JUDGMENT Mahendar Kumar Goyal, J. - The intra Court appeal has been directed against the order dated 07.08.2019 passed by the learned Single Judge whereby, the writ petition preferred by the respondent-petitioner assailing the order dated 10.05.2019 passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur (hereinafter referred as "the Tribunal") dismissing the appeal filed by the respondent under Section 7 of the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (for short "the Act of 1952") as barred by limitation, has been disposed of with directions to the learned Tribunal to hear the matter on merits by condoning the delay. 2. Facts in brief as emerge from perusal of the record are that the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, Jaipur vide its order dated 14.09.2018 assessed the dues in the tune of Rs. 48,187/- under Section 14-B of the Act of 1952 and a sum of Rs. 54,846/- under Section 7-Q of the Act of 1952 and directed the respondent to deposit the same. The respondent being aggrieved preferred an appeal before the Tribunal, Jaipur, which has been dismissed by the learned Tribunal vide its order dated 10.05.2019 as barred by limitation. The writ petition preferred by the respondent has been disposed of by the learned Single Judge directing the learned Tribunal to decide the matter on merits by condoning the delay. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that Rule 7(2) of the Employees Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1997 (for short "the Rules of 1997") provides that any person aggrieved by an order passed by any authority under the Act, may file an appeal within 60 days from the date of order and the Tribunal has been given discretion to extend the said period by a further period of 60 days if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the period prescribed. He submits that the statute does not prescribe extension of the limitation beyond 120 days and being special legislation, provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act has no applicability. He submits that the statute does not prescribe extension of the limitation beyond 120 days and being special legislation, provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act has no applicability. Relying upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of the Commissioner of Sale Tax, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow v. M/s. Parson Tools and Plants, Kanpur, (1975) AIR SC 1039, it was canvassed that this Court, exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India could not have issued directions to condone the delay in violation of the specific statutory provisions. 4. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent relying upon the judgment dated 22.03.2017 passed by a coordinate bench of this Court in DB Special Appeal Writ No.101/2017 titled as Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner v. Rajasthan Shiksha Karmi Board and other connected appeals, submits that the special appeals preferred by the appellant in matters involving identical questions have been dismissed and this Court has refused to interfere in the discretionary power exercised by the learned Single Judge under Article 226 of the Constitution of India whereby the delay in preferring the appeal before the Tribunal was condoned. 5. Heard learned counsels for the parties and perused the record. 6. The provisions of Rule 7 of the Rules of 1997 in no uncertain terms provide that period for preferring the appeal is 60 days which can be extended by the learned Tribunal by a period of 60 days only meaning thereby, an appeal has to be preferred within a period of 120 days from the date of order and not beyond that. A Larger Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of the Commissioner of Sales Tax (supra) in similar circumstances, while dealing with the provisions of Section 10 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 along with Rule 68(5) and (6) of the U.P. Sales Tax Rules, which are pari materia with the Rule 7(2) of the Rules of 1952, has held as under: "17. Thus the principle that emerges is that if the legislature in a special statute prescribes a certain period of limitation for filing a particular application thereunder and provides in clear terms that such period on sufficient cause being shown, may be extended, in the maximum, only upto a specified time-limit and no further, then the tribunal concerned has no jurisdiction to treat within limitation, an application filed before it beyond such maximum time-limit specified in the statute, by excluding the time spent in prosecuting in good faith and due diligence any prior proceeding on the analogy of Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act. 18. We have said enough and we may say it again that where the legislature clearly declares its intent in the scheme and language of a statute, it is the duty of the court to give full effect to the same without scanning its wisdom or policy, and without engrafting, adding or implying anything which is not congenial to or consistent with such expressed intent of the law-giver; more so if the statute is a taxing statute. We will close the discussion by recalling what Lord Hailsham (at p.11 in Pearlberg v. Varty, (1972) 2 AllER 6 ) has said recently in regard to importation of the principles of natural justice into a statute which is a clear and complete Code, by itself : "It is true of course that the courts will lean heavily against any construction of a statute which would be manifestly fair. But they have no power to amend or supplement the language of a statute merely because in one view of the matter a subject feels himself entitled to a larger decree of say in the making of a decision than a statute accords him. But they have no power to amend or supplement the language of a statute merely because in one view of the matter a subject feels himself entitled to a larger decree of say in the making of a decision than a statute accords him. Still less is it the functioning of the courts to form first a judgment on the fairness of an Act of Parliament and then to amend or supplement it with new provisions so as to make it conform to that judgment." For all the reasons aforesaid, we are of the opinion that the object, the scheme and language of Section 10 of the Sales Tax Act do not permit the invocation of Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act, either, in terms, or, in principle, for excluding the time spent in prosecuting proceedings for setting aside the dismissal of appeals in default, from computation of the period of limitation prescribed for filing a revision under the Sales-tax Act. Accordingly, we answer the question referred, in the negative." 7. The Hon'ble Apex Court has, while dealing with the similar situation wherein the application under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, was filed with delay, held in the case of M/s. Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019) AIR SC 505 as under: "8. section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 provides thus: "34. Application for setting aside arbitral award- (1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3). ***************************************** (3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under Section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal: Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter." 9. Section 34 provides that recourse to a court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award "in accordance with" sub-section (2) and sub-section (3). Section 34 provides that recourse to a court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award "in accordance with" sub-section (2) and sub-section (3). Sub-section (2) relates to the grounds for setting aside an award. An application filed beyond the period mentioned in sub-section 3 of Section 34, would not be an application "in accordance with" that subsection. By virtue of Section 34(3), recourse to the court against an arbitral award cannot be beyond the period prescribed. Sub-section (3) of Section 34, read with the proviso, makes it abundantly clear that the application for setting aside the award on one of the grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) will have to be made within a period of three months from the date on which the party making that application receives the arbitral award. The proviso allows this period to be further extended by another period of thirty days on sufficient cause being shown by the party for filing an application. The intent of the legislature is evinced by the use of the words "but not thereafter" in the proviso. These words make it abundantly clear that as far as the limitation for filing an application for setting aside an arbitral award is concerned, the statutory period prescribed is three months which is extendable by another period of upto thirty days (and no more) subject to the satisfaction of the court that sufficient reasons were provided for the delay." 8. In the case of Bengal Chemist and Druggists v. Kalyan Choudhary, (2018) AIR SC 807 while dealing with the provisions of Section 421(3) and section 433 of the Companies Act, 2013, it was held by the Hon'ble Apex Court as under: "4) A cursory reading of Section 421(3) makes it clear that the proviso provides a period of limitation different from that provided in the Limitation Act, and also provides a further period not exceeding 45 days only if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within that period. Section 433 obviously cannot come to the aid of the appellant because the provisions of the Limitation Act only apply "as far as may be". In a case like the present, where there is a special provision contained in Section 421(3) proviso, Section 5 of the Limitation Act obviously cannot apply. Section 433 obviously cannot come to the aid of the appellant because the provisions of the Limitation Act only apply "as far as may be". In a case like the present, where there is a special provision contained in Section 421(3) proviso, Section 5 of the Limitation Act obviously cannot apply. 5) Another very important aspect of the case is that 45 days is the period of limitation, and a further period not exceeding 45 days is provided only if sufficient cause is made out for filing the appeal within the extended period. According to us, this is a peremptory provision, which will otherwise be rendered completely ineffective, if we were to accept the argument of learned counsel for the appellant. If we were to accept such argument, it would mean that notwithstanding that the further period of 45 days had elapsed, the Appellate Tribunal may, if the facts so warrant, condone the delay. This would be to render otiose the second time limit of 45 days, which, as has been pointed out by us above, is peremptory in nature. 6) We are fortified in this conclusion by the judgment of this Court in Chhattisgarh SEB v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, (2010) 5 SCC 23 . The language of section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003, which is similar to the language contained in section 421 (3) of the Companies Act, 2013, came up for consideration in the aforesaid decision. The issue that arose before this Court was whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act can be invoked for allowing the aggrieved person to file an appeal beyond 60 days plus the further grace period of 60 days. This Court held that Section 5 cannot apply to Section 125 of the Electricity Act in the following terms: "25. Section 125 lays down that any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Tribunal can file an appeal to this Court within 60 days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Tribunal. Proviso to Section 125 empowers this Court to entertain an appeal filed within a further period of 60 days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing appeal within the initial period of 60 days. Proviso to Section 125 empowers this Court to entertain an appeal filed within a further period of 60 days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing appeal within the initial period of 60 days. This shows that the period of limitation prescribed for filing appeals under Sections 111(2) and 125 is substantially different from the period prescribed under the Limitation Act for filing suits, etc. The use of the expression "within a further period not exceeding 60 days" in the proviso to Section 125 makes it clear that the outer limit for filing an appeal is 120 days. There is no provision in the Act under which this Court can entertain an appeal filed against the decision or order of the Tribunal after more than 120 days." The aforesaid judgment was reiterated and followed in ONGC v. Gujarat Energy Transmission Corporation Limited, (2017) 5 SCC 42 at Para 5." 9. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Popat Bahiru Govardhane Etc v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer and Ors., (2013) 10 SCC 765 while dealing with the provisions of section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 held as under: "11. Section 28A of the Act reads as under: "28-A. Redetermination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the court.-(1) Where in an award under this Part, the court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11, the persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification under Section 4 sub-section (1) and who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that they had not made an application to the Collector under Section 18, by written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the court require that the amount of compensation payable to them may be redetermined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the court: Provided that in computing the period of three months within which an application to the Collector shall be made under this sub-section, the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded." (emphasis added) 13. This Court in Union of India & Ors. This Court in Union of India & Ors. v. Mangatu Ram, (1997) 6 SCC 59 and Tota Ram v. State of U.P., (1997) 6 SCC 280 , dealt with the issue involved herein and held that as the Land Acquisition Collector is not a court and acts as a quasi judicial authority while making the award, the provisions of the 1963 Act would not apply and, therefore, the application under Section 28A of the Act, has to be filed within the period of limitation as prescribed under Section 28A of the Act. The said provisions require that an application for re-determination is to be filed within 3 months from the date of the award of the court. The proviso further provides that the period of limitation is to be calculated excluding the date on which the award is made and the time requisite for obtaining the copy of the award. 16. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." (See: Martin Burn Ltd. v. The Corporation of Calcutta, (1966) AIR SC 529, AIR p. 535, para 14 and Rohitas Kumar v. Om Prakash Sharma, (2012) 13 SCC 792 ; AIR 2013 SC 30 )." 10. The 'ratio decidendi' of the aforesaid judgements leaves no room for discretion by the High Court exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to condone the delay or to extend the period of limitation beyond the period specified in the special statute. The 'ratio decidendi' of the aforesaid judgements leaves no room for discretion by the High Court exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to condone the delay or to extend the period of limitation beyond the period specified in the special statute. Therefore, we are in respectful disagreement with the judgment dated 22.03.2017 passed by the co-ordinate bench of this Court in the case of Assistant Provident Funds Commissioner (supra) which has, obviously, been passed without taking into consideration the aforesaid dictum deep rooted in a series of cases by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In Suganthi Suresh Kumar v. Jagdeeshan, (2002) 2 SCC 420 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that it is not only a matter of discipline for the High Courts in India, it is the mandate of the Constitution as provided in Article 141 that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India. The judgement of the coordinate bench of this Court can be reckoned as per incuriam as it has been passed oblivious of the judgements of the Hon'ble Apex Court, as taken note of by us. In these circumstances, we cannot countenance the approach adopted by the learned Single Judge and the appeal deserves to be allowed. Therefore, we quash and set aside the judgment dated 07.08.2019. 11. The appeal is allowed accordingly.