JUDGMENT 1. Vide this order, abovementioned two writ petitions would be disposed of. 2. Petitioner joined Rajasthan Judicial Service on 29.07.1980 in pursuance to the order dated 16.01.1980. Petitioner was promoted as Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate in the year 1993 and was further promoted to the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service Cadre in the year 2000. On 23.04.2013, an F.I.R. was registered against two advocates, one court clerk and one clerk of an advocate. On 23.06.2013, charge sheet was filed against three persons in the trial court and investigation qua the petitioner was kept pending. Petitioner was arrested on 27.05.2014 and was granted bail by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and was released on bail on 16.05.2015. Petitioner was placed under suspension vide order dated 24.06.2013. Petitioner superannuated on 31.01.2015 after attaining the age of 60 years. On the said date, petitioner was in judicial custody. Petitioner was granted provisional pension. Petitioner by way of a representation claimed that he was also entitled for gratuity and benefit of leave encashment. However, his representation was rejected. Petitioner was served with charge sheet vide memorandum dated 06.01.2017. Hence, the abovementioned writ petitions have been filed by the petitioner challenging the enquiry proceedings initiated against him after his retirement and withholding of benefit of gratuity and leave encashment. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that no enquiry/disciplinary proceedings could be initiated against the petitioner as on the day when charge sheet was issued against the petitioner, he was no longer a Government servant as he had already superannuated on 31.01.2015. No sanction from the Governor had been taken before initiation of disciplinary proceedings against him. Charge sheet could have been issued by the competent authority, but in the present case, the same had been issued by enquiry officer. As per Rule 16(2) of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules of 1958'), charge sheet could be issued only by the disciplinary authority. Enquiry initiated against the petitioner was a futile exercise as the petitioner could not be imposed any punishment provided under Rule 14 of the Rules of 1958. Petitioner was already facing criminal trial with regard to allegations relating to corruption. Thus, petitioner could be said to have committed an offence, but the said 'offence' could not be described as 'misconduct'. 4. Petitioner was already facing criminal trial with regard to allegations relating to corruption. Thus, petitioner could be said to have committed an offence, but the said 'offence' could not be described as 'misconduct'. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that as per Rule 7 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules of 1996'), only the Governor could order for withholding of retirement benefits. Respondent had placed reliance on Resolution dated 20.06.1996 (Annexure-R1/1 attached in D. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 73/2019), but the said Resolution could not prevail over the Rules. Rule 15 of the Rules of 1958 does not provide for delegation of powers. Charge sheet could have been issued to the petitioner with regard to any incident which had occurred within four years of his retirement, in case disciplinary proceedings had already been initiated, but in the present case no disciplinary proceedings had been initiated against the petitioner prior to his retirement. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Canara Bank Vs. D.R.P. Sundharam, 2016 12 SCC 724 , wherein it was held as under: "8. On an exhaustive consideration of the manner in which the provisions have been analyzed and the clear and unambiguous language of the same and also having regard to the provisions of the 1976 Regulations of the Bank with regard to initiation of disciplinary proceeding we have no doubt in our mind that the meaning given to the provisions of the Regulations in the said case is correct and does not require any reconsideration. From the above it would follow that by virtue of the provisions contained in Regulation 20(3)(iii), a disciplinary proceeding initiated by means of a charge-sheet prior to the retirement of a bank employee would continue even after his retirement in view of the deeming provision contained in the said Regulation 20(3)(iii) by which the officer is deemed to continue in service till completion of the proceedings. 9. In the present case, the proceedings have been initiated by submission of the charge-sheet after the retirement of the respondent. 9. In the present case, the proceedings have been initiated by submission of the charge-sheet after the retirement of the respondent. Having regard to the fact that the Regulations in force in Canara Bank are pari materia with those in the UCO Bank considered in the aforesaid decision, we deem it appropriate to affirm the orders of the High Court and dismiss the appeal." 6. Learned counsel has next placed reliance on the judgment of Single Bench of this Court in Dr. P.K. Kulshrestha Vs. State of Rajasthan & Others, 2017 4 WLC(Raj) 349 , wherein it was held as under: "17. Admittedly, no sanction of the Governor was taken before instituting the disciplinary action against the petitioner. Consequently, the same are without jurisdiction and deserve to be quashed on this ground alone." 7. Learned counsel has further placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in V.P. Gindroniya Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Another, 1970 1 SCC 362 , wherein it was held as under: "17. From the above findings, it follows that even since June 9, 1964, the appellant was not in the service of the Government. Therefore it was not open to the Government to take any disciplinary proceedings against him. Hence the impugned orders are liable to be quashed. We accordingly allow this appeal and quash those orders. No order as to costs." 8. Learned counsel has next placed reliance on the judgment of Calcutta High Court in Benoy Kumar Moulik Vs. Presidency Postmaster and Others, 1963 2 LLJ 477 Cal, wherein it was held as under: "9. In my opinion, the first branch of the argument of Mr. Bhattacharya is unworthy of being sustained. It appears from the wording of the order of suspension, dated 4 May 1959, that petitioner had been suspended on the ground that investigation was going on against the petitioner, for an alleged criminal offence. A departmental disciplinary action is concerned not with criminal offence but with misconduct. Departmental authorities have no power to punish an employee on a criminal charge, although such authorities may penalize an employee for misconduct on identical facts. The right to punish a citizen for crime is vested in the State, the right to penalize an employee for misconduct is in the employer, because of the existence of relationship of master and servant and also because the rules so provide in certain cases. The right to punish a citizen for crime is vested in the State, the right to penalize an employee for misconduct is in the employer, because of the existence of relationship of master and servant and also because the rules so provide in certain cases. Since the petitioner was suspended pending investigation into a criminal offence, the order of suspension has no relation to the departmental proceedings which was subsequently started. Since the petitioner was not suspended pending the departmental proceedings, the authorities cannot, in the departmental proceeding, take advantage of the order of suspension made against the petitioner pending investigation into a criminal offence alleged to have been committed by the petitioner. In the view that I take, I have to over-rule the first branch of the contention advanced by Mr. Bhattacharya." 9. Learned counsel has placed reliance on the judgment of Single Bench of this Court in Dr. B.K. Choudhary Vs. State of Rajasthan & Others, 1993 1 WLC(Raj) 47 , wherein it was held as under: "19. The additional reason for not allowing further holding of the enquiry is that even though, the petitioner had submitted a comprehensive reply running into 30 pages, the competent authority did not even bother to consider the reply before it, issued an order for appointment of the Enquiry Officer. Requirement of rule 16(4) has been treated as an empty formality by the respondents. The competent authority did not examine the various contentions raised by the petitioner in his reply to the show cause notice, instead, it simply passed one line order for appointment of the Enquiry Officer. In Dr. K.N. Sachdeva v. State of Rajasthan and others, decided on 3.2.87, S.C. Agrawal, J (as he then was), allowed the writ petition of the petitioner on the ground that before issuing the order of appointment of the Enquiry Officer, the disciplinory authority had failed to apply its mind to the reply submitted by the delinquent. Similar view has been expressed by the Division Bench in Sukhraj Singh Bajwa v. State of Rajasthan,1988 1 RentLR 613." 10. Learned counsel has next placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India, etc. etc. v. K.V. Jankiraman, etc. etc., 1991 AIR(SC) 2010 , wherein it was held as under: "6. Similar view has been expressed by the Division Bench in Sukhraj Singh Bajwa v. State of Rajasthan,1988 1 RentLR 613." 10. Learned counsel has next placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India, etc. etc. v. K.V. Jankiraman, etc. etc., 1991 AIR(SC) 2010 , wherein it was held as under: "6. On the first question, viz., as to when for the purposes of the sealed cover procedure the disciplinary/criminal proceedings can be said to have commenced, the Full Bench of the Tribunal has held that it is only when a charge-memo in a disciplinary proceedings or a charge-sheet in a criminal prosecution is issued to the employee that it can be said that the departmental proceedings/criminal prosecution is initiated against the employee. The sealed cover procedure is to be resorted to only after the charge-memo/chargesheet is issued. The pendency of preliminary investigation prior to that stage will not be sufficient to enable the authorities to adopt the sealed cover procedure. We are in agreement with the Tribunal on this point. The contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant-authorities that when there are serious allegations and it takes time to collect necessary evidence to prepare and issue charge-memo/charge-sheet, it would not be in the interest of the purity of administration to reward the employee with a promotion, increment etc., does not impress us. The acceptance of this contention would result in injustice to the employees in manycases. As has been the experience so far, the preliminary investigations take an inordinately long time and particularly when they are initiated at the instance of the interested persons, they are kept pending deliberately. Many times they never result in the issue of any charge-memo/charge-sheet. If the allegations are serious and the authorities are keen in investigating them, ordinarily it would not take much time to collect the relevant evidence and finalise the charges. What is further, if the charges are that serious, the authorities have the power to suspend the employee under the relevant rules, and the suspension by itself permits a resort to the sealed cover procedure. The authorities thus are not without a remedy. It was then contended on behalf of the authorities that conclusions Nos. 1 and 4 of the Full Bench of the Tribunal are inconsistent with each other. The authorities thus are not without a remedy. It was then contended on behalf of the authorities that conclusions Nos. 1 and 4 of the Full Bench of the Tribunal are inconsistent with each other. Those conclusions are as follows: "(1) consideration for promotion, selection grade, crossing the efficiency bar or higher scale of pay cannot be withheld merely on the ground of pendency of a disciplinary or criminal proceedings against an official; (2) .................... (3) .................... (4) the sealed cover procedure can be resorted only after a charge memo is served on the concerned official or the charge sheet filed before the criminal court and not before;" There is no doubt that there is a seeming contradiction between the two conclusions. But read harmoniously, and that is what the Full Bench-has intended, the two conclusions can be reconciled with each other. The conclusion No. 1 should be read to mean that the promotion etc. cannot be withheld merely because some disciplinary/criminal proceedings are pending against the employee. To deny the said benefit, they must be at the relevant time pending at the stage when chargememo/charge-sheet has already been issued to the employee. Thus read, there is no inconsistency in the two conclusions. We, therefore, repel the challenge of the appellantauthorities to the said finding of the Full Bench of the Tribunal." 11. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent No.1 has opposed the petitions and has submitted that disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner on 24.06.2013 by the Administrative Committee of this Court. Hence, as per Rule 7(2)(a), 7(2)(b) and 7(6) of the Rules of 1996, disciplinary proceedings could have continued against the petitioner after his retirement with regard to events which had taken place within four years of such institution. Hence, in the present case, no sanction of the Governor was necessary. As per Resolution dated 20.06.1996, the Administrative Judge or the Judge nominated by the Chief Justice shall have the power to issue charge sheet and to conduct enquiry under Rule 16 and 17 of the Rules of 1958. The said Resolution was not under challenge, hence, it could not be said to be a case of conflict of Resolution and the Rules. The said Resolution had been passed by the Full Court. 12. The said Resolution was not under challenge, hence, it could not be said to be a case of conflict of Resolution and the Rules. The said Resolution had been passed by the Full Court. 12. Learned Senior Counsel has further submitted that as per Rule 91B(7) of the Rajasthan Service Rules and Rule 7 and Rule 90(1)(c) of the Rules of 1996, leave encashment as well as gratuity of the petitioner could be withheld. 13. Learned Senior Counsel, in support of his arguments, has placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India and Others Vs. Upendra Singh, 1994 3 SCC 357 , wherein it was held as under: "6. In the case of charges framed in a disciplinary inquiry the tribunal or court can interfere only if on the charges framed (read with imputation or particulars of the charges, if any) no misconduct or other irregularity alleged can be said to have been made out or the charges framed are contrary to any law. At this stage, the tribunal has no jurisdiction to go into the correctness or truth of the charges. The tribunal cannot take over the functions of the disciplinary authority. The truth or otherwise of the charges is a matter for the disciplinary authority to go into. Indeed, even after the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings, if the matter comes to court or tribunal, they have no jurisdiction to look into the truth of the charges or into the correctness of the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority as the case may be. The function of the court/tribunal is one of judicial review, the parameters of which are repeatedly laid down by this Court. It would be sufficient to quote the decision in H.B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority, Karnal v. Gopi Nath & Sons, 1992 Supp2 SCC 312 . The Bench comprising M.N. Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was) and A.M. Ahmadi, J., affirmed the principle thus: (SCC p.317 para 8) "Judicial review, it is trite, is not directed against the decision but is confined to the decision-making process. Judicial review cannot extend to the examination of the correctness or reasonableness of a decision as a matter of fact. The Bench comprising M.N. Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was) and A.M. Ahmadi, J., affirmed the principle thus: (SCC p.317 para 8) "Judicial review, it is trite, is not directed against the decision but is confined to the decision-making process. Judicial review cannot extend to the examination of the correctness or reasonableness of a decision as a matter of fact. The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the authority after according fair treatment reaches, on a matter which it is authorised by law to decide, a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the Court. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. It will be erroneous to think that the Court sits in judgment not only on the correctness of the decision making process but also on the correctness of the decision itself." 14. Learned Senior Counsel has next placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Orissa and Another Vs. Sangram Keshari Misra and Another, 2010 13 SCC 311 , wherein it was held as under: "10. Though there appears to be some merit in the said contentions of the first respondent, it is unnecessary to examine the correctness of these contentions as normally a charge-sheet is not quashed prior to the conducting of the enquiry on the ground that the facts stated in the charge are erroneous. It is well settled that the correctness or truth of the charge is the function of the disciplinary authority (vide Union of India v. Upendra Singh, 1994 3 SCC 357 , SCC p. 362 para 6). Therefore we reject the contention that the charge ought to have been quashed without reserving to the State to proceed in accordance with law." 15. Learned Senior Counsel has next placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Secretary, Ministry of Defence and Others Vs. Prabhash Chandra Mirdha, 2012 11 SCC 565 , wherein it was held as under: "8. The law does not permit quashing of chargesheet in a routine manner. In case the delinquent employee has any grievance in respect of the charge-sheet he must raise the issue by filing a representation and wait for the decision of the disciplinary authority thereon. Prabhash Chandra Mirdha, 2012 11 SCC 565 , wherein it was held as under: "8. The law does not permit quashing of chargesheet in a routine manner. In case the delinquent employee has any grievance in respect of the charge-sheet he must raise the issue by filing a representation and wait for the decision of the disciplinary authority thereon. In case the chargesheet is challenged before a court/tribunal on the ground of delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings or delay in concluding the proceedings, the court/tribunal may quash the charge-sheet after considering the gravity of the charge and all relevant factors involved in the case weighing all the facts both for and against the delinquent employee and must reach the conclusion which is just and proper in the circumstance. (Vide State of M.P. v. Bani Singh, 1990 Supp1 SCC 738 ; State of Punjab v. Chaman Lal Goyal, 1995 2 SCC 570 ; Registrar, Coop. Societies v. Sachindra Nath Pandey, 1995 3 SCC 134 ; Union of India v. Ashok Kacker, 1995 Supp1 SCC 180 ; Prohibition & Excise Department v. L. Srinivasan, 1996 3 SCC 157 ; State of A.P. v. N. Radhakishan, 1998 4 SCC 154 ; Food Corporation of India v. V.P. Bhatia, 1998 9 SCC 131 ; Supt. of Police v. T. Natarajan, 1999 SCC(L&S) 646 ; M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India, 2006 5 SCC 88 ; P.D. Agrawal v. SBI, 2006 8 SCC 776 ; and Govt. of A.P. v. V. Appala Swamy, 2007 14 SCC 49 ). 10. Ordinarily a writ application does not lie against a charge-sheet or show-cause notice for the reason that it does not give rise to any cause of action. It does not amount to an adverse order which affects the right of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction/competence to do so. A writ lies when some right of a party is infringed. In fact, chargesheet does not infringe the right of a party. It is only when a final order imposing the punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, it may have a grievance and cause of action. Thus, a charge-sheet or show-cause notice in disciplinary proceedings should not ordinarily be quashed by the Court. In fact, chargesheet does not infringe the right of a party. It is only when a final order imposing the punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, it may have a grievance and cause of action. Thus, a charge-sheet or show-cause notice in disciplinary proceedings should not ordinarily be quashed by the Court. (Vide State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma, 1987 2 SCC 179 ; Bihar State Housing Board v. Ramesh Kumar Singh, 1996 1 SCC 327 ; Ulagappa v. Commr., 2001 10 SCC 639 ; Special Director v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse, 2004 3 SCC 440 ; and Union of India v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, 2006 12 SCC 28 ). 12. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that charge-sheet cannot generally be a subject matter of challenge as it does not adversely affect the rights of the delinquent unless it is established that the same has been issued by an authority not competent to initiate the disciplinary proceedings. Neither the disciplinary proceedings nor the charge-sheet be quashed at an initial stage as it would be a premature stage to deal with the issues. Proceedings are not liable to be quashed on the grounds that proceedings had been initiated at a belated stage or could not be concluded in a reasonable period unless the delay creates prejudice to the delinquent employee. Gravity of alleged misconduct is a relevant factor to be taken into consideration while quashing the proceedings." 16. Learned Senior Counsel has next placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India & Another Vs. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, 2006 12 SCC 28 , wherein it was held as under: "14. The reason why ordinarily a writ petition should not be entertained against a mere showcause notice or charge-sheet is that at that stage the writ petition may be held to be premature. A mere charge-sheet or show-cause notice does not give rise to any cause of action, because it does not amount to an adverse order which affects the rights of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so. It is quite possible that after considering the reply to the show-cause notice or after holding an enquiry the authority concerned may drop the proceedings and/or hold that the charges are not established. It is quite possible that after considering the reply to the show-cause notice or after holding an enquiry the authority concerned may drop the proceedings and/or hold that the charges are not established. It is well settled that a writ petition lies when some right of any party is infringed. A mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet does not infringe the right of any one. It is only when a final order imposing some punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, that the said party can be said to have any grievance." 17. Learned counsel for Respondent No. 2 has opposed the writ petitions and has supported the arguments advanced by learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent No. 1. 18. Admittedly, in the present case, petitioner joined as a Magistrate and earned his promotions from time to time. At the relevant time, he was posted as District and Sessions Judge, Ajmer. FIR was registered on 23.04.2013 under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Petitioner was arrested on 27.05.2014 and was released on bail on 16.05.2015. The Administrative Committee of this Court in its meeting held on 24.06.2013 resolved as under: "The Registry has laid before the Committee the letter No.PA/52 dated 22.6.2013 of the Special Judge, Designated Court, Ajmer forwarding a copy of the challan submitted on 21.6.2013 by the Anti Corruption Bureau, Rajasthan in connection with FIR No. 147/2013 against four persons as named therein, while keeping further investigation pending under section 173(8) Cr.P.C. against Shri Ajay Kumar Sharda, former District and Sessions Judge, Ajmer and Shri Bhagwan Singh Chauhan, Advocate. The Registrar (Vigilance), Jaipur has also in terms of the note dated 24.5.2013 of Hon'ble the Chief Justice laid before the Committee the set of documents referred to in the said note and amongst others related to the process of selection of the Lower Division Clerk in the District Judgeship of Ajmer held in the year 2013. On a perusal of the challan in the present state as submitted by the Investigating Agency as well as the aforementioned documents and further being satisfied about the gravity of the issues involved, the Committee resolves that a disciplinary proceeding under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 be initiated against Shri Ajay Kumar Sharda, former District and Sessions Judge, Ajmer and presently posted as Judge, Family Court, Banswara. On a due consideration of the above and all other relevant aspects in connection with the issues involved both factual and legal, the Committee is of the view that Shri Ajay Kumar Sharda, former District and Sessions Judge, Ajmer and presently posted as Judge, Family Court, Banswara be placed under suspension with immediate effect. Resolved accordingly. It is resolved further that during the period of suspension and until further orders, the headquarters of Shri Ajay Kumar Sharda, former District and Sessions Judge, Ajmer and presently posted as Judge, Family Court, Banswara would be at Rajsamand. The Registry would take immediate steps. The records referred to hereinabove be kept in sealed covers to abide by the future instructions." 19. A perusal of the above minutes of the meeting of the Administrative Committee reveals that the petitioner was placed under suspension on 24.06.2013 and disciplinary proceedings under Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958 were initiated against him. 20. Vide Resolution dated 20.06.1996, it was resolved as under: "On due consideration of the matter it is Resolved to further amend with immediate effect the Resolution of Full Court dated 30.10.1971 as under:- "(I) Sub-clause (i) of Clause (3) of the delegation of powers in Resolution dated 30.10.1971, shall be deleted and substituted by the following: "(i) The Administrative Judge or the Judge nominated by the Chief Justice shall have the power to issue charge sheet and to conduct enquiry under Rule 16 & 17 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 and to submit the Enquiry Report to the Chief Justice for placing it before the Full Court." (II) sub-clause (ii) of Clause (3) of the delegation of powers in Resolution dated 30.10.1971 shall be deleted and substituted by the following:- "(ii) The Enquiry Report submitted by the Administrative Judge or the Judge nominated by the Chief Justice shall be placed before the Full Court. The Full Court after considering the Report, may agree or disagree with it and may exonerate the delinquent officer or may impose suitable punishment on him following the procedure prescribed by the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958." The pending enquiries shall also be governed by this Resolution and Judges nominated by the Chief Justice as Disciplinary Authorities in those enquiries shall submit their report to the Chief Justice for being placed before the Full Court for consideration." 21. Thus, as per the above Resolution, the Administrative Judge or the Judge nominated by the Chief Justice had the power to issue charge sheet and conduct enquiry under Rule 16 and 17 of the Rules of 1958. In terms of the above Resolution, enquiry was to be conducted by the Judge nominated by the Chief Justice. 22. Thereafter, charge sheet was issued to the petitioner vide memorandum dated 06.01.2017. A perusal of the charge sheet reveals that thirteen charges were framed against the petitioner. Said charges relate to corruption and unfair means adopted by the petitioner and others with regard to selection to the post of Lower Division Clerks and Class IV Employees. Charges have also been framed against the petitioner with regard to illegal gratification obtained by him in connivance with other persons while deciding cases pending before him. Enquiry against the petitioner is still pending. 23. In view of Resolution dated 20.06.1996, there is no force in the argument raised by learned counsel for the petitioner that charge sheet issued by the enquiry officer was liable to be set aside as it had not been issued in accordance with law. Rather, from the Resolution dated 20.06.1996 passed by the Full Court, it is evident that the enquiry officer, who had been nominated by the Chief Justice of this Court, was authorised to issue the charge sheet. The said Resolution is not under challenge. 24. There is also no force in the argument raised by learned counsel for the petitioner that the enquiry proceedings could not have been initiated against the petitioner without prior sanction of the Governor. Rather, as per Rule 7(2)(a) of the Rules of 1996, departmental proceedings, which had already been initiated prior to the retirement of a Government servant, could continue after his/her retirement and could be concluded by the authority by which they were commenced. 25. In the present case, petitioner was suspended on 24.06.2013 and enquiry proceedings were initiated against him in pursuance to the decision taken by the Administrative Committee of this Court in its meeting held on 24.06.2013. Enquiry officer was appointed and charge sheet was issued against the petitioner on 06.01.2017. As per Rule 7(2)(b) of the Rules of 1996, disciplinary proceedings could be continued against the petitioner with regard to any event, which took place within four years of initiation of the proceedings. Enquiry officer was appointed and charge sheet was issued against the petitioner on 06.01.2017. As per Rule 7(2)(b) of the Rules of 1996, disciplinary proceedings could be continued against the petitioner with regard to any event, which took place within four years of initiation of the proceedings. A perusal of the charge sheet reveals that incidents in the present case relate to the year 2012- 2013. Thus, in the present case, departmental proceedings had been initiated against the petitioner on 24.06.2013 while he was in service and they were liable to continued in view of Rule 7(2)(a) of the Rules of 1996. 26. In the present case, petitioner is facing trial with regard to allegations of corruption. Thus, the criminal trial can also continue with regard to FIR registered against the petitioner under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The fact that the petitioner had allegedly indulged in corruption while he was posted as District Judge, Ajmer itself amounts to 'misconduct'. Hence, argument raised by learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner had not committed any misconduct is also without any force and the present case would not be a fit case for quashing the charge sheet. The petitioner can raise all the pleas available to him before the enquiry officer. So far no adverse order has been passed against the petitioner. 27. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decisions relied upon by learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent No. 1 that ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained against a charge sheet and at that stage, the writ petition may be held to be premature. Issuance of charge sheet does not give any cause of action for filing writ petition as no adverse order has been passed against the aggrieved employee at that stage. The enquiry officer will give its report on the basis of evidence produced before it. 28. We have carefully gone through the judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner but they fail to advance the case of the petitioner as they are based on different facts. 29. Thus, the writ petition (No.73/2019) challenging charge sheet issued against the petitioner, in the facts of the present case, is liable to be dismissed. 30. 28. We have carefully gone through the judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner but they fail to advance the case of the petitioner as they are based on different facts. 29. Thus, the writ petition (No.73/2019) challenging charge sheet issued against the petitioner, in the facts of the present case, is liable to be dismissed. 30. So far as writ petition (No.74/2019) filed by the petitioner with regard to withholding of his gratuity and leave encashment is concerned, the same is also liable to be dismissed. 31. Rule 91B(7) of the Rajasthan Service Rules reads as under: "Rule 91B. Cash payment in lieu of unutilised privilege leave on the date of retirement: (1) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (2) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (3) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (4) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (7) The Authority competent to grant leave may withhold whole or part of cash equivalent of privilege leave in case of a Government servant who retired from service on attaining the age of retirement while under suspension or while disciplinary or criminal proceedings are pending against him, if in the view of such authority there is a possibility of some money becoming recoverable from him on conclusion of the proceedings against him. On conclusion of the proceedings, he will become eligible to the amount so withheld after adjustment of Government dues, if any." Rule 90(1)(c) of the Rules of 1996 reads as under: "90. Provisional pension where departmental or judicial proceedings may be pending (1) (a) xxxxxxxxxxxxxx (b) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (c) No gratuity shall be paid to the Government servant until the conclusion of the departmental or judicial proceedings and issue of final orders thereon: Provided that where departmental proceedings have been instituted under Rule 17 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, for imposing any of the penalties specified in clauses (i) and (ii) of Rule 14 of the said Rules, the payment of gratuity shall be authorised to be paid to the Government servant. (2) xxxxxxxxxx" 32. As per the above provisions, leave encashment as well as gratuity of an employee, who is facing departmental proceedings, can be withheld. Thus, there is no force in the argument raised by learned counsel for the petitioner that leave encashment as well as gratuity of the petitioner have been illegally withheld. 33. Consequently, both the writ petitions filed by the petitioner are liable to be dismissed and are, accordingly, dismissed.