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2020 DIGILAW 349 (KAR)

Poovani Gowda S/o Narna Gowda v. G. Bharati W/o Subraya Muchinthaya

2020-02-05

NATARAJ RANGASWAMY

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JUDGMENT : NATARAJ RANGASWAMY, J. 1. This regular second appeal is filed by the defendants in O.S. No. 238/1995 challenging the judgment and decree dated 12.04.2004 passed by the Civil Judge (Jr. Dn), Belthangady. The defendants have also challenged the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court dated 20.06.2012 in R.A. No. 65/2004. 2. For the sake of brevity and easy understanding, the parties in this judgment are referred to as they were arrayed before the Trial Court. Appellants were defendants while the respondents were plaintiffs before the trial Court. 3. The facts leading to filing of O.S. No. 238/1995 are that suit schedule ‘A’ property belonged to husband of plaintiff No. 1 and father of plaintiff Nos. 2 to 8. After the death of plaintiff No. 1, plaintiff Nos. 2 to 8 were in possession and enjoyment of the schedule ‘A’ property. The husband of defendant No. 1 and father of defendant Nos. 2 to 9 were granted occupancy right in an area measuring 3 acres 42 cents in Survey No. 2/4B of Mogru Village in terms of the order of Land Tribunal dated 08.10.1990. It is contended that husband of defendant No. 1 was never in possession of 3 acres 42 cents of land in survey No. 2/4B of Mogru Village and the husband of plaintiff No. 1 was in possession of 62 cents in Sy. No. 2/4B. The order of Land Tribunal was challenged before this Court in W.P. No. 7807/1992 and occupancy right granted to the husband of defendant No. 1 was restricted to an extent of 2 acres 80 cents of land in Survey No. 2/4B. In so far as remaining 62 cents is concerned, grant of occupancy right was quashed. It is stated that during the pendency of the proceeding before the Land Tribunal, the husband of defendant No. 1 had forcibly taken possession of said 62 cents of land in the year 1978 and later the defendants were in illegal and wrongful possession of the aforesaid property. It is stated that after the order passed in W.P. No. 7807/1992, though the defendants conceded to the claim of the plaintiffs, failed to comply and did not hand over the possession. Hence, the plaintiffs were constrained to file the present suit for possession of suit schedule ‘A’ property and for future mesne profit. 4. It is stated that after the order passed in W.P. No. 7807/1992, though the defendants conceded to the claim of the plaintiffs, failed to comply and did not hand over the possession. Hence, the plaintiffs were constrained to file the present suit for possession of suit schedule ‘A’ property and for future mesne profit. 4. The defendants who have filed their written statement contended that the suit was highly belated and not maintainable. They also contended that the plaintiffs had admitted that husband of defendant No. 1 was in possession of 62 cents of land from the year 1978 and that the suit filed in the year 1995 was barred by law of limitation. It is also contended that the husband of defendant No. 1 was not a tenant in respect of 62 cents of land, he was tenant only in respect of 2 acres 80 cents and thus he had filed application in Form No. 7 only in respect of that extent. He further contended that he had developed the 62 cents of land and was in possession of the said land and planted coconut trees and also cultivated the said land for paddy etc. 5. Before the trial Court, the following issues were framed: “1. Whether the plaintiffs prove that they are the absolute owners of plaint ‘A’ schedule property? 2. Whether the plaintiffs prove that the defendants are in illegal possession of the plaint ‘A’ schedule property? 3. Whether the plaintiffs prove that they are entitled to recover the possession of plaint ‘A’ schedule property from the defendant? 4. Whether the plaintiffs prove that they are entitled to recover future mesne profits at the rate of 5 muras of rice per annum? 5. Whether the defendants prove that they have perfected their right, title and interest over the plaint A schedule property by adverse possession? 6. To what decree or order, the parties are entitled?” 6. Plaintiff No. 1 was examined as PW-1 and she got marked 6 documents as per Exs.P.1 to P.6 while defendant No. 4 was examined as DW-1, no documents came to be marked on behalf of them. 7. The trial Court noticed the fact that the claim of the plaintiffs was accepted by the defendants in W.P. No. 7807/1992 and that therefore, the defendants were bound in law to handover the possession to the plaintiffs. 7. The trial Court noticed the fact that the claim of the plaintiffs was accepted by the defendants in W.P. No. 7807/1992 and that therefore, the defendants were bound in law to handover the possession to the plaintiffs. The contention of the defendants that suit was barred by law of limitation and that the defendants had perfected their right, title and interest to the suit property by adverse possession was repulsed by the trial Court. The trial Court in terms of the judgment and decree dated 12.04.2004 decreed the suit and directed the defendants to handover the possession of suit ‘A’ schedule property. 8. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree, the defendants have filed R.A. No. 65/2004. The first appellate Court secured the records of the trial Court and heard the appellants and respondents and also framed the points for consideration. The first appellate Court also took note of the proceeding before this Court in W.P. No. 7807/1992 and held that the defendants had conceded to the right title and interest of the plaintiffs in so far as 62 cents of land in Survey No. 2/4B and from the date when W.P. No. 7807/1992 was disposed off, the defendants have trespassed into the possession and therefore the plaintiffs were entitled to sue the defendants for possession. It is true as contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the first appellate Court merely brushed aside the contention of the defendants that the suit was barred by limitation. 9. It is against the aforesaid concurrent findings on facts, the defendants are in this regular second appeal. 10. The facts which are not in dispute are that the claim of the defendants in Survey No. 2/4B of Mogru Village was pending consideration before the Land Tribunal in respect of 3 acres 42 cents. It is not in dispute that the Tribunal granted 3 acres 42 cents in terms of the order dated 08.10.1990. The husband of plaintiff No. 1 being aggrieved by the said grant of occupancy right, filed W.P. No. 7807/1992 before this Court. The parties arrived at a settlement and the said writ petition was disposed off in terms of Ex.P.1, whereby the right of the husband of plaintiff No. 1 was recognized to an extent of 62 cents where the husband of defendant No. 1 was restricted to an extent of 2 acres 80 cents. The parties arrived at a settlement and the said writ petition was disposed off in terms of Ex.P.1, whereby the right of the husband of plaintiff No. 1 was recognized to an extent of 62 cents where the husband of defendant No. 1 was restricted to an extent of 2 acres 80 cents. Thus, the grant of occupancy right in respect of 62 cents in Survey No. 2/4B was quashed. 11. The operative portion of the order passed by this Court is as follows: “In view of the above, this petition is treated as restricted to the challenge to the conferment of occupancy rights in regard to 62 cents in sy. no. 2/4B in excess of 2 acres 80 cents for which the application has been filed. The order of the Tribunal conferring occupancy rights in excess of 2 acres 80 cents in so far as sy. no. 2/4B (that is 62 cents in sy. no. 2/4B) is quashed on the ground that the application was filed only for 2 acres 80 cents.” 12. Since the aforesaid order came to be passed on a mutual understanding between the plaintiffs and defendants, the defendants had acknowledged the right, title and interest of the plaintiffs in the suit schedule property. The defendants were therefore, bound in law to deliver possession of the property as per agreement entered into between them. 13. The contention urged of the learned counsel for the appellants that the plaint itself disclosed that the defendants were in possession of the suit property forcibly from the year 1978 and therefore the suit filed in the year 1995 is barred by limitation, cannot be accepted for the simple reason that limitation does not bar the right but merely bars the remedy. In the present case, the defendants had solemnly accepted to recognize the right, title and interest of the plaintiffs in the suit property and therefore, this was by way of a concession that the defendants acknowledged claim of the plaintiffs before this Court. Thus, the question of limitation would not arise. Since the plaintiffs have contended in the plaint that the defendants, though bound in law to deliver back possession in the year 1995, when the W.P. No. 7802/1992 was disposed of, had failed to do so, forms sufficient cause of action to file the suit for possession. 14. Thus, the question of limitation would not arise. Since the plaintiffs have contended in the plaint that the defendants, though bound in law to deliver back possession in the year 1995, when the W.P. No. 7802/1992 was disposed of, had failed to do so, forms sufficient cause of action to file the suit for possession. 14. In so far as other contention is concerned that the defendants have perfected their title to the said property by adverse possession in view of plaint averments that the defendants were in possession of the suit property from the year 1978, they have failed to place on record pleadings and proof regarding three classic requirements of proving a case of adverse possession. 15. I do not find any perversity in the findings of the Courts below and since no substantial question of law arises for consideration, the appeal is dismissed. 16. So far as the claim for mesne profit is concerned, the defendants have claimed to have developed the property in question by rising areca nut trees and other valuable trees. The Courts below, while considering the question of mesne profits may take into consideration the said development and if feasible, set off the same against any mesne profits payable. This is however subject to the condition that defendants shall not damage the trees and maintain them in good and proper health.