JUDGMENT : 1. This is a defendant's second appeal. The plaintiff-respondents (for short, ‘the plaintiffs’) instituted O.S. No. 63 of 1983 in the Court of Munsif, Amroha, District Moradabad against the four defendants, seeking relief of permanent prohibitory injunction, to the effect that respondent Nos. 2 and 3 be restrained perpetually from delivering possession of the suit property to defendant Nos. 1 and 4 and to maintain status quo on the spot. The Trial Court, vide judgment and decree dated 22.02.1992 decreed the suit restraining defendant Nos. 1 and 4 from interfering with the plaintiffs’ possession over the suit property. Defendant Nos. 2 and 3 were declared tenants in the said property and were ordered by the decree to attorn the plaintiffs as their landlords. A declaration was also made in those terms. The sole appellant, Smt. Chandrawati, who was defendant no. 1 to the suit, is hereinafter referred to as ‘the defendant’. The plaintiff-respondents, who are arrayed here as plaintiff-respondents first set, are hereinafter referred to as ‘the plaintiffs’. Defendant nos. 2 and 3, who are arrayed as respondent Nos. 5 and 6 in the second set, shall be hereinafter referred to as ‘defendant nos. 2 and 3’. The defendant No. 4 to the suit Usman Ali, Advocate here arrayed as respondent No. 7 in the second set, shall be hereinafter referred to as ‘defendant No. 4’. 2. Aggrieved by the aforesaid decree, the defendant carried an appeal to the District Judge, Moradabad where it was registered as Civil Appeal No. 137 of 1992. Upon assignment, it came up for determination before the Court of the 4th Additional District Judge, Moradabad, who by the impugned judgment and decree dated 12th March, 1996, dismissed the defendant's appeal with costs and affirmed the Trial Court. 3. Aggrieved, this appeal from the appellate decree has been filed. 4. This appeal was admitted to hearing on the following substantial questions of law: 1. whether the will dated 26.10.1979 alleged to have been executed by Abdul Mueed in favour of Farhan Khan was proved in accordance with law. If not its effect? 2. Whether will dated 26.10.1979 can be made the basis of the suit without getting probate for the same? 3. Whether the courts below could act as an Expert and tally the signature of the plaintiff-respondents by themselves? 4. If not its effect? 2. Whether will dated 26.10.1979 can be made the basis of the suit without getting probate for the same? 3. Whether the courts below could act as an Expert and tally the signature of the plaintiff-respondents by themselves? 4. Whether the courts below have gone beyond the relief sought and made declaration which would not have been pleaded or proved by the plaintiff-respondents? 5. The hearing in this appeal commenced on 29.01.2020 when Sri J.S. Pandey, Advocate holding brief of Sri Tarun Varma, learned counsel for the appellant addressed the Court on behalf of the appellant. No one appeared on behalf of the respondents. Accordingly, this appeal has proceeded ex parte. It was heard on 29.01.2020, 21.01.2020 and today. At the hearing, Sri J.S. Pandey has confined his submissions to two substantial questions of law that is to say questions Nos. 2 and 3 extracted supra. Now, the suit giving rise to this appeal appears to have been instituted in the Court of Munsif, Amroha for a permanent prohibitory injunction in terms indicated hereinbefore. 6. The plaintiffs came with a case that one Abdul Mueed Khan was owner in possession of the suit property detailed at the foot of the plaint. Abdul Mueed Khan died issueless. It was the plaintiff's case that Abdul Mueed Khan, during his lifetime, had executed a will bequeathing the suit property in favour of one Farhat Khan on 26.10.1979. Upon death of the testator, succession opened in favour of Farhat Khan in terms of the bequests and Farhat Khan thus became owner and entered possession of the suit property. After the decease of Farhat Khan, the plaintiffs became owners of the suit property by interstate succession, being his heirs under the law. Defendant Nos. 2 and 3 were claimed to be in actual physical possession of the suit property as tenants of the testator, Abdul Mueed Khan, and after his death, they were said to have become the tenants of Farhat Khan. After Farhat Khan, the tenants held on behalf of the plaintiffs’ by operation of law. The cause of action in the suit arose as the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant, who had got a sale deed of the suit property executed in her favour by defendant No. 4 on 21.09.1982, in collusion with defendant Nos. After Farhat Khan, the tenants held on behalf of the plaintiffs’ by operation of law. The cause of action in the suit arose as the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant, who had got a sale deed of the suit property executed in her favour by defendant No. 4 on 21.09.1982, in collusion with defendant Nos. 2 and 3, the plaintiffs’ tenants, was proceeding to take possession of the said property along with defendant No. 4. The plaintiffs sued to prevent that eventuality and to protect their possession. 7. The defendant filed a written statement traversing the plaint allegations and asserted that the plaintiffs had no cause of action to sue. The defendant asserted that the will dated 26.10.1979 from Abdul Mueed Khan that was propounded by the plaintiffs as a bequest in favour of Farhat Khan, was a forged and bogus document that was got up in collusion with defendant No. 2. It was asserted that defendant No. 4 was owner of the suit property after Mueed Khan, being his nephew as Mueed Khan died issueless. It was also pleaded on behalf of the defendant that the defendant No. 2 has been in occupation as a tenant at the rate of Rs. 150/- per year. There was some dispute about the payment of rent between defendant no. 2 and the original owner of the property, Mueed Khan that had led defendant no. 2 to deposit rent in Court. 8. After exchange of pleadings, issues were struck between parties in Hindi that were rendered into English by the Lower Appellate Court. The issues, six in number, and in the manner rendered into English by the lower Court, read as follows: 1. Whether Abdul Mueed Khan was the owner and in possession of the property in dispute? 2. Whether Abdul Mueed Khan had executed a will on 26.10.79 of the disputed property in favour of Farhat Khan? 3. Whether Usman Khan was the owner of the property in dispute? 4. Whether the sale deed dated 21.09.82 executed by Usman Khan in favour of defendant no. 1 is illegtal and void? 5. Whether the suit has wrongly been valued and the court fees paid is insufficient? 6. To what relief, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled? 9. Learned counsel for the appellant does not dispute the correctness of the English rendition of the issues done by the Lower Appellate Court. 1 is illegtal and void? 5. Whether the suit has wrongly been valued and the court fees paid is insufficient? 6. To what relief, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled? 9. Learned counsel for the appellant does not dispute the correctness of the English rendition of the issues done by the Lower Appellate Court. The parties led evidence, both documentary and oral, where four witnesses were examined on behalf of the plaintiffs and one on behalf of the defendant. 10. A reading of the judgment of the Lower Appellate Court shows that the will was proved by examining both marginal witnesses. The will was accepted to be proved on the evidence of PW-3, Buniyad Ali, who successfully established, in the opinion of the Courts below, for a fact that he had seen the testator's sign the will and himself had signed in the presence of the testator, who had seen him sign. The Lower Appellate Court concurring with the Trial Court appears to have found the will to be a plausible disposition by the testator, who has been held to be a literate person. He has also been found to be one who could understand the consequences of his actions and his best interest. The Lower Appellate Court on a reasonable view of the evidence, has excluded practice of any fraud, cheating or deception, to secure execution of the will on a plain paper, that was subsequently got signed. 11. Heard Sri J.S. Pandey, Advocate holding brief of Sri Tarun Varma, learned counsel for the appellant. No one appears on behalf of the respondents. 12. There cannot be much scope for this Court to interfere with consistent findings of fact recorded by the two Courts below about proof of the will in favour of Farhat Ali by Abdul Mueed Khan, the testator. Learned counsel for the appellant also does not canvass a case that those findings are wrong or can be re-evaluated in the present second appeal. 13. Learned Counsel for the appellant Sri Pandey, however, has emphatically submitted that the will dated 26.10.1979 propounded by Abdul Mueed Khan in favour of Farhat Ali Khan could not have been accepted by the Courts below, whatever they might have found for a fact regarding proof of the will, the logical nature of its disposition, exclusion of a case of fraud and deceit etc. He submits that the will could not have been acted upon or looked into by the Courts below because of the provisions of Section 213 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (for short, the Succession Act'). It is urged that Section 213 (supra) prohibit any Court of justice from accepting the right of any person as an executor or a legatee under a will, unless a Court of competent jurisdiction in India has granted probate of the will, under which the legatee claims. It is submitted here for a fact that no probate of the will dated 26.10.1979 was ever granted by a Court of competent jurisdiction, as mandated by Section 213 of the Succession Act. 14. This Court has considered the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant with reference to the substantial question of law No. 2, formulated in this appeal. For one, the issue that an unprobated will cannot be acted upon on behalf of a person who claims a right under it as a legatee, was not raised either before the Trial Court or before the Lower Appellate Court. It has been raised before this Court for the first time. As such, there is no factual foundation before this Court to act upon the plea, to the extent, that for a fact, it is not known whether probate was indeed secured or not. Assuming that a probate of the will in question was not secured, going by the practice in the State, the question is being determined on the basis of a premise that there was no probate of the will in question. The provisions of Section 213 of the Succession Act are being quoted in extenso: "213. Right as executor or legatee when established.— (1) No right as executor or legatee can be established in any Court of Justice, unless a Court of competent jurisdiction in 1[India] has granted probate of the Will under which the right is claimed, or has granted letters of administration with the Will or with a copy of an authenticated copy of the Will annexed. [(2) This section shall not apply in the case of Wills made by Muhammadans [or Indian Christians], or and shall only apply— (i) in the case of Will made by any Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina where such Wills are of classes specified in clauses (a) and (b) of section 57; and (ii) in the case of Wills made by any Parsi dying, after the commencement of the Indian Succession (Amendment) Act, 1962, where such Wills are made within the local limits of the ordinary civil jurisdiction of the High Courts at Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, and where such Wills are made outside those limits, in so far as they relate to immoveable property situated within those limits. 15. A bare reading of the provisions of sub-Section (2) of Section 213 shows that sub-Section (2) is a proviso to sub-Section (1) and clearly excepts wills made by Mohmandans and Indian Christians from the teeth of the mandatory requirement about obtaining probate of a will by a legatee, before he claims under it. Even if for a moment it were to be considered that there was some doubt about the constitutionality of this provision on ground that it excepts members of two particular religious communities from the operation of the rule in sub-Section (1) of Section 213, there is no basis to infer that kind of a discrimination, also. This is so because the view of the law regarding the requirement of a compulsory probate, as interpreted by their Lordships of the Supreme Court and this Court, would show that there is no requirement, even for a Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain, or for that matter, anyone to obtain probate of a will in Uttar Pradesh. In this regard, the decision of this Court in Dr. Sunil Kumar vs. Chaitanya Prakash and others, 2014 SCC OnLine All 15433: 2014 (10) ADJ 642 may be referred to with profit. Paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of the report in Dr. Sunil Kumar (supra) is relevant, where it has been held: 8. From the perusal of the aforementioned provisions, it is quite evident that a probate will not be required to be obtained by a Hindu in respect of a Will made regarding the immovable properties situate in Uttar Pradesh. The same view taken by this Court in the Case of Naubat Ram v. Gayatri Devi [1968 ALJ 69]. From the perusal of the aforementioned provisions, it is quite evident that a probate will not be required to be obtained by a Hindu in respect of a Will made regarding the immovable properties situate in Uttar Pradesh. The same view taken by this Court in the Case of Naubat Ram v. Gayatri Devi [1968 ALJ 69]. Here in the present case, the parties are Hindu and the property situate in the State of Uttar Pradesh, as such, section 57 read with section 213 of the Indian Succession Act is not at all application in the present case. 9. At this juncture, it is useful to refer the observations made by the Apex Court in the case of Clarence Pais v. Union of India [2001 (43) ALR 249 (SC).], which reads as follows: “The scope of section 213(1) of the Act is that it prohibits recognition of rights as an executor or legatee under a Will without production of a probate and sets down a rule of evidence and forms really a part of procedural requirement of the law of forum. Section 213(2) of the Act indicates that its applicability is limited to cases of persons mentioned therein. Certain aspects will have to be borne in mind to understand the exact scope of this section. The bar that is imposed by this section is only in respect of the establishment of the right as an executor or legatee and not in respect of the establishment of the right in any other capacity. The section does not prohibit the will being looked into for purpose's other than those mentioned in the section. The bar to the establishment of the right is only for its establishment in a Court of justice and not its being referred to in other proceedings before administrative or other Tribunal. The section is a bar to everyone claiming under a Will, whether as plaintiff or defendant, if no probate or Letters of Administration is granted. The effect of section 213(2) of the Act is that the requirement of probate or other representation mentioned in sub-section (1) for the purpose of establishing the right as an executor or legatee in a Court is made inapplicable in case of a will made by Muhammadans and in the case Of wills coming under section 57(c) of the Act. The effect of section 213(2) of the Act is that the requirement of probate or other representation mentioned in sub-section (1) for the purpose of establishing the right as an executor or legatee in a Court is made inapplicable in case of a will made by Muhammadans and in the case Of wills coming under section 57(c) of the Act. Section 57(c) of the Act applies to all Wills and codicils made by any Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain, on or after the first day of January, 1927 which does not relate to immovable property situate within the territory formerly subject to the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal or within the local limits of the ordinary civil jurisdiction of the High Courts of Judicature at Madras and Bombay, or in respect of property within those territories. No probate is necessary in the case of Wills by Muhammadans. Now by the Indian Succession [Amendment] Act, 1962, the section has been made applicable to Wills made by Parsi dying after the commencement of the 1962 Act. A combined reading of sections 213 and 57 of the Act would show that where the parties to the Will are Hindus or the properties in dispute are not in territories falling under section 57(a) and (b), sub-section (2) of section 213 of the Act applies and sub-section (1) has no application. As a consequence, a probate will not be required to be obtained by a Hindu in respect of a will made outside those territories or regarding the immovable properties situate outside those territories. The result is that the contention put forth on behalf of the Petitioners that section 213(1) of the Act is applicable only to Christians and not to any other religion is not correct.” 10. Learned Counsel for the revisionist has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of T. Venkata Narayana v. Smt. Venkata Sub-bamma (dead) [ (1995) 5 SCC 691 : 1996 (28) A.I.R. 70 (SC).]. The authority cited by the learned Counsel for the revisionist is not at all applicable in the present case. In the said case the Apex Court has not considered the implication of section 57 read with section 213 of the Indian Succession Act. The authority cited by the learned Counsel for the revisionist is not at all applicable in the present case. In the said case the Apex Court has not considered the implication of section 57 read with section 213 of the Indian Succession Act. However, the Apex Court in his subsequent decision in the case of Clarence Pais v. Union of India (supra) has made it clear that a probate will not be required to be obtained by a Hindu in respect of a Will made with respect to the immovable properties situate in Uttar Pradesh. 16. The substantial questions of law raised is squarely answered against the appellant by the decision of this Court in Dr. Sunil Kumar (supra) following the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Clarence Pais v. Union of India, 2001 (4) SCC 325 , the relevant part of which has been quoted in Dr. Sunil Kumar (supra). The position that therefore emerges is that neither a Hindu or a Mohmandan and practically all classes of persons who have been mentioned in Section 213 of the Succession Act, read with Section 57, whomsoever are required to compulsorily obtain a probate of a will under which they claim as legatee, or to be the executor thereof, in respect of a bequest made for immovable properties situate in Uttar Pradesh. Substantial question of law No. 2 pressed on behalf of the appellant is, accordingly, answered in the negative. 17. The other substantial question of law that has been pressed by Sri Pandey on behalf of the appellants is substantial question of law No. 3, hereinabove extracted. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the will cannot be regarded as proved going by the findings recorded by the Courts below, as those Courts being Courts of fact, were under an obligation to call an expert to determine the genuineness of the signatures of the testator on the will, once the bequest was disputed by the defendant. The submission of Sri Pandey, in particular, is that there was a specific case pleaded in paragraph 3 of the written statement that the will propounded by the plaintiffs dated 26.10.1979, was absolutely a forged and bogus document. He submits that in the face of such a plea, it was imperative for the Courts below to have called in aid an expert to determine the genuineness of the testator’s signatures. He submits that in the face of such a plea, it was imperative for the Courts below to have called in aid an expert to determine the genuineness of the testator’s signatures. He has criticized the approach of the Trial Court, in going about doing a comparison of the admitted and the disputed signatures of the testator, by comparing the two specimens itself and holding that the signatures of the testator on the bequest were genuine. 18. This Court has considered the aforesaid submission keenly. It is true for a fact that the Trial Court has gone about the exercise of doing a comparison of the admitted and the disputed signatures of the testator on the will, comparing them with certain admitted signatures, the specimen of which were available on certain documents, which are marked as Exhibits 5 to 7. The Trial Court on doing a comparison of the admitted and the disputed signatures has recorded a finding that the two signatures are attributable to one and the same person. In this regard, the Trial Court has recorded the following finding (in Hindi vernacular): bl vfHkys[k ij vCnqy eqbZn [kka ds ys[k esa fy[ks x;s dqN fufoZokni= ÁLrqr fd;s x;sA oknh ds }kjk ÁLrqr i=] Án'kZ&5 ls 7 gSA bu i=ksa ij vCnqy eqbZn [kka dk ys[k rFkk gLrk{kj Áfrokfnuh la0 ds lk{kh Mh0 MCyw0 2 lqukmYykg [kka us Hkh Lohdkj fd;kA vCnqy eqbZn [kka ds bu ij miyC/k gLrk{kj bPNki= ij miyC/k gLrk{kjksa ls iw.kZ jis.k feyrs gSA blh Ádkj Áfrokfnuh la0 ds }kjk ÁLrqr i= Án'kZ d&2 ls d&5 ij miyC/k vCnqy eqbZn [kka ds gLrk{kj bPNki= ij miyC/k gLrk{kjksa ls iq.kZ jis.k [kkrsa gS 19. Now, whether the Trial Court could do this by a comparison of the admitted signatures with those disputed, without the aid of an expert, is the moot question. In this regard, the provisions of Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act are very relevant. These are quoted infra: 73. Now, whether the Trial Court could do this by a comparison of the admitted signatures with those disputed, without the aid of an expert, is the moot question. In this regard, the provisions of Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act are very relevant. These are quoted infra: 73. Comparison of signature, writing or seal with others admitted or proved.—In order to ascertain whether a signature, writing or seal is that of the person by whom it purports to have been written or made, any signature, writing, or seal admitted or proved to the satisfaction of the Court to have been written or made by that person may be compared with the one which is to be proved, although that signature, writing, or seal has not been produced or proved for any other purpose. The Court may direct any person present in Court to write any words or figures for the purpose of enabling the Court to compare the words or figures so written with any words or figures alleged to have been written by such person. [This Section applies also, with any necessary modification, to finger impressions.] (Ins. By Act 5 of 1899, sec. 3.) 20. In support of his contention learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon a decision of the Gauhati High Court in Shyam Sundar Chowkhani alias Chandan & others vs. Kajalkanti Biswas, AIR 1999 Gau 101 , where it has been held: “14. Since the science of identification of handwriting by comparison is not an infallable one, prudence demands that before acting on such opinion, the Court should be fully satisfied about the authorship of the admitted writing which is made the sole basis for comparison and the Courts should also be fully satisfied about the competence and credibility of the handwriting Expert. When there are conflicting opinions, it is necessary to exercise extra care and caution in evaluating their opinions before accepting the same. In no case can the Court base its finding solely on the opinion of the Handwriting Expert. It however does not mean that even if there exists numerous shrieking similarities and mannerism which tend down to identify the writer, the Court will not act on the Expert's evidence. It all depends on the character of the evidence of the Expert and the facts and circumstances of each case. It however does not mean that even if there exists numerous shrieking similarities and mannerism which tend down to identify the writer, the Court will not act on the Expert's evidence. It all depends on the character of the evidence of the Expert and the facts and circumstances of each case. The ordinary method of proving handwriting are:— (i) By calling as a witness a person who wrote the document or saw it written or with qualified expert opinion as to the hand writing by virtue of Section 47 of the Evidence Act. (ii) By the admission of the person against whom the document is tendered. (iii) By comparison of handwriting as provided in section 73 of the Evidence Act. It should also be borne in mind that only where other evidence is not available and the handwriting has not been proved by independent witness to be the handwriting of a particular person that it is necessary to have recourse to the provisions of section 73 of the Evidence Act. The two paragraphs of section 73 are not mutually exclusive. They are complementary to each other, section 73 is, therefore, to be read as a whole in the light of section 45 of the Evidence Act. (See (1979) 2 SCC 158 : AIR 1979 SC 14 ). Section 73 read as a whole in the light of section 45 and section 47 of the Evidence Act makes it clear that the Court does not exceed its power under section 73 of the Evidence Act if in the interest of justice, it directs a person appearing before it whether it is Civil or Criminal Court to give a sample writing to enable the same to be compared by Hand Writing Expert because even in adopting such course the purpose is to enable the Court to compare the disputed writing with the admitted writing and to reach its own conclusion with assistance of the Expert. 16. First let us take up the legality of the finding arrived at by the Court regarding genuineness of the signatures of the plaintiffs in Exhibit K.A. In order to decide it again we must go back to section 73 of the Evidence Act. 16. First let us take up the legality of the finding arrived at by the Court regarding genuineness of the signatures of the plaintiffs in Exhibit K.A. In order to decide it again we must go back to section 73 of the Evidence Act. Although Section 73 empowers the Court to compare the disputed writing with the specimen/admitted writing shown to be genuine, prudence demands that the Court should be extremely slow in venturing an opinion on the basis of comparison, more so, when the quality of evidence in respect of specimen/admitted writing, is not of high standard (See (1992) 3 SCC 700 : AIR 1992 SC 2100 ). Of course that case before the Apex Court was a criminal case. As pointed out by Privy Council in 3 Indian Appeals 154 -A comparison of a hand writing by the Court with the other document not challenged as fabricated upon its own initiative and without guidance of an expert and even that it is at all times hazardous and recognizably inconclusive. It is unsafe to arrive at a decision in a case where there is a conflict of testimony between the parties as to the general character of a signature on the correct determination of the genuineness of the signature by mere comparison with the admitted signatures specially without the and in evidence of microscopic enlargement or any expert's evidence (See AIR 1928 Privy Council 277). further a signature made for the occasion post-litem-motam merely for the use at the trial ought not to be taken as a standard, as it is likely to be simulated. It may however, be compared with any genuine writing for all, that is, worth. The criteria of comparison of signature can not be a safe guide and surely can not be the sole guide. But that is, what has been done by the learned judge in this particular case. The learned Judge did not discus any other evidence on this point and based solely on his own comparison, he came to the finding that the signatures in Exhibit KA are not the signatures of the plaintiffs………………….” 21. In the present case none of the parties produced any expert in support of their plea, particularly the defendant, who urged that the bequest was a forged document and the signatures thereon were not those of the testator. In the present case none of the parties produced any expert in support of their plea, particularly the defendant, who urged that the bequest was a forged document and the signatures thereon were not those of the testator. It was her burden to have examined an expert, and may be thereafter, the plaintiff would also have to examine an expert. To whatever end the experts would have opined, the Court would then avail the benefit of two expert reports before it while forming its opinion whether the signatures on the will were genuine or not. In the absence of any side, particularly the defendant examining an expert, it was always open to the Court to have done a comparison of its own, between the disputed signatures and those admitted, and recorded its own conclusions as it has done. 22. The scope, authority and duty of the Court’s power to do a comparison of the disputed signature/ handwriting with that admitted fell for consideration of the Supreme Court in Murari Lal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1980) 1 SCC 704 , where it was held: “12. The argument that the court should not venture to compare writings itself, as it would thereby assume to itself the role of an expert is entirely without force. Section 73 of the Evidence Act expressly enables the court to compare disputed writings with admitted or proved writings to ascertain whether a writing is that of the person by whom it purports to have been written. If it is hazardous to do so, as sometimes said, we are afraid it is one of the hazards to which Judge and litigant must expose themselves whenever it becomes necessary. There may be cases where both sides call experts and two [ Vide Correction slip No. F. 3/79 (Ed.J) dt. 21-8-80] voices of science are heard. There may be cases where neither side calls an expert, being ill able to afford him. In all such cases, it becomes the plain duty of the court to compare the writings and come to its own conclusion. The duty cannot be avoided by recourse to the statement that the court is no expert. Where there are expert opinions, they will aid the court. Where there is none, the court will have to seek guidance from some authoritative textbook and the court's own experience and knowledge. The duty cannot be avoided by recourse to the statement that the court is no expert. Where there are expert opinions, they will aid the court. Where there is none, the court will have to seek guidance from some authoritative textbook and the court's own experience and knowledge. But discharge it must, its plain duty, with or without expert, with or without other evidence. We may mention that Shashi Kumar v. Subodh Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 529 , and Fakhruddin v. State of M.P. [ AIR 1967 SC 1326 : 1967 Cri LJ 1197] were cases where the Court itself compared the writings.” 23. In this regard, a decision of this Court in Satya Prakash Pandey and others vs. Dev Brat Mishra, 2011 (3) ADJ : 2011 SCC OnLine All 202 may be referred to. In Satya Prakash Pandey and others (supra) it has been held in paragraph 16, 17 and 18 of the report: “16. The second reason given in the impugned order for entertaining and deciding a review application is that the view expressed by the earlier Presiding Officer on the genuineness of the signatures appearing on the compromise 64 Ka was erroneous. Admittedly in the present case neither of the parties have applied or furnished any report of an expert on the disputed signatures. The court in the absence of any such report has the jurisdiction to peruse the signatures and come to a prima facie finding with respect to its genuineness on comparison. Moreover the opinion of the expert is merely an opinion which generally requires corroboration. The court can decide whether the expert opinion requires corroboration at all. The expert report can be accepted only if the court is satisfied by comparing the admitted signature with the disputed signature and then come to its own conclusion. Hence when an expert report is available on record of a case it is still the conclusion of the court that either accepts it or rejects it. The court in any event has to take the final decision. Therefore, in a case where there is no expert report on record the court has to even then give its conclusion on the dispute and that can be done by the court upon bare perusal of the two signatures. 17. The court in any event has to take the final decision. Therefore, in a case where there is no expert report on record the court has to even then give its conclusion on the dispute and that can be done by the court upon bare perusal of the two signatures. 17. The Supreme Court in Murari Lal (supra) held that by comparing the writing itself the court could not assume the rule (sic) in of an expert. Section 73 of the Evidence Act enables the court to compare the disputed writing with admitted or proved writing to ascertain whether the writing is of that person. The opinion of the expert is an aid to the court, but where there is no such report the court will have to seek guidance from the authoritative text book and the court's own experience and knowledge. It was held that duty is to be discharged by the court with or without expert and with or without other evidence. 18. Admittedly in the present case neither of the parties have produced or applied for report of a handwriting and fingerprint expert. The Court never refused to admit an expert opinion. In such circumstances the court was within its jurisdiction to form an opinion by comparison of the disputed and admitted signatures. That is what has been done by the court in the judgment under review. The impugned order is an order passed on a review application and such was not a ground under Order XLVII Rule 1 Code of Civil Procedure to hold that an error apparent on the face of record has been committed in comparison of the signature by the earlier Presiding Officer, and hence it can be reviewed.” 24. The present case is clearly one where the Court did not refuse to admit in evidence any expert opinion produced by the parties. But, shorn on any expert assistance, the Court was competent to go into the question by doing a comparison going by the clear legislative edict to that effect, carried in Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act. This view has the approval of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Murari Lal vs. State of M.P., AIR 1980 SC 531 , which has been referred to in Satya Prakash Pandey and others (supra). This view has the approval of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Murari Lal vs. State of M.P., AIR 1980 SC 531 , which has been referred to in Satya Prakash Pandey and others (supra). It is not a case where the Court took upon itself the role of an expert, where it had guidance. It is a case where the Court discharged its duty in accordance with Section 73 where there was no expert evidence led by parties to its aid, in deciding upon the dispute regarding genuineness of the signatures, that was raised by the defendants. 25. In this view of the matter, substantial question No. 3 is answered in the manner that in the absence of an expert report being filed by either party, it is not only open to a Court but its duty to do a comparison of the admitted and disputed signatures and record its own findings. In view of the answers to substantial questions of law nos. 2 and 3, which alone were pressed, this court does not find any merit in this appeal. 26. This appeal fails and is dismissed. However, costs will go easy looking to the fact that the respondents have not appeared at the hearing. 27. Let a decree be drawn up, accordingly.