JUDGMENT J.P.Gupta, J. - This appeal has been directed against the decree dated 31.3.2001 passed by Additional District Judge, Gadarwara, District Narshinghpur in Ist Civil Appeal No. 14-A/98 reversing the decree of rejection of the suit dated 31.7.1998 passed by Civil Judge Class-II, Gadarwara, in Civil Suit No. 45-A/94, and the plaintiffs/respondents have been declared owner of the suit premises and also declared that the sale deed dated 28.11.1998 executed in favour of the appellant is not binding of the respondents/plaintiffs and the appellant is also directed to handover the vacant possession of the suit premisses to the respondents/plaintiffs. 2. In this case, these facts are admitted that earlier the suit premises was of the ownership of the Rambagas @ Ramcharan and who died after leaving four sons, namely, Dulichand, Babulal, Kanhaiyalal and Mathura Prasad that they have also died and Kanhaiyalal and Babulal had no children and Babulal died leaving his wife Jai Bai. Respondents/plaintiffs are heirs of Moolchand, who was the son of Dulichand and the appellant is son of Mathura Prasad and there are other two children of Mathura Prasad one son Gopal and one daughter Rajan Bai and the suit premises is the part of house, which was left by Rambagas @ Ramcharan and situated towards house of Bishan Seth at Subhash Marg, Gadarwara. 3. On behalf of the respondents/plaintiffs, ancestor Moolchand filed the suit and he had died during the proceeding of the suit and the representatives are legal heirs of him. Jai Bai, defendant no. 1 was also died without having any legal heir. The suit was filed with regard to suit premises, alleging that after the death of Rambagas his all four sons were residing separately on their own portion of the house and the suit premises was in possession of Dulichand and Moolchand and before one year in rainy season, some part of the portion of the plaintiffs/respondents destroyed, when they made efforts to repair the damaged part, the appellants/defendants objected by saying that the suit premises has been purchased by him from Jai Bai, original defendant no. 1, wife of Babulal, who was owner of the suit premises, while Jai Bai was not owner of the suit premises, therefore, sale deed is not binding on them and prayer was made that the plaintiffs be declared the owner of the suit premises and the sale deed be declared to be void and the defendants be directed to hand over the possession of the suit premises. 4. Appellants/Defendants in written statement replied that ancestors of plaintiff/respondent, namely, Dulichand, near about 50 years, before relinquish, had share in the house in lieu of Rs. 500/- and left village and settled at village of Codia and purchased land at village Chirahcala by sale deed dated 23.6.1941. Thereafter, neither Dulichand nor his heirs including plaintiffs came to reside in the house and wife of Babulal and Kanhaiyalal were residing and appellants/defendants also reside in his portion of the house and he had purchased the house from the wife of Babulal by sale deed dated 28.11.1988, thereafter, he is owner of the suit premises and also has possession in suit premises. Accordingly, the plaintiffs has no right to get any relief with regard to suit premises, moreover the plaintiff has not impleaded other heirs of Mathura Prasad, namely, Gopal and Rajani Bai, on account of this error, the suit is not maintainable. Hence the suit be dismissed. 5. Learned trial Court after trial dismissed the suit holding that 50 years before Dulichand relinquished his share in lieu of Rs. 500/- in favour of the other share holders/coparceners and resided in another village and purchased land there and the plaintiff was not in possession, on the basis of mutual partition and there is no defect of non-joinder of the party. 6. The aforesaid findings were challenged before the appellate Court and learned appellate Court set-aside the decree of the trial Court and arrived at the conclusion that the suit premises is part of joint Hindu Family property and there is no documentary evidence with regard to relinquishment of suit premises by Dulichand and Moolchand in favour of their share holder or coparceners as the value of the property was more than Rs. 100/-, therefore, registered relinquishment deed is must, in absence of it, the respondents/plaintiffs are entitled to get decree of declaration of title and possession, consequently, declared the respondents/plaintiffs owner of the suit premises with the direction that the sale deed dated 28.11.1988 is not binding to them and the appellants shall hand over the possession of the suit premises to them. Hence this appeal. 7. This Second Appeal by order dated 26.11.2001 has been admitted on the following substantial question of law :- 1. Whether in the fact and circumstances of the case, the finding of learned first appellate Court that ouster of late Dulichand from the Joint Hindu Family property could not be established without execution of any relinquished deed in favour of other coparceners, was arbitrary and perverse? 8. On the aforesaid substantial question of law, learned both the parties were heard at length and having considered their contentions and perusal of record, it is found that there is a concurrent finding of both the courts below that one coparcener Dulichand relinquished his share in favour of other coparceners in lieu of Rs. 500/-, in other words, under the oral family settlement, the suit premises was not come in his share. 9. In the present case, the only question is that in absence of written and registered deed of relinquishment, the aforesaid act of relinquishment or family settlement has any legal enforcement, can be legally enforced or binding on the heirs of deceased coparceners. Learned counsel of the respondent has placed reliance on the judgment which have been relied by the learned Ist appellate Court. The judgment of Madras High Court in The Official Assignee, Madras v. Tehmina Dinshaw Tehrani and anr., (1972) AIR Madras 187 , the hon'ble Bench in this case, considered the question that whether relinquishment deed executed in favour of wife was transfer of property or to delay the creditors. In other words, in this case, there was no question for consideration which is to be considered in the present case, similarly, another judgment which has been relied by the respondent in case of Harish Chandra and ors. In other words, in this case, there was no question for consideration which is to be considered in the present case, similarly, another judgment which has been relied by the respondent in case of Harish Chandra and ors. v. Chandra Shekhar and ors., (1977) AIR Allahabad 44 , in which question was raised whether the person in whose favour deed of release was executed by other persons in favour of him is entitled to redeem the property when it was subjected to mortgage and the answer was affirmative. Apparently, this judgment is also not relevant to the question involved in the present case. Learned appellate Court has also placed reliance, without mentioning the name of the party by the Citation of AIR 1961 Madhya Pradesh 10, Page no. 10 on that page there is no such citation on the aforesaid subject and in the volume relating to year 1961, there is no citation on the aforesaid subject matter. Ist appellate Court has also placed reliance on the judgment of Harisingh v. Panchubai, 1982 MPWN 46 , in which it is held that as under :- "However, I am not inclined to accept the aforesaid contention as, in my opinion, it clearly creates an interest in the disputed property in favour of the plaintiffs. Even in the case of family settlement what has to be seen is that where under the family settlement there has been any transfer of property or not and in case there has been any transfer of property the same would require registration and for want of registration no right title and interest as such passed in favour of the plaintiffs. Thus, in a case in which absolute title is being claimed to the property, the formalities of law about the passing of title by transfer would have to be observed and registration would become necessary and the finding recorded by the two Courts below on the aforesaid question, in my opinion, does not suffer from any error of law requiring interference in his second appeal. Appeal dismissed." 10. In the aforesaid citation, there is no complete facts of the case mentioned and the aforesaid case law does not laid down categorically that if one coparcener release his share in favour of other coparcener, the registered relinquished deed is must when the value of the property is more than Rs. Appeal dismissed." 10. In the aforesaid citation, there is no complete facts of the case mentioned and the aforesaid case law does not laid down categorically that if one coparcener release his share in favour of other coparcener, the registered relinquished deed is must when the value of the property is more than Rs. 100/-, moreover, it is made clear that it should be seen that by way of family settlement, there is any transfer of property or not. So far, the present case is concerned, relinquishment of one co-owner in favour of coparceners cannot be said to be transfer of ownership as the other co-owners already had ownership. Only in such cases, where at the time of family settlement, any such property which is exclusively of the ownership of one coparcener, release in favour of others, may attract the aforesaid provision, but when the other co-sharers have the right of ownership, in such circumstances, it cannot be said the act of release his share, would be amount to transfer of property under the Transfer of Property Act, therefore, the aforesaid case law is also not applicable in the present case. 11. Learned counsel for the appellants has rightly placed reliance on the judgment of Venku Bai v. Raju Bai (Alias) Rajeswaramma and ors. ALT 360, (1987) 1 CCC 878 AP, in this case, the question has been dealt with exhaustively and relevant paras are 4 to 9, which are as under :- "4. The substantial question of law on which the Second Appeal was admitted is whether a relinquishment can be inferred from the circumstances and whether without registration it is valid and binding. The learned counsel for the appellant did not press the second part stating that there are decisions on either side. The only question, therefore, that arises for consideration in the second appeal is whether relinquishment of the share of a coparcener in the joint family property must be evidenced by a document in writing or whether it can be inferred from circumstances. 5. Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act defines "transfer of property" as an act by which a living person "conveys" property, in present or in future, to one or more other living persons or to himself. 5. Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act defines "transfer of property" as an act by which a living person "conveys" property, in present or in future, to one or more other living persons or to himself. Therefore the performance of an act by a person will operate as a transfer of property only if by such an act he "conveys" property to another. It implies that the person conveying the property is entitled to the property sought to be conveyed and is conveying it to a person who has no title to such property otherwise. The crucial test therefore that determines whether a transaction amounts to conveyance of property is whether the same is in favour of a person who has no title to the property which is the subject matter of the transaction. 6. In Ramman Singh v. Dilla Singh (1),1929 AIR(Oudh) 334 it is held that a "transfer" in law must be deemed to imply a transfer by a person entitled to that property in favour of a person having no title otherwise. It is held in Saya Haman v. Saya Hla (2),1935 AIR(Rang) 449 that the appropriate form of conveyance whereby one joint tenent relinquishes his interest in favour of another joint tenant is a release, and not a sale or a gift and that it operates rather as an extinguishment of a right than as a conveyance. His Lordship held that under the Transfer of Property Act, a release by parole is a perfectly valid transaction. In coming to that conclusion the decision of a Division Bench of Madras High Court in Munuswamy Mudallar v. Govindaraja Chetty (3), (1935) AIR Madras 113 is followed wherein it is held that where the contract to release is not between the mortgagor and a motgagee, but between a mortgagee and a stranger the Transfer of Property Act does not apply and that there may be an oral release of the property purchased from the mortgagee. 7. A Division Bench of Patna High Court in Jatru Pahan v. Ambikajit Prasad (4), (1957) AIR Patna 570 held that a transfer of property clearly contemplates that the transferor has interest in the property, which is sought to be conveyed but the transferee has no such interest in such property. 7. A Division Bench of Patna High Court in Jatru Pahan v. Ambikajit Prasad (4), (1957) AIR Patna 570 held that a transfer of property clearly contemplates that the transferor has interest in the property, which is sought to be conveyed but the transferee has no such interest in such property. Their Lordships further held that a partition converts joint enjoyment into enjoyment in severalty and as such it is neither a conveyance nor a gift. The essence of a coparcenary under the Mitakshara Law is unity of ownership and the ownership of the coparcenary property is in the whole body of coparceners. No coparcener is entitled to any special interest in the coparcenery property nor is he entitled to exclusive possession of any part of the property. There is community of interest and unity of possession between all the members of the family. 8. That being the concept of a coparcener under Mitakshara Law, it cannot be said that the plaintiff's husband had an Exclusive title to be conveyed and that the persons in whose favour he had relinquished his rights had no title to such property otherwise. Following the decisions referred to above. I hold that as the plaintiff's husband had no exclusive right and title to the suit property, there is no conveyance in favour of the other sharers by the act of his relinquishment. It does not amount to be a transfer of property requiring the execution of a document and registration thereof. The learned appellate Judge after discussing the evidence and on a consideration of the discrepencies in the evidence of P.Ws 1 to 3 enumarated the various circumstances in paragraph 11 of his judgment and arrived at the conclusion that there is an oral release by the plaintiff's husband. In addition, D.Ws 5 & 7 have deposed to the relinquishment and the learned appellate Judge found as a Page: 363 fact that there was relinquishment. It is a pure question of fact based upon the evidence and cannot be interfered with by this Court in the second Appeal. 9. From the above discussion I hold that the relinquishment of the share of a coparcener in the joint family property need not be evidenced by a document in writing and that it can be inferred even from the circumstances as such an act does not amount to a conveyance of property. 9. From the above discussion I hold that the relinquishment of the share of a coparcener in the joint family property need not be evidenced by a document in writing and that it can be inferred even from the circumstances as such an act does not amount to a conveyance of property. The second appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs confirming the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge, Nizamabad in A.S No. 47/79." 12. Learned counsel for the appellants has also placed reliance on the judgment of Division Bench of Patna High Court Akhaj and ors. v. Arjun Koeri and ors., (1952) AIR Patna 67 , in which it is held that relinquishment of surrender does not require any writing, it may be effected by a limited owner under the Hindu Law by any voluntary act, which may operate as a civil death, if a limited owner dies a natural death, the heirs of last male owner succeed, and the same result follows if she dies a civil death. Therefore, relinquishment by a limited owner of her interest simply extinguishes her own right and does not create any interest in favour of the next reversioner, similarly, Bombay High Court in case of Ramdas Chimna v. Pralhad Deorao and ors., (1965) AIR Bombay 74 , has held that the extinguishment of immovable property by oral relinquishment by mother do not attract provision of Transfer of Property Act and Indian Registration Act. The aforesaid two judgments related to relinquishment of limited interest in the joint Hindu Family property but the principles are same, therefore, the aforesaid judgments support the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court referred earlier. 13. In view of the aforesaid pronunciation of law, this court is also have a considered view that relinquishment of share by one coparcener in favour of other coparcener or a family settlement, cannot be said illegal or unenforceable, on account of absence of written and registered deed of relinquishment. In the aforesaid background, consequently, the finding of learned Ist appellate Court is contrary to law and can be termed arbitrary and pervert. Accordingly, the answer of the aforesaid substantial question of law is affirmative, therefore, the decree and judgment of Ist appellate Court is not sustainable. Hence it is set aside and the decree and judgment of learned trial Court is restored. No order as to cost.