JUDGMENT 1. Heard finally. 2. This Misc. Appeal under Section 173 of Motor Vehicles Act, has been filed against the award dated 7-4-2017 passed by Vth Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Morena in Claim Case No. 450/2015. 3. The present appeal has been filed by the Insurance Company whereas the respondent no. 3 has filed his cross objection. The respondent no.3 has valued his cross objection at Rs.3 lacs, however, has not paid the Court Fee. Even the Counsel for the respondent no.3 did not pray for time to pay the Court Fee. Therefore, the Cross objection filed by the respondent no.3 is dismissed on the ground of non-payment of Court Fee. 4. The necessary facts for disposal of the present appeal in short are that the respondent no.3 filed a claim petition under Section 166 of Motor Vehicles Act, on the averment that on 3-7-2015, he was going to his matrimonial house along with his brother Jeetu on a motor cycle. He was driving the motor cycle cautiously. When he reached near the police outpost Mevada, the driver of the offending truck bearing registration no. RJ 11/G.A. 0215, by driving the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner, dashed the motor cycle of the respondent no.3, as a result of which he sustained grievous injuries on his right elbow, wrist, left knee, face, jaw and on other part of the body. The respondent no.3 was shifted to hospital. An FIR was lodged and accordingly, the police registered offence in crime no. 68/2015 for offence under Sections 279,337 of IPC. 5. The Claims Tribunal, after framing issues and recording evidence, held that the Claimant is 25% negligent in causing the accident and allowed the Claim petition and awarded Rs. 2,74,797/- to the respondent no. 3 and it was also held that the Insurance Company is jointly and severally liable to pay compensation amount. 6. Challenging the impugned award passed by the Claims Tribunal, it is submitted by the Counsel for the appellant that in fact no accident had taken place with the offending truck and the truck in question was falsely involved. It is further submitted that exorbitant compensation has been awarded to the respondent no.3. 7. Per contra, the Counsel for the respondent no. 3 has supported the award passed by the Claims Tribunal. 8. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties. 9. It is further submitted that exorbitant compensation has been awarded to the respondent no.3. 7. Per contra, the Counsel for the respondent no. 3 has supported the award passed by the Claims Tribunal. 8. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties. 9. In order to prove that the vehicle was falsely involved by the respondent no. 3, it is submitted by the Counsel for the appellant that the accident took place on 3-7-2015, where as the F.I.R. was lodged on 4-7-2015. It is further submitted that in the information, Ex. P.4, which was sent by the Hospital to the police station, it was mentioned that some unknown person has caused the accident. 10. It is well established principle of law that mere delay in lodging the F.I.R. is not sufficient to disbelieve the case of the claimant. Further, the claim petitions are to be decided on the basis of the evidence led before the Claims Tribunal and cannot be decided solely on the basis of the documents of criminal cases. 11. The Supreme Court in the case of Mangla Ram Vs. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in (2018) 5 SCC 656 has held as under:- ''24. It will be useful to advert to the dictum in N.K.V. Bros. (P) Ltd. v. M. Karumai Ammal , wherein it was contended by the vehicle owner that the criminal case in relation to the accident had ended in acquittal and for which reason the claim under the Motor Vehicles Act ought to be rejected. This Court negatived the said argument by observing that the nature of proof required to establish culpable rashness, punishable under IPC, is more stringent than negligence sufficient under the law of tort to create liability. The observation made in para 3 of the judgment would throw some light as to what should be the approach of the Tribunal in motor accident cases. The same reads thus: (SCC pp. 458-59) ' 3. Road accidents are one of the top killers in our country, specially when truck and bus drivers operate nocturnally. This proverbial recklessness often persuades the courts, as has been observed by us earlier in other cases, to draw an initial presumption in several cases based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 458-59) ' 3. Road accidents are one of the top killers in our country, specially when truck and bus drivers operate nocturnally. This proverbial recklessness often persuades the courts, as has been observed by us earlier in other cases, to draw an initial presumption in several cases based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Accidents Tribunals must take special care to see that innocent victims do not suffer and drivers and owners do not escape liability merely because of some doubt here or some obscurity there. Save in plain cases, culpability must be inferred from the circumstances where it is fairly reasonable. The court should not succumb to niceties, technicalities and mystic maybes. We are emphasising this aspect because we are often distressed by transport operators getting away with it thanks to judicial laxity, despite the fact that they do not exercise sufficient disciplinary control over the drivers in the matter of careful driving. The heavy economic impact of culpable driving of public transport must bring owner and driver to their responsibility to their neighbour. Indeed, the State must seriously consider no-fault liability by legislation. A second aspect which pains us is the inadequacy of the compensation or undue parsimony practised by tribunals. We must remember that judicial tribunals are State organs and Article 41 of the Constitution lays the jurisprudential foundation for State relief against accidental disablement of citizens. There is no justification for niggardliness in compensation. A third factor which is harrowing is the enormous delay in disposal of accident cases resulting in compensation, even if awarded, being postponed by several years. The States must appoint sufficient number of tribunals and the High Courts should insist upon quick disposals so that the trauma and tragedy already sustained may not be magnified by the injustice of delayed justice. Many States are unjustly indifferent in this regard." 25. In Dulcina Fernandes , this Court examined similar situation where the evidence of claimants eyewitness was discarded by the Tribunal and that the respondent in that case was acquitted in the criminal case concerning the accident. This Court, however, opined that it cannot be overlooked that upon investigation of the case registered against the respondent, prima facie, materials showing negligence were found to put him on trial. This Court, however, opined that it cannot be overlooked that upon investigation of the case registered against the respondent, prima facie, materials showing negligence were found to put him on trial. The Court restated the settled principle that the evidence of the claimants ought to be examined by the Tribunal on the touchstone of preponderance of probability and certainly the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied as noted in Bimla Devi . In paras 8 & 9 of the reported decision, the dictum in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta , has been adverted to as under: ( Dulcina Fernandes case , SCC p. 650) ' 8. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta while considering the nature of a claim petition under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 a three-Judge Bench of this Court has culled out certain propositions of which Propositions ( ii ), ( v ) and ( vi ) would be relevant to the facts of the present case and, therefore, may be extracted hereinbelow: (SCC p. 518, para 10) 10. ( ii ) The rules of the pleadings do not strictly apply as the claimant is required to make an application in a form prescribed under the Act. In fact, there is no pleading where the proceedings are suo motu initiated by the Tribunal. * * * ( v ) Though the Tribunal adjudicates on a claim and determines the compensation, it does not do so as in an adversarial litigation. ( vi ) The Tribunal is required to follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. It may choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of and matters relevant to inquiry, to assist it in holding the enquiry. 9. The following further observation available in para 10 of the Report would require specific note: ( Shila Datta case , SCC p. 519) 10. We have referred to the aforesaid provisions to show that an award by the Tribunal cannot be seen as an adversarial adjudication between the litigating parties to a dispute, but a statutory determination of compensation on the occurrence of an accident, after due enquiry, in accordance with the statute.' In para 10 of Dulcina Fernandes , the Court opined that non-examination of witness per se cannot be treated as fatal to the claim set up before the Tribunal. In other words, the approach of the Tribunal should be holistic analysis of the entire pleadings and evidence by applying the principles of preponderance of probability.'' 12. The Supreme Court in the case of Halappa Vs. Malik Sub. reported in (2018) 12 SCC 15 has held as under:- "8. The judgment of the Tribunal indicates that the defence of the insurer based on the first information report, the complaint Ext. P-1 and the supplementary statement of the appellant at Ext. P-2 was duly evaluated. The Tribunal, however, observed thus: ' Respondent 3 and RW 1 submitted that the petitioner has invited the alleged unfortunate accident but except the FIR and complaint Ext. P-1 Respondent 3 has not produced any documents to show that at the time of accident the petitioner was travelling as a passenger by sitting on the engine of the tractor in question. During the course of cross-examination RW 1 has admitted that Respondent 3 has maintained a separate file in respect of accident in question and he has also admitted that Respondent 3 has not produced the investigators report of this case. Admittedly Respondent 3 has not examined any independent eyewitness to the accident to prove that on the relevant date and time of the accident the petitioner was travelling as a passenger by sitting on the engine of the tractor. If really the petitioner has sustained grievous injuries by falling down from the engine of said tractor Respondent 3 insurer could have produced the separate file maintained by it in respect of the accident in question and it could have also produced investigators report in respect of the said accident but admittedly Respondent 3 has not produced the said separate file and investigators report in respect of the accident in question for the reasons best known to it. On the other hand as already stated above it is clear from the statement of petitioner on oath and eyewitness and from the supplementary statement of petitioner at Ext. P-2 and police statement of witnesses at Ext. P-3 and charge-sheet at Ext. P-6 it is clear that due to rash and negligent driving of said tractor by Respondent 1 the said tractor turtled down and fell over the petitioner who was about to board the tractor and as a result of which the petitioner has sustained grievous injuries. P-2 and police statement of witnesses at Ext. P-3 and charge-sheet at Ext. P-6 it is clear that due to rash and negligent driving of said tractor by Respondent 1 the said tractor turtled down and fell over the petitioner who was about to board the tractor and as a result of which the petitioner has sustained grievous injuries. Moreover as already stated above the Investigating Officer concerned after detail investigation has filed the charge-sheet against Respondent 1 for the offences punishable under Sections 279 and 338 IPC' 9. The High Court has proceeded to reverse the finding of the Tribunal purely on the basis that the FIR which was lodged on the complaint of the appellant contained a version which was at variance with the evidence which emerged before the Tribunal. The Tribunal had noted the admission of RW 1 in the course of his cross-examination that the insurer had maintained a separate file in respect of the accident. The insurer did not produce either the file or the report of the investigator in the case. Moreover, no independent witness was produced by the insurer to displace the version of the incident as deposed to by the appellant and by PW 3. The cogent analysis of the evidence by the Tribunal has been displaced by the High Court without considering material aspects of the evidence on the record. The High Court was not justified in holding that the Tribunal had arrived at a finding of fact without applying its mind to the documents produced by the claimant or that it had casually entered a finding of fact. On the contrary, we find that the reversal of the finding by the High Court was without considering the material aspects of the evidence which justifiably weighed with the Tribunal. We are, therefore, of the view that the finding of the High Court is manifestly erroneous and that the finding of fact by the Tribunal was correct." 13. The Supreme Court in the case of State of M.P. Vs. Surbhan reported in AIR 1996 SC 3345 has held as under : "7 . It is contended that the FIR mentions the names of above persons who were specifically mentioned and it lends corroboration to the evidence of P.W. 2. We find no substance in this contention. The Supreme Court in the case of State of M.P. Vs. Surbhan reported in AIR 1996 SC 3345 has held as under : "7 . It is contended that the FIR mentions the names of above persons who were specifically mentioned and it lends corroboration to the evidence of P.W. 2. We find no substance in this contention. The FIR cannot be used as substantive evidence or corroborating a statement of third party, i.e., P.W. 2. FIR cannot be used to corroborate the evidence of P.W.2. It can be used either to corroborate or for contradiction of its maker." 14. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Dhanwanti and others Vs. Kulwant singh and others reported in 1994 ACJ 708 has held as under : "10. ....It is a well settled proposition of law that evidence recorded in criminal court and the findings arrived at thereon should not be used in claim cases. Such evidence for the purposes of claim cases is inadmissible. [See Shabbir Ahmed Vs. M.P.S.R.T.C., Bhopal, 1984 ACJ 525 (M.P.) ]" 15. The co-ordinate bench of this Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Kamli and others reported in 2010 ACJ 1340 has held as under : "F.I.R. is not a substantive piece of evidence and as such, it cannot be placed on pedestal higher than the statement made before the Claims Tribunal on oath..... therefore, we donot find any illegality in the approach of the Claims Tribunal while coming to the conclusion that the deceased was not travelling in the tractor-trolley." 16. The Supreme Court by judgment dated 14.2.2019 passed in Civil Appeal No.1665/2019 ( Sunita and Ors. Vs. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & Anr.) has held as under :- "20........ It is thus well settled that in motor accident claim cases, once the foundational fact, namely, the actual occurrence of the accident, has been established, then the Tribunals role would be to calculate the quantum of just compensation if the accident had taken place by reason of negligence of the driver of a motor vehicle and, while doing so, the Tribunal would not be strictly bound by the pleadings of the parties. Notably, while deciding cases arising out of motor vehicle accidents, the standard of proof to be borne in mind must be of preponderance of probability and not the strict standard of proof beyond all reasonable doubt which is followed in criminal cases." 17. Further, there is no delay in lodging the F.I.R. The F.I.R. was lodged on the next day and the truck was also seized by the police from the spot itself. Thus, it cannot be said that the vehicle was falsely involved in the case. 18. So far as the quantum of compensation is concerned, it is submitted by the Counsel for the appellant, that in fact the respondent no.3 had not sustained any fracture and the x-ray report is of much later date. 19. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties. 20. The respondent no.3 has relied upon the MLC report, Ex-P5 which was prepared immediately after the accident. On medical examination, the following injury was found on the body of the respondent no.3: 21. Lacerated wound with crush injury on left fore arm exposed muscle, bone, skin. 22. Thus, it is clear that the respondent no.3 had suffered a crush injury and therefore, the submission made by the Counsel for the appellant that the respondent no. 3 had not sustained any injury is rejected. 23. It is next contended by the Counsel for the appellant, that the Claims Tribunal has wrongly assessed the whole body permanent disability as 25%. The respondent no. 3 has not stated in his evidence, that he is not in a position to perform his work of daily needs, or because of injury, his earning capacity has reduced. 24. Per contra, it is submitted by the Counsel for the respondent no.3, that Dr. Subhash Agrawal, P.W. 2 has specifically stated about the nature of injury. 25. Considered the submissions made by the Counsel for the parties. 26. Hariom Joshi (P.W.1)/respondent no.3 has stated in para 1 of his examination in chief, that he had suffered fracture of wrist bone. In para 3 of the examination in chief, it is stated that because of the injury, he is not in a position to walk, stand, sit properly and therefore, he is unable to run his Chaat handcart. 26. Hariom Joshi (P.W.1)/respondent no.3 has stated in para 1 of his examination in chief, that he had suffered fracture of wrist bone. In para 3 of the examination in chief, it is stated that because of the injury, he is not in a position to walk, stand, sit properly and therefore, he is unable to run his Chaat handcart. In Para 17 of cross examination, it is stated by respondent no.3 that he was working with Anil Sharma, who is the owner of chaart handcart in Kota (Rajasthan). Thus, the respondent no. 3 has failed to prove that he himself was running a chaat handcart. Further, the respondent no. 3 has not filed any document to show that his monthly income was Rs. 30,000/-. 27. So far as the statement of the respondent no.3 that he cannot sit, walk, stand etc is concerned, it is clear that fracture of his wrist joint cannot have any impact on the above mentioned body functions. Thus, it is clear that the Claims Tribunal has wrongly assessed the whole body permanent disability as 25%. Considering the nature of the injury sustained by the respondent no.3, it is held that he had sustained 10% whole body permanent disability. 28. The Claims Tribunal has assessed the monthly income of the respondent no. 3 as Rs.5,000/-. No document has been filed by the respondent no. 3 to prove his income. Anil Sharma (P.W.4) has stated that the respondent no. 3 was working under him as a labourer for preparation of Chaat . However, no document has been filed to prove that the respondent no. 3 was working with him, and no document has been filed to prove the income and expenses of Anil Sharma (P.W.4) and nothing has been filed to show that Anil Sharma (P.W.4) was making payment @ Rs. 600 per day. Further it is the claim of Anil Sharma that his monthly income is Rs. 40,000/-. Although Shri Anil Sharma (P.W.4) has not filed any document to show his income, but even if it is accepted that the monthly income of Anil Sharma (P.W.4) was Rs. 40,000/- per month, then it is clear that he cannot pay Rs. 18000/- p.m. @ Rs. 600 per day to the respondent no.3, as he has admitted that the salary to his servants is paid by him out of his monthly income of Rs.40,000/-. 40,000/- per month, then it is clear that he cannot pay Rs. 18000/- p.m. @ Rs. 600 per day to the respondent no.3, as he has admitted that the salary to his servants is paid by him out of his monthly income of Rs.40,000/-. Therefore, it is held that the income assessed by the Claims Tribunal is on higher side and accordingly, the yearly notional income of the respondent no. 3 is assessed as Rs. 30,000/- p.a. Since, the respondent no.3 has suffered whole body permanent disability of 10%, therefore, his loss of income is assessed as Rs. 3,000/- p.a. 29. Since, the respondent no. 3 was aged about 24 years, therefore, the multiplier of 18 would apply. The medical expenses awarded by the Claims Tribunal does not call for any interference. The Claims Tribunal has awarded Rs. 9,000, 4500 and Rs. 10,000 towards expenses of attendant, special diet and mental and physical pain and suffering respectively. The amount awarded under these heads do not call for any interference. 30. Accordingly, the respondent no.3 is entitled for the following Compensation amount : 1. Yearly Income : Rs. 30,000 2. Permanent Disability 10% : Rs., 3,000 p.a. 3. Multiplier 18 : Rs. 54,000 4. Contributory Negligence 25% : Rs. 13,500 5. Loss of Income : Rs. 40,500 4. Medical Expenses : Rs. 52,397 5. Attendant Expenses : Rs. 9,000 6. Special Diet : Rs. 4,500 7. Physical and Mental suffering : Rs. 10,000 Total : Rs. 1,16,397/-. 31. The Claims Tribunal has awarded Rs. 2,74,797/- whereas the respondent no. 3 is entitled for an amount of Rs. 1,16,397/-. 32. With aforesaid modifications, the award dated 7-4-2017 passed by Vth Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Morena in Claim Case No.450/2015 is hereby affirmed.