JUDGMENT : Shaji P. Chaly, J. Writ appeal is filed by the writ petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 10921 of 2017 challenging the interim direction dated 26.02.2020 issued by the learned single Judge. The order reads thus: “In the above view of the matter, there will be an interim direction to the 1st respondent to take an appropriate decision on the revised estimate proposal submitted by the Chief Engineer. The contentions of the petitioner, especially those highlighted in the reply affidavit, shall also be taken note of, while orders are passed. Appropriate orders shall be passed within a period of three weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The petitioner shall make available a copy of the writ petition and the reply affidavit before the 1st respondent.” 2. The subject matter of the writ petition relates to the award of a contract to the appellant. According to the appellant, the work was completed in the year 2014. However, the respondents have failed to release the bill amount in accordance with the revised estimate. It is submitted that because of the non-sanctioning of the revised estimate by the first respondent by including the Daily Labour Report (DLR) approved and released by the competent authority, the second respondent i.e., the Chief Engineer, PWD Roads and Bridges, Thiruvananthapuram, as per Ext.P3 and P8 recommendation, directing the Chief Engineer again and again to re-submit the revised estimate for the work as per Exts.P9 and P10 by the first respondent State, appellant was constrained to file the writ petition. It is also the case of the appellant that the claim raised by the appellant for the release of Rs.27,41,030/-covered by bill No. 595 dated 27.12.2015 in respect of the construction work of the Chethukadavu Bridge across the Kalilkavu river in Malappuram District is legally due to the appellant on the basis of Ext.P2 agreement, which is liable to be released by the respondents. 3. 3. The formidable contention advanced by the appellant is that while issuing the interim order, the learned single Judge had not evaluated the sustainability or otherwise of the new proposal mentioned in the additional counter affidavit, in view of the averments of the State Government in the earlier counter affidavit to the effect that the second respondent had repeatedly submitted favourable proposals to sanction the revised estimate, and the interim order is as good as the disposal of the writ petition, without evaluating the claims raised by the appellant on the basis of the substantive right accrued on account of the correspondences issued by the Chief Engineer to the Secretary to Government and other authorities. Yet another contention advanced is that instead of directing the Chief Engineer to take a decision, the learned single Judge ought to have taken a final decision in the writ petition itself and the attempt of the learned Single Judge is to find out the details with respect to the contract awarded and was making an attempt to adjudicate the issue calling for the materials from the respective statutory authority. Therefore, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, the attempt of the learned single Judge is in violation of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Mohinder Singh Gill and Others. v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and Ors. [ (1978) 1 SCC 405 ], wherein it was held that “the second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out.” Therefore, it is submitted that the learned single Judge went wrong in issuing the interim direction which is under challenge in the appeal. 4. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant, Smt. M.A. Vaheeda Babu, and learned Senior Government Pleader, Sri. Aravinda Kumar Babu, and perused the pleadings and documents on record. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant mainly addressed the arguments on the basis of the pleadings discussed above. 4. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant, Smt. M.A. Vaheeda Babu, and learned Senior Government Pleader, Sri. Aravinda Kumar Babu, and perused the pleadings and documents on record. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant mainly addressed the arguments on the basis of the pleadings discussed above. On the other hand, learned Senior Government Pleader submitted that the correspondences relied upon by the appellant as the basis for the claims raised in the writ petition are only internal correspondences, which would not secure any right to the appellant so as to claim the amounts raised in the writ petition. Moreover, it is submitted that the correspondences produced by the appellant would show that the claims raised by the appellant on the basis of the revised estimate was never concluded and no communications were issued to the appellant that the amount as is claimed is due to him. 6. Taking into account the arguments advanced, the immediate attempt of this Court would be to find out, whether as is claimed by the appellant, prima facie, there is any amount due on the basis of the alleged revised estimate. It is true that the appellant was making request to the statutory authority to make the final payment. It is also true that the Executive Engineer has addressed the Superintending Engineer, PWD Roads and Bridges, Kozhikode in respect of the revised estimate. However, fact remains, even though several correspondences were made by and between the officials, no communication was issued to the appellant at any point of time sanctioning the revised estimate in accordance with the claims raised. It is also true that the difficulties in the nature of work awarded to the appellant and the difficulty in removing the boulders was also pointed out by the Chief Engineer to the Secretary to Government and recommendations were made evident from Exts.P6, P8 and P9 communications by and between the authorities. But, on a reading of Ext.P10 issued by the Additional Chief Secretary to Government to the Chief Engineer (Roads and Bridges), Thiruvananthapuram dated 02.02.2017, it is evident that the issue with respect to the revised estimate was never concluded. The letter reads thus: GOVERNMENT OF KERALA PUBLIC WORKS (D) DEPARTMENT No. PWD-D1/54/2016/PWD Thiruvananthapuram Dated: 02.02.2017 From The Addl. Chief Secretary to Government. To The Chief Engineer (Roads and Bridges), Thiruvananthapuram. The letter reads thus: GOVERNMENT OF KERALA PUBLIC WORKS (D) DEPARTMENT No. PWD-D1/54/2016/PWD Thiruvananthapuram Dated: 02.02.2017 From The Addl. Chief Secretary to Government. To The Chief Engineer (Roads and Bridges), Thiruvananthapuram. Sir, Sub: PWD -Construction of Chethukadavu Bridge across Kalikavu River in Malappuram District -Reg. Ref: Your letter No.CE/R&B/MNJ 1870/12 Dated 30.04.2016 Inviting attention to the letter cited I am to inform you that Govt. have examined the proposal in detail with reference to the report of the Chief Technical Examiner. On perusal of abstract of approved DLR Submitted by CE, it is observed that total Man days taken for cutting and breaking boulders and wooden logs more than 40dm3 size comes to 216 only. As per PWD Revised SoR 2010, rate of Well sinker -Diver using diving set will be @Rs.460 + 10% C.P.=@Rs.506/Each. Hence, value of work for the above item at estimate rate as per the details submitted comes to Rs.1,09,296/-(216 Man days @ Rs.506/Each only). The amount arrived in the revised estimate is without any basis. I am therefore to request you to re-submit a revised estimate for the work 'construction of Chethukadavu bridge across Kalikkavu River in Malappuram District' along with certified copy of relevant pages where the usable materials of materials have been brought into MAS account after complying the above observations. I am also to request you to confirm whether usable materials are disposed of by action or issued to contractor. Yours faithfully, J. REGI KUMAR, Under Secretary for Addl. Chief Secretary to Government.” 7. Therefore, the prime question for consideration is, whether the inter-office correspondences made by the statutory authorities would create any claim to the appellant in the contract in question on the basis of the alleged revised estimate. The issue was considered by the Apex Court in Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab and another [ AIR 1963 SC 395 ]. Paragraphs 9 and 10 are relevant to the context, which read thus: 9. The questions, therefore, is whether he did in fact make such an order. Merely writing something on the file does not amount to an order. Before something amounts to an order of the State Government two things are necessary. The order has to be expressed in the name of the Governor as required by clause (1) of Art. 166 and then it has to be communicated. Merely writing something on the file does not amount to an order. Before something amounts to an order of the State Government two things are necessary. The order has to be expressed in the name of the Governor as required by clause (1) of Art. 166 and then it has to be communicated. As already indicated, no formal order modifying the decision of the Revenue Secretary was ever made. Until such an order is drawn up the State Government cannot, in our opinion, be regarded as bound by what was stated in the file. As long as the matter rested with him the Revenue Minister could well score out his remarks or minutes on the file and write fresh ones. 10. The business of State is a complicated one and has necessarily to be conducted through the agency of a large number of officials and authorities. The constitution, therefore, requires and so did the Rules of Business framed by the Rajpramukh of PEPSU provide, that the action must be taken by the authority concerned in the name of the Rajpramukh. It is not till this formality is observed that the action can be regarded as that of the State or here, by the Rajpramukh (Till the abolition of that office by the Amendment of the Cosntitution in 1956). We may further observe that, constitutionally speaking, the Minister is no more than an adviser and that the head of the State, the Governor or Rajpramukh, is to act with the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers. Therefore, until such advice is accepted by the Governor whatever the Minister or the Council of Ministers say in regard to a particular matter does not become the action of the State until the advice of the Council of Ministers is accepted or deemed to be accepted by the Head of the State. Indeed, it is possible that after expressing one opinion about a particular matter at a particular stage of Minister or the Council of Ministers may express quite a different opinion, one which may be completely opposed to the earlier opinion. Which of them can be regarded as the 'order' of the State Government? Therefore to make the opinion amount to a decision of the Government it must be communicated to the person concerned. Which of them can be regarded as the 'order' of the State Government? Therefore to make the opinion amount to a decision of the Government it must be communicated to the person concerned. In this connection, we may quote the following from the judgment of this Court in the State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh, AIR 1961 SC 493 at p. 512.: "Mr. Gopal Singh attempted to argue that before the final order was passed the Council of Ministers had decided to accept the respondent's representation and to reinstate him, and that, according to him, the respondent seeks to prove by calling the two original orders. We are unable to understand this argument. Even if the Council of Ministers had provisionally decided to reinstate the respondent that would not prevent the Council from reconsidering the matter and coming to a contrary conclusion later on, until a final decision is reached by them and is communicated to the Rajpramukh in the form of advice and acted upon by him by issuing an order in that behalf to the respondent." Thus it is of the essence that the order has to be communicated to the person who would be affected by that order before the State and that person can be bound by that order. For, until the order is communicated to the person affected by it, it would be open to the Council of Ministers to consider the matter over and over again and, therefore, till its communication the order cannot be regarded as anything more than provisional in character.” 8. Again the question was considered by the Apex Court in Laxminarayan R. Bhatt and others v. State of Maharashtra and another [ (2003) 5 SCC 413 ]. Paragraphs 44 and 45 are relevant to the context, which read thus: “44. It is, therefore, evident that the correspondences exchanged between the parties did not fructify into a binding agreement. 45. The rights and obligations of the parties, therefore, despite those correspondences continued to be governed by the terms of the award of the arbitrator as to the provisions of the Scheme.” 9. In Sethi Auto Service Station v. DDA [ (2009) 1 SCC 180 ], the Apex Court had occasion to consider, whether any inter-departmental communications and notings in departmental files do have any sanction of law, creating a legally enforceable right. paragraph 14 is relevant, which reads thus: “14. In Sethi Auto Service Station v. DDA [ (2009) 1 SCC 180 ], the Apex Court had occasion to consider, whether any inter-departmental communications and notings in departmental files do have any sanction of law, creating a legally enforceable right. paragraph 14 is relevant, which reads thus: “14. … Needless to add that internal notings are not meant for outside exposure. Notings in the file culminate into an executable order, affecting the rights of the parties, only when it reaches the final decision-making authority in the department, gets his approval and the final order is communicated to the person concerned.” 10. In Jasbir Singh Chhabra v. State of Punjab [ (2010) 4 SCC 192 ], at paragraph 35, it is held as follows: “35. It must always be remembered that in a democratic polity like ours, the functions of the Government are carried out by different individuals at different levels. The issues and policy matters which are required to be decided by the Government are dealt with by several functionaries some of whom may record notings on the files favouring a particular person or group of persons. Someone may suggest a particular line of action, which may not be conducive to public interest and others may suggest adoption of a different mode in larger public interest. However, the final decision is required to be taken by the designated authority keeping in view the larger public interest.” 11. Therefore, on an analysis of the fact situations with the settled proposition of law, it is unequivocal that interdepartmental correspondences cannot be termed as any communication which has attained finality so as to make any claim on the basis of the same. It is an admitted fact that copies of none of the correspondences were served on the appellant, nor any communication in respect of the revised estimate thus, accruing a right to the appellant was given by the respondents enabling the appellant to raise a claim. 12. It is also the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that on the basis of the correspondences by and between the authorities, the appellant has a legitimate expectation that the said amount would be received by the appellant. 12. It is also the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that on the basis of the correspondences by and between the authorities, the appellant has a legitimate expectation that the said amount would be received by the appellant. However, in our considered opinion, in order to raise a claim on the basis of the principles of legitimate expectation, there should have been a decision taken by the statutory authority finally and communicated to the appellant, thus creating a legitimate right or interest on the appellant. 13. A reference to a few of the judgments of the Apex Court would make the legal position clear: In Food Corporation of India v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries [ (1993) 1 SCC 71 ], a three-Judge Bench of this Court had observed thus: “8. The mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen, in such a situation, may not by itself be a distinct enforceable right, but failure to consider and give due weight to it may render the decision arbitrary, and this is how the requirement of due consideration of a legitimate expectation forms part of the principle of non-arbitrariness, a necessary concomitant of the rule of law. Every legitimate expectation is a relevant factor requiring due consideration in a fair decision making process. Whether the expectation of the claimant is reasonable or legitimate in the context is a question of fact in each case. Whenever the question arises, it is to be determined not according to the claimant's perception but in larger public interest wherein other more important considerations may outweigh what would otherwise have been the legitimate expectation of the claimant. A bona fide decision of the public authority reached in this manner would satisfy the requirement of non-arbitrariness and withstand judicial scrutiny. The doctrine of legitimate expectation gets assimilated in the rule of law and operates in our legal system in this manner and to this extent.” 14. In National Buildings Construction Corpn. v. S. Raghunathan [ (1998) 7 SCC 66 ], a three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court has observed as follows: “18. The doctrine of "legitimate expectation" has its genesis in the field of administrative law. The Government and its departments, in administering the affairs of the country, are expected to honour their statements of policy or intention and treat the citizens with full personal consideration without any iota of abuse of discretion. The doctrine of "legitimate expectation" has its genesis in the field of administrative law. The Government and its departments, in administering the affairs of the country, are expected to honour their statements of policy or intention and treat the citizens with full personal consideration without any iota of abuse of discretion. The policy statements cannot be disregarded unfairly or applied selectively. Unfairness in the form of unreasonableness is akin to violation of natural justice. It was in this context that the doctrine of 'legitimate expectation' was evolved which has today become a source of substantive as well as procedural rights. But claims based on 'legitimate expectation' have been held to require reliance on representations and resulting detriment to the claimant in the same way as claims based on promissory estoppel.” So much so, in Sethi Auto Service Station (supra), the Apex Court had occasion to consider the very same issue and held that a legitimate expectation is not the same thing as an anticipation and it is distinct and different from a desire and hope, and further it is based on a right. It was also held that the court could not interfere based on mere legitimate expectation without anything more cannot ipso factogive a right to invoke these principles. 15. On evaluation of the facts, law and circumstances of the case at hand, it is relevant to note that at no point of time, any promise was made by the statutory authority to the appellant so as to create a right or interest to the appellant. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the learned single Judge has issued the direction in the order under challenge basically to identify whether on the basis of the inter-departmental correspondence, any legal right has accrued to the appellant justifying the claim. Thinking in that manner, it cannot be said that the appellant is, in any manner, aggrieved by the interim order passed by the learned single Judge, so as to allege any legal infirmity to interfere in an appeal preferred under Section 5 of the Kerala High Court Act. Moreover, the arguments advanced by the appellant in the appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge are not that impressionable and cogent, warranting interference. 16. Resultantly, writ appeal fails, accordingly it is dismissed. Moreover, the arguments advanced by the appellant in the appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge are not that impressionable and cogent, warranting interference. 16. Resultantly, writ appeal fails, accordingly it is dismissed. However, we make it clear that the observations and findings are rendered to answer the questions raised by the appellant and that may not stand in the way of the learned single Judge taking a decision on the merits of the matter, taking into account all the inputs available to adjudicate and decide the writ petition.