JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner who was posted as a Lekhpal in Kshetra -Nakela, Tehsil-Biswan, District-Sitapur was suspended on 26.11.1991. A charge sheet issued by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Biswan District -Sitapur was served upon him on 31.12.1991. Upon receiving the charge sheet on 2.1.1992, the petitioner prayed for time for submitting his reply on 16.1.1992. When in the meantime on 10.2.1992, the enquiry office who was appointed by the Sub Divisional Officer, namely, the Naib Tehsildar Biswan, Sri Virendra Bahadur had lodged a First Information Report against the petitioner, he submitted an application to the Sub Divisional Magistrate Biswan with a request that the enquiry officer, namely, Sri Virendra Bahadur be changed. This application was filed by the petitioner on 17.2.1992. However, on 18.2.1992 Sri Virendra Bahadur, who was sought to be changed, in pursuance of the earlier application filed by the petitioner for the extension of time, extended the time to file the reply to the charge sheet up to 25.2.1992. However, this letter never reached the petitioner and, therefore, while the petitioner was still waiting for the extension of time to submit his reply and also for the change of the enquiry officer, the enquiry officer completed the enquiry and on 24.3.1992 submitted his report. Based on the enquiry report, the punishing authority, that is, the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Biswan, in his turn passed an order of dismissal on 23.5.1992. Thereafter, the petitioner approached the High Court by means of a writ petition being Service Bench No. 239 of 1992 which was disposed of by an order dated 14.12.2017 with a direction that the Appellate Authority was to decide the appeal within a period of one month from the passing of the order of the High Court. When the Appellate Court on 31.3.2018 dismissed the appeal, the instant writ petition was filed. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the orders dated 23.5.1992 passed by the Sub Divisional Officer Biswan and the Appellate order dated 31.3.2018 essentially on the following grounds:- I. If the charges which were levelled against the petitioner were perused it was evident that they were absolutely vague. The charge no. 1 had implicated the petitioner with a charge that he had violated a certain code of conduct. The charge no. 1 had implicated the petitioner with a charge that he had violated a certain code of conduct. It had stated that as per the Rules, the petitioner could not have participated in the activities of any political party but no rule has been cited. By the charge no. 2 it was stated that on 25.11.1991, in a rally held in Ramleela Maindan, Kasba, Biswan, District Sitapur wherein some political leaders, namel y, Rewati Raman Singh, Ram Poojan Patel, Ramnaresh Kushwaha, Kaushal Kishore and Shiv Sewak Dixit etc. were present, the petitioner was also sitting on the dais. It has been further stated that the petitioner had read a certain demand letter from the dais. The charges no. 1 and 2, therefore, stated that the petitioner was involved in certain political activities. The charge no. 3 was to the effect that the petitioner had not done any work connected with his area and that there was no contribution of the petitioner towards the family welfare schemes. By charge no. 4 it was alleged that some allotment of land was also not done by the petitioner. The charge no. 5 was a reiteration of charge no. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that none of the charges indicated as to which particular Rule or Law, the petitioner had violated by participating in the political activity. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that even though the petitioner had never participated in any political activity yet it was not clear from the charges that which Rule was violated by the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that a perusal of the charges no. 3 and 4 also did not indicate as to where was the shortcoming in his performance so far as the various schemes were concerned. He submits that the charges did not make it clear as to which land was not allotted by the petitioner. Therefore, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the enquiry was vitiated on account of the fact that the charges were not clear. II. When the petitioner had asked for time and the enquiry officer had not responded and in fact the enquiry officer on 10.2.1992 had lodged a first information report against the petitioner then upon the prayer of the petitioner, the enquiry officer should have got himself changed. II. When the petitioner had asked for time and the enquiry officer had not responded and in fact the enquiry officer on 10.2.1992 had lodged a first information report against the petitioner then upon the prayer of the petitioner, the enquiry officer should have got himself changed. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that a person who was himself implicating the petitioner in a criminal case should not have been trusted with the enquiry which was being conducted by him. When the first information report was lodged by the enquiry officer himself against the petitioner and when the petitioner had objected to the same then the petitioner could not have trusted his life with the enquiry officer who had himself lodged the first information report against the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, submits that the Enquiry Officer should always be like an independent adjudicator and one who was always obliged to act fairly and impartially. He has to act in good faith without any bias. He submits that when the enquiry officer was virtually the representative of the punishing authority and he was all set to punish the petitioner then the Enquiry Report should have been rejected. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon 2018 (7) SCC 670 (Union of India and others v. Ram Lakhan Sharma) and since the petitioner's counsel relied upon on the paragraph 24, 28, 31, 33 and 34 they are being reproduced here as under:- "24.The disciplinary proceedings are quasi-judicial proceedings and Enquiry Officer is in the position of an independent adjudicator and is obliged to act fairly, impartially. The authority exercising quasi-judicial power has to act in good faith without bias, in a fair and impartial manner. 28. When the statutory rule does not contemplate appointment of Presenting Officer whether non-appointment of Presenting Officer ipso facto vitiates the inquiry? We have noticed the statutory provision of Rule 27 which does not indicate that there is any statutory requirement of appointment of Presenting Officer in the disciplinary inquiry. It is thus clear that statutory provision does not mandate appointment of Presenting Officer. When the statutory provision does not require appointment of Presenting Officer whether there can be any circumstances where principles of natural justice can be held to be violated is the broad question which needs to be answered in this case. It is thus clear that statutory provision does not mandate appointment of Presenting Officer. When the statutory provision does not require appointment of Presenting Officer whether there can be any circumstances where principles of natural justice can be held to be violated is the broad question which needs to be answered in this case. We have noticed above that the High Court found breach of principles of natural justice in Enquiry Officer acting as the prosecutor against the respondents. The Enquiry Officer who has to be independent and not representative of the disciplinary authority if starts acting in any other capacity and proceed to act in a manner as if he is interested in eliciting evidence to punish an employee, the principle of bias comes into place. 31.A Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court speaking through Justice R.V. Raveendran, CJ (as he then was) had occasion to consider the question of vitiation of the inquiry when the Inquiry Officer starts himself acting as prosecutor in Union of India and ors. vs. Mohd. Naseem Siddiqui, ILR (2004) MP 821. In the above case the Court considered Rule 9(9) (c) of the Railway Servants (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1968. The Division Bench while elaborating fundamental principles of natural justice enumerated the seven well recognised facets in paragraph 7 of the judgment which is to the following effect: “7. One of the fundamental principles of natural justice is that no man shall be a judge in his own cause. This principle consists of seven well recognised facets: (i) The adjudicator shall be impartial and free from bias, (ii) The adjudicator shall not be the prosecutor, (iii) The complainant shall not be an adjudicator, (iv) A witness cannot be the Adjudicator, (v) The Adjudicator must not import his personal knowledge of the facts of the case while inquiring into charges, (vi) The Adjudicator shall not decide on the dictates of his Superiors or others, (vii) The Adjudicator shall decide the issue with reference to material on record and not reference to extraneous material or on extraneous considerations. If any one of these fundamental rules is breached, the inquiry will be vitiated.” 33. The Division Bench after elaborately considering the issue summarised the principles in paragraph 16 which is to the following effect: “16. If any one of these fundamental rules is breached, the inquiry will be vitiated.” 33. The Division Bench after elaborately considering the issue summarised the principles in paragraph 16 which is to the following effect: “16. We may summarise the principles thus: (i) The Enquiry Officer, who is in the position of a Judge shall not act as a Presenting Officer, who is in the position of a prosecutor. (ii) It is not necessary for the Disciplinary Authority to appoint a Presenting Officer in each and every inquiry. Non-appointment of a Presenting Officer, by itself will not vitiate the inquiry. (iii) The Enquiry Officer, with a view to arrive at the truth or to obtain clarifications, can put questions to the prosecution witnesses as also the defence witnesses. In the absence of a Presenting Officer, if the Inquiry Officer puts any questions to the prosecution witnesses to elicit the facts, he should thereafter permit the delinquent employee to cross-examine such witnesses on those clarifications. (iv) If the Inquiry Officer conducts a regular examination-in-chief by leading the prosecution witnesses through the prosecution case, or puts leading questions to the departmental witnesses pregnant with answers, or cross-examines the defence witnesses or puts suggestive questions to establish the prosecution case employee, the Enquiry Officer acts as prosecutor thereby vitiating the inquiry. (v) As absence of a Presenting Officer by itself will not vitiate the inquiry and it is recognised that the Inquiry Officer can put questions to any or all witnesses to elicit the truth, the question whether an Inquiry Officer acted as a Presenting Officer, will have to be decided with reference to the manner in which the evidence is let in and recorded in the inquiry. Whether an Enquiry Officer has merely acted only as an Enquiry Officer or has also acted as a Presenting Officer depends on the facts of each case. To avoid any allegations of bias and running the risk of inquiry being declared as illegal and vitiated, the present trend appears to be to invariably appoint Presenting Officers, except in simple cases. Be that as it may.” 34. We fully endorse the principles as enumerated above, however, the principles have to be carefully applied in facts situation of a particular case. Be that as it may.” 34. We fully endorse the principles as enumerated above, however, the principles have to be carefully applied in facts situation of a particular case. There is no requirement of appointment of Presenting Officer in each and every case, whether statutory rules enable the authorities to make an appointment or are silent. When the statutory rules are silent with regard to the applicability of any facet of principles of natural justice the applicability of principles of natural justice which are not specifically excluded in the statutory scheme are not prohibited. When there is no express exclusion of particular principle of natural justice, the said principle shall be applicable in a given case to advance the cause of justice. In this context reference is made of a case of this Court in Punjab National Bank and others vs. Kunj Behari Misra, 1998 (7) SCC 84 . In the above case, this Court had occasion to consider the provisions of Punjab National Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1977. Regulation 7 provides for action on the enquiry report. Regulation 7 as extracted in paragraph 10 of the judgment is as follows: 10. …...........“7. Action on the enquiry report.—(1) The disciplinary authority, if it is not itself the enquiring authority, may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, remit the case to the enquiring authority for fresh or further enquiry and report and the enquiring authority shall thereupon proceed to hold the further enquiry according to the provisions of Regulation 6 as far as may be. (2) The disciplinary authority shall, if it disagrees with the findings of the enquiring authority on any article of charge, record its reasons for such disagreement and record its own findings on such charge, if the evidence on record is sufficient for the purpose. (3) If the disciplinary authority, having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charge, is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in Regulation 4 should be imposed on the officer employee, it shall, notwithstanding anything contained in Regulation 8, make an order imposing such penalty. (3) If the disciplinary authority, having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charge, is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in Regulation 4 should be imposed on the officer employee, it shall, notwithstanding anything contained in Regulation 8, make an order imposing such penalty. (4) If the disciplinary authority having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charge, is of the opinion that no penalty is called for, it may pass an order exonerating the officer employee concerned.” Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon 2010 (2) SCC 772 (State of Uttar Pradesh and Others vs. Saroj Kumar Sinha) and submitted that an employee should be treated fairly in any proceeding which may culminate in a major punishment. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that an enquiry officer should not act both as a prosecutor and as a judge. His function was to examine facts and evidence which were presented by the delinquent and the department. This, he submits, the enquiry officer had to do objectively even if the delinquent official is absent. The enquiry officer had to in the absence of the delinquent officer assess the evidence produced by the department and had to see if the unrebutted evidence was sufficient to prove that the charges were proved. Since the learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon paragraphs 28, 29 and 30 of the judgment they are being reproduced here as under:- "28. An Inquiry officer acting in a quasi judicial authority is in the position of an independent adjudicator. He is not supposed to be a representative of the department/disciplinary authority/Government. His function is to examine the evidence presented by the department, even in the absence of the delinquent official to see as to whether the unrebutted evidence is sufficient to hold that the charges are proved. In the present case the aforesaid procedure has not been observed. Since no oral evidence has been examined the documents have not been proved, and could not have been taken into consideration to conclude that the charges have been proved against the respondents. 29. Apart from the above by virtue of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India the departmental inquiry had to be conducted in accordance with rules of natural justice. 29. Apart from the above by virtue of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India the departmental inquiry had to be conducted in accordance with rules of natural justice. It is a basic requirement of rules of natural justice that an employee be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in any proceeding which may culminate in punishment being imposed on the employee. 30. When a departmental enquiry is conducted against the Government servant it cannot be treated as a casual exercise. The enquiry proceedings also cannot be conducted with a closed mind. The enquiry officer has to be wholly unbiased. The rules of natural justice are required to be observed to ensure not only that justice is done but is manifestly seen to be done. The object of rules of natural justice is to ensure that a government servant is treated fairly in proceedings which may culminate in imposition of punishment including dismissal/removal from service." 6. In the instant case, learned counsel submitted that when the petitioner could not be present and when the enquiry officer himself appeared to be on inimical terms, he having have lodged a first information report against the petitioner, the enquiry should not have been allowed to continue. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that in the enquiry neither any place, date or time was fixed for the appearance of the petitioner or for the production of any evidence. Witnesses could not be produced by either sides and, therefore, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the enquiry was absolutely vitiated. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that as per Rule 55 of the C.C.A Rules which provide for a full fledged enquiry no enquiry took place. He relied upon a decision reported in AIR 1968 SC 158 (State of U.P. and another vs. C.S. Sharma). Since he specifically relied upon paragraphs 6 and 10 of the judgment they are being reproduced here as under:- "6. The first question is whether this inquiry was made under sub-rule (1) or (3) of r. 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. Since he specifically relied upon paragraphs 6 and 10 of the judgment they are being reproduced here as under:- "6. The first question is whether this inquiry was made under sub-rule (1) or (3) of r. 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. It is an admitted fact that Sharma was a temporary employee and therefore his case would fall to be governed by sub-rule (3) of r. 55 if it could be said that the enquiry which was being made was for a specific fault or on account of his unsuitability for service. Sub-rule 1) of r. 55 is a general rule for enquiries where the conduct of a person is inquired into for misconduct but sub-rule (3) says that sub-rule shall not apply where it is proposed to terminate the employment of a probationer, or to dismiss, remove or reduce in rank a temporary government servant for any specific fault or on account of his unsuitability for the service. Sub-rule (3) says that in such cases, the probationer or temporary government servant concerned shall be apprised of the grounds of such proposal, given an opportunity to show cause against the action to be taken against him, and his explanation in this behalf, if any, shall be duly considered before orders are passed by the competent authority. If the third sub-rule applied, it is obvious that the kind of enquiry made complied with its requirements. The first sub-rule, however,-provides for a full-blooded enquiry which is the counter-part of a regular trial : witnesses have to be examined in support of the allegations, opportunity has to be given to the delinquent, officer to cross-examine them and to lead evidence in his defence. In our judgment the present case was governed by the first sub-rule and not the third sub-rule. The third sub-rule deals with the unsuitability of an officer for the service or with a charge for any specific fault. This fault means a fault in the execution of his duties and not a misconduct such as taking bribe etc. which are charges of a more serious nature, affecting the character of the individual concerned. The collocation of the words "any specific fault" or "on account of unsuitability for service" give the clue of the distinction between the third sub-rule and the first sub-rule. which are charges of a more serious nature, affecting the character of the individual concerned. The collocation of the words "any specific fault" or "on account of unsuitability for service" give the clue of the distinction between the third sub-rule and the first sub-rule. An officer who is, for example, habitually lazy or makes mistakes frequently or is not polite or decorous may be considered unsuitable for the service. Another officer who makes a grievous default in the execution of his work may be charged for the specific individual fault, that is a dereliction or defect in the execution of that duty. Where there is an allegation that an officer is guilty of a misconduct such as accepting bribe or showing favours, the matter is not one of specific fault in the execution of his work but something more. That matter will fall to be governed by the first sub-rule because you cannot charge a man with criminal conduct without affording him adequate opportunity to clear his character. Mr. Aggarwal fairly pointed out that the Government had appointed the enquiring officer to take action under r. 55(1) and it is thus quite clear that Government viewed the matter also in this light. 10. We may not omit to state that there was an allegation against the Commissioner that he was biased against Sharma. It does appear that the Commissioner, in one of his letters, stated that he had heard witnesses and satisfied himself that Sharma was definitely corrupt. This statement of the Commissioner showed that : he approached the case with a feeling that Sharma was guilty although the State Government cannot be said to share this bias of the Commissioner. We would have said something more about this, if the occasion had demanded this, but as we are upholding the order of the High Court on the ground that no reasonable 8 54 opportunity was afforded to Sharma to lead his evidence, it is not necessary to say whether an officer in the position of the Commissioner, who on the basis of secret enquiries behind the 'back of ,delinquent officer has reached the conclusion that there are good grounds for holding that the officer is corrupt, should himself ,conduct the enquiry. That matter may be left for consideration in another case." III. That matter may be left for consideration in another case." III. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that domestic enquiries ought to be conducted honestly, bonafidely and with a view to determine whether charges are proved. Care has to be taken to see that the enquiry does not become an empty formality. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon 2016 (12) SCC 204 (Chamoli District Cooperative Bank Limited and another v. Raghunath Singh Rana and others). IV. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the disciplinary authority, namely, the Sub Divisional Magistrate Biswan when was stated to be a witness of the facts which formed the basis of the charges then he would be considered to be a judge in his own cause. In this regard, learned counsel relied upon 1958 AIR 86 (The State Of Uttar Pradesh vs Mohammad Nooh). V. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that when the charge itself stated that the meeting at the Ramlila Maidan was held on 25.11.1991 then when the enquiry report which dealt with an incident on 1.3.1992, it could safely be said that the enquiry report was based on conjectures and surmises and learned counsel for the petitioner to substantiate his argument relied upon 2009 (2) SCC 570 (Room Singh Negi vs. Punjab National Bank). The paragraph 23 of the judgment upon which learned counsel heavily relied upon is being reproduced here as under:- "Furthermore, the order of the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority are not supported by any reason. As the orders passed by them have severe civil consequences, appropriate reasons should have been assigned. If the enquiry officer had relied upon the confession made by the appellant, there was no reason as to why the order of discharge passed by the Criminal Court on the basis of selfsame evidence should not have been taken into consideration. The materials brought on record pointing out the guilt are required to be proved. A decision must be arrived at on some evidence, which is legally admissible. The provisions of the Evidence Act may not be applicable in a departmental proceeding but the principles of natural justice are. As the report of the Enquiry Officer was based on merely ipse dixit as also surmises and conjectures, the same could not have been sustained. The inferences drawn by the Enquiry Officer apparently were not supported by any evidence. The provisions of the Evidence Act may not be applicable in a departmental proceeding but the principles of natural justice are. As the report of the Enquiry Officer was based on merely ipse dixit as also surmises and conjectures, the same could not have been sustained. The inferences drawn by the Enquiry Officer apparently were not supported by any evidence. Suspicion, as is well known, however high may be, can under no circumstances be held to be a substitute for legal proof. VI. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that there was also a technical flaw in the enquiry inasmuch as the petitioner was not served with the enquiry report and was also not required to show cause with regard to the punishment. He submitted that denial of the enquiry report to the petitioner amounted to the denial of a reasonable opportunity to object to the quantum of punishment. In this regard, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon 1991 (1) SCC 588 (Union of India and Ors. vs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan ) and 1994 LIC 762 (Managing Director Ecil Hyderabad ... vs B. Karunakar Etc. Etc). VII. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Appellate Authority also did not act in accordance with law and only dittoed the findings as were arrived at by the punishing authority. VIII. Learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, submitted that the enquiry itself was a slip shod one and no findings of it could be relied upon and, therefore, the orders 23.5.1992 and 31.3.2018 be quashed and the writ petition be allowed. 3. The petitioner for having been kept out of service illegally prayed that he be compensated by giving him full back wages. In this regard, the learned counsel relied upon 2013 (10) SCC 324 (Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.ED.) and Others). 4. Learned Standing Counsel, however, in reply submitted that the charges were evident from the charge sheet itself. There was nothing vague about it. He further submitted that when the petitioner was asked to submit his reply then he should have submitted the same and the lodging of the first information report did not mean that the enquiry officer would be biased against the petitioner. There was nothing vague about it. He further submitted that when the petitioner was asked to submit his reply then he should have submitted the same and the lodging of the first information report did not mean that the enquiry officer would be biased against the petitioner. He further submitted that the enquiry could not be said to be vitiated on account of the fact that the petitioner was also found to be participating in a political meeting on 1.3.1992. He submitted that it mattered little that though the petitioner was charged for allegedly attending the meeting held on 25.11.1991 but the fact that he had attended meeting on 1.3.1992 was taken into account. He submits that the enquiry officer had, after a broad assessment of the evidence present, concluded that the petitioner was inclined towards politics and had the protection of various politically active leaders and, therefore, no fault could be found with the enquiry report. The order of the punishing authority and the Appellate authority were, therefore, he submitted absolutely correct. 5. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, this Court is of the view that the order dated 23.5.1992 passed by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Biswan, dismissing the petitioner from service and the Appellate Court's order dated 31.3.2018 by which the punishment was confirmed could not be sustained in the eyes of law. Firstly, the Court finds that the charge sheet was extremely vague. No Rule had been mentioned which had been relied upon to punish the petitioner. The only allegation in the charge sheet appears to be that since the petitioner was a politically active person he was to be punished. Secondly, when the charges did not show as to which land was not allotted by the petitioner and as to which welfare programme was not followed properly by the petitioner there could not have been any definite reply. Still further when the petitioner was throughout asking for a change of the enquiry officer specially when he had himself lodged a first information report against the petitioner then the enquiry officer should not have been trusted with the life of the petitioner. Thirdly, if the petitioner did not appear then it was the duty of the enquiry officer to have come to a definite conclusion as to whether the petitioner was guilty and was liable to be punished. Thirdly, if the petitioner did not appear then it was the duty of the enquiry officer to have come to a definite conclusion as to whether the petitioner was guilty and was liable to be punished. The enquiry officer should have found out as to whether the unrebutted evidence was also conclusively proved or not. He should have seen whether the charges on the basis of unrebutted charges were proved sufficiently or not, to punish the petitioner. Fourth, I find that the enquiry report and the show cause regarding punishment were also not served upon the petitioner. 6. In the end, since the Court finds that the petitioner was illegally kept out of service on account of wrong orders having been passed, the petitioner be given the benefit of continuity of service and he be also given his full back wages. 7. The orders dated 23.5.1992 passed by the S.D.M. District Sitapur and 31.3.2018 passed by the District Magistrate, Sitapur, are quashed. 8. The writ petition is allowed.