JUDGMENT : The present writ petition has been filed for issuance of direction upon the respondent-Bank to show cause as to how a property registered in the name of the petitioner and his mother, who are in possession for more than 12 years, can be put to auction-sale for recovery of bank dues on the basis of sale deed mortgaged by one Birendra Kumar Singh showing himself to be the purported owner of the property. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is the purchaser of property in question i.e. Duplex No. Akansha-2, Goutam Green City, Plot No. 367, sub-plot No.-367/2, Khata no. 70, Thana no. 166, Village- Getlatu, District-Ranchi, measuring an area of 1000.50 sq. ft. The said property was sold to him and his mother by one Renu Singh-Chairperson of M/s. Gautam Construction & Developers Pvt. Ltd. for a valuable consideration of Rs. 17,01,111/- in the year 2007 and since then the petitioner is in possession of the same. However to his utter surprise, on 01.07.2012, he found a notice issued by the respondent-Bank under Section 13(4) of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets & Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (in short to be referred as “the SARFAESI Act”, 2002) pasted on his premises. On inquiry, the petitioner came to know that the sale deed of the same property was mortgaged by one Birendra Kumar Singh before the respondent-Bank for obtaining housing loan. The petitioner is neither the borrower nor a guarantor of any loan taken from the respondent-Bank and as such he has approached this Court by filing the present writ petition. 3. Mr. Ashok Kumar Yadav, learned counsel for the respondent-Bank, submits that the present writ petition is not maintainable as the petitioner has efficacious and statutory remedy under Sections 17 and 18 of the SARFAESI Act”, 2002 as well as under Section 30 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (in short “the Act, 1993”) as the property in question has been put to auction by the order of the Recovery Officer, Debts Recovery Tribunal, Ranchi. 4. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 5. The petitioner appears to be a third party and as such comes under the expression “any person” used in Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act”, 2002. 4. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 5. The petitioner appears to be a third party and as such comes under the expression “any person” used in Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act”, 2002. While considering the issue as to whether any third party can prefer application before the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act”, 2002 being affected by the action taken by the respondent-Bank under Section 13 (4) and Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act”, 2002, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tondon & Ors. reported in (2010) 8 SCC 110 , has held as under: “42. There is another reason why the impugned order should be set aside. If Respondent 1 had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under Section 13(4) or action taken under Section 14, then she could have availed remedy by filing an application under Section 17(1). The expression “any person” used in Section 17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not only the borrower but also the guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under Section 13(4) or Section 14. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective.” 6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a judgment rendered in the case of Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore and another Vs. Mathew K.C. reported in (2018) 3 SCC 85 while discussing the scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has held as under: “16. It is the solemn duty of the Court to apply the correct law without waiting for an objection to be raised by a party, especially when the law stands well settled. Any departure, if permissible, has to be for reasons discussed, of the case falling under a defined exception, duly discussed after noticing the relevant law. In financial matters grant of ex-parte interim orders can have a deleterious effect and it is not sufficient to say that the aggrieved has the remedy to move for vacating the interim order. Any departure, if permissible, has to be for reasons discussed, of the case falling under a defined exception, duly discussed after noticing the relevant law. In financial matters grant of ex-parte interim orders can have a deleterious effect and it is not sufficient to say that the aggrieved has the remedy to move for vacating the interim order. Loans by financial institutions are granted from public money generated at the tax payers expense. Such loan does not become the property of the person taking the loan, but retains its character of public money given in a fiduciary capacity as entrustment by the public. Timely repayment also ensures liquidity to facilitate loan to another in need, by circulation of the money and cannot be permitted to be blocked by frivolous litigation by those who can afford the luxury of the same. The caution required, as expressed in Satyawati Tandon (supra), has also not been kept in mind before passing the impugned interim order:- “46. It must be remembered that stay of an action initiated by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities for recovery of taxes, cess, fees, etc. seriously impedes execution of projects of public importance and disables them from discharging their constitutional and legal obligations towards the citizens. In cases relating to recovery of the dues of banks, financial institutions and secured creditors, stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of such bodies/institutions, which (sic will) ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of the nation. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in such matters. Of course, if the petitioner is able to show that its case falls within any of the exceptions carved out in Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad, Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks and Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. and some other judgments, then the High Court may, after considering all the relevant parameters and public interest, pass an appropriate interim order.” 17. The writ petition ought not to have been entertained and the interim order granted for the mere asking without assigning special reasons, and that too without even granting opportunity to the Appellant to contest the maintainability of the writ petition and failure to notice the subsequent developments in the interregnum. The writ petition ought not to have been entertained and the interim order granted for the mere asking without assigning special reasons, and that too without even granting opportunity to the Appellant to contest the maintainability of the writ petition and failure to notice the subsequent developments in the interregnum. The opinion of the Division Bench that the counter affidavit having subsequently been filed, stay/modification could be sought of the interim order cannot be considered sufficient justification to have declined interference.” 7. Hence keeping in view that the petitioner comes under the expression “any person” used in Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 and has the remedy of preferring an application under the SARFAESI Act, 2002, I am not inclined to entertain the present writ petition at this stage. Since the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the sale proclamation has been issued by the Recovery Officer, Debts Recovery Tribunal, Ranchi for putting the property in question to auction-sale, the petitioner is also at liberty to prefer an appeal under Section 30 of the Act, 1993 before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal. 8. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed as not maintainable with aforesaid liberty.