JUDGMENT : 1. The present writ petition has been filed, inter alia, seeking following prayers: “6(A) That Your Lordships be pleased to issue an order, direction and/or writ in the nature of certiorari and/or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 21-9-2011 marked ANN.I, being absolutely, illegal, arbitrary and discriminatory and be further pleased to direct the respondent to issue immediate appointment order to the petitioner and or revive the order of appointment already issued to the petitioner dated 23-6-2011 marked ANN.E, to this petition. (B) That Your Lordships be further pleased to direct the respondent to take action on the letter dated 27-6-2012 from Deputy Secretary, Urja and Petro-chemicals Department, Sachivalaya, Gandhinagar, and be further pleased to direct the respondent to disclose before this Hon'ble Court the action taken on the said letter dated 27-6-2012.” 2. The brief facts of the case leading to filing of the present writ petition are as under: 2.1. The petitioner had applied to the post of Assistant Personnel Officer pursuant to the advertisement issued by the respondent on 23.02.2011. Accordingly, the petitioner was called for the written test and it is the case of the petitioner that she was placed at serial No.3 having obtained highest marks, however, no appointment order was issued to the petitioner. 3. Learned advocate Ms.Dimple Thaker appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner received a letter on 23.06.2011 appointing her on the aforesaid post, but the same was never given effect, hence it is contended that such action of the respondent is contrary to the violation of principles of natural justice. She has also invited the attention of this Court to the Office Note dated 21.06.2011, wherein the petitioner has secured 42 marks in the written test, who was the only candidate who has been appointed on the aforesaid post. 3.1. It is further submitted that the action of the respondent in denying the appointment due to lack of experience as specified in the advertisement is contrary to the regulations of the respondent-Company since as per the requirement of regulations, only 3 years' experience is required and the petitioner possesses 4 ½ years' experience and hence, as per the clause stated in the advertisement, more particularly clause no.2, the respondent-Company was required to give relaxation to the petitioner. She has submitted that subsequently, the petitioner has acquired the experience; hence she is entitled to the appointment. Thus, she has submitted that the impugned order dated 21.09.2011 cancelling her appointment order is required to be set aside. 3.2 In support of her submissions, learned advocate Mr.Thaker has placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of R.S.Garg V/s. State of U.P. & Ors., (2006) 6 S.C.C. 430 , the judgment of the Patna High Court in the case of Arya Chandra Kumar V/s. The State, 1973 [1] S.L.R. 744, the judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of Shrawan Kumar Jha & Ors. V/s. State of Bihar & Ors., 1991 Supp (1) S.C.C. 330, in the case of K.Jagannadham V/s. District Collector, AIR 1996 Andhra Pradesh 59 and in the case of Shridhar S/o Ram Dular V/s. Nagar Palika, Jaunpur & Ors., 1990 (Supp) S.S.C. 157. Thus, she has submitted that the appointment cannot be cancelled without hearing the petitioner and hence, the impugned orders are required to be set aside. 4. Per contra, learned advocate Ms.Lilu K. Bhaya appearing for the respondent no.1-Company has submitted that since the petitioner herself has admitted that she is not having the requisite experience as specified in the advertisement, hence she was not appointed on the aforesaid post. She has further asserted that in fact the appointment order, which is placed on the record of the writ petition itself, is procured by illegal means as the same was never issued. She has submitted that the father of the petitioner was serving in the HR Section of the respondent-Company and the appointment letter in fact was withdrawn by the respondent-Company however, the same is procured by the petitioner by taking aid of her father and hence, the petition is required to be dismissed only on this ground. 4.1 Learned advocate Ms.Lilu K. Bhaya for the respondent no.1- Company has submitted that in fact the letter was addressed to the postmaster not to issue the aforesaid letter, however, it is surprising that the same has been obtained by the petitioner. Thus, she has submitted that since the respondent-Company has found that the petitioner was lacking in the experience of 5 years, as stated in the advertisement, no discretion was exercised in her favour for relaxing her qualification. Thus, she has submitted that since the respondent-Company has found that the petitioner was lacking in the experience of 5 years, as stated in the advertisement, no discretion was exercised in her favour for relaxing her qualification. It is contended that the appointment order was in fact not issued to the petitioner and hence, there is no need of granting any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. She has submitted that in fact no right has accrued in favour of the petitioner on the aforesaid post. Thus, she has submitted that since the appointment order was never issued to the petitioner; it was not mandatory to grant any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. 5. I have heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties. 6. The advertisement dated 23.02.2011, which was issued by the respondent-Company for filling up the post of Assistant Personnel Officer (HR) specifically mandates that a candidate should possess experience of minimum 5 years post qualification in HR side in reputed large scale organization in the field of HR & IR. It is an admitted position that the petitioner does not have the aforesaid experience. The main plank of the petitioner is that the appointment order should not have been cancelled without giving any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. The aforesaid submission does not merit acceptance since unquestionably, the appointment order, which is produced on record is not officially communicated to the petitioner and the petitioner has in fact not worked on the aforesaid post. Thus, there was no right accrued in favour of the petitioner since the respondents have specifically taken a stand in their affidavit which is not controverted that such appointment letter was not officially communicated to the petitioner and it was cancelled because she had only 4 years' and 3 months' experience which does not fulfill the criterion of experience of 5 years as stipulated in the advertisement. 7. At this stage, it would be apposite to refer to the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of Rakesh Kumar Sharma V/s. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors., (2013) 11 S.C.C. 58 . The Supreme Court held thus: “22. 7. At this stage, it would be apposite to refer to the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of Rakesh Kumar Sharma V/s. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors., (2013) 11 S.C.C. 58 . The Supreme Court held thus: “22. It also needs to be noted that like the present appellant there could be large number of candidates who were not eligible as per the requirement of rules/advertisement since they did not possess the required eligibility on the last date of submission of the application forms. Granting any benefit to the appellant would be violative of the doctrine of equality, a backbone of the fundamental rights under our Constitution. A large number of such candidates may not have applied considering themselves to be ineligible adhering to the statutory rules and the terms of the advertisement. 23. There is no obligation on the court to protect an illegal appointment. The extraordinary power of the court should be used only in an appropriate case to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat the rights of others or create arbitrariness. Usurpation of a post by an ineligible candidate in any circumstance is impermissible. The process of verification and notice of termination in the instant case followed within a very short proximity of the appointment and was not delayed at all so as to even remotely give rise to an expectancy of continuance.” The Supreme Court has held that there can be no dispute to the settled legal proposition that the selection process commences on the date when applications are invited. Any person eligible on the last date of submission of the application has a right to be considered against the said vacancy provided he fulfills the requisite qualification. The Supreme Court has further held that there could be large number of candidates who were not eligible as per the requirement of rules/advertisement since they did not possess the required eligibility on the last date of submission of the application forms. Granting any benefit to the appellant would be violative of the doctrine of equality, a backbone of the fundamental rights under our Constitution. 8. Thus, if any relaxation is provided to the petitioner, the same would be discriminatory and violative of doctrine of equality as the candidates, who had applied pursuant to the present advertisement would be left out. Granting any benefit to the appellant would be violative of the doctrine of equality, a backbone of the fundamental rights under our Constitution. 8. Thus, if any relaxation is provided to the petitioner, the same would be discriminatory and violative of doctrine of equality as the candidates, who had applied pursuant to the present advertisement would be left out. The Supreme Court has further held that there is no obligation on the court to protect an illegal appointment. The extraordinary power of the court should be used only in an appropriate case to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat the rights of others or create arbitrariness. 9. In the present case if any directions are issued by this Court appointing the petitioner then the same would result into an undue advantage to the petitioner as her appointment would be an illegal appointment de hors the requisite criterion of experience as prescribed in the advertisement. 10. Thus, any experience, which is gained after issuance of the advertisement would be futile as on the dates of filing the application, and advertisements unquestionably, the petitioner was not possessing the experience as required in the advertisement. It is contended by the petitioner that as per the regulations of the respondent-Company, 3 years' experience is required and hence, her case is required to be considered as per the regulations ignoring the experience specified in the advertisement. In the considered opinion of this Court such contention is misconceived since the petitioner knowingly fully well that as per the advertisement, the requisite qualification of experience is 5 years has participated in the recruitment process after undertaking the process, she cannot contended that she would be governed by the regulation and not as per the criteria prescribed in the advertisement. 11. I may with profit incorporate the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of DR. J. Shashidhara Prasad V/s. Governor of Karnataka & Anr., (1999) 1 S.C.C. 422 . The Supreme Court has held thus: “14.Learned counsel for the appellant cited the judgment in Jagdish Mitter vs. Union of India AIR 1964 Supreme Court 449 in support of his contention. It is seen that the facts of that case are entirely different and in the view which have expressed on the facts of this case. It is not necessary to consider the said ruling. It is seen that the facts of that case are entirely different and in the view which have expressed on the facts of this case. It is not necessary to consider the said ruling. 15.Learned counsel placed reliance on the decision in Dr. Bool Chand vs. the chancellor, Kurukshetra University 1968 (1) SCR 434 and drew our attention to certain passages in that judgment but we find that on the facts of that case, it was held that sufficient opportunity had been given to the person aggrieved and the order of termination was upheld. The ruling will not have any bearing in the present case. 16. Learned counsel invited our attention to the Judgment in D. Subba Rao vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1975 SC 94 . The Division Bench in that case, while quashing the removal of the President of Panchayat Samithi on the ground that he was denied an opportunity to be heard, directed the concerned authority to give an opportunity to him to make his representation against the charges set out in the notice and till an order was passed, the position which was then obtained was to be maintained provisionally. The facts of the case are entirely different and will not help the appellant herein. 17. The next decision referred to is the judgment in C L Kapoor vs. Jagmohan & Ors. (1981)1 SCR 746 . Reliance was placed on the following passage in the judgment: "In our view the principles of natural justice know of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any difference if natural justice had been observed. The nonobservance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It will come from a person who has denied justice that the person who has been denied justice is not prejudiced. The nonobservance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It will come from a person who has denied justice that the person who has been denied justice is not prejudiced. As we said earlier where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the Court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it is not necessary to observe natural justice but because Courts do not issue futile writs." The aforesaid passage itself shows that the Court will refuse to issue a writ which will be futile even after there had been failure to observe the principles of natural justice. On the facts of the present case, it is not disputed that the chancellor has appointed the second respondent as Vice chancellor after cancelling the appointment of the appellant. It is also not disputed that the criminal case was pending against the appellant on the date on which the order of cancellation of the appellant was made.” The Supreme Court has held that a candidate selected for appointment to a civil post, does not acquire an indefeasible right to be appointed in such post in absence of any specific rule entitling him for such appointment and he could be aggrieved by his non-appointment only when the administration does so either arbitrarily or for no bona fide reasons. It follows as a necessary concomitant that such candidate even if has a legitimate expectation of being appointed in such posts due to his name finding a place in the select list of candidates, cannot claim to have a right to be heard before such select list is cancelled for bona fide and valid reasons and not arbitrarily. It is further held by the Supreme Court that principles of natural justice know of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any difference if natural justice had been observed. The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It is further held by the Supreme Court that principles of natural justice know of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any difference if natural justice had been observed. The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It is further held that on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the Court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it is not necessary to observe natural justice but because Courts do not issue futile writs. Thus, there cannot be any cavil on the law enunciated by the Apex Court in the judgments cited at the bar, that once a candidate is appointed and has worked on the post, her/his appointment cannot be set aside without following the principles of natural justice. In the present case, the petitioner has not been officially communicated the appointment order and she has not worked on the post, hence no right has accrued in her favour to claim the appointment de hors the eligibility criterion. Thus, the decisions on which reliance is placed by the petitioner will not come to her rescue in wake of the fact that she was not actually appointed on the post. 12. In the present case, assuming the contention of the petitioner is accepted before passing any orders cancelling the appointment, an opportunity of hearing was necessitated, the same would result in the futile exercise as unquestionably the petitioner is not having the requisite qualification as required under the advertisement. 13. The present writ petition fails legal scrutiny. The same is dismissed. Rule is discharged.