JUDGMENT : The present writ petition has been filed seeking the following reliefs:- “That this is an application for issuance of appropriate writ/writs, direction/directions commanding the respondents particularly the respondent no. 4 to hand over the delivery of possession to the petitioner of the land in question which he got through the Bihar Bhodan Yagna Committee having area of 15 kattas of land and for the direction to the respondent no. 4 to act according to his earlier order vide letter bearing no. 640 dated 10.07.2018 whereby he has to allot the land in question having area 15 kattas of land to the petitioner and or issuance of consequential writ restraining the respondent no. 2 and 4 not to handover the land in question for construction of hostel on the land in question till the disposal of the present writ application and or issuance of any other writ, under the facts and circumstances of the case.” 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that 15 kathas of land, appertaining to Mauja-Bauram, Thana No. 413, Tawzi No. 6424, Khata No. 415, Plot No. 451/2 was settled in favor of the original writ petitioner by the Bihar Bhodan Yagna Committee on 25.01.1956, as would be apparent from Annexure-1 to the writ petition. It is submitted that the Bihar Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1954 governs the law pertaining to the case in hand and in this connection, the learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to Sections 11 and 14 thereof, which are reproduced herein below:- “Section 11 -Publication of, and investigation upon the, Yagna Danpatra-[(1) On receipt of the Bhoodan Yagna Danpatra the Revenue Officer shall cause the same to be published in the prescribed manner inviting written objections thereto within a period of thirty days from the date of publication. (2) If no written objection is filed within the period mentioned in subsection (1), the Revenue Officer shall make a summary inquiry in the prescribed manner as to the right, title and interest of the donor in such land and his competency to make a gift. (2) If no written objection is filed within the period mentioned in subsection (1), the Revenue Officer shall make a summary inquiry in the prescribed manner as to the right, title and interest of the donor in such land and his competency to make a gift. (3) If any written objection is filed within the period mentioned in subsection (1), the Revenue Officer shall register such objection and fix a date for hearing of which a public notice shall be given in the prescribed manner and a copy of such notice shall be served on the donor and the objector by registered post with acknowledgment due and on the date so fixed, the Revenue Officer shall hear the donor and the objector. (4) After holding the summary enquiry under sub-section (1) or after hearing the donor and the objector under sub-section (3), as the case may be, the Revenue Officer may supersede the Bhoodan Yagna Danpatra in whole or in part on any of the following grounds, namely:- (i) that the donor is incompetent to make a gift; (ii) that the title of the donor is defective; (iii) that the donor is not a person entitled to donate the land under the provisions of Section 10 or Section 12. (5) If the Bhoodan Yagna Danpatra is not superseded in whole or in part under sub-section (4), the Revenue Officer shall confirm it in whole and if it is superseded in part, he shall confirm it in respect of the part which is not superseded.] (6) The donation of the land in respect of which the Bhoodan Yagna Danpatra is superseded shall be cancelled and the right, title and interest of any person in such land before the date of the Yagna Danpatra shall not be affected in any manner.] (7) The Revenue Officer shall, in the hearing and disposal of objections under this section, have the powers of a civil court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), in respect of the following matters, namely:- (a) summoning and enforcing attendance of witnesses and examining them on oath; (b) requiring the discovery and production of any document; (c) reception of evidence on affidavits; (d) requisitioning any public record from any Court or Office; (e) issuing commission for examination of witnesses: and such proceeding before the Revenue Officer shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228 and for the purposes of Section 195 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860). (8) The Collector may at any time transfer a petition filed under subsection (2) any other Revenue Officer, within his jurisdiction, for disposal.] Section 14 -Grant of land to landless persons:-(1) The Committee or such other authority or person, as the Committee may specify, either generally or in respect of any local area, in the prescribed manner may, [subject to sub-section (2)] grant lands which have vested in the Committee to landless persons [or to a village community, Gram Panchayat, or a Co-operative Society] organised by the Committee] and the grantee of the land shall acquire the same right, title and interest as the donor had in such land: Provided that- (i) in case the donor's interest in such land was that of proprietor or tenure-holder as defined in the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 (Bihar Act XXX of 1950), the grantee's right, title and interest shall be that of an occupancy raiyat liable to pay rent to the State Government; (ii) in case the estate or tenure, as the case may be in which such land is situated has vested in the State under the said Act, the right, title and interest of the grantee shall also be subject to the provisions of that Act; and (iii) in case such land has vested in the Committee under section 12, the right, title and interest of the grantee shall be that of an occupancy raiyat liable to pay rent to the State Government: Provided further that- (i) [grantee, his heirs, assigns or successor-in-interest shall not be competent to sublet or transfer the land or any portion thereof by sale, gift or otherwise, but shall be competent to transfer the same by exchange with the previous permission of the Committee in writing; and (ii) the rights of the grantee over such land shall be subject to such other restrictions and conditions as may be prescribed [by the Committee]. [Provided also that the grantee, his heirs, assignee, or successors-in-interest may enter into a simple mortgage for raising loan for agricultural purposes in respect of the land with a bank or society registered or deemed to be registered under the Bihar and Orissa Cooperative Societies Act, 1935 (Bihar and Orissa Act VI of 1935) or with the State Bank of India or a bank specified in column 2 of the First Schedule to the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970 (Act V of 1970) or with a company or a corporation owned by or in which not less than fifty-one percent of the share capital is held by the State Government or the Central Government or partly by the State Government and partly by the Central Government and which has been set up for raising loan for agricultural purposes]. (2) All grants shall be made as far as may be in accordance with the scheme of Bhoodan Yagna as may be prescribed; [Provided that in making grants of waste lands in the district of Santhal Parganas which have vested in the Committee, the principle prescribed for settlement of waste lands under section 28 of the Santhal Parganas Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 1949 (Bihar Act XIV of 1949), shall be followed]. (3) For the purpose of grant of lands under this section, the Committee may, by regulations, fix after taking into consideration the quality of lands, the maximum and minimum areas to be granted to a landless person [or to a village community, Gram Panchayat or a Co-operative Society organised by the Committee] and different areas may be fixed for different districts, sub-divisions or thanes. Explanation.--For the purposes of this section, "occupancy raiyat", means a raiyat having a right of occupancy in the land held by him [within the meaning of the tenancy law of the area in which it is situated].” 3. It is thus submitted by the Ld. Counsel for the petitioner that as per the aforesaid provisions of the Bihar Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1954, the grantee of the land donated by means of Yagna Danpatra acquires the same right, title and interest as the donor had in such land, therefore, the original writ petitioner had become undisputed owner of the aforesaid land in question and had also been paying the rent to the State Government and receiving the land revenue receipts. It is further submitted that even the Circle Officer, Gauda Bauram, Darbhanga by letter dated 10.7.2018 has confirmed the right, title and ownership of the original writ petitioner with regard to the aforesaid land in question i.e. Mauja-Bauram, Thana No. 413, Old Khata No. 415 and Old Khesra No. 451, admeasuring 35 decimal, which has subsequently been changed into new Khata No. 1419 and new Khesra No. 1056 as also 9 decimal of land pertaining to Khata No. 415 and Khesra No. 451, which has been subsequently renumbered as 1055/6181(new). It is further submitted that as far as 9 decimal of land is concerned, appertaining to Khesra No. 1055 (new), there is no dispute, however, a dispute is being created by the Respondents-State with respect to Khesra No. 1056(new) and the Respondent No. 4 i.e. the Circle Officer Gauda Bauram, Darbhanga has issued a no objection certificate, treating the said land to be in the name of Anavad Bihar Sarkar, for construction of the hostel in question, whereafter the construction work has also started. It is further submitted that the original writ petitioner is the rightful owner of not only Khesra No. 1056 (new), but also Khesra No. 1069 (new), though the Respondent authorities have stated that the original writ petitioner has got claim only on Khesra No. 1069 (new). It is thus submitted that the respondents-State as also the Respondent No. 5 herein should be precluded from encroaching the aforesaid land of the original writ petitioner herein. 4. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the Respondents-State has submitted that though the original writ petitioner is claiming 45 decimals of land, but actually, he is having right, title and interest only over 35 decimal of land. It is further submitted that the land in question, appertaining to Khata No. 1419, Khesra No. 1056, admeasuring an area of 35 decimal has been recorded in revisional survey khatiyan in the name of Anavad Bihar Sarkar and the nature of the land is Purani Parti, as would be apparent from Annexure-B to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Respondents No. 2 and 4. It is further submitted that on the said Government land, construction of 50 bedded hostel for minority welfare at Bauram, Block-Gaura Bauram, District-Darbhanga is being carried out and that too after proper demarcation process was undertaken by the Circle Officer, Gaurabauram, Darbhanga along with his officials / staffs, as would be apparent from the letters of the various officials annexed as Annexure-C series to the counter affidavit. It is further submitted as per the old Khata No. 415, Khesra No. 451 and as per the entry made in the R.S. Khatiyan, the petitioner and the Respondent No. 5 had got their respective shares / portion, appertaining to Khata No. 418, Khesra No. 1069 (new), admeasuring an area of 65 decimal and with regard to the same, on account of dispute in between the original writ petitioner and the Respondent No. 5, they have been approaching the appropriate authorities by making various complaints on various occassions. It is further submitted that as far as Khata No. 418, Khesra No. 1069, admeasuring 65 decimal of land is concerned, a case was instituted before the Land Reforms Deputy Collector bearing Case No. 54 of 2018-19 (Abdul Aziz vs. Feku Mukhiya) and the final order was passed therein on 21.12.2019 (Annexure-D to the counter affidavit) whereby and whereunder on account of the disputed question of facts pertaining to title, the parties to the said case were directed to approach the civil court. It is pertinent to mention here that the original writ petitioner was also a party to the said case and the dispute in question was pertaining to Khesra No. 1069 (new). In fact, the original writ petitioner had also filed a written statement before the leaned D.C.L.R. in the aforesaid case, which is at internal page no. 51 of the counter affidavit and in paragraph no. 9 of the said written statement, the original writ petitioner had stated that he is in possession of Khata No. 418, Khesra No. 1069. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the Respondents-State that a title suit bearing T.S. No. 17 of 2020 is also pending consideration before the learned court of Sub-Judge, Biraul and the present substituted petitioners no. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the Respondents-State that a title suit bearing T.S. No. 17 of 2020 is also pending consideration before the learned court of Sub-Judge, Biraul and the present substituted petitioners no. 2, 5 and 6 are defendants to the said suit, hence, a bona fide dispute is pending adjudication before the learned court below, thus, it is clear that the present case involves disputed question of facts, hence, it would be appropriate for the petitioner to approach the competent court having civil jurisdiction. In nutshell, it is the submission of the learned counsel for the Respondents-State that it is crystal clear from the records that though the petitioner has bonafide claim, appertaining to Khata No. 418, Khesra No. 1069, however, he has changed his stand subsequently and has begun laying claim on the land appertaining to Khata No. 1419, Khesra No. 1056 recorded in the R.S. Khatiyan in the name of Anavad Bihar Sarkar, hence, the petitioner has got no right, title or interest over Khata No. 1419, Khesra No. 1056. 5. The learned counsel for the Bihar Bhodan Yagna Committee, Ms. Alka Verma, has supported the case of the petitioner and has submitted that the letter of the Circle Officer, Gaurabauram, Darbhanga dated 10.7.2018 is very clear and has laid bare the actual position existing on facts and therefore, the original writ petitioner is not only possessing the right, title and ownership of Khesra No. 1069, but also over Khesra No. 1056. 6. The learned counsels for the interveners have supported the submissions made by the learned counsel for the State. 7. At this juncture, the learned counsel for petitioner, in reply, has submitted that mutation of both the plots, appertaining to Khesra Nos. 1056 and 1069 has already been carried out in favour of the original writ petitioner, as is apparent from the order of mutation dated 03.07.2018. 8. At this juncture, the learned counsel for the Respondents-State has submitted that it is a well-settled law that an order of mutation does not confer any legal title, however, the fact remains that the petitioner has failed to refute the relevant portion of the revisional survey khatiyan, brought on record in this case by way of Annexure-B to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Respondent Nos. 2 and 4 to show that Khata No. 1419, Khesra No. 1056, admeasuring area of 35 decimal has been recorded in the revisional survey khatiyan in the name of Anavad Bihar Sarkar and the nature of land is Purani Parti. It is further submitted that the disputed question of facts cannot be adjudicated in a writ petition, hence, it would be appropriate for the petitioner to approach a competent court having appropriate civil jurisdiction. 9. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials on record. 10. It is apparent from the records that the original writ petitioner was granted/allotted 15 kathas of land by the Bihar Bhodan Yagna Committee on 25.1.1956, he being a landless person and had become owner of the said land in question by virtue of the force of Section 14 of the Bihar Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1954. It appears that the original writ petitioner had come in possession of land appertaining to old Khata No. 415, Khesra No. 451, Mauja-Bauram, Thana No. 413, however subsequently, when the same was renumbered, the said khata and khesra number changed to Khata No. 1419 (new) and Khesra No. 1056 (new), as is being claimed by the petitioner herein. The petitioner also claims to be owner of the land, appertaining to Khesra No. 1069. However, the Respondents –State, on the contrary has produced the relevant extract of the R.S. Khatiyan (Annexure-B to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Respondents No. 2 and 4) where the new Khesra No. 1056 has been shown to be Anavad Bihar Sarkar land and its nature has been shown to be Purani Parti. In fact, the respondents-State has also come out with a case that the said new Khesra No. 1056 is a Government land whereas the land of the petitioner is situated at new Khesra No. 1069. It is further noted that the original writ petitioner has regularly been claiming ownership over plot appertaining to new Khesra No. 1069, as is apparent from the written statement filed by him in the proceedings before the learned D.C.L.R., Biraul, Darbhanga in Case No. 54 of 2018-19. In fact, a title suit bearing Title Suit No. 17 of 2020 is pending adjudication before the Ld. Court of Sub-Judge, Biraul. In fact, a title suit bearing Title Suit No. 17 of 2020 is pending adjudication before the Ld. Court of Sub-Judge, Biraul. Thus, this Court is of the view that though it is true that the petitioner was granted land by the Bihar Bhodan Yagna Committee, appertaining to Khata No. 415 (old) and Khesra No. 451 (old), however, there seems to be a dispute with regard to the new khata and khesra number inasmuch as though the petitioner is claiming his ownership over both new Khesra No. 1069 and new Khesra No. 1056, however, the respondent-State has been able to demonstrate that in the R.S. Khatiyan, the new Khesra No. 1056 has been depicted as a Government land and the name of the original writ petitioner is nowhere to be found, as per the records. Hence, this Court is of the opinion that a bonafide dispute with regard to right, title and possession of the land in question, appertaining to Mauja-Bauram, Thana No. 413, Katha No. 1419(new), Khesra No. 1056(new) has arisen and such disputed question of facts cannot be decided in a writ Jurisdiction. 11. At this juncture, it would be apt to refer to a judgment rendered by the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Shri Sohan Lal vs. Union of India & Another, reported in AIR 1957 SC 529 , paragraph no. 5 to 8 are reproduced herein below:- “5. We do not propose to enquire into the merits of the rival claims of title to the property in dispute set up by the appellant and Jagan Nath. If we were to do so, we would be entering into a field of investigation which is more appropriate for a Civil Court in a properly constituted suit to do rather than for a Court exercising the prerogative of issuing writs. These are questions of fact and law which are in dispute requiring determination before the respective claims of the parties to this appeal can be decided. Before the property in dispute can be restored to Jagan Nath it will be necessary to declare that he had title in that property and was entitled to recover possession of it. This would in effect amount to passing a decree in his favour. Before the property in dispute can be restored to Jagan Nath it will be necessary to declare that he had title in that property and was entitled to recover possession of it. This would in effect amount to passing a decree in his favour. In the circumstances to be mentioned hereafter, it is a matter for serious consideration whether in proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution such a declaration ought to be made and restoration of the property to Jagan Nath be ordered. 6. Jagan Nath had entered into a transaction with the Union of India upto a certain stage with respect to the property in dispute, but no letter of allotment had been issued to him. Indeed, he had been informed, when certain facts became known, that the property in question could not be allotted to him as he was a displaced person who had been allotted land in East Punjab. As between Jagan Nath and the Union of India it will be necessary to decide what rights were acquired by the former in the property upto the stage when the latter informed Jagan Nath that the property would not be allotted to him. Another question for decision will be whether Jagan Nath was allowed to enter into possession of the property because it was allotted to him or under a misapprehension as the Union of India was misled by the contents of his application. The case of the Union of India is that under the scheme Jagan Nath was not eligible for allotment of a house in West Patel Nagar, as it was subsequently discovered that he had been allotted, previous to his application, agricultural land in the District of Hissar. Being satisfied that Jagan Nath was not eligible for allotment, the Union of India refused to allot to him the tenement No. 35, West Patel Nagar and allotment of that house was made to the appellant who was found to be eligible in every way. The appellant was accordingly given possession of the property after Jagan Nath's eviction. The appellant had complied with all the conditions imposed by the Union of India and a letter of allotment was actually issued to him and he entered into possession of the property in dispute under the authority of the Union of India. Did the appellant thereby acquire a legal right to hold the property as against Jagan Nath? The appellant had complied with all the conditions imposed by the Union of India and a letter of allotment was actually issued to him and he entered into possession of the property in dispute under the authority of the Union of India. Did the appellant thereby acquire a legal right to hold the property as against Jagan Nath? In our opinion, all these questions should be decided in a properly constituted suit in a Civil Court rather than in proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 7. The eviction of Jagan Nath was in contravention of the express provisions of S. 3 of the Public Premises (Eviction) Act. His eviction, therefore, was illegal. He was entitled to be evicted in due course of law and a writ of mandamus could issue to or an order in the nature of mandamus could be made against the Union of India to restore possession of the property to Jagan Nath from which he had been evicted if the property was still in possession of the Union of India. The property in dispute, however, is in possession of the appellant. There is no evidence, and no finding of the High Court that the appellant was in collusion with the Union of India or that he had knowledge that the eviction of Jagan Nath was illegal. Normally, a writ of mandamus does not issue to or an order in the nature of mandamus is not made against a private individual. Such an order is made against a person directing him to do some particular thing specified in the order, which appertains to his office and is in the nature of a public duty (Halsbury's Laws of' England Vol. 11, Lord Simonds Edition, p. 84). If it had been proved that the Union of India and the appellant had colluded, and the transaction between them was merely colourable, entered into with a view to deprive Jagan Nath on his rights, jurisdiction to issue a writ to or make an order in the nature of mandamus against the appellant might be said to exist in a Court. We have not been able to find a direct authority to cover a case like the one before us but it would appear that so far as election to an office is concerned, a mandamus to restore, admit, or elect to an office will not be granted unless the office is vacant. If the office is in fact, full proceedings must be taken by way of injunction or election petition to oust the party in possession and that a mandamus will go only on the supposition that there is nobody holding office in question. In R. v. Chester Corporation 1855-25 LJQB 61(E), it was held that it was inflexible rule of law that where a person has been de facto elected to a corporate office, and has accepted and acted in the office, the validity of the election and the title to the office can only be tried by proceeding on a quo warranto information. A mandamus will not lie unless the election can be shown to be merely colourable. We cannot see why in principle there should be a distinction made between such a case and the case of a person, who has, apparently entered into bona fide possession of a property without knowledge that any person had been illegally evicted therefrom. 8. In our opinion, the High Court erred in allowing the application of Jagan Nath filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution and making the order it did. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the order of the High Court is set aside. In, the circumstance of the present case, however, we are of the opinion that each party should bear his own costs in this Court and in the High court.” 12. It would be relevant to refer to yet another judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Punjab National Bank & Others vs. Atmanand Singh & Others, as recently held on 6.5.2020, reported in 2020 SCC Online SC 433, paragraph nos. 15 to 24 whereof are reproduced hereinbelow:- “15. The judgment of the learned single Judge has completely glossed over these crucial aspects and the writ petition has been disposed of in a very casual manner. The Division Bench of the High Court committed the same error in upholding the decision of the learned single Judge. 15 to 24 whereof are reproduced hereinbelow:- “15. The judgment of the learned single Judge has completely glossed over these crucial aspects and the writ petition has been disposed of in a very casual manner. The Division Bench of the High Court committed the same error in upholding the decision of the learned single Judge. The Division Bench has not even analysed the efficacy of the affidavits filed in support of the stand taken by the appellant-Bank during the pendency of the LPA. It merely reiterates the view taken by the learned single Judge in just two short paragraphs reproduced in paragraph 6 above. It has not analysed the efficacy of the proceedings in Misc. Case No. 4 (DW1) PNB/1989-90, as well as, the certified copy of the proceedings filed in appeal before it, in the context of affidavits of Bank officials and report of the District Magistrate. The Division Bench was also misled by the voluminous documents relied upon by the respondent No. 1 and assumed that the same could not be a figment of imagination or a piece of fiction. 16. Even if the impugned judgments were to be read as a whole, there is no analysis of the relevant documents and in particular, the stand taken by the appellant-Bank expressly denying the existence of the stated agreement and genuineness thereof, which plea was reinforced from the affidavits of the concerned Bank officials and the report of the District Magistrate. Notably, the District Magistrate in the affidavit filed in compliance of the order dated 18.3.2016 had clearly denied the existence of the stated proceedings for want of contemporaneous official record in that regard. This aspect has not been taken into account by the High Court at all. On facts, therefore, the High Court committed manifest error in disregarding the core jurisdictional issue that the matter on hand involved complex factual aspects, which could not be adjudicated in exercise of writ jurisdiction. 17. The appellant-Bank has rightly invited our attention to the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Thansingh Nathmal (supra). In paragraph 7, the Court dealt with the scope of jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in the following words:— “7. 17. The appellant-Bank has rightly invited our attention to the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Thansingh Nathmal (supra). In paragraph 7, the Court dealt with the scope of jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in the following words:— “7. … The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is couched in wide terms and the exercise thereof is not subject to any restrictions except the territorial restrictions which are expressly provided in the Articles. But the exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary: it is not exercised merely because it is lawful to do so. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it will ordinarily be exercised subject to certain self-imposed limitations. Resort that jurisdiction is not intended as an alternative remedy for relief which may be obtained in a suit or other mode prescribed by statute. Ordinarily the Court will not entertain a petition for a writ under Article 226, where the petitioner has an alternative remedy, which without being unduly onerous, provides an equally efficacious remedy. Again the High Court does not generally enter upon a determination of questions which demand an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce which the writ is claimed. The High Court does not therefore act as a court of appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal, to correct errors of fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction under Article 226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided by statute for obtaining relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal, or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute, the High Court normally will not permit by entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the machinery created under the statute to be bypassed, and will leave the party applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set up. (emphasis supplied) Similarly, another Constitution Bench decision in Suganmal (supra) dealt with the scope of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. In paragraph 6 of the said decision, the Court observed thus:— “6. (emphasis supplied) Similarly, another Constitution Bench decision in Suganmal (supra) dealt with the scope of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. In paragraph 6 of the said decision, the Court observed thus:— “6. On the first point, we are of opinion that though the High Courts have power to pass any appropriate order in the exercise of the powers conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution, such a petition solely praying for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the State to refund the money is not ordinarily maintainable for the simple reason that a claim for such a refund can always be made in a suit against the authority which had illegally collected the money as a tax. … We do not find any good reason to extend this principle and therefore hold that no petition for the issue of a writ of mandamus will be normally entertained for the purpose of merely ordering a refund of money to the return of which the petitioner claims a right.” (emphasis supplied) And again, in paragraph 9, the Court observed as follows:— “9. We therefore hold that normally petitions solely praying for the refund of money against the State by a writ of mandamus are not to be entertained. The aggrieved party has the right of going to the civil court for claiming the amount and it is open to the State to raise all possible defences to the claim, defences which cannot, in most cases, be appropriately raised and considered in the exercise of writ jurisdiction.” (emphasis supplied) In Smt. Gunwant Kaur (supra) relied upon by the respondent No. 1, in paragraph 14, the Court observed thus:— “14. The High Court observed that they will not determine disputed question of fact in a writ petition. But what facts were in dispute and what were admitted could only be determined after an affidavit in reply was filed by the State. The High Court, however, proceeded to dismiss the petition in limine. The High Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Article 226 merely because in considering the petitioner's right to relief questions of fact may fall to be determined. In a petition under Article 226 the High Court has jurisdiction to try issues both of fact and law. The High Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Article 226 merely because in considering the petitioner's right to relief questions of fact may fall to be determined. In a petition under Article 226 the High Court has jurisdiction to try issues both of fact and law. Exercise of the jurisdiction is, it is true, discretionary, but the discretion must be exercised on sound judicial principles. When the petition raises questions of fact of a complex nature, which may for their determination require oral evidence to be taken, and on that account the High Court is of the view that the dispute may not appropriately be tried in a writ petition, the High Court may decline to try a petition. Rejection of a petition in limine will normally be justified, where the High Court is of the view that the petition is frivolous or because of the nature of the claim made dispute sought to be agitated, or that the petition against the party against whom relief is claimed is not maintainable or that the dispute raised thereby is such that it would be inappropriate to try it in the writ jurisdiction, or for anologous reasons.” (emphasis supplied) We restate the above position that when the petition raises questions of fact of complex nature, such as in the present case, which may for their determination require oral and documentary evidence to be produced and proved by the concerned party and also because the relief sought is merely for ordering a refund of money, the High Court should be loath in entertaining such writ petition and instead must relegate the parties to remedy of a civil suit. Had it been a case where material facts referred to in the writ petition are admitted facts or indisputable facts, the High Court may be justified in examining the claim of the writ petitioner on its own merits in accordance with law. 18. In the next reported decision relied upon by the respondent No. 1 in Babubhai (supra), no doubt this Court opined that if need be, it would be open to the High Court to cross-examine the affiants. We may usefully refer to paragraph 10 of the said decision, which reads thus:— “10. 18. In the next reported decision relied upon by the respondent No. 1 in Babubhai (supra), no doubt this Court opined that if need be, it would be open to the High Court to cross-examine the affiants. We may usefully refer to paragraph 10 of the said decision, which reads thus:— “10. It is not necessary for this case to express an opinion on the point as to whether the various provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution. Section 141 of the Code, to which reference has been made, makes it clear that the provisions of the Code in regard to suits shall be followed in all proceedings in any court of civil jurisdiction as far as it can be made applicable. The words “as far as it can be made applicable” make it clear that, in applying the various provisions of the Code to proceedings other than those of a suit, the court must take into account the nature of those proceedings and the relief sought. The object of Article 226 is to provide a quick and inexpensive remedy to aggrieved parties. Power has consequently been vested in the High Courts to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any government, within the jurisdiction of the High Court, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari. It is plain that if the procedure of a suit had also to be adhered to in the case of writ petitions, the entire purpose of having a quick and inexpensive remedy would be defeated. A writ petition under Article 226, it needs to be emphasised, is essentially different from a suit and it would be incorrect to assimilate and incorporate the procedure of a suit into the proceedings of a petition under Article 226. The High Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Article 226 merely because in considering the petitioner's right of relief, questions of fact may fall to be determined. In a petition under Article 226 the High Court has jurisdiction to try issues both of fact and law. Exercise of the jurisdiction is no doubt discretionary, but the discretion must be exercised on sound judicial principles. In a petition under Article 226 the High Court has jurisdiction to try issues both of fact and law. Exercise of the jurisdiction is no doubt discretionary, but the discretion must be exercised on sound judicial principles. When the petition raises complex questions of fact, which may for their determination require oral evidence to be taken, and on that account the High Court is of the view that the dispute should not appropriately be tried in a writ petition, the High Court may decline to try a petition (see Gunwant Kaur v. Bhatinda Municipality [ (1969) 3 SCC 769 ]. If, however, on consideration of the nature of the controversy, the High Court decides, as in the present case, that it should go into a disputed question of fact and the discretion exercised by the High Court appears to be sound and in conformity with judicial principles, this Court would not interfere in appeal with the order made by the High Court in this respect.” (emphasis supplied) This decision has noticed Smt. Gunwant Kaur (supra), which had unmistakably held that when the petition raises complex questions of facts, the High Court may decline to try a petition. It is further observed that if on consideration of the nature of the controversy, the High Court decides to go into the disputed questions of fact, it would be free to do so on sound judicial principles. Despite the factual matrix in the present case, the High Court not only ventured to entertain the writ petition, but dealt with the same in a casual manner without adjudicating the disputed questions of fact by taking into account all aspects of the matter. The manner in which the Court disposed of the writ petition, by no stretch of imagination, can qualify the test of discretion having been exercised on sound judicial principles. 19. In Hyderabad Commercials (supra), on which reliance has been placed, it is clear from paragraph 4 of the said decision that the Bank had admitted its mistake and liability, but took a specious plea about the manner in which the transfer was effected. On that stand, the Court proceeded to grant relief to the appellant therein, the account holder. In the present case, however, the concerned officials of the Bank have denied of being party to the stated agreement and have expressly asserted that the said document is forged and fabricated. On that stand, the Court proceeded to grant relief to the appellant therein, the account holder. In the present case, however, the concerned officials of the Bank have denied of being party to the stated agreement and have expressly asserted that the said document is forged and fabricated. It is neither a case of admitted liability nor to proceed against the appellant Bank on the basis of indisputable facts. 20. Even the decision in ABL International Ltd. (supra) will be of no avail to the respondent No. 1. This decision has referred to all the earlier decisions and in paragraph 28, the Court observed as follows:— “28. However, while entertaining an objection as to the maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the court should bear in mind the fact that the power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provisions of the Constitution. The High Court having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. The Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions in the exercise of this power. (See Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks [ (1998) 8 SCC 1 ]) And this plenary right of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ will not normally be exercised by the Court to the exclusion of other available remedies unless such action of the State or its instrumentality is arbitrary and unreasonable so as to violate the constitutional mandate of Article 14 or for other valid and legitimate reasons, for which the Court thinks it necessary to exercise the said jurisdiction.” 21. For the view that we have taken, it is not necessary for us to dilate on the decisions of this Court in Bhinka (supra) and Kaliya (supra), which have dealt with the efficacy and admissibility of certified copies of the relevant documents. Be it noted that these decisions are in reference to the suit/trial in the concerned case, where the documents are required to be proved by the party relying upon it by examining competent witnesses to prove the existence thereof and also their contents. 22. Be it noted that these decisions are in reference to the suit/trial in the concerned case, where the documents are required to be proved by the party relying upon it by examining competent witnesses to prove the existence thereof and also their contents. 22. A priori, we have no hesitation in taking the view that in the facts of the present case, the High Court should have been loath to entertain the writ petition filed by the respondent No. 1 and should have relegated the respondent No. 1 to appropriate remedy for adjudication of all contentious issues between the parties. 23. Accordingly, we are inclined to allow this appeal. As a consequence, the impugned decisions of the learned single Judge and the Division Bench are set aside and the writ petition filed by the respondent No. 1 shall stand dismissed with liberty to respondent No. 1 to take recourse to other alternative remedy as may be permissible in law. The same be decided on its own merits in accordance with law uninfluenced by the observations on factual matters made in the impugned judgment and order of the High Court or for that matter, this judgment. In other words, all contentions available to both parties are left open including to proceed against respondent No. 1 as per law, if it is found by the concerned Court/forum that false and incorrect statement on oath has been made by the respondent No. 1 and that the documents produced by him are forged and fabricated documents. 24. In view of the above, this appeal succeeds. The impugned decisions are set aside and the writ petition filed by the respondent No. 1 being CWJC No. 867/1999 stands dismissed with liberty as aforesaid. There shall be no order as to costs. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.” 13. Reference be also held to a judgment reported in (1982) 2 SCC 134 (Government of Andhra Pradesh vs. Thummala Krishna Rao & Another), paragraph nos. 8 to 10 whereof are reproduced hereinbelow:- 8. It seems to us clear from these provisions that the summary remedy for eviction which is provided for by Section 6 of the Act can be resorted to by the Government only against persons who are in unauthorised occupation of any land which is “the property of the Government”. 8 to 10 whereof are reproduced hereinbelow:- 8. It seems to us clear from these provisions that the summary remedy for eviction which is provided for by Section 6 of the Act can be resorted to by the Government only against persons who are in unauthorised occupation of any land which is “the property of the Government”. In regard to property described in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 2, there can be no doubt, difficulty or dispute as to the title of the Government and, therefore, in respect of such property, the Government would be free to take recourse to the summary remedy of eviction provided for in Section 6. A person who occupies a part of a public road, street, bridge, the bed of the sea and the like, is in unauthorised occupation of property which is declared by Section 2 to be the property of the Government and, therefore, it is in public interest to evict him expeditiously, which can only be done by resorting to the summary remedy provided by the Act. But Section 6(1) which confers the power of summary eviction on the Government limits that power to cases in which a person is in unauthorised occupation of a land “for which he is liable to pay assessment under Section 3”. Section 3, in turn, refers to unauthorised occupation of any land “which is the property of the Government”. If there is a bona fide dispute regarding the title of the Government to any property, the Government cannot take a unilateral decision in its own favour that the property belongs to it, and on the basis of such decision take recourse to the summary remedy provided by Section 6 for evicting the person who is in possession of the property under a bona fide claim or title. In the instant case, there is unquestionably a genuine dispute between the State Government and the respondents as to whether the three plots of land were the subject-matter of acquisition proceedings taken by the then Government of Hyderabad and whether the Osmania University, for whose benefit the plots are alleged to have been acquired, had lost title to the property by operation of the law of limitation. The suit filed by the University was dismissed on the ground of limitation, inter alia, since Nawab Habibuddin was found to have encroached on the property more than 12 years before the date of the suit and the University was not in possession of the property at any time within that period. Having failed in the suit, the University activated the Government to evict the Nawab and his transferees summarily, which seems to us impermissible. The respondents have a bona fide claim to litigate and they cannot be evicted save by the due process of law. The summary remedy prescribed by Section 6 is not the kind of legal process which is suited to an adjudication of complicated questions of title. That procedure is, therefore, not the due process of law for evicting the respondents. 9. The view of the Division Bench that the summary remedy provided for by Section 6 cannot be resorted to unless the alleged encroachment is of “a very recent origin”, cannot be stretched too far. That was also the view taken by the learned Single Judge himself in another case which is reported in Meharunnissa Begum v. State of A.P. [(1970) 1 Andh LT 88] which was affirmed by a Division Bench [Meherunnissa Begum v. Govt. of A.P. AIR 1971 AP 382 : (1971) 1 Andh LT 292 : ILR 1972 AP 44]. It is not the duration, short or long, of encroachment that is conclusive of the question whether the summary remedy prescribed by the Act can be put into operation for evicting a person. What is relevant for the decision of that question is more the nature of the property on which the encroachment is alleged to have been committed and the consideration whether the claim of the occupant is bona fide. Facts which raise a bona fide dispute of title between the Government and the occupant must be adjudicated upon by the ordinary courts of law. The Government cannot decide such questions unilaterally in its own favour and evict any person summarily on the basis of such decision. But duration of occupation is relevant in the sense that a person who is in occupation of a property openly for an appreciable length of time can be taken, prima facie, to have a bona fide claim to the property requiring an impartial adjudication according to the established procedure of law. 10. But duration of occupation is relevant in the sense that a person who is in occupation of a property openly for an appreciable length of time can be taken, prima facie, to have a bona fide claim to the property requiring an impartial adjudication according to the established procedure of law. 10. The conspectus of facts in the instant case justifies the view that the question as to the title to the three plots cannot appropriately be decided in a summary enquiry contemplated by Sections 6 and 7 of the Act. The long possession of the respondents and their predecessors-in-title of these plots raises a genuine dispute between them and the Government on the question of title, remembering especially that the property, admittedly, belonged originally to the family of Nawab Habibuddin from whom the respondents claim to have purchased it. The question as to whether the title to the property came to be vested in the Government as a result of acquisition and the further question whether the Nawab encroached upon that property thereafter and perfected his title by adverse possession must be decided in a properly constituted suit. Maybe, that the Government may succeed in establishing its title to the property but, until that is done, the respondents cannot be evicted summarily.” 14. Yet another judgment, which this Court seeks to rely upon is the one rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Kerala & others vs. M.K.Jose, reported in (2015) 9 SCC 433 , paragraph no. 16 is reproduced hereinbelow:- 16. Having referred to the aforesaid decisions, it is obligatory on our part to refer to two other authorities of this Court where it has been opined that under what circumstances a disputed question of fact can be gone into. In Gunwant Kaur v. Municipal Committee, Bhatinda [ (1969) 3 SCC 769 ], it has been held thus: (SCC p. 774, paras 14-16) “14. The High Court observed that they will not determine disputed question of fact in a writ petition. But what facts were in dispute and what were admitted could only be determined after an affidavit-in-reply was filed by the State. The High Court, however, proceeded to dismiss the petition in limine. The High Court observed that they will not determine disputed question of fact in a writ petition. But what facts were in dispute and what were admitted could only be determined after an affidavit-in-reply was filed by the State. The High Court, however, proceeded to dismiss the petition in limine. The High Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Article 226 merely because in considering the petitioner's right to relief questions of fact may fall to be determined. In a petition under Article 226 the High Court has jurisdiction to try issues both of fact and law. Exercise of the jurisdiction is, it is true, discretionary, but the discretion must be exercised on sound judicial principles. When the petition raises questions of fact of a complex nature, which may for their determination require oral evidence to be taken, and on that account the High Court is of the view that the dispute may not appropriately be tried in a writ petition, the High Court may decline to try a petition. Rejection of a petition in limine will normally be justified, where the High Court is of the view that the petition is frivolous or because of the nature of the claim made dispute sought to be agitated, or that the petition against the party against whom relief is claimed is not maintainable or that the dispute raised thereby is such that it would be inappropriate to try it in the writ jurisdiction, or for analogous reasons. 15. From the averments made in the petition filed by the appellants it is clear that in proof of a large number of allegations the appellants relied upon documentary evidence and the only matter in respect of which conflict of facts may possibly arise related to the due publication of the notification under Section 4 by the Collector. 16. In the present case, in our judgment, the High Court was not justified in dismissing the petition on the ground that it will not determine disputed question of fact. 16. In the present case, in our judgment, the High Court was not justified in dismissing the petition on the ground that it will not determine disputed question of fact. The High Court has jurisdiction to determine questions of fact, even if they are in dispute and the present, in our judgment, is a case in which in the interests of both the parties the High Court should have entertained the petition and called for an affidavit-in-reply from the respondents, and should have proceeded to try the petition instead of relegating the appellants to a separate suit.” (emphasis supplied) 15. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and for the reasons mentioned hereinabove in the preceding paragraphs as also taking into account the well settled principle of law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a catena of decisions, as referred to hereinabove, this Court finds that since the present case involves disputed question of fact as to the right and title of the petitioner over the land in question, the present writ petition is not maintainable, hence, the same stands dismissed. 16. Accordingly, I.As for intervention are also dismissed.