JUDGMENT : The defendants 3 to 5 are the appellants. The respondents were the plaintiffs 2 to 4 and have been the legal representatives of the original plaintiff late Sri Rudraraju Venkataraju. He died during pendency of the suit and hence the respondents were brought on record as his L.Rs. The defendants 1 and 2 are not parties to this appeal and to the cross-objections. The 1st respondent presented the cross-objections. 2. The decree and judgment in O.S.No. 69 of 1987 dated 23.07.1996 on the file of the Court of the learned Subordinate Judge, Razole (Senior Civil Judge) is questioned in this appeal as well as in the cross-objections. 3. A decree for Rs.19,000/-(Rupees nineteen thousand only) with proportionate costs thereon with future interest at 6% p.a. from the date of the presentation of the plaint till realization was granted by the trial Court against the appellants and in favour of the respondents 1 to 3, while dismissing remaining part of their claim in the suit, without costs. The suit was also dismissed against the defendants 1 and 2. 4. Before considering and evaluating the material and evidence on record in this appeal, it is desirable to know the case of the respondents in the plaint and the defence in the written statement, of the appellants. 5. The original plaintiff Sri late Rudraraju Venkataraju was undisputedly the owner of the plaint schedule property (for short, ‘the suit house’). It is in ward No.3, R.S.No.97/7A in an extent of Ac.0-12 cents at Malkipuram Gram Panchayat of East Godavari District. Since it was a new construction, no door number as such was assigned to it. 6. The original plaintiff averred in the plaint that for the purpose of the branch of then Sri Konaseema Cooperative Central Bank at Malkipuram, they approached him to let out the suit house and requested him to make certain alterations to the suit house as suggested by the 1st appellant-General Manager. The rent was agreed at Rs.1000/-per month and it was the case of the original plaintiff in the plaint that as suggested by the then Manger of this cooperative bank viz., the 3rd appellant, he gave a letter to this bank. The rent was agreed at Rs.1000/-per month and it was the case of the original plaintiff in the plaint that as suggested by the then Manger of this cooperative bank viz., the 3rd appellant, he gave a letter to this bank. It is also the case of the original plaintiff in the plaint that this proposal was approved in the Board meeting of the bank on 05.09.1986, which consisted of the General Manager, the Deputy Registrar of Cooperative Societies and the Revenue Divisional Officer, being the chairman of this Board. 7. It is further averred in the plaint that the original plaintiff was informed of the same by a memo dated 11.09.1986 sent to the 3rd appellant, a copy of which was marked to the original plaintiff and that the 3rd appellant addressed a letter to the original plaintiff on 15.09.1986 calling upon to complete the alterations to the building for immediate occupation, while requesting the original plaintiff to execute a formal agreement constituting the terms already agreed and settled among them. The plaint sets out the alterations to be made being construction of a strong room, a stationery room, a office room, two bathrooms and latrines and residential quarters for the Manager of this branch. 8. It is also averred in the plaint that the original plaintiff spent more than Rs.25,000/- to make these alterations and informed the appellants of the same, while also bringing to their notice that the building was ready for occupation, even before 01.10.1986. The original plaintiffs, as per the averments in the plaint, had to spend Rs.6000/-for construction of the strong room particularity. Thereafter, a number of representations to different authorities were made as per the averments in the plaint including the 1st appellant. Since there was no action from them to take over this building for the purpose of the branch, the details of which are set out in the plaint, ultimately, as per the averments in the plaint, the original plaintiff had to issue a legal notice dated 26.08.1987 purportedly under Section 80 CPC to all the concerned including the 1st appellant and it was also served on the appellants as well as other defendants. 9. 9. It is also averred in the plaint that since the appellants did not occupy the building, though it was ready even before 01.10.1986, inspite of his several letters, representations, notices as well as oral representations to the 1st appellant, the District cooperative officer, the Revenue Divisional Officer , the District Collector and also Registrar of cooperative societies and the Managing Director of Cooperative Central bank and since he was made to wait without any positive action from these authorities, he suffered loss due to deprivation of rent for such period. According to him, he is entitled for the rent from 01.10.1986 to 01.12.1987 and also future rent at the rate of Rs.1,000/-till the premises is let out to third parties. 10. Thus claiming in the plaint that he suffered loss on account of the alterations carried out for the purpose of making the suit house ready for accommodating a branch of a bank, and further amount he would have to spent to convert this building into a residential house as he also suffered loss of rents as stated above, in all, he should be compensated by Rs.39,000/-. Thus, he claimed the relief in the suit and also future damages by way of loss of rent till the building was let out to others after affecting necessary modifications and for costs. 11. The 1st appellant filed written statement opposing the claim of the original plaintiff in the plaint, denying all the averments therein. There is no denial that the suit house was offered for the purpose of locating the branch at Malkipuram of SKCC bank, for which according to the averments in the written statement, an offer was made by the original plaintiff. It was also the case of the 1st appellant in the written statement that basing on such offer, then General Manager inspected the building along with then Branch Manager at Malkipuram, at which time, informed the requirements for locating a branch. By then, according to the averments in the written statement, the construction of the building was not over since only outer walls and slab were put up and the original plaintiff stated that he did not have any objection to put up the walls in such a manner to accommodate a branch of the bank in the premises including strong room. The averments in the written statement also spell out that only suggestions were made by the then General manager and no other request for additional construction or accommodation was made nor on account of it the original plaintiff had to incur any other additional expenditure on the building he was constructing. 12. It is also averred in the written statement that on the basis of application of the plaintiff requesting to take the suit house for the purpose of locating branch, the then Board passed a resolution accepting the offer of the original plaintiff to take this building on a monthly rental of Rs.1,000/-, subject to making the building suitable for locating its branch office and this resolution was communicated to the 3rd appellant. It is also averred in the written statement that the construction of the building was not completed within the time stated in the application of the original plaintiff and in the meantime, many objections were received by the 1st appellant from a number of societies and individuals complaining against location of this branch in a far away place from the village, at the suit house, on which an enquiry was ordered, before taking final decision by the authorities. Since offer of the original plaintiff was not communicated by the appellants accepting it, as per the averments in the written statement, there was no concluded contract between the appellants on one hand and the original plaintiff on the other. 13. While admitting that the proceedings of the Board was communicated to the 3rd appellant by a memo , a copy of which was marked to the original plaintiff while also calling upon him to enter into a lease upon settled terms and conditions to occupy the building, it is averred in the written statement that since it was felt that the building was not safe, from security point of view and could not be a proper location for offering services to the customers, as per outcome of the enquiry ordered, no further steps were taken in this regard. 14. While referring to petitions and representations sent by the original plaintiff for occupying the building, the alleged expenditure for converting the building of Rs.25,000/-is specifically denied in the written statement contending that except a strong room no other additional accommodation was made by the plaintiff for such purpose. 14. While referring to petitions and representations sent by the original plaintiff for occupying the building, the alleged expenditure for converting the building of Rs.25,000/-is specifically denied in the written statement contending that except a strong room no other additional accommodation was made by the plaintiff for such purpose. Loss of rent alleged by the original plaintiff is also denied in the written statement while stating that he did not take any steps to mitigate the loss. Thus, the 1st appellant denied liability of the bank for the suit claim. 15. The appellants 2 and 3 adopted the written statement of the 1st appellant. 16. Basing on the above pleadings, the trial Court settled the following issues for trial: “1. Whether there is a concluded contract between the parties for construction of the building? 2. Whether the plaintiff invested the amount for construction as required by the defendant Bank? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for damages as claimed for the construction of the building? 4.Whether the plaintiff is entitled for damages towards loss of income because of the failure to occupy by the defendants? 5. To what relief?” 17. At the trial, the 1st respondent examined himself as P.W.1. A mason, who attended to the construction and the alleged alterations in the suit house, as P.W.2 and P.W.3, being a third party who claimed to have witnessed such alterations for locating a branch of the Cooperative Bank were also examined on their behalf at the trial, while relying on Ex.A1 to A14, on behalf of the respondents. The then Branch Manager representing the 3rd respondent was examined as D.W.1 and then Branch Manager of the 3rd respondent, who was working then at Malkipuram by the date of the alleged suit transaction, was examined as D.W.2. The appellants relied on Ex.B1 and Ex.B2 in support of their contention. 18. On a careful and meticulous consideration of the material on record including evidence and considering the claims of both the parties with reference to their pleadings, the learned trial Judge accepted the claim of the respondents in part as stated above decreeing the suit, while dismissing remaining part of the claim of the respondents. 19. Heard arguments of Sri K.V.Seshagiri Rao, representing the appellants, and of Sri S. Subbareddy, learned counsel for the respondents. 20. Now the following points arise for determination: 1. 19. Heard arguments of Sri K.V.Seshagiri Rao, representing the appellants, and of Sri S. Subbareddy, learned counsel for the respondents. 20. Now the following points arise for determination: 1. Whether there was a concluded contract to have the suit house on lease by the appellants and the original plaintiff? 2. Whether the respondents are entitled for damages as claimed including rent for the suit house for the period from 01.10.1986 to 30.11.1987 with interest thereon? 3. Whether the decree and the judgment of the trial court requires interference? 4. To what relief? Point No.1:- 21. As seen from the material on record including the pleadings as well as the evidence, it is not in dispute that by July, 1986, the appellants agreed to locate their branch of Malkipuram, in the suit house. Apart from this evidence of P.W.1, which is in consonance with the claim in the plaint, there is definite version from D.W.2 in this context of considering location of the branch of SKCC Bank in the suit house. 22. D.W.2 clearly deposed in his examination-in-chief itself in this respect that pursuant to offer of P.W.1, who was their customer, to give away the suit house to locate their branch, at his request, the then General Manager of SKCC Bank visited the suit house, on 06.08.1986, in his presence, a cashier of this branch and P.W.1. During this visit, according to D.W.2, certain suggestions were made, to make this building suitable for locating the branch including a strong room. Thereupon, the material on record makes out that a letter in the nature of Ex.A1 was given to the 1st appellant by the original plaintiff Sri Rudraraju Venkataraju on 27.08.1986 agreeing to let out the building on a rent of Rs.1,000/-per month and to deliver the premises by 31.08.1996, after carrying out alterations as desired by the 1st appellant. He also expressed his consent to enter into a formal agreement for such purpose setting out the terms and conditions. D.W.2 admitted Ex.A1 stating that its original was given to the 1st appellant. He further deposed that the Board of their Bank accepted Ex.A1 proposal, which was communicated by him to P.W.1 vide Ex.A2. 23. The evidence of D.W.2 further makes out that in the wake of Ex.A2, P.W.1 approached him and by then no agreement was entered into in between these parties. He further deposed that the Board of their Bank accepted Ex.A1 proposal, which was communicated by him to P.W.1 vide Ex.A2. 23. The evidence of D.W.2 further makes out that in the wake of Ex.A2, P.W.1 approached him and by then no agreement was entered into in between these parties. Thereafter, according to D.W.2, he as well as P.W.1 met the then General Manager of the Bank, within 3 days therefrom, at which time, the General Manager informed P.W.1 that certain complaints were received against the suit house and to hold an enquiry thereon. 24. The fact remained established is that the suit house was not taken by the appellants to locate their branch. A lot of correspondence went on in this respect as could been seen from Ex.A3 and Ex.A5 to Ex.A9, in between 20.10.1986 to 13.08.1987. The contents of these letters or petitions make out the frantic effort made by the deceased plaintiff to implore upon the appellants to shift their branch to the suit house, while also complaining his hardship, since the building remained vacant. In all these documents, there is specific reference that the building was made ready and suitable to accommodate the branch of this bank well before 01.10.1986. Ultimately, since there was no response, the deceased plaintiff had to issue suit notice under Section 80 CPC as seen from Ex.A10 on 26.08.1987. 25. The manner in which the action upon Ex.A1 letter was taken by the Board of this bank as seen from Ex.B1, which is a copy of resolution, communicating the same calling upon the original plaintiff to enter into formal agreement completing necessary alterations for the purpose of the branch, on which D.W.2 sent Ex.A2 to the original plaintiff as rightly observed in the judgment under appeal are clearly indicative and demonstrative of the fact that there was a complete understanding, amounting to consensus ad idem in between the original plaintiff on one hand and the appellants on the other. Thus, it reflected a concluded contract in between these parties, whereby the appellants had agreed and accepted to have the suit house on rent from the deceased plaintiff. The agreed rent was also Rs.1,000/-. 26. The manner in which certain alterations were made pursuant thereto including raising a strong room in the suit house itself indicated that there was a positive response from the appellants. The agreed rent was also Rs.1,000/-. 26. The manner in which certain alterations were made pursuant thereto including raising a strong room in the suit house itself indicated that there was a positive response from the appellants. It infact, impelled the original plaintiff to make such alterations, to suit location of a branch of a bank. But for such acceptance, completing the contract, the original plaintiff would not have taken such steps to make the building suitable for the purpose of the appellants. 27. Strenuous contentions are advanced in this appeal questioning the finding of the trial Court in this respect and mainly on the ground that there is no documentary proof in respect thereof. It is further contended for the appellants that since the lease is in respect of a building and in relation to an institution like bank, it should be reflected by means of a lease deed in terms of the Transfer of Property Act setting out clear terms and conditions and that it also requires registration. Therefore, in the absence of any of these instances, it is the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the lease as propounded by the respondents, could not have been accepted by the trial court. Thus pointing out that the entire transactions have remained only at the stage of consideration of an offer, which did not fructify into a contract, it is further contended for the appellants the same could not have been made basis by the learned trial Judge to pass a decree against the appellants. 28. Sri S. Subba Reddy, learned counsel for the respondents contended that right reasons are assigned in the judgment under appeal and material on record particularly with reference to Ex.A1, Ex.B1 and Ex.A2 as well as consideration of the testimony of D.W.2 apart from P.W.1 clearly reflected that there was a concluded contract. In these circumstances, the contentions on behalf of the appellants, according to the learned counsel for the respondents, need not be taken into consideration nor they stand to ground. 29. The material on record did reflect, as discussed above, a completed contract between the original plaintiff on one hand and the appellants on the other by which they accepted to have the suit house on rent for locating their branch at Malkipuram. 29. The material on record did reflect, as discussed above, a completed contract between the original plaintiff on one hand and the appellants on the other by which they accepted to have the suit house on rent for locating their branch at Malkipuram. As rightly contended for the respondents, these circumstances clearly attracted Section 10 of The Contract Act, a reference of which is made in the judgment under appeal. Reference is also made in the judgment under appeal of Bikram Kishore Parida and others vs. Benudhar Jena, AIR 1976 Ori. 4 in this respect by the learned trial Judge, which is also relied on by the learned counsel for the respondents and rightly. 30. In this ruling, an extract from Anson’s Law of Contract is drawn in para 10. It is desirable to refer it hereunder: “10.… In Anson’s Law of Contract at page 29 :- “the intention of the parties is a matter of inference from their conduct and the inference is more or less easily drawn according to the circumstances of the case. “At page 32 it has also been stated that:- “the test of an intention to effect legal relations is an objective one. It may be that the promisor never anticipated that this promise would give rise to any legal obligation, but if a reasonable man would consider that he intended so to contract, then he will be bound to make good his promise” 31. This reference is made by the learned counsel for the respondents pointing out that the material on record clearly reflected the intentions of the parties. In as much as a concluded contract is based on the intentions of the parties demonstrative of completeness and mutual understanding, in relation to the present case on hand, according to the learned counsel for the respondents, it is well reflected. 32. This contention has to be accepted. 33. Apart from these circumstances as are available from the material on record, Ex.A2, stands as culmination of the deliberations in between these parties with reference to an offer and acceptance that was ultimately communicated to the original plaintiff by D.W.2. The offer in Ex.A1 was considered at appropriate level in this Bank as reflected by Ex.B1, on account of passing of resolution accepting such offer. The appellants now cannot resile from them. The offer in Ex.A1 was considered at appropriate level in this Bank as reflected by Ex.B1, on account of passing of resolution accepting such offer. The appellants now cannot resile from them. Added to it, the contention sought to be advanced now in this appeal was never their claim in the trial Court. These questions are raised for the first time in the appeal. They were never projected either in the written statement or through the testimony of D.W.2 or by suggesting such defence in the cross-examination to P.W.1, they cannot now be permitted. 34. Therefore, on a careful consideration of the material, the finding recorded by the learned trial Judge that there was a completed contract to take the suit house on lease on a monthly rent of Rs.1,000/-between the appellants on one hand and the deceased plaintiff on the other, is confirmed. 35. Thus, this point is answered. POINT NO.2:- 36. According to the respondents, the original plaintiff had to spend Rs.25,000/-to make alterations to the building to accommodate the branch of the appellants. The nature of alterations sought is set out in para-4 of the plaint. They are, provision for strong room, stationery room, office room, two bathrooms and two latrines and also residential quarters for the Manager. P.W.1 deposed in this respect and of effecting such alterations as desired by the appellants. According to him, they spent about Rs.35,000/-for such alterations. These alterations include, as seen from the testimony of P.W.1, constructing a strong room without windows only with a door in the hall portion of the building, making out provision for three separate rooms on the east and a big hall towards north as well as a room by its side. Two separate latrines were provided. Thus, as stated in the plaint, rooms for office including stationery room, strong room and also for other purposes of office were these alterations according to P.W.1. His evidence reflects that initially there were eight rooms in his building and which were altered to meet the requirements of the appellants. 37. However, D.W.2 deposed that by 06.08.1996 when their General Manager in his presence visited the suit house, the entire building was not constructed as such, except for raising three rooms with slab on the east, two rooms on the north and a hall. He also deposed that bathrooms were constructed in part of this site on the west. 37. However, D.W.2 deposed that by 06.08.1996 when their General Manager in his presence visited the suit house, the entire building was not constructed as such, except for raising three rooms with slab on the east, two rooms on the north and a hall. He also deposed that bathrooms were constructed in part of this site on the west. But he asserted that he and his General Manager did not offer any specifications, though they required a strong room to be constructed adjoining three rooms on the east and as a part of the hall. He also deposed that they did not suggest P.W.1 to remove some of the walls or to reconstruct few more walls including staircase to reach the terrace. D.W.2 also deposed that after 06.08.1986 he did not visit the suit house till the commissioner appointed in the suit visited this building. Similarly, according to him, their General Manager also did not visit this premises after 06.08.1986. 38. In order to know that there were certain structures raised in the building prior to these alleged alterations, the best evidence which the respondents could have produced at the trial was the sanctioned plan issued by the Gram Panchayat. It is not in dispute that Malkipuram is a major Gram Panchayat. Construction of the suit house must necessarily to be based on a sanctioned plan of the Gram Panchayat. Had it been produced, it would have given an indication as to the proposed structure of the suit house. Obviously, it was suppressed and the respondents did not choose to produce it. P.W.1 was specifically cross-examined on behalf of the appellants in this respect. His answer in this context apparently was evasive. When specifically questioned, P.W.1 stated in his cross-examination that he did not remember whether they got the building constructed after obtaining permission from the Panchayat and if notice of its completion was given to the Panchayat. Suggestion was made on behalf of the appellants to P.W.1, finding nature of this evasive answer to the effect that he came out with such version attributing lack of memory, since production of such sanctioned plan would run contrary to his case. These suggestions were also taken into consideration rightly, by the learned trial Judge in evaluating the nature of testimony of P.W.1 in this context. 39. These suggestions were also taken into consideration rightly, by the learned trial Judge in evaluating the nature of testimony of P.W.1 in this context. 39. As seen from the testimony of P.W.1, certain arrangement by using cement pipes was made, for flow of water for irrigation purposes of the land in the neighbourhood (Bodi in Telugu) raising the level of the land infront of the suit house, facing the main road, which is known as KNF road. Any facility so provided, would be for the benefit of this building and possibly a necessity for the respondents. It cannot be taken as an indication of bringing out certain extra amenities for locating the bank in this building. 40. The material on record from the testimony of P.W.1 and D.W.2 is also indicative of the fact that strong room was raised to meet the requirements of the branch and as suggested by D.W.2 and his General Manager. 41. On behalf of the respondents, reliance was also placed at the trial on the testimony of P.W.2. He claimed to be a mason at Malkipuram and deposed in respect of the alleged alterations brought to the building readjusting the structures. No documentary proof was adduced during trial in support of his version nor was any material placed at the trial to prove that P.W.2 was the mason, who actually attended to the work of this alleged alterations at the suit house. 42. Testimony of P.W.3 has no significance since he claimed to be a resident of neighbouring village, who was given to attending the cattle, whenever they were sick, to treat them. He claimed that such activity by him was going on in front of the suit house, beyond KNF road. His evidence as such, is not of any credibility. 43. Rightly, the testimony of P.W.2 and P.W.3 was rejected by the learned trial Judge being of no significance. 44. Strenuous contentions are advanced on behalf of the respondents in this respect and also with reference to the testimony of P.W.2. His evidence as such, is not of any credibility. 43. Rightly, the testimony of P.W.2 and P.W.3 was rejected by the learned trial Judge being of no significance. 44. Strenuous contentions are advanced on behalf of the respondents in this respect and also with reference to the testimony of P.W.2. When basic premise of structures available in this building initially when it was raised as per P.W.1, is not established as stated supra by producing sanctioned plan of the Gram Panchayat, in the light of testimony of D.W.2 as to nature of structure available in the form of the suit house by 06.08.1986 when he and his General Manager visited, the contention sought to be presented on behalf of the respondents, cannot be accepted. It was rightly rejected by the learned trial Judge. 45. A commissioner was appointed in the course of trial. The learned commissioner visited the suit house on 27.12.1987 and again on 02.01.1988. When the situation to consider in this context should be of July to September, 1986, a visit by the learned commissioner during December, 1987 or January, 1988 could not have elicited any information nor possibility of securing any information relating to such relevant period, is too remote. Even otherwise, this commissioner report though not formally marked during trial, which otherwise can be considered as a part of material record in the absence of any specific objections from the parties to the suit in terms of Order-26, Rule-10-A CPC, did not offer support the contention of the respondents. The learned trial Judge had chosen to reject the report of the learned commissioner more for the reason that it is based on the information furnished on behalf of the respondents than upon an independent assessment. The learned trial Judge is right in doing so. 46. However, the fact established and apparently undisputed, of raising a strong room in the building was considered by the learned trial Judge for the purpose of awarding the damages. The observations of the learned commissioner in the report were considered in this context despite rejecting the report itself. Reasons have been assigned by the learned trial Judge in this context, which as such cannot be derided or rejected. The observations of the learned commissioner in the report were considered in this context despite rejecting the report itself. Reasons have been assigned by the learned trial Judge in this context, which as such cannot be derided or rejected. Either the written statement of the 1st appellant or the testimony of D.W.2 did not deny that a strong room was raised on account of the suggestion of the then General Manager in the presence of D.W.2 during their visit to this premises. Strong room is not necessary for the purpose of a residential house. Since there was agreement to take this building on a monthly rent on behalf of the appellants, a strong room was constructed in the hall portion of this building. Location of this building as well as the rooms as well as strong room is clearly shown in the plan appended to the commissioner’s report. 47. As seen from the contention of the respondents, Rs.6,000/-was spent for raising the strong room. Except the testimony of P.W.1, there is no other evidence on record in this respect. Added to it, even with reference to the entire claim, either as seen from the plaint or the testimony of P.W.1 that the original plaintiff had spent either Rs.25,000/-or Rs.30,000/-as deposed by P.W.1 for making these alterations, neither there are specific pleadings in the plaint clearly indicating the expenditure incurred item-wise nor evidence. 48. When a specific plea is raised on behalf of the respondents, as the plaintiffs, making such claim for damages, they should necessarily furnish all particulars in respect thereof clearly depicting the expenditure incurred item-wise. When the claim of the respondents is that they went to the extent of making major alterations by removing or adding certain walls or structures to the building to accommodate the respondents, these particulars and details should have been specifically pleaded in the plaint. In consonance with such pleadings, they should have let in evidence. This is a major flaw in the case of the respondents. Oral evidence of P.W.2 cannot be a substitute in this context. 49. Even as seen from the deposition of P.W.2, the probable expenditure for the purpose of carrying out these alterations, specifically item-wise was not brought out. He merely deposed that Rs.30,000/-or so was spent for the purpose of these alterations. Oral evidence of P.W.2 cannot be a substitute in this context. 49. Even as seen from the deposition of P.W.2, the probable expenditure for the purpose of carrying out these alterations, specifically item-wise was not brought out. He merely deposed that Rs.30,000/-or so was spent for the purpose of these alterations. When he stated to be a mason, who attended to such work, a bald statement and which is as vague as it could be, cannot be held sufficient to prove this fact. 50. These facts need to be taken into consideration particularly in the light of the finding recorded by the learned trial Judge in awarding Rs.5,000/-as damages for constructing a strong room in this building. The learned trial Judge rejected the claim of the respondents for Rs.6000/-in this respect. But reliance is placed upon an estimate of expenditure given by the learned commissioner in the report for constructing this strong room at Rs.5,0000/-. When the fact admitted is that the strong room was raised at the instance of the respondent, in the absence of any other material, possibly the learned trial Judge was right in relying on such observations of the commissioner. 51. Contentions are advanced in this appeal that while the learned trial Judge was right in rejecting the claim of the respondents that there was an alteration of the building for their purpose to accommodate their branch, there is no justification to award such amount for constructing a strong room. It is further contended that the report of the learned commissioner shows that a strong room was raised in the hall portion without any windows and with a door. It is further contended that the strong room by itself makes out that its construction should be of different nature and the door provided to this room should be proved that it is strong enough to secure the contents of this room. In the absence of such material, it is contended for the appellants that awarding Rs.5,000/-by the learned trial Judge for constructing this strong room, is not proper. The learned counsel for the respondents in fact contended that the entire claim towards damages should have been awarded for which purpose the respondents have also raised cross-objections questioning the findings in the judgment of the learned trial Judge. 52. The learned counsel for the respondents in fact contended that the entire claim towards damages should have been awarded for which purpose the respondents have also raised cross-objections questioning the findings in the judgment of the learned trial Judge. 52. In the absence of any material, when the learned trial Judge had chosen to rely on the report of the learned commissioner and his assessment of expenditure for raising for such a strong room, it is not necessary that it should be interfered with. Apparently, it is a reasonable assessment. 53. The original plaintiff was right in making a claim for rent right from 01.10.1986 to 01.12.1987 at the rate of Rs.1000/-per month. It is not as though he did not keep the appellants informed that the building was ready for their occupation. As already stated, sufficient correspondence was entered into in the nature of representations and petitions by him requesting the appellants to take over this building. One ground the appellant tried to project in this case to justify their inaction to occupy this premises is complaints from certain quarters about location of this building and safety in locating the bank in such premise as well as inconvenience to the customers. The reason sought to be projected is that the place where the suit house is located is away from the village. However, D.W.2 and his General Manager after assessing and evaluating the suitability of the premises accepted to have this building for their branch purpose. 54. Evidence of P.W.1 makes out that a cinema theatre is located nearby apart from telephone exchange. D.W.2 also deposed that the distance between the suit house and the building where their branch then located in that village, is 1 K.M. His evidence points out that there were already building in the vicinity of the suit house and that it is located on the main road, leading to Sakhineti Palli. He also deposed that at a distance of about 100 yards on the other side of the road of the suit house, FCI godowns are located. When such is the nature of location of this building, it cannot be stated that security would have been a cause for not occupying it. As rightly contended for the respondents there appears to be other reasons which the appellants did not project in this case to reject this building for their branch purposes. When such is the nature of location of this building, it cannot be stated that security would have been a cause for not occupying it. As rightly contended for the respondents there appears to be other reasons which the appellants did not project in this case to reject this building for their branch purposes. The respondents claimed that it was on account of the political interference, their building was not accepted. 55. Suitability of the suit house to locate a branch could not have been a factor for the appellants to refuse to locate their branch. One of the contentions of the appellants is that the deceased plaintiff had agreed to give the premises by 31.08.1986 and he did not stand by it. The material on record makes out that the deceased plaintiff received communication from the appellants through Ex.A2 dated 13.09.1986. Therefore, final acceptance of the premises upon approval of the Board vide Ex.B1 resolution dated 05.09.1986 was communicated beyond 31.08.1986. As already stated, the consistent version of the deceased plaintiff including the testimony of P.W.1 is that the building was made 1st ready for occupation by the bank, well before October, 1986. Therefore, immediately upon receipt of Ex.A2, apparently the deceased 1st plaintiff got the building ready as desired. Therefore, the reason so sought to be assigned by the appellants in this context basing on delay in handing over the premises, cannot stand. 56. The version of the 1st appellant in para-3 of the written statement in this context should be taken into consideration. It makes out as if they would have accepted this building for their branch purpose if the deceased plaintiff had completed the construction of the building on or before 31.08.1986 as stated in Ex.A1. It was also stated in the same paragraph that no complaints were received by then and it would have enabled to shift the branch of this building. 57. It cannot be the reason at all for the appellants to avoid this building. The appellants went on assigning one reason or other obviously inventing such factors and circumstances to justify their inaction to occupy the suit house though it was very much available, by September, 1986 itself. As rightly contended for the respondents, it should also be borne in mind that the branch was shifted to another premises by the years 1990-91. Evidence of D.W.2 refers to this fact. As rightly contended for the respondents, it should also be borne in mind that the branch was shifted to another premises by the years 1990-91. Evidence of D.W.2 refers to this fact. D.W.2 also deposed that they were in search of an alternative accommodation as the existing accommodation was unable to withstand effect of rains, since the roof of the building had developed leakage. Thus, he suggested that there was seepage affecting the records in the branch, as the impending necessity to shift the bank to another premises. 58. Therefore, even though the premises of the respondents was available well before the years 1990-91, which was made ready to accommodate the branch of the appellants, it is manifest that they avoided to occupy purposely and intentionally. Keeping the deceased plaintiff or the respondents waiting, without any response in this respect and without any intimation whether they would occupy the premises or not for long, is justifiable reason to claim rent for such period. Rightly such step was taken by the deceased plaintiff, in the plaint. 59. One of the contentions of the appellants is that there was no compelling necessity for the respondents to retain this building without letting it out and steps could have been taken by them to mitigate the loss, if any, to suffer. In fact, as seen from the judgment under appeal, learned trial Judge clearly recorded that on behalf of the respondents, a memo was filed during the course of trial that they got the building altered and leased out the same to others after the suit was filed. This factor reflects that even during pendency of the suit, the building was not let out by the respondents. It further reflected the conduct of the respondents. It is not for the appellants to suggest that there was no necessity for the respondents to wait for long without letting out the premises to third parties. 60. In as much as the admitted situation of the suit house proved that the building was converted for commercial exploitation for a Bank raising a strong room, it should be altered, converting into a residential premises. For such reason alone it appears that a memo was filed on behalf of the respondents during the course of the trial in the suit informing such fact of altering the structures in the building and letting out to third parties. For such reason alone it appears that a memo was filed on behalf of the respondents during the course of the trial in the suit informing such fact of altering the structures in the building and letting out to third parties. Therefore, the question relating to mitigation of the loss suffered by the respondents keeping this building vacant, cannot be a factor or a reason for the appellants to contend in this appeal. Obviously, they are taking advantage of their own wrong upon creating such circumstance for the respondents to suffer. Taking advantage of the same, apparently, this contention is advanced, which cannot be encouraged nor can be accepted. 61. Thus, there is complete justification in awarding such amount by the learned trial Judge and right reasons are assigned in this context warranting no interference. 62. Thus, this point is answered. POINT NO.3:- 63. The learned trial Judge has meticulously considered oral and documentary evidence and recorded appropriate reasons, in drawing such conclusions. It is a well reasoned judgment in every respect and the same has to be confirmed. 64. In view of the findings on points 1 to 3, this appeal as well as the cross-objections should be dismissed. The appellants though were guided by the resolution of the Board of the bank as per Ex.B2 during pendency of the suit, did not choose to accept the decree passed against it in the suit. In fact, as seen from Ex.B2, an offer was made on behalf of this bank for Rs.30,000/-to settle this claim provided P.W.1 withdrew the suit. Though the decree passed in this case is for less than the above amount, the appellants unnecessarily pursued this matter in this appeal. This appeal was presented in the year 1996 initially in the District Court at Rajahmundry and later it appears that it was represented in the High Court at Hyderabad, where it was registered in the year 1999. Right from the year 1996, the matter was pursued by the appellants without any reason. In these circumstances, it is desirable that the appellants pay costs in this appeal to the respondents and the appellants shall bear their own costs. 65. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs of the respondents confirming the decree and judgment in O.S.No.69 of 1987 dated 23.07.1996 of the Court of learned Subordinate Judge, Razole. In these circumstances, it is desirable that the appellants pay costs in this appeal to the respondents and the appellants shall bear their own costs. 65. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs of the respondents confirming the decree and judgment in O.S.No.69 of 1987 dated 23.07.1996 of the Court of learned Subordinate Judge, Razole. The cross-objections filed by the respondents stand dismissed and without costs. The appellants shall suffer their costs in this appeal. As sequel thereto, all miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed. Interim Orders, if any, shall stand vacated.