ORDER : 1. Petitioner is a Municipality constituted under the provisions of Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963. This petitioner approached this Court through its Chief Officer challenging the validity and legality of the award dated 30.04.2010 passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Bhavnagar in Reference (IT) No.50 of 1996, whereby the Court had given the direction to the petitioner to give the difference in the pay scale from 20.07.1996 to 06.10.2009 to the respondent for his having held the additional charge of the Light Inspector, while continued to have worked as wireman. The respondent worked on a permanent post of a wireman in Botad Municipality. Person, who held the post of Light Inspector retired and, therefore, the respondent had been given the charge of the Light Inspector on 23.07.1996 and he continued to hold the said charge till he attained the age of superannuation on 31.10.2013. After having worked for 2 years as a Light Inspector, while continuing to hold his own charge of a wireman, he had preferred a Reference(IT) No.50 of 1996, where oral evidence came to be adduced by the respondent. He was also crossexamined and the petitioner chose not to adduce any oral evidence. After availing the opportunities to the parties, the Court partially allowed the Reference and directed, as stated above. 2. This has aggrieved the petitioner Municipality which is before this Court seeking following reliefs: “9. On the above grounds and those may be urged at the time of hearing of this petition, the petitioner prays that: (A) Your Lordships will be pleased to admit and allow the present petition; (B) Your Lordships will be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari or a writ in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside the award dated 30.4.2010 passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal, Bhavnagar below Exh.42 in Reference (IT) No.50 of 1996 at Annexure-A to this petition; (C) Pending admission and final disposal of this petition, Your Lordships will be pleased to stay the implementation, execution and operation of the award dated 30.4.2010 passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal, Bhavnagar below Exh.42 in Reference (IT) No.50 of 1996 at Annexure-A to this petition; (D) Such other and further relief that is just, fit and expedient in the facts and circumstances of the case may be granted.” 3. The affidavit-in-reply is filed by the respondent employee, who has urged inter alia that he joined the service of Municipality since 1977 as a permanent wireman in the Light Department. There was permanent set up of two Wiremen. The respondent as well as another Wiremen viz. Shri Devayatbhai were the two permanent Wiremen and the respondent was the senior most wireman. There were about five daily waged wiremen and permanent set up of one Light Inspector. Upto 1994, Shri Batukray M. Devmurari was working as permanent Light Inspector and on attaining the age of superannuation, he was relieved from services in December, 1994. The respondent was given the charge of Light Inspector w.e.f. 30.11.1994 and he was also ordered to be paid the charge allowance w.e.f. 1.12.1994 vide Office Order issued by the petitioner Municipality dated 05.12.1994. 3.1. The respondent also possessed more educational qualification than the earlier Light Inspector Shri Batukray M. Devmurari. The respondent has passed Second Class Wireman Examination as well as he has passed 8th Standard examination. 3.2. The respondent was initially given the charge allowance of Rs.200/-per month and, thereafter, he was paid Rs.300/- per month. There are about 12 to 13 employees working in the Electrical Department. There are 05 wiremen, 91 clerks, 3 ladder-men etc. including the respondent herein, of which two wiremen are permanent. There were about 1500 light poles, but, at present there are about 5500 light poles as well as 03 high mass towers and around 400 T' lights on the divider of the roads. As Light Inspector, the respondent has been looking after the complaints, find out the fault and do the necessary repairing work as well as to allot the work to the other workmen of Electrical Department. He had not been given permanent post as well as the pay scale, salary and other monetary benefits of Light Inspector w.e.f. 01.12.1994. 3.3. The pay scale of Light Inspector is Rs.1400-40-1800-EB-50-2300, while the pay scale of Wiremen is Rs.950-20-115—EB-25-1500. There is only one vacant post of Light Inspector. The Industrial Tribunal directed the petitioner Municipality to pay the monetary benefits as per the pay scale of light Inspector for the period from 23.07.1996 to 06.10.2009. Therefore, no interference is desirable. 4. Having heard both the sides this Court has heard learned advocate Mr. Premal Joshi appearing with Mr. There is only one vacant post of Light Inspector. The Industrial Tribunal directed the petitioner Municipality to pay the monetary benefits as per the pay scale of light Inspector for the period from 23.07.1996 to 06.10.2009. Therefore, no interference is desirable. 4. Having heard both the sides this Court has heard learned advocate Mr. Premal Joshi appearing with Mr. N.R. Koyani for the petitioner, who has fervently urged that by virtue of the resolution No.333 passed by the General Board of the petitioner Municipality, no regular appointment was to be made on the post of the Light Inspector and on other posts. It was required because the total establishment expenditure on administrative side could not have acceded 48%. It is also further the say of the learned advocate that there was only one post of Light Inspector for which the charge was already given. No grievance should be made and the Court below has misread the entire evidence and has erroneously granted difference in the pay scale. According to him, this cannot be done indirectly, as it is impermissible to fill in the post of Light Inspector, since as per the said resolution, the same could not have been permitted. The manner in which it has been done is impermissible under the law. 5. Per contra, learned advocate Mr. D.G.Shukla appearing for the respondent has urged that from 1994 to 06.10.2009 and thereafter, till the date of superannuation of the respondent, the charge allowance has been given. The Court has rightly struck a balance of granting him the difference in pay scale from the year 1996 to 06.10.2009 when the post was abolished. He has further urged that the minimum pay scale is to be given to the temporary employee, as held by the Apex Court in the case of Sabha Shanker Dube vs. Divisional Forest Officer and others, AIR 2019 SC 220 , whereas, in the instant case, for number of years, person has discharged his duties as a Light Inspector and he had to be satisfied only with the charge allowance, although there was an opportunity for the petitioner to fill in the said post. 6. 6. Reliance is also placed on the decision of this Court (Coram: Vipul M. Pancholi, J.) in the case of Botad Municipality vs. Industrial Tribunal, Bhavnagar and another, in Special Civil Application No. 10869 of 2014, which is a case of the very Municipality, where the Tribunal had partly allowed the reference to regularize the services of the workmen as cleaner along with other benefits. In the matter before this Court, as per the Government Resolution, set up of each Municipality was sanctioned classwise and the petitioner Municipality, since falls within “B” Class, the sanctioned set up of the petitioner Municipality was of two posts, out of which, one was vacant and on that post, workman was working. The permanent cleaner was being given salary by the Municipality as per the 5th Pay Commission and the workman was working on daily wage basis. He continued to work for many years and his juniors were given the benefit of permanency. In such circumstances, relying on the decision of the Apex Court, this Court had not chosen to interfere with the judgment and order of the Tribunal. 6.1. This order of the learned Single Bench had been confirmed by the Division Bench of this Court (Coram:Akil Kureshi & A.Y. Kogje, J.J.) in Letters Patent Appeal No. 65 of 2016 by a slight modification by providing that the regularisation of the workman on the post of cleaner would be effective from 01.06.2010, since that is the date on which the post had fallen vacant and all other conditions and directions had remained unchanged. 6.2. The Apex Court's decision in the case of Umrala Gam Panchayat vs. Secretary, Municipal Employees Union, 2015 (12) SCC 775 , where it was the question of unfair labour practice, where the nonpermanent workmen were claiming permanent status and equal pay for equal work. They were all appointed as cleaners (Safai Kamdars) of Appellant Panchayat and had served for many years. The Labour Court, by its award, concluded that they were to be made permanent employees and had directed Panchayat to pay them the wages, allowance and other monetary benefits accordingly. Learned Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the appeal and held that discrepancy in the payment of wages and salary was alarming between permanent and nonpermanent workmen. The Labour Court, by its award, concluded that they were to be made permanent employees and had directed Panchayat to pay them the wages, allowance and other monetary benefits accordingly. Learned Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the appeal and held that discrepancy in the payment of wages and salary was alarming between permanent and nonpermanent workmen. This was also held to be unfair labour practice, as defined in section 2(ra) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (“the I.D. Act' for short) read with Entry NO.10 of Fifth Schedule of the I.D. Act. 6.3. The Apex Court held that the demand raised by the respondent unit need to be accepted. It also directed to pay regular pay scale as per the revised pay scale. Pay fixation to the post of permanent Safai Kamdar for the total period of 15 years and the legal representatives of respondent deceased workman and, accordingly, the appeal was dismissed. 6.4. In case of Sabha Shanker Dube (supra), the Apex Court has reiterated the principle of “equal pay for equal work” and made it applicable to the temporary employees. The Court held that the temporary employees are entitled to minimum pay scale applicable to regular employees working on the same post as long as they continue in service. It was a case where while being appointed as daily rated workers, employees in the Forest Department of the State of U.P, sought regularisation of their services with minimum pay scale being applied as per the pay scale of their counterpart working on regular post and treat them in continuous service, while condoning the breaks in the service. 6.5. Relevant paragraphs are reproduced as under: “8. The daily wagers relied upon a judgment of this Court in Putti Lal (supra) and submitted that the same relief may be extended to them. It is relevant to note that the judgment in Putti Lal (supra) relates to a dispute similar to that involved in this case. Daily rated wage earners in the Forest Department in the State of Uttar Pradesh approached the High Court for regularization of their services. The Division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad directed the State Government to constitute the Committee as directed in order to frame the scheme for regularization. Daily rated wage earners in the Forest Department in the State of Uttar Pradesh approached the High Court for regularization of their services. The Division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad directed the State Government to constitute the Committee as directed in order to frame the scheme for regularization. The judgment of the High Court that the daily rated wage workers shall be paid at the minimum of the pay scales was affirmed by this Court on the principle of equal pay for equal work. The Division Bench of the High Court while deciding Special Appeal No.1530 of 2007 referred to the judgment in Putti Lal (supra) but placed reliance on a later judgment of this Court Tilak Raj (supra). The Division Bench of the High Court also cited the case of Surjit Singh (supra) to hold that the daily wagers cannot seek the benefit of the judgment of Putti Lal (supra) case in view of the subsequent decisions of this Court wherein, according to the High Court, it was held that daily wage employees were not entitled to the minimum of the pay scales. 9. On a comprehensive consideration of the entire law on the subject of parity of pay scales on the principle of equal pay for equal work, this Court in Jagjit Singh (supra) held as follows: “58. In our considered view, it is fallacious to determine artificial parameters to deny fruits of labour. An employee engaged for the same work cannot be paid less than another who performs the same duties and responsibilities. Certainly not, in a welfare State. Such an action besides being demeaning, strikes at the very foundation of human dignity. Anyone, who is compelled to work at a lesser wage does not do so voluntarily. He does so to provide food and shelter to his family, at the cost of his self-respect and dignity, at the cost of his self-worth, and at the cost of his integrity. For he knows that his dependants would suffer immensely, if he does not accept the lesser wage. Any act of paying less wages as compared to others similarly situate constitutes an act of exploitative enslavement, emerging out of a domineering position. Undoubtedly, the action is oppressive, suppressive and coercive, as it compels involuntary subjugation.” 10. For he knows that his dependants would suffer immensely, if he does not accept the lesser wage. Any act of paying less wages as compared to others similarly situate constitutes an act of exploitative enslavement, emerging out of a domineering position. Undoubtedly, the action is oppressive, suppressive and coercive, as it compels involuntary subjugation.” 10. The issue that was considered by this Court in Jagjit Singh (supra) is whether temporary employees (daily wage employees, ad hoc appointees, employees appointed on casual basis, contractual employees and likewise) are entitled to the minimum of the regular pay scales on account of their performing the same duties which are discharged by those engaged on regular basis against the sanctioned posts. After considering several judgments including the judgments of this Court in Tilak Raj (supra) and Surjit Singh (supra), this Court held that temporary employees are entitled to draw wages at the minimum of the pay scales which are applicable to the regular employees holding the same post. 11. In view of the judgment in Jagjit Singh (supra), we are unable to uphold the view of the High Court that the Appellants herein are not entitled to be paid the minimum of the pay sales. We are not called upon to adjudicate on the rights of the Appellants relating to the regularization of their services. We are concerned only with the principle laid down by this Court initially in Putti Lal (supra) relating to persons who are similarly situated to the Appellants and later affirmed in Jagjit Singh (supra) that temporary employees are entitled to minimum of the pay scales as long as they continue in service. 12. We express no opinion on the contention of the State Government that the Appellants are not entitled to the reliefs as they are not working on Group ‘D’ posts and that some of them worked for short periods in projects. 13. For the aforementioned reasons, we allow these Appeals and set aside the judgments of the High Court holding that the Appellants are entitled to be paid the minimum of the pay scales applicable to regular employees working on the same posts. The State of Uttar Pradesh is directed to make payment of the minimum of pay scales to the Appellants with effect from 1st December, 2018.” 7. The State of Uttar Pradesh is directed to make payment of the minimum of pay scales to the Appellants with effect from 1st December, 2018.” 7. The question that arises for consideration of this Court is as to whether in wake of the Resolution No.333 of the General Board of the petitioner Municipality, is there a requirement of any interference. 8. The decision of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty & Another vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC 329 on the aspect of supervisory jurisdiction needs to be referred to, which proceeds on the ground that as far as possible unless the judgement and award is ex facie illegal, or there is an apparent error of “not staying within its bounds” requiring any interference, the Court need not indulge into the judgement and award of the labour Court. 8.1. Relevant paragraph of the said decision is reproduced as under: “62. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, `within the bounds of their authority'. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India & others, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality." 9. Here is a case where the Court below has granted benefits accruing from the post of Light Inspector, which the respondent was holding as additional charge from 23.07.1996 till 06.10.2009 when the post came to be abolished. 10. It has not been disputed by the petitioner that the respondent continued to function as Light Inspector from 01.12.1994. As Mr. Here is a case where the Court below has granted benefits accruing from the post of Light Inspector, which the respondent was holding as additional charge from 23.07.1996 till 06.10.2009 when the post came to be abolished. 10. It has not been disputed by the petitioner that the respondent continued to function as Light Inspector from 01.12.1994. As Mr. B.M. Devmurari was attaining the age of superannuation on 30.11.1994 and from 01.12.1994, the respondent was directed to be given the charge allowance of Light Inspector. 10.1. Within two years of his having discharged duties, the respondent had raised industrial dispute and the reference was made being Reference (IT) No.50 of 1996, where the terms of Reference were as to whether he should be permitted to enjoy the consequential benefits of the permanent post. 10.2. The decisions discussed hereinabove clearly and unequivocally lay emphasis on the requirement of applicability of the principle of equal pay for equal work and the grant of minimum pay scale to the temporary employees, as would be otherwise applicable to the regular employees working on the same post, as long as they continue in service. The only ground, which has been raised by the Municipality is of abolition of the said post, in wake of the said resolution as it was in need of a 20% cut on expenditure. Otherwise, it would not be possible to give the pay scale benefit to other employees. Admittedly, there is only one post of Light Inspector, which was abolished on account of resolution dated 06.10.2009. 10.3. Nothing prevented the petitioner to fill in the said post from the year 1994 and from the day on which Shri Devmurari had attained the age of superannuation. The charge has been given to the present respondent and he continued to discharge his duties diligently. He was the senior most person out of the two regularly employed wiremen. There are other five wiremen, who were daily waged workers working in the Municipality. It is since not in dispute that second person was not senior to the present respondent, his order of holding the additional charge of Light Inspector and his having drawn the charge allowance all these years would not warrant any further inquiry. 10.4. There are other five wiremen, who were daily waged workers working in the Municipality. It is since not in dispute that second person was not senior to the present respondent, his order of holding the additional charge of Light Inspector and his having drawn the charge allowance all these years would not warrant any further inquiry. 10.4. So far as difference in the pay scale as directed by the Court is concerned, it appears that for striking the balance for the person working till 2012, when he attained the age of superannuation, the amount has been given from the date he has taken the charge and the same has continued till 06.10.2009. Therefore, the only defence in the armor of the petitioner of the post having been abolished also falls. The award impugned is a well considered and aptly concluded decision, where the Court below had struck balance even while granting the benefit to the respondent is also well apparent on the face of the record, which does not deserve any kind of interference. 10.5. This Court notices that the difference in the pay scale is also obvious on the record and the same is also not being disputed, and hence, also what remains is to direct the petitioner to let the same be paid at the earliest to the respondent. 11. Resultantly, this petition deserves no entertainment, confirming the judgment and award being Reference (IT) No.50 of 1996. Let the entire amount with all consequential benefits as directed be paid to the respondent within eight weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of this order. 12. The judgment and award dated 30.04.2010 passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Bhavnagar is confirmed. Petition stands dismissed. Disposed of accordingly.