced to 9% per annum from 6% per annum. In the said case, the accident had occurred in the year 2009, whereas the accident in the case on hand had occurred in the year 2003. Therefore, the appellants are entitled the interest only @ 7.5% per annum from the date of petition till realization instead of 6% granted by the Tribunal. 29. In the said case, the accident had occurred in the year 2009, whereas the accident in the case on hand had occurred in the year 2003. Therefore, the appellants are entitled the interest only @ 7.5% per annum from the date of petition till realization instead of 6% granted by the Tribunal. 29. In view of the above discussion, the appellants are entitled to Rs.10,45,860 and rounding it off to Rs.10,46,000/- (Rupees ten lakhs forty six thousand only) as compensation under the following heads: (i) Loss of dependency Rs.5,76,000.00 (ii) Future prospects at 40% Rs.2,30,400.00 (iii) Pain and Suffering Rs.20,000.00 (iv) Funeral expenses Rs.15,000.00 (v) Loss of estate Rs.15,000.00 (vi) Spousal Consortium Rs.40,000.00 (vii) Parental consortium Rs.40,000.00 (viii) Medical expenses Rs.1,03,460.00 (ix) Transportation Charges Rs.5,000.00 (x) Damages to clothes Rs.1,000.00 Total Rs.10,45,860.00 30. In the result, the appeal filed by the appellants - claimants is allowed. Accordingly, the order and decree dated 26.06.2006 in O.P. No.501 of 2005 passed by the Tribunal are modified enhancing the compensation to Rs.10,46,000/- (Rupees ten lakhs forty six thousand only) from Rs.2,23,460/-(Rupees two lakhs twenty three thousand four hundred and sixty only) with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum thereon from the date of petition till realization. The compensation amount shall be apportioned between the appellants - claimants in the same proportion in which original compensation amounts were directed to be apportioned by the Tribunal. The claimants are directed to pay the deficit court fee within one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. Similarly, Respondent No.2 is directed to deposit the above said amount with interest and costs, after deducting the amount, if any, deposited earlier within one month from the date of receipt of certified copy of this judgment. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, Miscellaneous Applications, if any, pending in the appeal shall stand closed.