ORDER : Sharad Kumar Sharma, J. 1. A very peculiar, but a very interesting question which arises for consideration in the present writ petition, is with regard to the following wider issues:- (i) That, what would be the impact carried, of an amendment made, in The Uttarakhand Urban And Country Planning and Development Act, 1973, viz-a-viz its implication, on a Civil Proceedings, which ultimately culminated, to a decree which stands adjudicated by a regular civil proceedings by way of a competent Civil Court; prior to the amendment being carried in the Act of 1973, by insertion of Section 37 A, vide Amendment Act No. 30. (ii) That, as to what would be the effect of the amendment made in the Act of 1973 w.e.f. 05.04.2013, viz.-a-viz., its comparative scrutiny and effect on a decision on Issue No. 11, which already stood decided by the learned trial court qua the parties to the Suit, pertaining to the applicability of the Act of 1973, holding thereof that the subject-matter in question, which was considered and settled by the learned Trial Court, was outside the preview of the Act of 1973. (iii) That as to whether the insertion made in the Act, by the Amending Act No. 30, would have a retrospective effect, and will have a bearing on the civil proceedings already decided by the Competent Civil Court. (iv) Whether the Execution proceedings, will fall to be under the purview of Section 37A, to be referred to be adjudicated by Chairman of the Development Authority? 2. The brief facts of the case are, that there is a property which is lying within the Municipal Area of Nagar Nigam, District Haridwar, bearing Municipal No. 59/36, situated at Vishnu Ghat, which is also commonly called as Baroda Wali Dharmshala, which is contended by the petitioner to have been registered, as per law with the District Magistrate as such, located at Mohalla, Ramghat, Haridwar (hereinafter to be called as the property in dispute). 3. According to the case of the petitioner, since the said property was a very old construction and as it was in a very dilapidated condition, and that they had been consistently, noticed by the Nagar Nigam, for getting an appropriate repairs and renovation done, as it was a building, which was categorized by the local body, as to be a building creating and posing danger to the public at large. Since according to the perception of the petitioner's contention, in the pleadings, was that the magnitude of repair and renovation, which was expected to be carried by the petitioner over the disputed building would be falling within the ambit of the provisions contained under Section 52(A) of the Act of 1973, and under law where there was no prior sanction, as such which was formally required from the Development Authority. But since there was an obstruction raised by the respondent Development Authority, the petitioner had instituted a civil suit; being Suit No. 310 of 2004, Ishwar Dayal Kansal v. Haridwar Development Authority. In which, after the exchange of pleadings, apart from the fact that there were other issues, which were raised but the learned trial court on exchange of pleadings have framed the issues as contained in para 9 of the said judgment/decree, which is quoted hereunder:- 4. For deciding the present controversy, the relevant issue, which would be entailing consideration, by this Court, would be Issue Nos. 5 and 11, which already stood decided. However, the said suit proceeded on merits and on exchange of pleadings and completion of evidence and consequent thereto, the learned trial court vide its judgment and decree dated 02.07.2008, on the basis of the undertaking which was given by the plaintiff/petitioner's, therein had decreed the suit of the plaintiff/petitioner, to the effect that the plaintiff/petitioner, would be carrying out only the internal repair and reconstruction and would not be altering the nature of property, as such, which could have entailed a requirement of formal mandatory prior sanction, under the Act of 1973. The following decree was rendered:- 5. Though the suit was decreed, on the basis of an undertaking given by the plaintiff/petitioner, by the judgment of 02.07.2008, as rendered by the court of Civil Judge (SD), Haridwar, but the same has attained finality, qua the parties to the suit, as the same was not put to challenge, before any superior appellate court, by any of the parties to the proceedings of the suit. The learned trial court while deciding the issue Nos. 5 and 11, of applicability on the Act of 1973, in its Issue Nos. 5 and 11, it has held that the provisions of the Act of 1973, would not apply over the disputed structure in question, and the following finding was recorded:- 6. The learned trial court while deciding the issue Nos. 5 and 11, of applicability on the Act of 1973, in its Issue Nos. 5 and 11, it has held that the provisions of the Act of 1973, would not apply over the disputed structure in question, and the following finding was recorded:- 6. Subsequent thereto, after the decree of 02.07.2008, when the plaintiff/petitioner, intended to carry out the necessary construction, the respondent raised an objection, contending thereof that the so called repair and construction work, which was being undertaken by the petitioner happens to be in contravention to the Act of 1973 and as such, they had passed an order on 31.03.2018, by invoking the provisions contained under Section 28A of the Act of 1973, by directing the sealing of the disputed premises. 7. Faced with the said order dated 31.08.2018, the petitioner had filed an Execution Application under Order 21 of CPC, being Execution Case No. 03 of 2018 on 06.04.2018, along with an application under Section 94 of the CPC, which was numbered as Paper No. 11-A. The provisions contained under Section 94 of the CPC contemplates, and includes within its ambit and scope of power, which could be exercised by the Civil Courts, in order to meet out a particular contingency, which chances in a proceeding and hence it has been nomenclature under the statute as to be a "Supplemental Proceedings", Section 94 of the CPC, which, is quoted hereunder:- "94. Supplemental proceedings.-In order to prevent the ends of justice from being defeated the Court may, if it is so prescribed,- (a) issue a warrant to arrest the defendant and being him before the Court to show cause why he should not give security for his appearance, and if he fails to comply with any order for security commit him to the civil prison; (b) direct the defendant to furnish security to produce any property belonging to him and to place the same at the disposal of the Court or order the attachment of any property; (c) grant a temporary injunction and in case of disobedience commit the person guilty thereof to the civil prison and order that his property be attached and sold; (d) appoint a receiver of any property and enforce the performance of his duties by attaching and selling his property; (e) make such other interlocutory orders as may appear to the Court to be just and convenient." 8. However, the application thus preferred by the petitioner on 18.05.2018, invoking the provisions of Section 94 of the CPC, no interim order was granted by the Executing Court and it remained pending, till the respondent's proceeded to pass yet another order of sealing the premises, which would be second in sequence dated 16.05.2018, whereby the respondent sealed the premises, by issuance of a notice expressing their intention effectively to seal it on 21.05.2008, under Section 28 of the Act of 1973. The said order thus issued was numbered as Order No. 464/Haridwar/169/2004-05. It was on account of the issuance of the said order of 16.05.2018, expressing the intention of the Development Authority of sealing the disputed premises. The petitioner had filed the application under Section 94 of CPC, as already quoted above. Ultimately, the Execution Case, along with the application under Section 94 of CPC, came up for consideration before the court of Civil Judge (Sr. The petitioner had filed the application under Section 94 of CPC, as already quoted above. Ultimately, the Execution Case, along with the application under Section 94 of CPC, came up for consideration before the court of Civil Judge (Sr. Div.), in Execution Case No. 03 of 2018 and the Executing Court by virtue of one of the impugned order, which is under challenge in the Writ Petition i.e. dated 18.05.2018, had rejected the application of the petitioner on the ground that the proceedings of the Execution Case, as well as the tenability of an application under Section 94 of CPC, would be barred, to be instituted before Civil Court, in view of the amended provisions of Section 37A of Act of 1973, which was enforced in the Act by virtue of an amendment carried w.e.f. 05.04.2013, by Amending Act No. 30. Hence, in view of the embargo created by the newly inserted Section 37A, the Civil Court remitted the matter, contending thereof that all issues inter-se between the parties in relation to the property in dispute could be dealt with by the Chairman of the Development Authority, as it has been intended by the legislature. Now under Section 37A of Act No. 1973, which reads as under:- It was an amendment, which was carried by way of "Insertion" by Act No. 30 w.e.f. 05.04.2013, it reads as:- "[37A. Bar of jurisdiction of Civil Courts. (1) No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceedings in respect of any matter the cognizance of which can be taken and disposed of by any authority empowered by this Court under the rules or regulations made under this Act. (2) No suit shall lie against the State Government or any State or Local Authority for any relief in respect of any matter covered by this Act. (2) No suit shall lie against the State Government or any State or Local Authority for any relief in respect of any matter covered by this Act. (3) All suits, appeals, revisions, application for review and other incidental or ancillary proceedings including all proceedings under Order 39 of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act No. V of 1908) arising out of such suits, pending before any court subordinate to the High Court and all revisions arising out of interlocutory orders pending before the Courts subordinate to High Court, relating to any matter covered under this Act, on the date of commencement of this Act, shall stand transferred to the Chairman of the concerned Local Development Authority or the State Authority, as the case may be and Local Development Authority or the State Authority shall decide the cases in the same manner as if they were instituted before them under Section 27 and/or 28 or Section 7-B of this Act respectively. Provided that Local Development Authority or the State Authority, as the case may be, subject to the provision of Section 27 and 28 or Section 7-B of this Act respectively, shall commence the proceedings from the stage at which the case stood transferred as aforesaid with any pleadings presented or any oral or documentary evidence produced in the court as if the same were presented or produced before them.]" 9. The said order of 18.05.2018, of Civil Judge (Sr. Div.), Haridwar, was put to challenge by the petitioner, by way of filing a Civil Revision, being Civil Revision No. 80 of 2018, Ishwar Dayal Kansal v. Haridwar Development Authority, the same too has been dismissed by the Revisional Court, of II Additional District Judge, by the impugned order dated 23.04.2019. Hence, the present writ petition. 10. The order sheet of the Writ Petition reflects that the Coordinate Bench of this Court by virtue of an order dated 01.05.2019, while passing an interim order had constituted a team of Advocates, including Mr. Ajay Veer Pundir and Mrs. Neetu Singh, Advocates, who were appointed as an Advocate Commissioner to visit the spot in question, and to submit their report with regards to the extent of construction or the repair work, which was being carried on by the petitioner. In compliance thereto, Advocate Commissioners have filed their report before the Registry of this Court on 10.05.2019. Neetu Singh, Advocates, who were appointed as an Advocate Commissioner to visit the spot in question, and to submit their report with regards to the extent of construction or the repair work, which was being carried on by the petitioner. In compliance thereto, Advocate Commissioners have filed their report before the Registry of this Court on 10.05.2019. Since the parties to the Writ Petition, were dissatisfied with the contents of the report the Coordinate Bench, yet again by an order of 29.05.2020, had directed the same team of Advocate Commissioners, to visit the spot afresh and to furnish their supplementary spot inspection report and as a consequence thereto the Commission of Advocates (named aforesaid), visited the spot and submitted their report in a sealed envelope on 13.06.2019. Thereafter there had been various set of proceedings, which were held in the writ petition, whereby the parties to the Writ Petition, were directed to receive the copy of the respective Commission Report, and to submit their objection, in case if they want to in relation to it. While the case was listed for its final consideration, during the course of argument the Advocates, to the parties arrived at a consensus, that for the purposes of deciding this Writ Petition, the Commission's report may not be of much relevance, for the reason being that the sole question, which was now disputed and which was to be determined in the Writ Petition was the maintainability of the proceedings under the Act and also with regards to, as to whether the amendment which was made by virtue of an insertion w.e.f. 05.04.2013, would be applicable to the proceedings of the suit, which already stood decided and decreed by the competent Civil Court by the judgment and decree dated 02.07.2008, and hence both the parties agreed that they would be only contesting the matter and confining their respective arguments, on the legal aspects and the report as such would not be of much relevance and hence, the parties to the Writ Petition agreed, that the same may be ignored. 11. The respective argument of the counsel for the parties are; that the petitioner's argument is from the view point that:- (i) Since, while deciding Issue No. 5 and 11, the court of Civil Judge (Sr. 11. The respective argument of the counsel for the parties are; that the petitioner's argument is from the view point that:- (i) Since, while deciding Issue No. 5 and 11, the court of Civil Judge (Sr. Div.), Haridwar, once if it had already decided in-ter-se dispute between the parties to the effect, that the provisions of Act of 1973, would not apply, over the disputed property, hence those findings would be binding amongst them and hence even the subsequent amendment, which has been carried in the Act by way of insertion of Section 37A w.e.f. 05.04.2013 by Amendment Act No. 30, it will not govern the implications of the decree dated 02.07.2008, and it has to be executed as decree by Civil Courts only. (ii) He further submits that the amendment by way of insertion, which has been carried w.e.f. 05.04.2013, in view of the provisions contained under Section 5 of the U.P. General Clauses Act of 1904, since it has been made effective w.e.f. 05.04.2013, it would not be governing the decrees or the proceedings, which has already been rendered by the competent civil court and which still legally survives and exists in the eyes of law, to be enforced as per law. (iii) Thirdly, Mr. Arvind Vashistha, the learned Senior Advocate, would submit that since the decision on Issue No. 5, where it has already been held between the parties that Act of 1973, is not applicable over the disputed building; in that eventuality, it would be deemed that non applicability of the Act, is in relation to the subject-matter, which could not have been subsequently brought within the ambit of the Act of 1973, by the subsequent amendment, made in accordance with sub-section (2) of Section 37A, as it was incorporated only w.e.f. 05.04.2013 and particularly when the applicability of the Act, on the subject-matter of the suit itself was ousted from the purview of Act of 1973, thus in view of sub-section (2) of Section 37 A, the insertion of sub-section (3) of Section 37 A, would not apply once it has already been held that Act of 1973 would not apply, over the disputed premises. 12. While on the other hand, the contrary argument, which has been raised by the learned counsel for the respondent Mr. 12. While on the other hand, the contrary argument, which has been raised by the learned counsel for the respondent Mr. Shailendra Singh Chauhan, Advocate, is to the effect that he submits that by implication of Section 32(A) and particularly he has raised his argument from the view point of sub-section (3), as contained therein and had submitted that Section 37A, absolutely creates a bar that all incidental or ancillary st proceedings including all proceedings under Order 39, and of 1 Schedule of CPC, which was pending before any subordinate court and all revisions arising out of the proceedings of the Civil Court, would be relegated back to the Chairman of the concerned Local Development Authority, to be decided by him as per the amended law. He submits that since there is an absolutely restriction of entertainment of appeals, revisions, application for review and other identical or ancillary matters, the Execution proceedings, itself as; preferred by the petitioner on 06.04.2018, would not be maintainable and would be barred under the Amended Act of 1973. 13. After giving a thoughtful consideration, to the argument as it has been extended by the counsel for the parties at length, I am of the view that the provisions contained under Section 37A, has to be harmoniously construed and the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 37A, as inserted w.e.f. 05.04.2013, cannot be isolatedly made applicable by creating a bar for initiation of proceedings of even an Execution Case, before the Civil Court, and that too of a concluded decree, which is only executable under Civil laws, because it has had to be read along with the implications of sub-section (2), which provides and creates the bar of the proceedings, under sub-section (3), would only be attracted in those eventualities where the subject-matter falls to be covered within the ambit of Act of 1973. Meaning thereby, as per the opinion of this Court, the restrictions of tenability of the Execution Case No. 3 of 2018; in view of sub-section (3) of Section 37A, which was inserted later w.e.f. 05.04.2013, could have only be and exclusively be, attracted, had the issue or the subject-matter of suit, in the suit or in the execution proceedings, was covered by the Act of 1973, and not otherwise. I am of the view that since, the learned trial court in para 28 of the judgment has held as under, which is quoted has held as hereunder: 14. Has already ousted the applicability of the Act of 1973, from over the disputed building, vide its decision on Issue No. 5 and 11, it will be having a binding effect qua the parties to the suit, since having attained finality, and that too even much prior to the insertion made in the Act of 1973, hence the subsequent insertion made in the Act of 1973, would not apply, once the principal Act itself has been held to be not applicable over the disputed property, logically any subsequent amendment in the Act would not apply, over the disputed property. 15. As observed above that the provisions of Act 1973, is not applicable meaning, thereby by an unchallenged judicial precedent of an adjudication, already made by the competent Civil Court, by a decree dated 02.07.2008, of a judicially determined right inter-se between the parties, where the Court has already held that the subject-matter of the suit would not fall to be within the ambit of Act 1973, and if that be so once, I am of the view that, once the competent Court, has already held that Act of 1973, is not applicable and the said issue has attained finality qua parties due to its non-challenged before any superior court, in that eventuality, I am of the considered view that the bar of Section 37A sub-section (3), will not be attracted. Even there is yet an another logic also. The logic is that if sub-section (3) of Section 37A, itself is taken into consideration, the restriction of the proceedings being carried by the Civil Court is in relation to the proceeding contained under the 1 Schedule of CPC, which includes the suits, appeals, revisions, review and other incidental or ancillary proceedings, which ought to have been pending, at the time when the amendment by way of insertion was carried i.e., w.e.f. 05.04.2013, by the Amending Act No. 30. Since after the adjudication of the suit by the judgment of 02.07.2008, I am of a definite opinion, that its execution would always fall to be by invocation of the provisions contained under Order 21 and since being a prior adjudication by a decree and execution is not included, in the exclusion clause as provided under Section 37A, that is prior to the enforcement of the amending Act, the bar would not be attracted for holding the Execution Case, as to be not maintainable in view of restrictions contained under Section 37A(3) of the Act. 16. Under the Act of 2013, the provisions contained under Section 37A, is shown to have been inserted by Amending Act No. 30 w.e.f. 05.04.2013. The term, insertion has not been defined, under Section 4 of the U.P. General Clauses Act, 1904 and if its impact of the term insertion is read in co-relation to the coming into an effect and operation of an amended enactment, as contained under Section 5 of the General Clauses Act, as its birth in the Statute would be only with effect from the date when the legislation by way of insertion has been brought into force and not with a retrospective effect and since the said provision being procedural in nature, it will not be having a retrospective effect, but rather would be prospective in nature and would not apply to the proceedings which has already been culminated earlier by way of decree, otherwise, it will create an absolute procedural chaos. This aspect has also to be considered from the literal meaning of the term "insertion", which has been provided with in the Webster Comprehensive Dictionary, which means that it is an act of inserting or its a state of being inserted, that is for the first time, it is being given birth too and has been brought in the Statute and given birth to a particular provision in the legislature and once it has been incorporated by way of an insertion, then it means that it is an addition, of a new provision and it is not an elaboration or explanatory in nature of a pre existing legislation. If it is being construed literally, it means that to put or to place into something else between or among other existing things, which were already pre-existing, meaning thereby it has got altogether its new birth under the Statute. 17. If it is being construed literally, it means that to put or to place into something else between or among other existing things, which were already pre-existing, meaning thereby it has got altogether its new birth under the Statute. 17. The issue, which has been widely discussed in the present Writ Petition is with regard to the effect of insertion of Section 37A in the Act of 2013, by virtue of an amendment, which was carried w.e.f. 5 April, 2013, as to whether the same would be having any applicability over the judgment and decrees, which has been rendered, prior to its enforcement, by the competent Civil Court, and as to whether the execution proceedings, which are being instituted as a consequence of the prior judgment and decree already rendered, could be remitted to the Chairman of the Development Authority or not, under newly inserted provision of Section 37 A of Act of 1973. The said controversy, has also to be looked from yet another view point, i.e. in view of the provisions contained under Section 5, sub-section (b) of U.P. General Clauses Act, 1904. Sub-clause (b) of Section 5 of the General Clauses Act, 1904, refers to the applicability of an enactment, which is being legislated and made after the enforcement of the Constitution, which would be the case at hand, as the Act of 1973, was incorporated in the year 1973, by virtue of a gazette notification and its commencement would be construed from the date when the assent to it was granted by the Governor of the State, hence Section 5(a) would be having its applicability over the present controversy arising from Amending Act 30 of 2013. 18. Sub-section (b) of Section 5 of the General Clauses Act, 1904, is quoted hereunder:- "(b) in the case of an Uttar Pradesh Act made after the commencement of the Constitution, it shall come into operation on the day on which the assent thereto of the Governor or the President, as the case may require, is first published in the Official Gazette." 19. The is yet another provisions which is contained under Section 6-C of the Act of 1904, it deals with the effect of repealment or expiration of the law, and the textual amendment, which are made under an existing law. The is yet another provisions which is contained under Section 6-C of the Act of 1904, it deals with the effect of repealment or expiration of the law, and the textual amendment, which are made under an existing law. It is under Section 6-C of the U.P. General Clauses Act, 1904, where the terms, for example, omission, "insertion" or substitution has been used, which entails a textual amendment of an existing enactment, as a consequence of an incorporation of a new law by making a textual amendment in the principle existing provisions itself. Section 6-C of the Act reads as under:- "6-C. Repeal or expiration of law-making textual amendments in other laws. - (1) Except as provided by sub-section (2), where any Uttar Pradesh Act amends the text of any Uttar Pradesh Act or Regulation by the express omission, insertion or substitution of any matter, and the amending enactment is subsequently repealed, the repeal shall not affect the continuance of any such amendment made by the enactment so repealed and in operation at the time of such repeal. (2) Where any such amendment of text is made by any temporary Uttar Pradesh Act or by an Ordinance or by any law made in exercise of the power of the State Legislature by the President or other authority referred to in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of Article 357 of the Constitution, and such Act, Ordinance or other law ceases to operate without being re-enacted (with or without modifications) the amendment of text made thereby shall also cease to operate." 20. This Court is of the opinion that, if the language of Section 6-C (2), is taken into consideration, it contemplates that when the State Legislature, while exercising its powers under Sub-clause (a) of Clause (1) of Article 357 of the Constitution of India, creates or inserts a law, by virtue of its insertion, it has provided that it will not effect the continuance of any such existing enactments, which has been existing prior to insertion in the enactment and was in operation at the time of the so called repealed or insertion. These existing provisions are protected in its enforcement by virtue of the clear intention of Section 6-C (2) of the Act 1904. 21. These existing provisions are protected in its enforcement by virtue of the clear intention of Section 6-C (2) of the Act 1904. 21. Hence, if Sub-section (b) of Section 5 of Act of 1904, is read along with Section 6-C of the Act, this Court is of the view that the "insertion" made in the Act of 1973, by the Amending Act No. 13 of 2013, its enforcement would be only prospective in nature and will not be retrospective, having any bearing on the decree or judgment rendered by the competent Civil Court under an existing law, whose execution would be brought under Sections 37A as inserted w.e.f. 05.04.2013. 22. The aforesaid logic also finds its support from the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered and as reported in: AIR 2001 SC 3580 , M/s. Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. v. M/s. Amrit Lal and Co. and another, Particularly, the reference may be had to para 30, 31, 32 and 36, which are quoted hereunder:- "30. In the case of Bansidhar and others v. State of Rajasthan and others: (1989) 2 SCC 557 : a Constitution Bench of this Court interpreting the provisions of Section 6 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, which is pari-materia with section 6 of the Act, it was observed: "This takes us to the next question whether in the present cases even if the provisions of Section 6 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955, are attracted, the present cases did not involved any rights "accrued" or obligations "incurred' so as to attract the old law to them to support initiation or continuation of the proceedings against the landholders after the repeal. It was contended that even if the provisions of the old Act were held to have been saved it could not be said that there was any right accrued in favour of the State or any liability incurred by the landholders in the matter of determination of the 'ceiling area' so as to attract to their cases the provision the old law. The point emphasised by the learned counsel is that the excess land would vest in the State only after the completion of the proceedings and upon the landholder signifying his choice as to the identity of the land to be surrendered. The point emphasised by the learned counsel is that the excess land would vest in the State only after the completion of the proceedings and upon the landholder signifying his choice as to the identity of the land to be surrendered. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955, provide, respectively, that the repeal of an enactment shall not unless a different intention appears, "affect any right privilege, obligation or liability, acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed" or "affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, fine, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid." For purposes of these clauses the "right" must be "accrued" and not merely an inchoate one. The distinction between what is and what is not a right preserved by Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, it is said if often one of great fineness. What is unaffected by the repeal is aright 'acquired' or 'accrued' under the repealed statute and not "a mere hope of expectation" of acquiring a right or liberty to apply for a right." 31. In Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bombay City-1 v. Godavari Sagar Mills Ltd. 1967 (1) SCR 798 : this Court observed:- "We proceed to consider the next contention to the appellant that S. 13 of the 1949 Act repealed the Ordinance completely and the effect of this section was that the Ordinance was obliterated from the Statute Book as if it never existed and, therefore, there was no bar in the way of the Income-tax Officer to make the order on March 11, 1955. Mr. S.T. Desai is not right in his contention that the effect is S. 13 of the 1949 Act is to obliterate the Ordinance completely from the Statute Book. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act (Act 10 of 1897) states as follows:- "6. Mr. S.T. Desai is not right in his contention that the effect is S. 13 of the 1949 Act is to obliterate the Ordinance completely from the Statute Book. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act (Act 10 of 1897) states as follows:- "6. Whereas this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not- (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment os repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed." The reason for enacting S. 6of the General Clauses Act has been described by this Court in State of Punjab v. Mohar Sigh as follows: "Under the law of England, as it stood prior to the Interpretation Act of 1889, the effect of repealing a statute was said to be to obliterate it as completely from the records of Parliament as if it had never been passed, except for the purpose of those actions, which were commenced, prosecuted and concluded while it was an existing law. A repeal therefore without any saving clause would destroy any proceeding whether not yet begun or whether pending at the time of the enactment of the Repealing Act and not already prosecuted to a final judgment so as to create a vested right. To obviate such results a practice came into existence in England to insert a saving clause in the repealing statute with a view to preserve rights and liabilities already accrued or incurred under the repealed enactment. To obviate such results a practice came into existence in England to insert a saving clause in the repealing statute with a view to preserve rights and liabilities already accrued or incurred under the repealed enactment. Later on, to dispense with the necessity of having to insert a saving clause on each occasion, section 38(2) was inserted in the Interpretation Act of 1889 which provides that a repeal, unless the contrary intention appears, does not affect the previous operation of the repealed enactment or anything duly done or suffered under it and any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced in respect of any right, liability and penalty under the repealed Act as if the Repealing Act had not been passed. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, as is well know, is on the same lines as Section 38(2) of the Interpretation Act of England." Section 13 of the 1949 Act is almost identical in language with S. 11 of Punjab Act XII of 1948 which was the subject-matter of consideration in State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh and for the reason given by this Court in that case the provisions of S. 6(c), (d) and (e) of the General Clauses Act are applicable to this case since there is no contrary intention appearing in the repealing statute." 32. In M.S. Shivananda v. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation and Ors.: (1980) SC 66, this court observed:- "If, however, the right created by the statute is of an enduring character and has vested in the person, that right cannot be taken away because the statute by which it was created has expired. In order to ascertain whether the rights and liabilities under the repealed Ordinance have been pat an end to by the Act, the line of enquiry would be not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities under the repealed Ordinance but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them. Another line of approach may be to see as to how far the new Act is retrospective in operation." 36. Another line of approach may be to see as to how far the new Act is retrospective in operation." 36. In view of the aforesaid findings we conclude, by recording our findings on the question posed earlier by holding:- (1) A landlord or tenant are relegated to seek their rights and remedies under the common law once the protection given to a tenant under the Rent Act is withdrawn, except in cases where Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 is applicable; (2) A ground of eviction based on illegal subletting under proviso (b) to Section 14 of the Rent Act would not constitute to be a vested right of a landlord, but it would be a right and privilege accrued within the meaning of Section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act in a matter if proceeding for eviction is pending; (3) When tenant has no vested right under a Rent Act having only protective right, withdrawal of such protection would not confer on a landlord a vested right to evict a tenant under Rent Act except where sub-clause (c) of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is applicable. In view of these findings we hold landlord has a right under the repealed Rent Act by virtue of Section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act, which would save the pending proceedings before the Rent Controller, which may continue to be proceeded with as if repealed Act is still in force." 23. In fact, the Hon'ble Apex Court, while dealing with the effect of an enactment by virtue of an amendment has made a reference to the judgment reported in AIR 1989, SC 1614, Bansidhar and others v. State of Rajasthan and others, which was dealing with an enactment made in the Rajasthan Tenancy Act of 1955. In its wider implication, it was dealing with the effect of an amendment, in its relation to the right, which has already accrued to a party to the proceedings under an existing law that is in the present case by decree dated 02.07.2008 rendered in Original Suit No. 310 of 2004. It has laid down, that if a right under the prevalent law is preserved by General Clauses Act, it would not result into an acquiring a right to the controversy, to an adversary, under the repealed statute. It has laid down, that if a right under the prevalent law is preserved by General Clauses Act, it would not result into an acquiring a right to the controversy, to an adversary, under the repealed statute. In fact, if para 36, while dealing with the provisions contained under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act of 1897, has held that the insertion since is giving a birth to a new enactment by adding to a pre-existing law, it will not be having a retrospective effect, so as to have an effect on a concluded action, or rights which has already been taken under the existing law, prior to the amendment by way of insertion. 24. Hence, in that view of the matter and in view of the reasons assigned in para 36, I hold that the Amending Act No. 30 of 2013, inserting Section 37A, will not apply in the present set of circumstances. For the reasons aforesaid, and for other reasons, which have already been assigned in the body of the judgment. 25. Even if the Amending Act No. 30, which was incorporated under the Act of 1973; the Section 37A, sub-section (2), which also speaks about the ancillary and incidental proceedings, over which the provisions of the said Act has been made applicable. This Court is of the view that since under the CPC, the provisions contained under Order 21, itself entails deciding all the issues afresh, and in an event if there happens to be an objection raised by the judgment debtor or anybody else who alleges to be affected by the decree and once if an adjudication is made under Order 21, it takes the shape of a decree and under law, and it has been made appealable under Order 21 Rule 103 of the CPC, the said impact in expanse of proceedings, which has to be taken in the execution, will not fall to be within the ambit of the definition of an ancillary or incidental proceeding, which are contemplated under the Code of Civil Procedure. Hence to, for the aforesaid logic, the execution in itself of a pre-existing decree, which was rendered even much prior to insertion of the amendment, would not be covered within its ambit. Hence to, for the aforesaid logic, the execution in itself of a pre-existing decree, which was rendered even much prior to insertion of the amendment, would not be covered within its ambit. The decrees, which are put to execution and orders passed during its proceedings, once had been made applicable, it cannot be said to be as an ancillary or incidental proceeding so as to apply the provisions, under Section 37A of the Act of 2013, because the judgments and orders passed in Execution has been made subject to appeal. 26. Further in order to better elucidate the legal implication, it would be necessary to make reference to the definition of decree as provided under sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the CPC, which is quoted hereunder:- "(2) "decree" means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within 5[* * *] Section 144, but shall not include- (a) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order, or (b) any order of dismissal for default. Explanation.- A decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of. It is final when such adjudication completely disposes of the suit. It may be partly preliminary and partly final;" 27. Explanation.- A decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of. It is final when such adjudication completely disposes of the suit. It may be partly preliminary and partly final;" 27. On its simplicitor reading the term decree as defined therein it amounts to be a final determination or an expression of a right, which has been determined judicially by competent Court, between the parties whereby a right inter-se has been laid to rest as a consequence of the delivery of a judgment made by the Court which constitutes to be the reason, which makes the decree as defined therein to be enforceable under law by invoking the provisions contained under Order 21, hence once a determination has already been made by way of a adjudication made by the judgments, which assigns the reasons for coming to a particular conclusion over a controversy and if that conclusion takes a shape of a decree, in that eventuality, its execution could have been only possible under the provisions contained under the CPC itself, and it could not have been remitted back to the Chairman, who is an administrative authority under Act, who cannot exercise judicial powers of execution of decree rendered by Courts and that too when the authority so assigned with powers, i.e. the Chairman of the Development Authority, under the Amending Act, lacks that infrastructure, expertise to decide an execution case, in view of the subsequent provisions which has been incorporated later by insertion of Section 37A, hence also the provisions of Section 37A, would not apply to the execution proceeding which has been instituted by the petitioner before the learned trial court. 28. This issue has also to be considered from perspective, that the classification of the restrictions of proceedings, which has been provided under sub-section (3) does not include the execution proceedings, which is being independently conducted as per the provisions contained under Part II of CPC and under Order 21, because as soon as the decree is rendered, it amounts to be a concluded decision, which is binding inter-se, of having decided a right inter-se between the parties, which has to be put to effect under Order 21. Since sub-section (3) and it does not create bar in tenability of execution proceedings, the argument thus extended by the counsel for the respondent is not accepted by this Court. Since sub-section (3) and it does not create bar in tenability of execution proceedings, the argument thus extended by the counsel for the respondent is not accepted by this Court. 29. There is another reason, why this Court is not agreeing with the argument extended by the learned counsel for the respondent, it is for the reason being that, after the classification of the class of proceedings, as has been provided under sub-section (3) of Section 37A, is taken into consideration, it entails that it is only those proceedings, which has been classified, under sub-section (3), which would be excluded by implication, the execution proceedings, by its implications of exclusion of execution due to its non inclusion under Section 37A, apart from the fact that it will not apply to the execution cases where there is a concluded right decided by the competent Civil Court, hence the pendency of an execution case will not be treated as to be a pendency of class of proceedings, as dealt with under sub-section (3) of Section 37A. Thus the bar of Section 37A, will not come into play as argued by the counsel for the respondent. Besides this, as already dealt with quite elaborately, above all, the arguments of the respondent could have been accepted subject to the condition, that he would have been in a position to override the effect of findings, which has been recorded on Issue Nos. 5 and 11; because once the competent Civil Court, has already held that the provisions of Act of 1973, will not apply over the disputed property, then by implication, it means that any subsequent amendment made by way of insertion will also notably, which has been carried under the said Amending Act w.e.f. 05.04.2013, would not be applicable with regard to the subject-matter, which has been dealt with by the Civil Court. Consequently, in view of the aforesaid, the impugned orders under challenge in the Writ Petition are not sustainable; they are hereby quashed. The matter is remitted back to the Executing Court, to reconsider and decide the applications afresh exclusively on its own merit independent, to any of the findings, which has been recorded by this Court, as above leaving all contentions of the parties open to be argued.