JUDGMENT Achintya Malla Bujor Barua, J. - Heard Mr. A.R Bhuyan, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. SK Goswami, learned counsel for the respondent No.5, Mr. J Handique, learned counsel for the respondent No.1 and Ms. MB Bora, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4. 2. The petitioner Md. Karim Ali participated in the selection process for appointment of village Headman (Gaonbura) of Haripur village in the Nalbari district pursuant to the Notice No.NLR.1019/2018/16 dated 08.07.2019 of the Deputy Commissioner, Nalbari. Amongst the qualification criterias, the applicants for the aforesaid post were required to be a permanent inhabitant of the concerned village; having a minimum age of 35 years; having the minimum qualification of Class-X passed from a Government recognized board or institution; be a physically and mentally fit person; shall not be insolvent and bankrupt; shall not be a Government service holder; shall possess land or other immovable property in his name at the concerned Lat; shall not be a member of a political party; shall be a person of high repute, personality, efficiency; and shall be a person who voluntarily participate in implementation of Government policies and programmes. It is also stated that apart from the qualification criteria provided in the advertisement notice, the other criteria for the post of Gaonbura are provided in the executive instructions called the Executive Instructions under the Assam Land and Revenue Regulations, 1886 as amended in the year 2016. By the aforesaid amendment to the earlier existing Executive Instructions, Clauses 160, 162, 162A, 162C and 164 stood amended and the amendment was modified as per the notification dated 10.04.2018. Amongst others, Executive Instruction 162(1), providing for the minimum qualification, is as follows:- wxyz "162(1) Minimum qualification zyxw wxyz The Deputy Commissioner/Principal Secretaries of Autonomous Council areas shall appoint Gaonburas from the persons having the following qualifications: zyxw wxyz (i) He/she should be a citizen of India and permanent resident of the area in respect of which he/she seeks appointment; zyxw wxyz (ii) He/She should be of minimum 35 years of age. He/she should be minimum 10 th pass from a Board/Institution recognized by the State Government; zyxw wxyz (iii) He/She should be physically fit and have sound mind; zyxw wxyz (iv) He/She should not have been declared as an insolvent or defaulter in payment of Government dues; zyxw wxyz (v) Preference shall be given to the family members of Gaonburas and views of the Mouzadar shall be taken into consideration; zyxw wxyz (vi) He/She should not be a Government Employee; zyxw wxyz (vii) He/She should have landed property/immovable property in his/her name in the area in which he/she intend to be appointed as Gaonbura; zyxw wxyz (viii) He/She should not be a member of any political party; zyxw wxyz (ix) He/She should be a person of high status and command and have a respectable position in the society; zyxw wxyz (x) He/She should have worked/volunteered for the advancement of the Government Policies and programmes and rendered assistance in natural calamities." zyxw 3. In the resultant selection process, it was the respondent No.5, who was selected as per the select list dated 28.08.2019. The result of the selection process as notified by the declared result dated 28.08.2019 in respect of Haripur village where the respondent No.5 was selected is being assailed in this writ petition. 4. The core ground urged upon by Mr. AR Bhuyan, learned counsel for the petitioner is that under Clause 162(1)(v) of the Executive Instructions as amended, the petitioner being the son of the earlier deceased Gaonbura namely Badir Ali ought to have been selected in the selection process on the basis of preference required to be given to the family members of the Gaonburas. Apart from the aforesaid ground taken, no other ground has been urged. 5. While relying upon the provisions of the Executive Instructions under Clause 162(1)(v), which provides that preference shall be given to the family members of the Gaonburas and views of the Mouzadars shall be taken into consideration, Mr. AR Bhuyan, learned counsel for the petitioner also raises the contention that the views of the Mouzadar in the selection process is also mandatorily required to be taken and in the instant case, as no such view was taken, therefore, the whole selection itself is vitiated. 6. By the order dated 25.10.2019, an interim order was passed that till the next returnable date, the parties to the proceeding shall maintain a status-quo. 6. By the order dated 25.10.2019, an interim order was passed that till the next returnable date, the parties to the proceeding shall maintain a status-quo. As a result of the interim order, no further process had been initiated for appointment of the respondent No.5 pursuant to the aforesaid selection. In the circumstance, the respondent No.5 instituted Interlocutory Application (Civil) No.3915/2019 for a modification/vacation of the interim order dated 25.10.2019. As an adjudication on the question as to whether the interim order is required to be modified/vacated or not would also require an interpretation of Clause 162(1)(v) of the Executive Instructions as amended, which may ultimately be a final adjudication on the lis between the parties and further as for the purpose of such adjudication, a detail hearing is required and had been done by the parties, including the production of the records by the respondent authorities, we are inclined to take up the writ petition itself for its consideration. 7. The core contention of Mr. AR Bhuyan, learned counsel for the petitioner is that the provisions of Clause 162(1)(v) of the Executive Instructions provides for two distinct and separate provisions i.e. firstly preference be given to the family members of the Gaonburas and secondly the view of the Mouzadar shall be taken into consideration for the selection. By so contending, Mr. Bhuyan, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in the instant case, the petitioner being the son of the earlier deceased Gaonbura is entitled to a preference in the appointment and the respondent authorities in making the selection had not given the preference to the petitioner. A further contention is also raised that the requirement of the views of the Mouzadar being an independent requirement, which again is mandatory in nature and the view of the Mouzadar having not being given a consideration, the entire selection itself is vitiated. 8. Mr. SK Goswami, learned counsel for the respondent No.5 on the other hand contends that the concept of preference as interpreted by the Courts would mean that if in the resultant selection, two candidates secure same marks, in such event, the question of preference would come in and the candidate to whom the preference is required to be given would have a precedence over the other candidate. But to give effect to a preference, the basic requirement would be that the marks obtained by the two candidates would have to be equal and only thereafter the question of giving preference would come. The further contention of Mr. SK Goswami, learned counsel for the respondent No.5 is that Clause 162(1)(v) of the Executive Instructions as amended is one whole provision and it does not comprise of two separate independent provisions to be applied independently of each other. 9. In order to substantiate his submission that the petitioner is required to be given a preference over the other candidates being the son of the earlier deceased Gaonbura, Mr. AR Bhuyan, learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon the pronouncement of this Court in Promode Chandra Roy - vs- State of Assam and others,2006 2 GauLJ 604 , wherein in paragraph 10, the provision of Clause 161A of the Executive Instructions was referred, which provides for three distinct conditions, which includes the claim of the family of the Gaonbura, the view of the Mouzadar and the suitability of the person concerned and accordingly in paragraph 14 a conclusion was arrived that the selection committee was required to have taken into consideration the aforesaid three factors while making a selection for the appointment of Gaonbura. Accordingly, it is submitted that as views of the Mouzadar and claims of the family of the Gaonbura are two independent factors, therefore, Clause 162(1)(v) of the Executive Instructions as amended would also have to be interpreted in the same manner. Reliance is also placed on an earlier decision of this Court in the judgment and order dated 14.11.2017 in WP(C) No.4798/2008 Sri Dipu Bora -vs- State of Assam and others, wherein by interpreting the word ''agradhikar'' which means priority and not preference, this Court had held that the family members of the earlier Gaonbura are entitled to a priority and if the priority aspect was not given a consideration, the selection itself would be vitiated. Further reliance is placed on the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Kandarpa Sarma -vs- Rajeswar Das and others, (2011) 14 SCC 752 , wherein in paragraph 20, a de-novo consideration was required to be made in the selection of the Gaonbura by taking into consideration the relevant factors and the observations made by the Supreme Court in the said order. 10. Mr. 10. Mr. SK Goswami, learned counsel for the respondent No.5 on the other hand relies upon a pronouncement of this Court Talebur Rahman -vs- State of Assam and others,2014 2 GLR 100 , wherein in paragraph 13 it had been provided that the office of the Gaonbura is not a hereditary office and therefore, the petitioner being the son of the earlier deceased Gaonbura can have no claim for a preference. 11. In the context of the aforesaid contentions being raised, the issue for determination for the present proceeding amongst others, would be whether the provisions of Clause 162(1)(v) of the Executive Instructions, as amended, provides that preference in the nature of a precedence be given to the family members of the earlier Gaonbura in the matter of appointment of Gaonbura or the requirement of preference would come into play only when the marks secured by the respective candidates are equal. The other issue would be whether the provisions of Clause 162(1)(v) of the Executive Instructions providing for preference to the family members of the Gaonbura and the requirement of the views of the Mouzadar are to be read as two independent provisions/requirements or the requirement of obtaining the views of the Mouzadar would have to be read conjointly with the preference to be given to the family members of Gaonbura meaning thereby that the requirement of the view of the Mouzadar to be obtained would be only in respect where a preference to the family of the members of the Gaonbura is to be given. 12. In order to substantiate his contention that the preference to the family members of the Gaonbura would mean a precedence over any other candidate in the selection, Mr. AR Bhuyan, learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon an earlier pronouncement of this Court rendered in Sri Dipu Bora (supra), wherein the matter was remanded back to the primary selecting authority inasmuch as, the requirement of priority was not given in the selection process. 13. We have taken note of that in Dipu Bora (supra), the advertisement notification clearly provided that ''agradhikar'' would be given to such candidates, who are family members of the Gaonburas. 13. We have taken note of that in Dipu Bora (supra), the advertisement notification clearly provided that ''agradhikar'' would be given to such candidates, who are family members of the Gaonburas. Accordingly, the vernacular word ''agradhikar'' was held to mean priority and accordingly by making a distinction between the concept of priority and the concept of preference, it was held that as the requirement of the advertisement in that case was for priority to be given, therefore, there was a requirement of a priority to be given by the selecting authority and the authorities could not have fallen back on the proposition that only when the marks of two candidates are equal, the priority could have been given, which again would be the concept of preference. 14. But in the instant case, no such provision is incorporated in the advertisement at hand i.e. the advertisement dated 08.07.2019. The requirement of preference is found only in Clause 162(1)(v) of the Executive Instructions, but as the eligibility requirement of a Gaonbura would have to be read conjointly with the eligibility requirements provided in the advertisement and those provided in the Executive Instructions, we are of the view that the provisions of Clause 162(1)(v) would have a relevance for the purpose. 15. But again Clause 162(1)(v) clearly provides for a preference to be given to the family members of the Gaonbura in contra-distinction to the requirement of priority in the provisions of the earlier case in Dipu Bora (supra). 16. The Supreme Court as well as this Court in a plethora of decisions, which need not be cited once again had clearly held that the concept of giving preference to one candidate over the other comes into play only when the marks obtained by the two respective candidates are equal. If the marks obtained by the two candidates are unequal, in such circumstance, there is no requirement of giving preference to one candidate over the other and the inequality of the marks would determine as to who amongst the two candidates would be selected. 17. Adopting the said meaning given to the said expression ''preference'', when we look into the facts of the present case, we take note of that in the selection process, the respondent No.5 obtained 29 marks whereas the petitioner obtained 23 marks. 17. Adopting the said meaning given to the said expression ''preference'', when we look into the facts of the present case, we take note of that in the selection process, the respondent No.5 obtained 29 marks whereas the petitioner obtained 23 marks. As because there is an inequality in the marks obtained between the petitioner and the respondent No.5, we do not find that the provisions of preference being provided for the family members of the Gaonbura would have any effect in the determination in the present dispute. 18. As regards the other contention that the view of the Mouzadar is a mandatory requirement under Clause 162(1)(v) of the Executive Instructions as amended, from a reading of the said provision, it is discernible that preference is required to be given to the family members of the Gaonbura and the views of the Mouzadar shall be obtained. We have taken note of that the provisions of Clause 162(1)(v) is a conjunctive provision where the requirement of giving preference to the family members of the Gaonbura is in conjunction with the requirement of obtaining the view of the Mouzadar through the expression ''and''. 19. In Hyderabad Asbestos Cement Product -vs- Union of India, (2000) 1 SCC 426 , it had been held that the word ''or'' is normally disjunctive and ''and'' is normally conjunctive although at times they may be read vice-versa to give effect to the manifest intention of the Legislature as disclosed from the context. 20. Again in A.G -vs- Beauchamp, (1920) 1 KB 650 , it had been held that if the literal meaning of the word produces an unintelligible or absurd result, the expression ''and'' may be read for ''or'' and the expression ''or'' for ''and'' even though the result of so modifying the words is less favourable to the subject provided that the intention of the Legislature is otherwise quite clear. 21. A reading of the aforesaid two propositions where it is laid down as to under what context the expression ''and'' can be read to be ''or'', it is manifestly clear that the expression ''and'' which otherwise indicates a conjunction can be read to be ''or'' in a circumstances when the intention of the legislature is clear that the expression ''and'' would have to be read as ''or'', or otherwise if the provision is read in conjunctive, it would result in an unintelligible or absurd result. 22. In the instant case, when we read the provisions in the Clause 162(1) (v) of the Executive Instructions as amended, a reading of the expression ''and'' to be conjunctive would give a meaning that preference be given to the family members of the Gaonbura and for the purpose the view of the Mouzadar shall be taken into consideration. Such a meaning to the provision of Clause 162(1)(v) of the Executive Instructions does not lead to any unintelligibleness nor it leads to any absurdity. We also take note of that prior to the amendment of the Executive Instructions, the provisions that prevailed read as follows:- wxyz "162. Nomination and appointment of Gaonburas- Gaonburas are appointed by the Deputy Commissioner. In the case of vacancy, the Deputy Commissioner shall take into consideration (a) the claims of the family of the late Gaonbura, (b) the wishes of the villagers and (c) the views of the mauzadar, and shall appoint the person whom he considers most suitable for the post. zyxw wxyz In charges consisting entirely of nisf-khiraj or lakhiraj estate the nomination of Gaonburas shall rest with the proprietors unless the nominee is plainly unfit. zyxw wxyz The Deputy Commissioner may dismiss a Gaonbura from office after recording his reasons in writing." zyxw 23. The un-amended provisions clearly provided for three distinct and independent factors to be taken into consideration for the appointment of Gaonbura i.e. (i) claims of the family of the deceased Gaonbura; (ii) the wishes of the villagers and (iii) the views of the Mauzadar. When we read the propositions laid down by this Court in Promode Chandra Roy (supra), which has been relied upon by Mr. AR Bhuyan, learned counsel for the petitioner, we take note of that the provisions of the unamended Clause 162 of the Executive Instructions was taken into consideration and interpreted by the Hon''ble Court. The said decision is of 18.05.2006, whereas the amendment was brought into effect by the notification of 10.04.2018. Similarly, we also take note of the provisions of the Supreme Court rendered in Kandarpa Sarma (supra), wherein in paragraph 13, amongst others, it was provided that the contents of the Executive Instruction relating to appointment of Gaonbura requires updating and further amendment be in tune of the present day requirements. 24. Similarly, we also take note of the provisions of the Supreme Court rendered in Kandarpa Sarma (supra), wherein in paragraph 13, amongst others, it was provided that the contents of the Executive Instruction relating to appointment of Gaonbura requires updating and further amendment be in tune of the present day requirements. 24. The said view of the Supreme Court was also made in the context of the un-amended Executive Instructions, wherein as already noted, the three factors were provided independent to each other. But after the amendment has been incorporated to Clause 162, the amended Clause 162(1)(v) clearly provides the requirement of giving preference to the family member of the Gaonbura and the requirement of obtaining the view of the Mouzadar to be conjunctive with each other. 25. Apart from interpreting the expression ''and'' as appearing in Clause 162 (1)(v) of the Executive Instructions, we also take note of the aspect that the independent factors were provided in the unamended Executive Instructions, which again was viewed by the Supreme Court to require an updating and further amendment and thereafter the amendment had been brought in by making the provisions conjunctive with each other. 26. In view of the above, we are unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that Clause 162(1)(v) of the Executive Instructions are disjunctive and that the two requirements of giving preference and obtaining the views of the Mouzadar are independent of each other. 27. In view of the conclusion as arrived above, we do not fine any merit in the writ petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. The interim order dated 25.10.2019 stands vacated.