JUDGMENT : The absence and lack of specific statutory guidelines and framework in computing compensation payable to the employees/workmen in the case of wrongful dismissal from service seem to be often vexing the Courts and Tribunals while issuing compensatory Awards. 2. This case is no different, with an Arbitration Court, constituted under the provisions of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, first fixing Rs.1.5 crores as compensation; which was then reduced by the Appellate Tribunal to nearly its one tenth. 3. This is precisely the problem because the Courts/Tribunals often arrive at a computation without any delineated guidelines for such purpose. 4. I am, consequently, of the view that now it becomes enjoined upon this Court to stipulate, as is legally permissible, the broad parameters which can then guide the Courts/Tribunals in finalising computation of compensation not merely in this case but for general application in future cases also. 5. The facts involved in this case are not in dispute and therefore, it would only require me to record the most essential among it. 6. The controversy in question arose when Smt.K.Smitha was terminated from service by her employer, the Irinjalakkuda Co-operative Agricultural and Rural Development Bank Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as 'the Bank' for short), on 01/05/2010, on the allegation of misappropriation; and when she was unable to obtain favourable orders through the hierarchy of Disciplinary Authorities, she preferred ARC.No.164 of 2011 before the Co-operative Arbitration Court (Northern), Calicut, which, initially, set aside the enquiry report and allowed the parties to lead evidence, finally concluding that she is entitled to be reinstated, but without back wages. 7. Being aggrieved by the decision of the Arbitration Court, Calicut, the Bank filed Appeal No.97 of 2014, to the extent to which reinstatement of Smt.K.Smitha was ordered; while the latter filed Appeal No.2 of 2015 against the Award of the Arbitration Court to the extent to which it had denied her back wages. 8. The records show that the afore two appeals were disposed of by the Co-operative Tribunal, Trivandrum, setting aside the direction of reinstatement ordered by the Arbitration Court and remitting it to the said Court for computing the compensation payable to Smt.K.Smitha. 8. The records show that the afore two appeals were disposed of by the Co-operative Tribunal, Trivandrum, setting aside the direction of reinstatement ordered by the Arbitration Court and remitting it to the said Court for computing the compensation payable to Smt.K.Smitha. Interestingly, this order of the Arbitration Tribunal was challenged by the Bank by filing W.P(C)No.27526 of 2015 and W.P(C)No.28069 of 2015 (since there were two appeals before the Tribunal) which were, however, dismissed by this Court through the judgment dated 24.02.2016. 9. Consequent to the dismissal of the afore writ petitions, the Arbitration Court reconsidered ARC.No.164 of 2011 and issued a fresh Award on 30/09/2016, fixing the compensation payable to Smt.K.Smitha at Rs.1.5 Crore, which was based on the number of years that she would have served in the Bank till she turns 58 years in age, along with other statutory benefits. The Bank challenged this Award before the Co-operative Tribunal, Calicut, by filing Appeal No.4 of 2017; and the said Tribunal, through the order dated 26/07/2017, reduced the compensation to an amount commensurate the salary that would have been entitled to Smt.K.Smitha for a period of 3.3 years, along with other statutory and eligible benefits, following the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in O.P.Bhandari v. Indian Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. & Others [ (1986) 4 SCC 337 ]. 10. It is this order of the Co-operative Tribunal which is impugned in these petitions. 11. Among the two petitions above, which are being heard together on account of the analogous nature of the circumstances and facts pleaded, O.P.(C)No.3502 of 2017 has been filed by Smt.K.Smitha (who will hereinafter be referred by her name for the sake of convenience); while W.P(C)No.31769 of 2017 has been filed by the Bank. 12. Smt.K.Smitha challenges the order of the Co-operative Tribunal asserting that the compensation now awarded by it is too exiguous; while the Bank challenges it on the ground that it is excessive. 13. I have heard Shri.C.Chandrasekharan, learned counsel appearing for Smt.K.Smitha – petitioner in O.P(C)No.3502 of 2017 and Shri.Manzoor Ali K.A., learned counsel appearing for the Bank – petitioner in W.P(C)No.31769 of 2017. 14. 13. I have heard Shri.C.Chandrasekharan, learned counsel appearing for Smt.K.Smitha – petitioner in O.P(C)No.3502 of 2017 and Shri.Manzoor Ali K.A., learned counsel appearing for the Bank – petitioner in W.P(C)No.31769 of 2017. 14. Shri.C.Chandrasekharan, learned counsel for Smt.K.Smitha, began his submissions by saying that since his client had been fully exonerated and found not guilty of any of the charges levelled against her, the Bank ought to have reinstated her with back wages; but that since they are unwilling to do so, the Arbitration Court correctly found that she was entitled to the entire salary that she would have received had she continued in service till her retirement, when she attains the age of 58 years. 15. Shri.Chandrasekharan, impressed upon me that Smt.K.Smitha was only 20 years of age at the time she obtained employment in the Bank and that her initial appointment was consequent to the death of her mother -which she suffered when she was mere 2½ years in age -under the compassionate appointment scheme; and that she was removed from service by the Bank unfairly and uncharitably, by levelling baseless allegations against her, on 01/05/2010; further asserting that her innocence has been subsequently declared by this Court. 16. Shri.Charandrasekharan thus contends that Smt.K.Smitha is entitled to a much larger compensation than what has been now awarded by the Co-operative Tribunal through the impugned order and he relies for substantiation on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Indian Railway Construction Company Ltd. v. Ajay Kumar [ AIR 2003 SC 1843 ]; General Manager Operations, Chennai Container Terminal Pvt. Ltd. & Another v. K.Thiruthanikumaran & Another [ (2017) 16 SCC 361 ]; Correspondent, Anaikar Oriental (Arabic) Higher Secondary School and Another v. A.Haroon and Another [ (2017) 2 SCC 510 ] and Vashrambhai Dhanabhai Vegad v. State of Gujarat and Others [ (2017) 2 SCC 508 ]. He thus prays that O.P(C)No.3502 of 2017 filed by Smt.K.Smitha be allowed; and W.P(C)No.31769 of 2017 filed by the Bank be dismissed. 17. In contrast, Shri.Manzoor Ali K.A., learned counsel appearing for the Bank, began his submissions by saying that Smt.K.Smitha is not entitled even to the compensation now awarded by the Tribunal, since it amounts to a large sum, which would be a burden on the already precarious fiscal position of the Bank. 17. In contrast, Shri.Manzoor Ali K.A., learned counsel appearing for the Bank, began his submissions by saying that Smt.K.Smitha is not entitled even to the compensation now awarded by the Tribunal, since it amounts to a large sum, which would be a burden on the already precarious fiscal position of the Bank. He says that the assertion of Shri.C.Chandrasekharan that Smt.K.Smitha had been exonerated of full charges is not correct, since she was acquitted only on technical reasons. He adds to this submission by contending that, in any event of the matter, the rate of interest now awarded by the Tribunal is excessive and that it could have awarded not more than 6%. He thus prays that the Bank's writ petition be allowed and that of Smt.K.Smitha be dismissed. 18. As I have said in the prefatory paragraphs ut supra, the parameters in computation of compensation in lieu of reinstatement requires to be now specifically delineated, since various Courts and Tribunals presently appear to be adopting rough and ready calculations or ballpark figures, while arriving at such Awards, of course, guided by the singularities of the facts and circumstances involved. 19. This often leads to huge differences in the compensation awarded even in similar circumstances and am consequently of the certain view that it is now time for this Court to speak about this affirmatively. 20. However, when I say as above, it is gratifying that I do not have to travel far searching for light to illuminate my path because, in O.P.Bhandari (Supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered these aspects quite in detail. 21. One of the main contentions before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in O.P.Bhandari (Supra) was that when an employee had been exonerated of all charges, but when he cannot be reinstated on account of the opposition of the employer, the compensatory Award in his favour must be equivalent to the salary and benefits that he would have earned for the full tenure of his remaining service. The Hon'ble Supreme Court did not accept this contention and repelled it in the following words, which is available in Paragraph 9 of the said judgment:- “9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court did not accept this contention and repelled it in the following words, which is available in Paragraph 9 of the said judgment:- “9. Counsel for the appellant having forcefully pressed the claim for reinstatement, has contended that in case the Court is disinclined to order reinstatement, the appellant ought to be awarded the full salary and allowances which would have accrued to him till the date of his superannuation which is more than 8 years away. We think it would be unreasonable to award 8 years' salary and allowances, as lump sum compensation in lieu of reinstatement. We consider it unreasonable because - (i) To do so would tantamount to paying to the appellant every month 20 per cent over and above what he would have earned if he was continued in service without doing any work as the lump sum payment of 8 years' salary invested at 15 per cent interest (it being the current rate of interest) would yield a monthly recurring amount equivalent to his current monthly salary 'plus' 20 percent. (ii) To do so would be tantamount to paying to him his present salary etc. plus 20 per cent more every month not only till his date of retirement but till his death (if he lives longer) and also to his heirs thereafter, in perpetuity. (iii) Besides, the corpus of the lump sum amount so paid as compensation would remain with him intact. Obvious it is, therefore, that the Court would be conferring a 'bonanza' on him and not compensating him by accepting this formula. The submission, accordingly, deserves to be repelled unhesitatingly.” 22. After expressing their Lordships' opinion as afore, the Hon'ble Court went on to stipulate the criterion for computation of such compensatory awards in paragraph No.10, which is required to be read in its entirety, for which purpose it is reproduced as under: “In our considered opinion, the compensation equivalent to 3.33 years salary (including allowances as admissible) on the basis of the last pay and allowances drawn by the appellant would be a reasonable amount to award in lieu of reinstatement taking into account the following factors viz: (1) The corpus if invested at the prevailing rate of interest (15 per cent) will yield 50 per cent of the annual salary and allowances. In other words every year he will get 50 per cent of what he would have earned by way of salary and allowances with four additional advantages: (i) He will be getting this amount without working. (ii) He can work somewhere else and can earn annually whatever he is worth over and above, getting 50 per cent of the salary he would have earned. (iii) If he had been reinstated he would have earned the salary only up to the date of superannuation *up to 55, 58 or 60 as the case may be) unless he died earlier. As against this 50 per cent he would be getting annually he would get not only beyond the date of superannuation, for his lifetime(if he lives longer), but even his heirs would get it in perpetuity after hid demise. (iv) The corpus of lump sum compensation would remain intact, in any event.” No doubt he will not have the advantage of further promotion, but then what are his prospects, given in the present relationship? Besides, the chances of promotion can be set off against the risk of a departmental disciplinary proceeding. Factors (I), (ii) (iii) and (iv) are of such great significance that compensation on the basis of 50 percent of his annual salary and allowances is much more to his advantage. We are thus satisfied that compensation in lieu of reinstatement on the aforesaid basis is more than reasonable.” 23. Thus, it is ineluctable that the Hon'ble Supreme Court concluded that the compensation equivalent to 3.33 years of salary -based on the last pay and allowances drawn by the employee would be reasonable compensation to him in lieu of reinstatement, taking note of the singular fact that the prevailing rate of interest of 15% (at the time when the said judgment was delivered) would yield 50% of his annual salary and allowances. 24. The above being so, however, it is now common knowledge, which will be justified for this Court to take judicial notice of, that the rate of interest as at present is much lower than 15% and that deposits are being accepted by the Banks only at about 7%, or at the best 7.5% per annum. 24. The above being so, however, it is now common knowledge, which will be justified for this Court to take judicial notice of, that the rate of interest as at present is much lower than 15% and that deposits are being accepted by the Banks only at about 7%, or at the best 7.5% per annum. Obviously, therefore, even going by the ratiocination of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as afore, if compensation is now computed taking 3.33 years of salary, then the desideratum of a minimum yield of 50% annual salary being obtained by the employee can never be achieved. 25. As has been already seen above, in O.P.Bhandari (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court adopted 3.33 years salary as being just compensation with the clear intent of the employee obtaining at least 50% of the salary and allowances that he would have received had he been in service; and therefore, going by the present interest scenario, I am certain that this Court will be justified in enhancing this to be 6.5 years, which period alone would now obtain such a yield. 26. However, before I finalize my view as afore, I must certainly look through the judgments cited by Sri.C.Chandrasekharan, since he asserts that in subsequent judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not follow O.P.Bhandari (supra) but has awarded much larger amounts than 3.33 years of salary. 27. The first judgment cited by Sri.Chandrasekharan is Indian Railway Construction Limited (supra) and he says that the Hon'ble Supreme Court had awarded Rs.17 lakh to the employee therein. When I examine this judgment, it becomes indubitable that their Lordships were primarily concerned about the question as to whether reinstatement in service would automatically entitle the employee to full back wages; and after holding it to be otherwise, their Lordships fixed a sum of Rs.15 lakh, over and above an amount of Rs.3 lakh already received by the petitioner therein, as being fair compensation. However, what is clearly discernible from this judgment is that, while arriving at this computation, their Lordships fixed a reasonable figure to find a balance between the rival interests and obviously, were acting under the ambit of Article 142 of the Constitution of India. 28. The second judgment cited by Sri.Chandrasekharan is Vashrambhai Dhanabhai Vegad (supra), wherein, an amount of Rs.5 lakh was fixed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as being just and proper compensation. 28. The second judgment cited by Sri.Chandrasekharan is Vashrambhai Dhanabhai Vegad (supra), wherein, an amount of Rs.5 lakh was fixed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as being just and proper compensation. Here again, the Hon'ble Supreme Court fixed the figure enhancing the earlier award of Rs.50,000/-, finding it to be extremely meagre, but without disclosing any particular reason for having arrived at the said figure. 29. In Anaikar Oriental (Arabic) Higher Secondary School (supra), an amount of Rs.50 lakh was ordered to be paid to the employee; but, as is evident from paragraph No.6 of the said judgment, this amount was conceded to by the employer and consequently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court merely accepted the same. 30. Finally, in K.Thiruthanikumaran (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court, no doubt, fixed an amount of Rs.25 lakh as being the compensation; but again, without specifying any particular criterion followed for arriving at such a figure. Indisputably, therefore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was acting under the ambit of Article 142 of the Constitution of India, so as to obtain complete justice between the parties, holding that this amount would operate as sufficient compensation in the said case. 31. In contrast, in O.P.Bhandari (supra), as I have already seen above, the Hon'ble Supreme Court specifically weighed the available options and evaluated the alternatives, thus arriving at a formula for computation of compensation, fixing it to be the salary payable for 3.33 years, for the reasons which have been afore recorded. This judgment was followed approvingly by a three member Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Workmen v. Bharat Fritz Werner (P) Ltd. and another [ 1990 (3) SCC 565 ] and the compensation in that case was fixed accordingly. 32. Thus, as at present, the only reasoned formula available before this Court is as has been declared in O.P.Bhandari (supra) and followed in Bharat Fritz Werner (P) Ltd. (supra). 33. 32. Thus, as at present, the only reasoned formula available before this Court is as has been declared in O.P.Bhandari (supra) and followed in Bharat Fritz Werner (P) Ltd. (supra). 33. In such perspective, being implicitly guided by the intent, resolve and purpose declared by the Hon'ble Court in O.P.Bhandari (supra), I am persuaded to the firm opinion that, taking note of the regime of commercial bank interest in the present day, if compensation is computed to be only the salary for 3.33 years, the result would be travesty and would militate against the loadable purposes disclosed in the said judgment; and axiomatically that the requisite years of salary to ensure the benefits to an employee as per O.P.Bhandari (supra) should be a minimum of 6.5 years. 34. In culmination, I am of the perpended opinion that in cases where compensatory awards become necessary in lieu of reinstatement, the formula enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in O.P.Bhandari (supra), subject to the afore modification, would be the most reasonable and just to both sides; and resultantly, feel that these petitions must be disposed of on such basis. 35. That said, the other contention raised before me by the Bank is regarding the interest awarded by the Co-operative Tribunal, which has been fixed at the rate of 10%. Going by the same reasoning as above, I am of the view that the interest must be reduced and that it will be better that it is fixed at 7.5%, which will be more or less the commercial rate prevalent today. In the result, both the afore petitions are allowed in part, modifying the impugned order of the Co-operative Tribunal, thus ordering the Bank to pay compensation to Smt.K.Smitha, calculated to be the salary that would have been payable to her for 6.5 years, based on the pay and allowances drawn by her on the date of her termination, namely 01.05.2010 -after reducing the subsistence allowance, if any, paid -along with gratuity and all other eligible amounts under the Provident Fund, Welfare Fund etc; which amounts shall carry interest at the rate of 7.5% from 01.05.2010, till the date on which it is actually paid. Needless to say, the amount that was remitted to the Bank by Smt.K.Smitha, namely Rs.1 lakh, allegedly under duress to obtain exoneration from the allegations against her, shall also be returned to her, along with 7.5% interest from 24.09.2009, being the date on which such remittance was made, till it is repaid, in addition to the afore compensation. I also record that this repayment has been expressly agreed to by Sri.Mansoor Ali, learned counsel for the Bank. Taking note of the rather and singular circumstances involved in these cases, I deem it appropriate not to make any order as to costs and to direct the parties to suffer their respective costs. After I dictated this judgment, Sri.Manzoor Ali, learned counsel for the Bank, prayed that his client be given at least six months' time to pay the afore amounts, since they are going through extreme financial constraints. I am afraid that I cannot accede to the period now sought for by Sri.Manzoor Ali, since I find it to be excessive, but I deem it appropriate that the afore amounts be paid by the Bank within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. It is so ordered.