JUDGMENT G.R. Swaminathan, J. 1. Heard the learned Advocate General appearing for the appellant and the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent. 2. In this appeal, the State represented by the District Collector and District Magistrate, Thoothukudi, challenge the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge/Fast Track Court No. 2, Thoothukudi, allowing C.A. No. 143 of 2006 filed by the respondent herein under Section 6-C of the Essential Commodities Act 1955. 3. On 15.08.2004 an information was received by the Thoothukudi police that a large quantity of rice is being smuggled through rail wagons to New Delhi. On inspection, it was found that the information was true. 2300 MT of rice had been loaded on to 40 rail wagons. They were seized and sealed. Crime No. 176 of 2004 was registered by the Civil Supply CID under Section 4(1), 19(1) of Tamil Nadu Essential Trade Articles (Regulation of Trade) Order 1984 and 2(1) and 6(4) of Tamil Nadu Scheduled Commodities (Regulation of Distribution by Card System) Order 1982 read with 7(1)(a)(ii) of Essential Commodities Act 1955. Thereupon, a report was sent to the District Collector for taking action under Section 6A of the Act to confiscate the seized commodities. The respondent claiming to be the owner of the goods filed W.P.(MD) No. 24026 of 2004 for returning all the seized rice to him. Even during the pendency of the said proceedings, 47,624 bags of rice were used for public distribution and a sum of Rs. 60 Lakhs was deposited by the Zonal Manager, TNCS in favour of the Special Tahsildar, Thoothukudi and it was kept in an escrow account. The writ petition filed by the respondent came to be ordered on certain terms on 11.09.2004 and it was followed by the institution of Cont. P.(MD) No. 831 of 2004. The Contempt petition was disposed of on 22.12.2004. Since 1539 MT of rice had already been utilised for public distribution, the remaining number of 832 MT of rice was directed to be released to the respondent on payment of Rs. 30 Lakhs. The respondent deposited a sum of Rs. 30 Lakhs as per the said order and the balance quantity of rice was returned to the respondent. On 24.08.2006 the District Collector passed an order under Section 6A of the Act confiscating the rice and also directed collecting the remaining amount of Rs. 39,12,509.75/- from the respondent. 4. 30 Lakhs. The respondent deposited a sum of Rs. 30 Lakhs as per the said order and the balance quantity of rice was returned to the respondent. On 24.08.2006 the District Collector passed an order under Section 6A of the Act confiscating the rice and also directed collecting the remaining amount of Rs. 39,12,509.75/- from the respondent. 4. Aggrieved by the said confiscation order dated 24.08.2006, the respondent filed C.A. No. 143 of 2006 before the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 2, Thoothukudi, under Section 6C of the Act. By the impugned order dated 15.05.2008, the Sessions Court set aside the confiscation order passed by the District Collector and directed the determination of the value of 1539.840.675 MT of rice and payment of the same with 9% interest and also return of the amount of Rs. 30 Lakhs deposited by him with interest. 5. The learned Advocate General took me through the entire factual matrix and strongly contended that the reasons assigned by the learned Sessions Judge are perverse. He called upon this Court to set aside the order of the learned Sessions Judge passed under Section 6-C of the Act and allow this appeal. 6. The learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent contended that this appeal itself is not maintainable. 7. I made it clear that any preliminary objection as regards the maintainability of the appeal ought to be made before the appellant opens his submissions. After the respondent makes his objection regarding the maintainability, the appellant has to reply. In this case, I spent almost one hour listening to the learned Advocate General on the merits of the matter. Judicial time is precious and it has to be effectively deployed. I called upon the learned Advocate General to satisfy this Court as regards the maintainability of the appeal. The appeal had been filed under Section 378 of Cr.P.C. Section 378 of Cr.P.C. is about challenge to acquittal by way of appeal. Obviously the respondent had not been acquitted by the Court below. What was set aside was the order of confiscation passed by the District Collector. Therefore, on the very face of it this provision has no application whatsoever. 8. An appeal is a creature of statute. Therefore, if an aggrieved litigant wants to challenge an order by way of appeal, he will have to cite a specific provision to maintain his appeal. Therefore, on the very face of it this provision has no application whatsoever. 8. An appeal is a creature of statute. Therefore, if an aggrieved litigant wants to challenge an order by way of appeal, he will have to cite a specific provision to maintain his appeal. In this case no such provision could be traced. Therefore, the learned Advocate General frankly submitted that he would concede that this appeal is not maintainable. He wanted this Court to convert this appeal to one of revision. 9. The scope of a revision proceeding is different from that of an appeal proceeding. In fact in "appeal", one can cover the entire canvass. But in the case of revision, the scope is rather limited. At this stage, the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that while a revision can be converted into an appeal, the appeal cannot be converted into a revision. He drew my attention to Section 401(5) of Cr.P.C. which reads as follows:- "401 High Court's powers of revision (1) .. (2) .. (3) .. (4) .. (5) Where under this Code an appeal lies but an application for revision has been made to the High Court by any person and the High Court is satisfied that such application was made under the erroneous belief that no appeal lies thereto and that it is necessary in the interests of justice so to do, the High Court may treat the application for revision as a petition of appeal and deal with the same accordingly." There is no corresponding provision which can enable the conversion of appeal into revision. He therefore wanted this Court to summarily dismiss this appeal as not maintainable and leave the matter as such. 10. I am unable to agree with the contention of the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent. The issue is no longer res integra. The Hon'ble Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the decision reported in (1983) Cri. L.J. 885 (Md. Kasimuddin Vs. Yunus Ali Mondal and others) held as follows:- "7. Mr. Ray, faced with this difficulty came up with his alternative prayer of treating the appeal as a revision. Relying on the observations in the case reported in 12 CWN 678 he argued that there is no wrong which in the interest of justice, cannot be remedied. Kasimuddin Vs. Yunus Ali Mondal and others) held as follows:- "7. Mr. Ray, faced with this difficulty came up with his alternative prayer of treating the appeal as a revision. Relying on the observations in the case reported in 12 CWN 678 he argued that there is no wrong which in the interest of justice, cannot be remedied. He also referred to a single Bench division reported in II Criminal Law Journal (1905) at page 105 where an appeal was treated as a revision. He also referred to another case reported in III Criminal Law Journal (1906) at page 123 in support of his contention. This was a case where an application under S. 526 of the Cr.P.C. was treated as a revision and has no bearing on principle to the facts of the present case. There can be no controversy that in a proper case a Memorandum of Appeal may be treated as a revision but the question is whether it would be expedient to do so in the interest of justice and in the facts of the present case. The petition of complaint was filed on 26.07.1968, that is to say more than 14 years ago. The respondents were acquitted by a Judgment dated 29.04.1975. If the memorandum is treated as a revision the most, that this Court can do, is to set aside the order of acquittal but cannot convict the accused persons. It may at the best send the matter back for retrial. We do not think it expedient to do so after the lapse of so many years. 8. This apart the scope of a revisional application is evidently narrowed than the scope of an appeal. In this connection learned Advocates for the respondents drew our attention to the amended provisions of S. 401 as contained in sub-s. (5) thereof. This sub-section provides that where under this Code an appeal lies but an application for revision has been made and the High Court is satisfied that such application was made under the erroneous belief that no appeal lies thereto and that it is necessary in the interest of justice so to do, the High Court may treat the application for revision as a petition of appeal and deal with the same accordingly. It was argued that the legislature having specifically made provisions for treating an application for revision as an appeal and not having made a converse provision for treating an appeal as revision, the contention of Mr. Ray must have to be rejected. We are unable to agree with this view. Although it was generally accepted as a principal even before the incorporation of sub-s. (5) that in appropriate cases a Memorandum of Appeal may be treated as a revision, there was same divergence of opinion as to whether a revision application could be treated as an appeal. To resolve the controversy the legislature in its wisdom thought it fit to engraft sub-s. (5). This was necessary because the scope of an appeal is wider than the scope of a revisional application and in order to empower the Court to enlarge its jurisdiction, sanction of the legislature was felt necessary. But when the question is not of enlarging the scope of the application but limiting it within a narrower sphere no such sanction was deemed necessary. Therefore, the absence of any specific provision to the effect that a Memorandum of Appeal can be converted into a revisional application cannot be construed to mean that such power is wanting in the Court." This decision was followed by the Madras High Court in the decision reported in (1992) L.W. (Crl.) 299 (R. Kaliamurthy and two others V. Sellammal and two others). 11. I also came across a host of cases invoking the inherent powers available under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., for treating criminal appeal as a criminal revision. In fact, one can also refer to the practice being followed in the civil side. When a second appeal was found to be not maintainable, it was converted into a civil revision petition. (2012) 2-L.W. 683 (Manickam Moopan V. Lakshmi and others). A first appeal was converted into a revision and disposed of. (2008) 2-L.W. 60 (Sinnamani and another V. G. Vettivel and others). 12. Merely because, there is no provision corresponding to Section 401(5) of Cr.P.C., authorising the appellate Court to treat an appeal that is not maintainable as a revision, that does not mean that the High Court is powerless to do so. The inherent powers available under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. would enable the High Court to convert a non-maintainable appeal as a petition for revision. The inherent powers available under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. would enable the High Court to convert a non-maintainable appeal as a petition for revision. Of course, that is a matter left to the discretion of the Court and the party cannot insist that such a course of action should be adopted. 13. I am satisfied that the interest of justice requires that the appeal is converted to one of revision and heard afresh as revision. 14. The learned senior counsel for the respondent would raise a technical objection that the District Collector as the original authority could not have himself challenged the impugned order before this Court. I do not agree with this submission. The statute casts a duty on the District Collector to confiscate the essential commodities, if there is a breach of the statutory provision or the orders made thereunder. Therefore, the District Collector is very much having the locus standi to assail the correctness of the order passed by the Sessions Court. 15. Therefore, even while holding that the appeal is not maintainable, I direct the Registry to convert this appeal to one of revision. The matter may be listed after obtaining necessary orders from the Hon'ble Administrative Judge.