JUDGMENT The Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Company Limited (hereinafter referred to as „the appellant?) is in appeal against the award dated 3rd March, 2014 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rajouri (for brevity “the Tribunal”) in claim petition No.85/C titled Ashok Singh v. Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Company Limited and others, whereby and whereunder respondent No.1 (hereinafter referred to as “the claimant”) has been held entitled to compensation of Rs.7,94,000/- along with pendente lite and future interest @ 7.5% per annum and the appellant- Insurance Company has been directed to satisfy the award within thirty days. 2. The claimant has also filed separate appeal seeking enhancement of the compensation amount. 3. Before proceeding to consider the grounds of challenge to the impugned award urged by the insurer, it would be necessary to state, briefly, few facts. As is gatherable from the award, on 11.05.2011, a motor vehicle accident involving the vehicle bearing registration No.JK02AA- 1157 (passenger bus) driven by respondent No.3, took place at Rajal National Highway within the jurisdiction of Police Station, Nowshera. The claimant, who was travelling in the offending vehicle suffered multiple injuries and was rendered permanently disabled to the extent of 70%. FIR No.96/2011 under Sections 279/337 RPC came to be registered against respondent No.3. The claimant, who suffered grievous injuries in the accident and was rendered permanently disabled, filed a claim petition before the Tribunal arraying apart from the driver and owner of the offending vehicle, the insurer, as well, as party respondents. The owner and driver of the offending vehicle despite service chose not to contest the claim petition and, thus, were proceeded ex-parte. The claim petition was contested by the insurer only. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the Tribunal framed the following issues:- “1. Whether on 11.05.2011 the driver of offending vehicle driving the vehicle No.JK02AA/1157 rashly and negligently and when it reached near Rajal National Highway under the jurisdiction of Police Station Nowshera he could not control the vehicle and caused accident, due to which petitioner sustained critical injuries? OPP 2. In case issue No.1 is provide in affirmative to which amount of compensation the petitioner is entitled to and from whom? OPP 3. Whether the driver of offending vehicle was not holding a valid driving licence at the time of accident, as such, respondent No.3 is not liable to indemnify the owner? OPR-3 4. OPP 2. In case issue No.1 is provide in affirmative to which amount of compensation the petitioner is entitled to and from whom? OPP 3. Whether the driver of offending vehicle was not holding a valid driving licence at the time of accident, as such, respondent No.3 is not liable to indemnify the owner? OPR-3 4. Whether the terms and conditions of the insurance policy have been violated, as such, respondent No.3 is not liable to pay any compensation to the petitioner? OPR-3 5. Relief….” The claimant besides himself entering the witness box, also examined Shivam Singh and Dr. Zakir Hussain as his witnesses to substantiate his claim and to discharge the onus of proof of issue Nos.1 and 2. The insurer also led its evidence in rebuttal and examined RW-Manish Kotwal, a legal executive of the Insurance Company and RW-Surinder Kumar, a clerk in the office of ARTO. 4. The Tribunal, upon appreciation of evidence brought on record by the parties, held issue No.1 proved in favour of the claimant and against the insurer and other respondents. Issue Nos. 3 & 4 were also held not proved by the insurer. The Tribunal, thus, considered the evidence with regard to quantum of compensation payable to the claimant and held him entitled to compensation of Rs.7,94,000/- alongwith interest. The insurer is aggrieved of the award and has challenged the same, inter alia, on the filing grounds:- a) The Tribunal has failed to consider that breach of permit conditions is a valid defense available to the insurer under Section 149 of the Motor Vehicles Act. b) The offending bus, a passenger vehicle, at the time of accident was being used as a transport vehicle without any permit from the competent authority and, therefore, the insurer was absolved of its liability to indemnify the insured against any loss occurred to him on account of use of the offending vehicle. c) The Tribunal erroneously relied upon the medical certificate and the statement of Dr. Zakir Hussain. It is submitted that the claimant is a resident of village Balli Tehsil Kalakote but he managed the certificate of permanent disability from Dr. Zakir Hussain of Mendhar. It is further submitted that Dr. Zakir Hussain not being a neurosurgeon was not competent to issue the disability certificate relied upon by the claimant. Zakir Hussain. It is submitted that the claimant is a resident of village Balli Tehsil Kalakote but he managed the certificate of permanent disability from Dr. Zakir Hussain of Mendhar. It is further submitted that Dr. Zakir Hussain not being a neurosurgeon was not competent to issue the disability certificate relied upon by the claimant. d) The Tribunal committed an error in assuming that 70% disablement suffered by the claimant has also resulted in 70% loss of earning capacity. 5. The claimant has opposed the appeal of the insurer vehemently. It is urged that the onus of proof of issue Nos. 3 & 4 was on the insurer, which it failed to discharge by leading any cogent evidence and, thus, the Tribunal committed no illegality in rejecting the similar contentions of the insurer, as have been raised before this Court. The claimant pressed his appeal and sought enhancement of the compensation on the ground that the amount awarded by the Tribunal is on the lower side and the relevant guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court for assessment of compensation in case of a person suffering permanent disablement in motor vehicle accident have not been followed by the Tribunal. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7. It may be noted, at the outset, that the parties even the insurer has not disputed the factum of accident nor have they challenged the finding of the Tribunal that the claimant was hit and received injuries in the motor vehicle accident that took place on 11.05.2011 at Rajal National Highway involving the offending vehicle, which was being driven by respondent No.3 and owned by respondent No.2. The insurer, however, seriously disputed its liability to indemnify the owner and pay compensation to the claimant on the ground that the offending vehicle, at the time of accident, was being driven without permit. 8. Mr. Vishnu Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the insurer, argues that use of vehicle without permit is violation of condition excluding the use of vehicle and, therefore, a statutory defense in terms of Section 149(2)(1)(a)(i) of the Motor Vehicle Act is available to the insurer. He submits that, if such defense raised by the Insurance Company is proved, the Company is absolved of its liability to indemnify the owner. He submits that, if such defense raised by the Insurance Company is proved, the Company is absolved of its liability to indemnify the owner. Relying upon the judgment of Supreme Court rendered in the case of National Insurance Company Limited v. Challa Bharathamma, 2004 ACJ 2094 , learned counsel contends that the instant case was a fit case, where the Tribunal should have applied the principle of pay and recover. 9. With a view to appreciate the contention of learned counsel for the appellant, it is necessary to set out few relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). Section 2 (31):- “permit” means a permit issued by a State or Regional Transport Authority or an authority prescribed in this behalf under this Act authorizing the use of motor vehicle as a transport vehicle. The term “transport vehicle? however, is defined in Section 2(47) of the Act which reads as under:- “transport vehicle” means a public service vehicle, a goods carriage, an educational institution bus or a private service vehicle”. 10. Chapter-V of the Act deals with control of transport vehicles and makes provisions with regard to the necessity of permits for transport vehicles. Section 66 of the Act is relevant in the context of controversy and is, thus, reproduced hereunder:- 66. Necessity for permits. 1. 10. Chapter-V of the Act deals with control of transport vehicles and makes provisions with regard to the necessity of permits for transport vehicles. Section 66 of the Act is relevant in the context of controversy and is, thus, reproduced hereunder:- 66. Necessity for permits. 1. No owner of a motor vehicle shall use or permit the use of the vehicle as a transport vehicle in any public place whether or not such vehicle Is actually carrying any passengers or goods save in accordance with the conditions of a permit granted or countersigned by a Regional or State Transport Authority or any prescribed authority authorising him the use of the vehicle in that place in the manner in which the vehicle is being used: Provided that a stage carriage permit shall, subject to any conditions that may be specified in the permit, authorise the use of the vehicle as a contract carriage: Provided further that a stage carriage permit may, subject to any conditions that may be specified in the permit, authorise the use of the vehicle as a goods carriage either when carrying passengers or not: Provided also that goods carriage permit shall, subject to any conditions that may be specified in the permit, authorise the use of the vehicle for the carriage of goods for or in connection with a trade or business carried on by him. 2. The holder of a goods carriage permit may use the vehicle, for the drawing of any public or semi-trailer not owned by him, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed. 3. 2. The holder of a goods carriage permit may use the vehicle, for the drawing of any public or semi-trailer not owned by him, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed. 3. The provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply-- a. To any transport vehicle owned by the Central Government or a State Government and used for Government purposes unconnected with any commercial enterprise; b. To any transport vehicle owned by a local authority or by a person acting under contract with a local authority and used solely for road cleansing, road watering or conservancy purposes; c. To any transport vehicle used solely for police, fire brigade or ambulance purposes; d. To any transport vehicle used solely for the conveyance of corpses and the mourners accompanying the corpses; e. To any transport vehicle used for towing a disabled vehicle or for removing goods from a disabled vehicle to a place of safety; f. to any transport vehicle used for any other public purpose as may be prescribed by the State Government in this behalf; g. to any transport vehicle used by a person who manufactures or deals in motor vehicles or builds bodies for attachment to chassis, solely for such purposes and in accordance with such conditions as the Central Government may, by notification in the Offical Gazette, specify in this behalf; h. [*******] i. to any goods vehicle, the gross vehicle weight of which does not exceed 3,000 kilograms; j. subject to such conditions as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify, to any transport vehicle purchased in one State and proceeding to a place, situated in that State or in any other State, without carrying any passenger or goods; k. To any transport vehicle which has been temporarily registered under section 43 while proceeding empty to any place for the purpose of registration of the vehicle; l. [*****] m. to any transport vehicle which, owing to flood, earthquake or any other natural calamity, obstruction on road, or unforeseen circumstances is required to be diverted through any other route, whether within or outside the State, with a view to enabling it to reach its destination; n. to any transport vehicle used for such purposes as the Central or State Government may, by order, specify; o. to any transport vehicle which is subject to a hire-purchase, lease or hypothecation agreement and which owing to the default of the owner has been taken possession of by or on behalf of, the person with whom the owner has entered into such agreement, to enable such motor vehicle to reach its destination; or p. To any transport vehicle while proceeding empty to any place for purpose of repair. 4. Subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), sub-section (1) shall if the State Government by rule made under section 96 so prescribes, apply to any motor vehicle adapted to carry more than nine persons excluding the driver.” 11. Section 81 deals with duration and renewal of permits. Relevant portion whereof is reproduced hereunder:- “81. Duration and renewal of permits. (1) A permit other than a temporary permit issued under section 87 or a special permit issued under sub-section (8) of section 88 shall be effective without renewal for a period of five years: Provided that where the permit is countersigned under sub- section (1) of section 88 such countersignature shall remain effective without renewal for such period so as to synchronies with the validity of the primary permit. (2) A permit may be renewed on an application made not less than fifteen days before the date of its expiry. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2), the Regional Transport Authority or the State Transport Authority, as the case may be, may entertain an application for the renewal of a permit after the last date specified in that sub-section if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by good and sufficient cause from making an application within the time specified. (4) ……………………….. (5) Where a permit has been renewed under this section after the expiry of the period thereof, such renewal shall have effect from the date of such expiry irrespective of whether or not a temporary permit has been granted under clause (d) of section 87 and where a temporary permit has been granted, the fee paid in respect of such temporary permit shall be refunded.” 12. From a conjoint reading of the above sections of the Act reproduced herein above, it is abundantly clear that a permit is required only, if a motor vehicle is to be used as transport vehicle and transport vehicle as defined in Section 2 (47) means a public service vehicle, goods carriage, an educational institution bus or private service vehicle. 13. The expressions used in Section 2(47) like “public service vehicle”, “goods carriage” have also been separately defined in Section 2 of the Act. 14. Section 66 deals with necessity for permits for the use of vehicle as transport vehicle in any public place. 13. The expressions used in Section 2(47) like “public service vehicle”, “goods carriage” have also been separately defined in Section 2 of the Act. 14. Section 66 deals with necessity for permits for the use of vehicle as transport vehicle in any public place. It further mandates that a transport vehicle must be used in the public place in accordance with the conditions of the permit granted by the competent authority. 15. Sub Section 3 of Section 66 lays down certain exceptions where permit may not be required for some class of transport vehicles. Section 80 lays down procedure in applying for and granting permits. 16. Section 81 reproduced herein above clearly lays down that a permit other than a temporary permit issued under Section 87 or a special permit issued under Sub Section 88(8) shall be effective for a period of five years from the date of issuance or renewal thereof. Furthermore, in terms of Sub Section 5 of Section 81, where the permit has been renewed under Section 81 after expiry of the period thereof, such renewal shall have the effect from the date of expiry of the permit meaning thereby that renewal of the permit when granted by the competent authority would date back to its expiry. The renewal would regularize the period between expiry of the permit and its actual renewal by the competent authority. 17. In the backdrop of aforesaid provisions of the Act, when the defense of the insurer raised in terms of Section 149(2)(a)(i) is appreciated, it is seen that apart from other statutory defenses available to the insurer, the insurer can very well seek to avoid its liability under the policy of insurance, if it pleads and demonstrates that there has been breach of condition of the policy excluding the use of vehicle, inter alia, for a purpose not allowed by the permit under which the vehicle is used, where the vehicle is a transport vehicle. So to say that use of transport vehicle for the purpose not allowed by the permit is a fundamental breach of the conditions of the insurance policy is much appreciable and accepted proposition of law. However, use of motor vehicle as transport vehicle without permit authorizing its use is different from the use of transport vehicle in violation of the terms of the permit. 18. However, use of motor vehicle as transport vehicle without permit authorizing its use is different from the use of transport vehicle in violation of the terms of the permit. 18. The case of Challa Bharathamma (supra) cited by the learned counsel for the insurer, was a case where the transport vehicle at the time of accident was being plied in public place without route permit and the Court after considering the relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act including Section 149 came to the conclusion that the violation of use of vehicle without permit was a fundamental breach of conditions of the policy absolving the insurer of its liability to indemnify the owner. The Court, however, looking to the beneficial nature of legislation and the object of providing compensation to the victim of motor vehicle accident, ultimately applied the principle of pay and recover. 19. There could be no dispute with regard to the proposition propounded by the learned counsel for the insurer and I am fully bound by the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Challa Bharathamma (supra). However, the facts of the instant case are slightly different. As per the evidence of RW-Shivam Kumar, a clerk in the office of ARTO, the offending vehicle was issued route permit on 29.07.2009 and the same was renewed upto 28th July, 2010. The route permit was further extended from 29th September, 2011 to 27th July, 2012. It has further come in his deposition that since the accident took place on 11.05.2011, as such, on the date of accident there was no valid permit in existence and it is, thus, violation of the Motor Vehicle Act. Accepting the testimony of RW- Surinder Kumar, on its face value, it needs to be noticed that the route permit, which was issued on 29th July, 2009 was to remain valid for a period of five years. This is so statutory provided by Section 81 of the Act. It is nobody?s case that the permit initially issued and renewed thereafter was a temporary permit issued under Section 87 or special permit issued under Section 88(8) of the Act. 20. From a plain reading of Section 81, reproduced herein above, it is abundantly clear that permit once issued under Section 66 or renewed shall be effective for a period of five years. 20. From a plain reading of Section 81, reproduced herein above, it is abundantly clear that permit once issued under Section 66 or renewed shall be effective for a period of five years. That apart, as is provided in Sub Section 5 of Section 81, permit once renewed shall have the effect of such renewal from the date of expiry of the original permit. As explained above, the renewal of permit takes care of the interregnum between the expiry of the permit and its renewal. Therefore, even on facts, it is clearly demonstrable that the offending vehicle at the time of accident was possessing a valid permit and, therefore, contention of the insurer that the vehicle was being used as a transport vehicle without permit is without any substance and deserves to be rejected out rightly. Otherwise also, it is not the case of the transport vehicle being used in public place without permit but is a case where at the time of accident, the permit of the offending vehicle had expired and the same was renewed few months thereafter. Going by the statutory provisions noted above, I have no doubt in my mind that the permit of the offending vehicle, in the instant case, was valid and subsisting even on the date of accident. 21. Contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the disability certificate issued by Dr. Zakir Hussain, who was not a specialist neurosurgeon, is also without any substance, therefore, deserved outright rejection. In the instant case, the certificate of disability has been issued by a board of doctors headed by the Block Medical Officer, Health and Family Welfare, Mendhar. Amongst others, the disability certificate has been singed by Dr. Tariq Mehmood, Assistant Surgeon (Ortho) and Dr. Zakir Hussain, B Grade Surgeon Specialist. The disability certificate has been issued on the basis of medical record of the Govt. Medical College, Jammu where the claimant remained admitted for treatment w.e.f. 12.05.2011 to 02.06.2011. Dr. Zakir Hussain, one of the signatories to the disability certificate, who appeared as witness of the claimant has elaborately deposed about the proceedings of the board of doctors of the office of Block Medical Officer, Mendhar. Looking to the certificate issued by in as many as four doctors, the contents whereof have been corroborated by Dr. Dr. Zakir Hussain, one of the signatories to the disability certificate, who appeared as witness of the claimant has elaborately deposed about the proceedings of the board of doctors of the office of Block Medical Officer, Mendhar. Looking to the certificate issued by in as many as four doctors, the contents whereof have been corroborated by Dr. Zakir Hussain, I find no reason to doubt its veracity nor do I find that in the absence of a neurosurgeon/physician, the doctors who issued the certificate were not competent to certify the disability. 22. The Motor Vehicles Act and the Rules framed thereunder do not provide for any particular form of the disability certificate nor do they provide that a disability certificate ought to have been issued by a Board of Doctors, however, this Court while dealing with another case has already issued guidelines for issuance of disability certificate to be used in motor accident claims and the same are not required to be reiterated once again in this appeal. 23. Suffice it to say that I find no infirmity in the disability certificate nor do I find any error of judgment committed by the Tribunal in taking the loss of earning capacity of the claimant as 70%. Admittedly, the claimant is driver by profession and with 70% disablement of left lower and upper limbs, his earning capacity would be drastically affected. As opined by the expert witness i.e. Dr. Zakir Hussain, the claimant would have difficulty in performing his job of a professional driver. True it is, that he may be in a position to do some other job or take up other avocation to earn his livelihood but that would not make the assessment of the Tribunal that claimant has suffered the loss of earning capacity to the extent of percentage of disability, arbitrary or irrational. I am in agreement with the view so taken by the Tribunal on the loss of earning capacity of the claimant. 24. Regarding quantum of compensation, it may be noted that the claimant, at the time of accident, was 26 years and was stated to be earning Rs. 6,000/- per month. The Tribunal has taken the monthly income of the claimant as Rs. 5,000/-, which, by no stretch of reasoning, can be said to be unreasonable, given the fact that the claimant is a driver by profession. 6,000/- per month. The Tribunal has taken the monthly income of the claimant as Rs. 5,000/-, which, by no stretch of reasoning, can be said to be unreasonable, given the fact that the claimant is a driver by profession. He has suffered permanent disability of 70% and the Tribunal has rightly taken the same percentage to be the loss of earning capacity. I find no reason or justification to differ with the view taken by the Tribunal given the nature of injuries suffered and resultant permanent disablement incurred. The claimant, a driver by profession, is indeed incapacitated to work as profession driver, therefore, his earning capacity is drastically affected. The Tribunal has correctly applied the multiplier of 17 but it has omitted to make addition to the monthly income by way of future prospects, as provided for in National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi and others (2017) 16 SCC 680 and in a recent judgment of the Supreme Court delivered in the case of Kajal v. Jagdish Chand and others (Civil Appeal No.735 of 2020 decided on 05.02.2020). Accordingly, the monthly income of the claimant deserves to be increased by 40%. 25. Therefore, taking the monthly income of the claimant as Rs. 5,000/-, adding 40% towards loss of future prospects, the monthly income of the claimant comes to 5000 + 2000= Rs. 7,000/-. Taking the disability @ 70 percent the monthly loss of earning capacity would come to Rs. 4,900/-. Applying the multiplier of 17, the total loss of future income comes to Rs. 9,99,600/-. Rest of the amounts awarded by the Tribunal on account of medical expenses, pain and suffering and loss of amenities of life are perfectly correct and, therefore, are not interfered with. The claimant would, thus, be entitled to following compensation. Loss of future income 9,99,600/- Medical expenses 20,000/- Pain and suffering 30,000/- Amenities of life 30,000/- Total 10,79,600/- The claimant would also be entitled to interest pendente lite and future on the awarded amount, as has been awarded by the Tribunal. 26. Modification of the award in the manner aforesaid also takes care of the appeal preferred by the claimant. 27. Therefore, the appeal filed by the insurer is found to be without any merit, hence dismissed and the appeal filed by the claimant is allowed and the award of the Tribunal is modified to the aforesaid extent.