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2020 DIGILAW 355 (UTT)

Jogendra Singh v. Mukul Joshi

2020-09-29

LOK PAL SINGH

body2020
JUDGMENT : Lok Pal Singh, J. 1. Second Appeal is directed against the judgment and its decree dated 21.03.2017, passed by Addl. District Judge, Ramnagar, District Nanital in Civil Appeal no. 11 of 2016, Jogendra Singh Vs. Smt. Mukul Joshi & another, whereby the appeal filed by the plaintiff/appellant has been dismissed and the judgment and order dated 04.01.2016, passed by Civil Judge (Sr. Div.), Ramnagar, Nainital in Original Suit no. 09 of 2011. 2. Factual matrix of the of the case are that the appellant/plaintiff instituted a suit for specific performance of contract with the averments that defendant no. 2 Girish Chandra Joshi is the recorded owner of the suit property. He executed registered Power of Attorney in favour of his wife Smt. Mukul Joshi (defendant no. 1) on 30.11.2010 and authorized her to sell the said property. She offered to the plaintiff that she wish to sell the suit property for an amount of Rs. 9,28,000/-. A registered agreement to sell was executed between them on 03.01.2011. An amount of Rs. 4,50,000/- was paid by the plaintiff to defendant no. 1 in presence of the witnesses and remaining amount was decided to be paid upto 15th June 2011, which was the last date to perform the part of contract. It was also mentioned in the agreement to sell that in case the defendant no. 1 would refuse to execute the sale deed in favour of plaintiff, in that case the plaintiff will be entitled to get the sale deed executed in his favour through a decree of the court. Plaintiff requested defendant no. 1 to accept the balance amount and execute the sale deed in his favour, but to no avail. On this, the plaintiff served a notice dated 27.06.2011 to the defendant through his counsel stating therein that the defendants should reach the office of Sub Registrar, Ramnagar on 30th June 2011 to perform their part of contract. On 30.06.2011, plaintiff reached the office of Sub Registrar along with the balance amount, but the defendants did not appear. Again on 08.07.2011, plaintiff sent a notice to the defendants stating therein that the defendants should reach the office of Sub Registrar, Ramnagar on 13.07.2011, at 10:00 a.m., and after receiving the balance amount in cash get the sale deed executed in favour of the plaintiff, otherwise he will be constrained to file civil and criminal cases against them. Again on 08.07.2011, plaintiff sent a notice to the defendants stating therein that the defendants should reach the office of Sub Registrar, Ramnagar on 13.07.2011, at 10:00 a.m., and after receiving the balance amount in cash get the sale deed executed in favour of the plaintiff, otherwise he will be constrained to file civil and criminal cases against them. Even then, the defendants did not execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. Lastly, the plaintiff instituted a suit against the defendants on 10.08.2011 seeking specific performance of contract. 3. Defendants filed their written statement and made a counter claim that by playing fraud the plaintiff has succeeded to get the agreement to sell executed in his favour with the connivance of his nephew Preetpal Singh Karakoti, to whom the property was to be sold at the rate of Rs. 13.50 lakhs per bigha and an agreement to sell was executed on 30.12.2010 between Preetpal Singh and defendant no. 2. Later on when Preetpal Singh showed his inability to purchase the land in question at the agreed rate, defendant no. 2 got executed a registered Power of Attorney in favour of his wife (defendant no. 1). 4. In rebuttal of the written statement and the counter claim filed by the defendants, plaintiff filed his reply stating therein that an agreement to sell was executed between the plaintiff and the defendant no. 1 for an amount of Rs. 9,28,000/- and an amount of Rs. 4,50,000/- has already been paid as advance to defendant no. 1. He denied the fact that any agreement dated 30.12.2010 was executed between Preet Pal Singh and defendant no. 2 in respect of the land in dispute. It is contended that the counter claim has been filed by suppressing the material facts from the court and, as such, the same is liable to be dismissed. 5. In the form of documentary evidence, plaintiff adduced true copy of extract of khatauni, Village Gojani, Fasli Year 1415-1420 (paper nos. 6C/1 to 6C/2); certified copy of khasra Village Gojani, Fasli Year 1417 (paper no. 6C/3); original copy of agreement to sell dated 03.01.2011 (paper nos. 6C/14); original copy of letters dated 15.06.2011 send by the plaintiff to the Sub Registrar, Ramnagar (paper nos. 6C/15 & 6C/16); original copy of notice dated 27.06.2011 (paper no. 6C/18). 6C/1 to 6C/2); certified copy of khasra Village Gojani, Fasli Year 1417 (paper no. 6C/3); original copy of agreement to sell dated 03.01.2011 (paper nos. 6C/14); original copy of letters dated 15.06.2011 send by the plaintiff to the Sub Registrar, Ramnagar (paper nos. 6C/15 & 6C/16); original copy of notice dated 27.06.2011 (paper no. 6C/18). PW1 Jogendra Singh, PW2 Anand Singh and PW3 Vallabh Bhai Tiwari were examined as witnesses. 6. Defendant adduced certified copy of extract of khatauni Village Gojani, Fasli Year 1415-1420 (paper nos. 23C/1, 23C/2 to 23C/4); photocopy of agreement to sell dated 30.12.2010 (paper no. 23C/5); photocopies of change of Power of Attorney dated 30.12.2010 (paper no. 23C/6 & 23C/7 to 23C/9); copy of order dated 05.04.2014 passed in civil revision (paper nos. 77C/1 to 77C/2). DW1 Smt. Mukul Joshi, DW2 Girish Chandra Joshi, DW3 Preet Pal Kadakoti and DW4 Bhairav Dutt Tiwari were examined. 7. On the basis of pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed following issues: i) Whether the agreement to sell dated 03.01.2011 was executed between defendant no. 1 Smt. Mukul Joshi, Power of Attorney Holder of defendant no. 2, and whether defendant no. 1 executed a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff as per the conditions laid down in said agreement to sell? ii) Whether the plaintiff side has always been ready and willing to comply with the conditions of agreement to sell? iii) Whether the plaintiff got executed the agreement to sell in question dated 03.01.2011 by playing fraud upon defendant no. 1? iv) Whether the agreement to sell in question dated 03.01.2011 being forged and void is liable to be rejected on the basis of facts and circumstances enumerated in the written statement of the defendants? v) Whether the plaintiff is trying to forcibly acquire the property in dispute by putting soil over it and by way of constructing road over it? vi) Whether the plaintiff has properly valued the suit? vii) Whether sufficient court fee has been paid by the plaintiff? viii) Whether legal partition has been entered between the defendants and co-sharers in respect of the property in dispute? ix) Whether the defendants have properly valued the suit? x) Whether sufficient court fee has been paid by the defendants? xi) To what relief, if any, plaintiff is entitled? xii) To what relief, if any, the defendants are entitled? 8. viii) Whether legal partition has been entered between the defendants and co-sharers in respect of the property in dispute? ix) Whether the defendants have properly valued the suit? x) Whether sufficient court fee has been paid by the defendants? xi) To what relief, if any, plaintiff is entitled? xii) To what relief, if any, the defendants are entitled? 8. The trial court having considered the pleadings of the plaintiff and the provision contained in Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and Form no. 47 has categorically recorded a finding that the plaintiff did not fulfill the requirement of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act and Form 47. However, the trial court having recorded the findings on all the issues, decreed the suit directing the defendants to pay an amount of Rs. 4,50,000/- along with 9 per cent interest per annum thereon from the date of institution of suit till the payment is made. The counter claim of the defendants was dismissed. Pursuant to the decree dated 04.01.2016, whereby the defendants were directed to pay an amount of Rs. 4,50,000/- along with interest at the rate of 9% per annum to the decree holder, the plaintiff/decree holder declined to receive the amount. The defendants deposited the said amount before the trial court in terms of decree passed in favour of the plaintiff. 9. Aggrieved against the judgment and decree dated 04.01.2016, plaintiff preferred Civil Appeal no. 11 of 2016, Jogendra Singh Vs. Smt. Mukul Joshi and another in the Court of Addl. District Judge, Ramnagar, District Nainital. Learned first appellant court framed points of determination and recorded categorical findings that the plaintiff has not averred that he was ever ready and willing to perform his part of contract. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and after perusing the documents brought on record, first appellate court dismissed the appeal vide judgment and decree dated 21.03.2017 and affirmed the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. Hence, present second appeal. 10. Before further discussion it would be apt to reproduce paragraph no. 12 of the plaint for the purpose of considering the fact whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of contract. Paragraph no. 12 reads as under: 11. Hence, present second appeal. 10. Before further discussion it would be apt to reproduce paragraph no. 12 of the plaint for the purpose of considering the fact whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of contract. Paragraph no. 12 reads as under: 11. The English translation of paragraph 12 of the plaint is-that the plaintiff is always ready to get the sale deed executed in his favour by paying the balance amount to the defendants in view of the registered agreement to sell, but the defendants being dishonest are not complying with the conditions of agreement to sell, therefore, the plaintiff is instituting the suit for specific performance. 12. Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') speaks about 'personal bars to relief'. It stipulates-Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person- (a) (b) (c) who fails to prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. 13. The second appeal was admitted on 03.08.2017 on the following substantial question of law: Whether learned courts below erred in law in not granting relief for specific performance in favour of the plaintiff? 14. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the entire material available on record. Answer to the substantial question of law: 15. Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff vehemently argued that the plaintiff did the requisite compliance of Section 16(c) of the Act. He placed reliance on the following judgments in support of his contention: i) Man Kaur (Dead) by LRs Vs. Hartar Singh Sangha, (2010) 10 SCC 512 . ii) Pukhraj D. Jain & others Vs. G. Gopalakrishna, (2004) 7 SCC 251 iii) Motilal Jain Vs. Ramdasi Devi (Smt.) and others, (2000) 6 SCC 420 iv) Sukhbir Singh and others Vs. Brij Pal Singh and others, (1997) 2 SCC 200 16. In Man Kaur (Dead) by LRs Vs Hartar Singh Sangha (2010) 10 SCC 512 , Hon'ble Apex Court has held that in a suit for specific performance of contract, the plaintiff has to prove that he/she was always ready and willing to perform his part of contract by paying the balance sale consideration and get the sale completed. In Man Kaur (Dead) by LRs Vs Hartar Singh Sangha (2010) 10 SCC 512 , Hon'ble Apex Court has held that in a suit for specific performance of contract, the plaintiff has to prove that he/she was always ready and willing to perform his part of contract by paying the balance sale consideration and get the sale completed. Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the plaintiff could not prove his readiness and willingness to perform the essential terms of the contract as he utterly failed to lead any evidence that he had the balance sale consideration, when the contract had to be performed. Therefore, the decree of specific performance passed by the courts below was set aside by the Hon'ble Apex Court. 17. In Pukhraj D. Jain & others Vs G. Gopalakrishna (2004) 7 SCC 251 , Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph no. 6 of the judgment has held as under: "6. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act lays down that specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. Explanation (ii) to this sub-section provides that the plaintiff must aver performance of, or readiness and willingness to perform, the contract according to its true construction. The requirement of this provision is that plaintiff must aver that he has always been ready and willing to perform the additional terms of the contract. Therefore not only there should be such an averment in the plaint but the surrounding circumstances must also indicate that the readiness and willingness continue from the date of the contract till the hearing of the suit. It is well settled that equitable remedy of specific performance cannot be had on the basis of pleadings which do not contain averments of readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform his contract in terms of Forms 47 and 48 of CPC. Here the respondent no. 1 himself sent a legal notice rescinding the contract and thereafter filed O.S. no. 801 of 1977 on 07.11.1977 claiming refund of the advance paid by him. Here the respondent no. 1 himself sent a legal notice rescinding the contract and thereafter filed O.S. no. 801 of 1977 on 07.11.1977 claiming refund of the advance paid by him. In fact the suit for recovery of the amount was decreed by the trial court on 24.07.1985 but he himself preferred a revision against the decree wherein an order of rejection of the plaint was passed by the High Court. In such circumstances, it is absolutely apparent that the respondent no. 1 was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and in view of the mandate of section 16 of the Specific Relief Act, no decree for specific performance could be passed in his favour. The trial court, therefore, rightly held that the suit filed by respondent no. 1 was not maintainable." 18. The appeal filed by the defendants in the judgment (supra) was allowed and the judgment and order of the High Court was set aside. The decree dismissing the suit passed by the trial court was affirmed. It has been held that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, as such, in view of the mandate of Section 16 of the Act, no decree for specific performance could be passed in his favour and the trial court was justified in holding that the suit filed by the plaintiff was not maintainable. 19. In Motilal Jain Vs Ramdasi Devi (Smt) and others (2000) 6 SCC 420 , their Lordships of Hon'ble Apex Court having placed reliance on the judgment of Syed Dastagir Vs T.R. Gopalakrishna Setty: (1996) 6 SCC 337 , have held that the plaint does clearly indicates the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff, the only obligation which he had to comply with is to prove that he had the balance sale consideration. Having considered the fact that pursuant to the directions issued by the trial court to the plaintiff to deposit the amount within specific time, the amount was not deposited and the decree passed by the trial court was upset by the High Court, Hon'ble Apex Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore the judgment and decree of the trial court and the legal representatives of the defendant were ordered to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. 20. 20. Hon'ble Apex Court in Sukhbir Singh and others Vs Brij Pal Singh and others (1997) 2 SCC 200, has held as under: "4. In paragraph 5, 9 and 10 of the plaint the respondents have in substance pleaded that they had been and were still willing to perform their part of the agreement and the defendants did have notice in that behalf. It is seen that averments made in the above paragraphs are in substance as per Forms 47 and 48 prescribed in Appendix AA of the Code as amended by the High Court. What requires to be considered is whether the essential facts constituting the ingredients in Section 16(1)(c) of the Act were pleaded and that found mentioned in the said Forms do in substance point to those facts. The procedure is the hand-maid to the substantive rights of the parties. It would, therefore, be clear from a perusal of the pleadings and the forms that the averments are consistent with the Forms. When the respondents had pleaded and proved by the by the Sub-Registrar's endorsement as per paper No. 41/C that the respondents were present in the office of the Sub-Registrar for having the sale deed executed and registered by the petitioners, it would be explicit that the respondents were ready and willing to perform their part of the agreement. The facts that the petitioners did not attend the office would prove positively that the petitioners had avoided execution of the sale deed." 21. The ratio of the judgments cited by learned counsel for the appellant is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case as the plaintiff/appellant did not aver and plead that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. 22. Per contra, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents placed reliance on the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of N.P. Thirugnanam (dead) through LRs Vs Dr. R. Jagan Mohan Rao and others (1995) 5 SCC 115 , Paragraph 5 of said judgment is relevant in the context of present case. The same is excerpted hereunder: "5. R. Jagan Mohan Rao and others (1995) 5 SCC 115 , Paragraph 5 of said judgment is relevant in the context of present case. The same is excerpted hereunder: "5. It is settled law that remedy for specific performance is an equitable remedy and is in the discretion of the court, which discretion requires to be exercised according to settled principles of law and not arbitrarily as adumbrated under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Under Section 20, the court is not bound to grant the relief just because there was a valid agreement of sale. Section 16(c) of the Act envisages that plaintiff must plead and prove that he had performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than those terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendants. The continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant the relief of specific performance. This circumstance is material and relevant and is required to be considered by the court while granting or refusing to grant the relief. If the plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he must fail. To adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, the court must take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior and subsequent to the filing of the suit along with other attending circumstances. The amount of consideration which he has to pay to the defendant must of necessity be proved to be available. Right from the date of the execution till date of the decree he must prove that he is ready and has always been willing to perform his part of the contract." 23. Reliance has also been placed on a judgment of Delhi High Court in the case of Sant Lal Vs Shyam Dhawan AIR 1986 DELHI 275, Paragraph 16 of said judgment is relevant in the context of present case. The same is excerpted hereunder: "16. Reliance has also been placed on a judgment of Delhi High Court in the case of Sant Lal Vs Shyam Dhawan AIR 1986 DELHI 275, Paragraph 16 of said judgment is relevant in the context of present case. The same is excerpted hereunder: "16. Even after finding and holding that the defendant had failed to perform his part of the contract inasmuch as he had failed to discharge the aforesaid three obligations cast upon him under the agreement to sell, the plaintiff, in order to succeed in this suit for specific performance, has to aver and prove that he has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him and this is the requirement of S. 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. In other words, the aforesaid requirement of law has to be proved by the plaintiff notwithstanding the aforesaid default on the part of the defendant in respect of the performance of the obligations cast upon him. The averments of continuous readiness and willingness to perform the essential terms of the contract in question are set out in the plaint and now the only question to be answered and which forms the subject-matter of issue No. 1 is the continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract and the only essential term of the contract to be performed by the plaintiff is the payment of the balance price at the time of the execution and the registration of the sale deed by the defendant. The question of payment of balance price could occur only after the defendant had got the sale permission from the DDA as also the income-tax clearance certificate and the vacant possession of the house in question from his tenant. The stage of the payment of the balance price never arose in this case on account of the failure on the part of the defendant in the matter of performance of his part of the contract. The requirement of law is simply the continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract throughout from the 'commencement of the agreement to sell till the hearing of the suit but that does not mean that the plaintiff was expected to carry on the cash balance price of Rs. The requirement of law is simply the continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract throughout from the 'commencement of the agreement to sell till the hearing of the suit but that does not mean that the plaintiff was expected to carry on the cash balance price of Rs. 1,45,000/- in his pocket during all the aforesaid period, but what he was to show was simply his continuous readiness and willingness to pay that balance price only as and when the appropriate occasion for the same was to arise. The expression "readiness and willingness" cannot be treated as a strait jacket formula and has to be determined from the totality of facts and circumstances relevant to the case and also to the conduct of the party concerned and in order to be real has to be backed by the capacity to do so." 24. Further reliance has been placed on behalf of the respondents on the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in R.C. Chandiok R.C. Chandiok Vs Chunni Lal (1970) 3 SCC 140 , wherein it has been held that wherever there are two possible interpretations, the one that subserves ends of justice should be accepted and the one which defeats justice should be rejected. 25. On a perusal of the averments of paragraph no. 12 of the plaint it depicts that the plaintiff has not averred anywhere that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of contract as per the mandate of Section 16(c) of the Act. The word 'readiness' is missing in the plaint. What has been averred in the plaint is that the plaintiff is always ready to get the sale deed executed in his favour by paying the remaining amount within time. A perusal of the agreement to sell would depict that the defendants executed the agreement to sell in regard to the land khata no. 32, plot no. 5/1204, measuring 1.063 hectare, wherein the defendant no. 2 has 1/4th share i.e. 0.265 hectare. The boundaries of the property agreed to be sold were mentioned as: East Land of Deepa Negi West Land of pandeyji North Forest South Check road 26. In the plaint, boundaries of plot no. 5/1204, measuring 0.265 hectare of khatauni no. 32, plot no. 5/1204, measuring 1.063 hectare, wherein the defendant no. 2 has 1/4th share i.e. 0.265 hectare. The boundaries of the property agreed to be sold were mentioned as: East Land of Deepa Negi West Land of pandeyji North Forest South Check road 26. In the plaint, boundaries of plot no. 5/1204, measuring 0.265 hectare of khatauni no. 32 of Village Gojani, Tehsil Ramnagar, District Nainital have been mentioned as under: East Land of Deepa Negi West Land of pandeyji North Forest South Check road 27. In the agreement to sell it has been mentioned that suit property is a joint property of the defendant no. 2 being share in the suit property whereof in the plaint the property has been mentioned with specific boundaries so it is divided property whereof there is no pleadings that the property agreed to be sold to the plaintiff had ever been divided between its owners. A joint owner cannot sell its share with the metes and bounds without there being any partition between the joint owners. Despite this, on perusal of the averments made in paragraph 12 of the plaint and having considered the ratio of the judgments cited above, this Court is of the view that the plaintiff has not averred that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and was having sufficient sale consideration. In evidence, nothing has been brought on record to suggest that the plaintiff was having the balance sale consideration with him. Besides this, since the share from a joint property had been agreed to sell, a co-sharer cannot sell specific part of joint property without getting the property partitioned. Thus, in such contingency, the agreement to sell cannot be enforced for decree of specific performance. Such decree of specific performance would not be executable. While granting the decree of specific performance, the court cannot change the terms and conditions of the agreement. 28. The ratio of the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in R.C. Chandiok Vs Chunni Lal, (1970) 3 SCC 140 does favour the defendants. Interpretation made by the courts below fully subserves the ends of justice in the present case. 29. The relief of specific performance is an equitable remedy. 28. The ratio of the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in R.C. Chandiok Vs Chunni Lal, (1970) 3 SCC 140 does favour the defendants. Interpretation made by the courts below fully subserves the ends of justice in the present case. 29. The relief of specific performance is an equitable remedy. The trial court having considered the fact that the plaintiff failed to prove his readiness and willingness that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract instead of granting the decree of specific relief has granted the decree of recovery of money in his favour by moulding the relief. The first appellate court also dismissed the appeal preferred by the plaintiff and rightly affirmed the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. 30. Furthermore, in an appellate jurisdiction under Section 100 of CPC, this Court can exercise its jurisdiction only when the courts below have recorded a perverse finding. On scrutiny of the pleadings and evidence adduced by the parties, this Court is of the firm view that neither the plaintiff has pleaded the averment as per the mandate of Section 16(c) of the Act as well as Form 47 nor has any evidence been led that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of contract. Hon'ble Apex Court in State of U.P. Vs. Singhara Singh & others AIR 1964 Supreme Court 358, has held that if a statute has conferred a power to do an act and has laid down the method in which that power has to be exercised, it necessarily prohibits the doing of the act in any other manner than that which has been prescribed. 31. Hon'ble Apex Court in C. Doddanarayana Reddy AIR 2020 SUPREME COURT 1912 C. Doddanarayana Reddy (Dead) by LRs and others Vs C. Jayarama Reddy (Dead) by LRs and others has categorically held that findings of fact cannot be interfered with in second appeal unless the findings are perverse. The relevant paragraph of the judgment is excerpted hereunder: "25. The question as to whether a substantial question of law arises, has been a subject matter of interpretation by this Court. In the judgment reported as Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Anjuman-E-Ismail Madris-Un-Niswan, (1999) 6 SCC 343 , it was held that findings of the fact could not have been interfered within the second appeal. This Court held as under: "12. In the judgment reported as Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Anjuman-E-Ismail Madris-Un-Niswan, (1999) 6 SCC 343 , it was held that findings of the fact could not have been interfered within the second appeal. This Court held as under: "12. This Court had repeatedly held that the power of the High Court to interfere in second appeal under Section 100 CPC is limited solely to decide a substantial question of law, if at all the same arises in the case. It has deprecated the practice of the High Court routinely interfering in pure findings of fact reached by the courts below without coming to the conclusion that the said finding of fact is either perverse or not based on material on record. 13. In Ramanuja Naidu v. V. Kanniah Naidu 1996 3 SCC 392 ), this Court held: "It is now well settled that concurrent findings of fact of trial court and first appellate court cannot be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code. The Single Judge of the High Court totally misconceived his jurisdiction in deciding the second appeal under Section 100 of the Code in the way he did." 14. In Navaneethammal v. Arjuna Chetty 1996 6 SCC 166 ), this Court held: "Interference with the concurrent findings of the courts below by the High Court under Section 100 CPC must be avoided unless warranted by compelling reasons. In any case, the High Court is not expected to re-appreciate the evidence just to replace the findings of the lower courts. Even assuming that another view is possible on a re-appreciation of the same evidence, that should not have been done by the High Court as it cannot be said that the view taken by the first appellate court was based on no material." 32. In view of the foregoing discussion, the substantial question of law is answered in negative. 33. Therefore, the second appeal is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed. The same is hereby dismissed. 34. In the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.