ORDER : C. Praveen Kumar, J. 1. This batch of writ petitions came to be filed against a common award passed by the Labour Court, Guntur, wherein the request of the petitioners therein with regard to difference of bonus, wages for weekly holidays, reinstatement etc., were accepted. 2. Taking WP No. 19878 of 2000 as a lead petition and as the legal issues raised in all the writ petitions being same, the following order is passed. 3. The writ petitioner herein is a tobacco company engaged in purchase of Tobacco leaves and selling finest tobacco in domestic and international market. As the business of the company has come down after 1985, many workmen left the company after settling their accounts. The respondent herein joined as a lorry Driver on 27.9.1978 and remained absent from 27.8.1986. It is said that a charge-sheet came to be issued on 3.9.1986 and thereafter an Enquiry Officer was appointed. 4. The case of the employee is that when he was on duty, he was orally informed by the Management about his termination from service, which was without any notice or compensation. When the enquiry was pending, the workman filed an application in "Form N" before the controlling authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. Thereafter, a settlement was recorded on 8.11.1986 under Section 12(3) of ID. Act before the Assistant Commissioner of Labour-2, Guntur. The employee received the amount including gratuity to his satisfaction and a stamped receipt was also executed by him. Having regard to the settlement arrived at, the management dropped the disciplinary action. 5. After lapse of four years, the respondent-workman filed a claim petition claiming minimum wages and leave salary. Two years thereafter, he filed an application for reinstatement-ID No. 36 of 1992 in MP No. 41 of 1990 (under Section 33-C(2) of Industrial Disputes Act). By its award dated 31.5.2000, the labour Court ordered reinstatement of the employee into service without continuity in service and backwages. Accordingly, MP No. 41 of 1990 was allowed and the respondent therein/petitioner herein was directed to pay the amount within three months. Challenging the same, the present writ petition is filed. 6. Sri C. Niranjan Rao, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, would contend that, having settled the issue and having received the amount to his satisfaction, the workman could not have raised the I.D., without challenging the settlement. Challenging the same, the present writ petition is filed. 6. Sri C. Niranjan Rao, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, would contend that, having settled the issue and having received the amount to his satisfaction, the workman could not have raised the I.D., without challenging the settlement. He further pleads that the Labour Court could not have decided the lis, without any evidence being adduced by the claimant/workman. He further pleads laches on the part of the workman, as he approached the Labour Court six years after the settlement. In any event, he would submit that an application under Section 33-C(2) is not maintainable. 7. On the other hand, Sri D. Pitchaiah, the learned Counsel for the workman would contend that settlement can only be out of an Industrial Dispute and there being no dispute, question of conciliation and settlement does not arise and the said settlement is non est in the eye of law. According to him, the petitioner herein worked for more than 240 days and his removal without following the procedure contemplated under Section 25-F of Industrial Dispute Act is illegal. It is urged that, when facts are proved through documents, adducing oral evidence is unnecessary. In other words, his plea is that it is a dispute falling within the meaning of 2-A, and as such, the conclusion or settlement arrived at shall not prevent raising an Industrial Dispute. 8. The point that arises for consideration is, Whether the Labour Court was justified in entertaining the Industrial Dispute, and awarding the relief claimed by the workman? 9. Before proceeding further, it is to be noted here that the Labour Court, while granting reinstatement with backwages and continuity in service, directed the petitioner herein to pay Rs. 22,868.47 ps., towards difference of minimum wages and Rs. 960/- towards leave salary. All other claims were rejected. The difference of minimum wages came to be granted pursuant to an application under Section 33-C(2) of I.D. Act. 10. The Section 12 of ID. Act deals with duties of conciliation officers, which is as under: "12. Duties of Conciliation Officers.--(1) Where an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, the conciliation officer may, or where the dispute relates to a public utility service and a notice under Section 22 has been given, shall, hold conciliation proceedings in the prescribed manner. The Section 12 of ID. Act deals with duties of conciliation officers, which is as under: "12. Duties of Conciliation Officers.--(1) Where an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, the conciliation officer may, or where the dispute relates to a public utility service and a notice under Section 22 has been given, shall, hold conciliation proceedings in the prescribed manner. * The conciliation officer shall, for the purpose of bringing about a settlement of the dispute, without delay, investigate the dispute and all matters affecting the merits and the right settlement thereof and may do all such things as he thinks fit for the purpose of inducing the parties to come to a fair and amicable settlement of the dispute. * If a settlement of the dispute or of any of the matters in dispute is arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings the conciliation officer shall send a report thereof to the appropriate Government or an officer authorised in this behalf by the appropriate Government together with a memorandum of the settlement signed by the parties to the dispute. * If no such settlement is arrived at, the conciliation officer shall, as soon as practicable after the close of the investigation, send to the appropriate Government a full report setting forth the steps taken by him for ascertaining the facts and circumstances relating to the dispute and for bringing about a settlement thereof, together with a full statement of such facts and circumstances, and the reasons on account of which, in his opinion, a settlement could not be arrived at. * If, on a consideration of the report referred to in sub-section (4), the appropriate Government is satisfied that there is a case for reference to a Board, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, it may make such reference. Where the appropriate Government does not make such a reference it shall record and communicate to the parties concerned its reasons therefore. * A report under this section shall be submitted within fourteen days of the commencement of the conciliation proceedings or within such shorter period as may be fixed by the appropriate Government: Provided that, Subject to the approval of the conciliation officer, the time for the submission of the report may be extended by such period as may be agreed upon in writing by all the parties to the dispute." 11. From a reading of the above section, it is clear that conciliation officer shall hold conciliation proceedings where any industrial dispute exists or apprehended. Section 12 does not make any distinction with regard to a dispute under Section 2(k) or 2-A of I.D. Act. In fact, the findings recorded by the Labour Court would establish mat there was a settlement entered into under Section 12(3) of the Act during the course of conciliation before A.C.L. and the same is binding on workman. It would be useful to extract the same, which is as under: "It is an admitted fact, that a settlement was reached between the management and applicant under Section 12(3) under Ex. M7, the applicant has agreed to receive an amount of Rs. 5,733-19/- towards gratuity, leave salary, bonus, difference in wages in full and final settlement and he has received Rs. 2,953-84/- towards Gratuity and Rs. 2,775-35/- towards Bonus, Leave Salary, difference in wages in full and final settlement of all his claims under Ex. M8. Since the above settlement is under Section 12(3) of I.D. Act entered into during the course of conciliation before the A.C.L., the same is binding on the workman and it is not a case of the petitioner that the settlement is vitiated by fraud or coercion. Thus, the settlement entered into under Section 12(3) of I.D. Act under Ex. M7 is binding on both the parties." 12. That being the position, it is to be seen whether the Labour Court was right in awarding difference of minimum wages. Before proceeding further, it would be useful to extract the stamped receipt executed by the workman pursuant to a settlement under Section 12(3), which is as under: "Stamped Receipt Received Rs. 2,953-84 (Rupees Two thousand nine hundred fifty three and paise eighty four only) bearing Cheque No. 0838853, dated 31.10.1986, towards gratuity and Cheque bearing No. 894652, dated 31.10.1986 for Rs. 2,779.35 (Rupees Two thousand seven hundred seventy nine and paise thirty five only) towards Bonus, Leave Salary, difference in wages and in full and final settlement of all the claims from the employer Bommidala Brothers Ltd., Guntur an amount of Rs. 500/- (Rupees Five hundred only) is set off against his loan amount. The total being Rs. 5,773.19/- (Rupees Five thousand seven hundred thirty three and paise nineteen only) I will have no further claim against the above employer. 500/- (Rupees Five hundred only) is set off against his loan amount. The total being Rs. 5,773.19/- (Rupees Five thousand seven hundred thirty three and paise nineteen only) I will have no further claim against the above employer. Place : Guntur Date : 31.10.1986 Sd/- Sk. Jhani Basha (in Telugu) Witness:-- 1. Sd/- K. Raju (in Telugu) Before me, Sd/- xxxxxxxx Assistant Commissioner of Labour 2nd Circle, Guntur 31.10.1986" 13. A reading of the stamped receipt would show that the workman has accepted a sum of Rs. 2,779.35 towards bonus, leave salary and difference in wages in full and final settlement of all claims. 14. The issue as to whether the settlement arrived at under Section 12(3) of the Act is binding on all workman, is no more res Integra. In Ram Pukar Singh and others v. Heavy Engineering Corporation and others, Civil Appeal No. 315/1991, dated August 31st, 1994, the Apex Court while dealing with facts in issue held as under: "Admittedly, there was only one Union representing all workers during all the relevant period. The settlement dated 13th September, 1990 was admittedly under Section 12(3) read with Section 18 and other provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. The settlement was, therefore, binding on all the workmen whether they were members of the Union or not. In the circumstances, we are of the view that the said settlement of 13th September, 1990 is binding on the appellants. Under the said settlement it is solemnly agreed that they will not claim any arrears of salary till 13th October, 1990 on which day they were appointed to the post of Assistant Personnel Officer. According to us, the High Court has taken the correct view of the matter." 15. In National Engineering Industries v. State of Rajasthan, 2002 LLR 228 (SC), the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while dealing with the issue as to whether the settlement arrived at under the Industrial Disputes Act is binding on all workman, held as under: "........... Settlement is arrived at by the free Will of the parties and is pointer to there being goodwill between them. Settlement is arrived at by the free Will of the parties and is pointer to there being goodwill between them. When there is a dispute that the settlement is not bona fide in nature or that it has been arrived at on account of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment of facts or even corruption and other inducements, it could be the subject-matter of yet another industrial dispute which an appropriate Government may refer for adjudication after examining the allegations as there is an underlying assumption that the settlement reached with the help of the Conciliation Officer must be fair and reasonable." 16. Similarly in Transmission Corporation A.P. Ltd. v. P. Ramachandra Rao and another, 2006 LLR 576 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the same. After referring to the authorities on the subject, the Court held that a settlement under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be held either unjust or unfair or illegal when the employees having retired before the date of settlement would not be entitled to the benefits as occurring out of the settlement. A settlement cannot be weighed in any golden scales and the question whether it is just and fair has to be answered on the basis of principles different from those which come into play when an industrial dispute is under adjudication." 17. From the judgments of the Apex Court referred to above, coupled with the findings of the Labour Court extracted above, it is clear that the settlement arrived at under Section 12(3) of the Act, which is not disputed, is binding on the workman. 18. The next question is, whether the settlement under Section 12(3) of the Act could be contrary to the statue vis-a-vis Section 25 of Minimum Wages Act. The Stamp receipt issued by the workman show that the amount received includes difference of minimum wages as well. In ITC Ltd. Workers Welfare Association v. Management of I.T.C. Ltd., AIR 2002 SC 937 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: "A settlement is a product of collective bargaining and is entitled to due weight and consideration more so when a settlement is arrived at in the course of conciliation proceeding. In ITC Ltd. Workers Welfare Association v. Management of I.T.C. Ltd., AIR 2002 SC 937 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: "A settlement is a product of collective bargaining and is entitled to due weight and consideration more so when a settlement is arrived at in the course of conciliation proceeding. The settlement can only be ignored in exceptional circumstances viz., if it is demonstrably unjust, unfair or the result of mala fides such or corrupt motives on the part of those who were instrumental in effecting the settlement. Also the settlement has to be judged as a whole, taking an overall view and cannot be examined in piecemeal and in vacuum. Viewed in the light of these principles it cannot be said that the settlement which is otherwise valid and just suffers from any legal infirmity merely for the reason that one of the clauses in the settlement extends the benefit of life pension scheme only to the employees retiring after a particular date. Exclusion of workmen retiring before that date is no ground to characterise the settlement as unjust or unfair, more so when it was done with the consent of majority of workmen." 19. Therefore, a settlement under Section 12(3) of the Act can be ignored in exceptional circumstances if it is demonstrably unjust, unfair, or as a result of mala fides, such as corrupt motives on the part of those who were instrumental in effecting the settlement. But in the instant case, we do not find any unjust, unfair or mala fides on the part of authority in effecting the settlement. 20. Even otherwise, two other issues crop up for consideration, namely:--(1) Whether such a relief could have been granted in an application filed under Section 33-C(2) of ID. Act and (2) that too after a delay of six years from the date of settlement? 21. A three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ganesh Razak another, 1995 LLR 161 : 1995 (1) ALD (S.C.S.N.) 17-3, while dealing with the maintainability of an application filed under Section 33-C of the Act held that, the High Court has referred to some of these decisions but missed the true import thereof. 21. A three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ganesh Razak another, 1995 LLR 161 : 1995 (1) ALD (S.C.S.N.) 17-3, while dealing with the maintainability of an application filed under Section 33-C of the Act held that, the High Court has referred to some of these decisions but missed the true import thereof. The ratio of the decisions referred clearly indicate that where the very basis of the claim or the entitlement of the workmen to a certain benefit is disputed, there being no earlier adjudication or recognition thereof by the employer, the dispute relating to entitlement is not incidental to the benefit claimed and is, therefore, clearly outside the scope of the proceeding under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. The Labour Court has no jurisdiction to first decide the workmen's entitlement and then proceed to compute the benefit so adjudicated on that basis in exercise of its power under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. It is only when the entitlement has been earlier adjudicated or recognized by the employer and thereafter for the purpose of implementation or enforcement thereof some ambiguity requires interpretation that the interpretation is treated as incidental to the Labour Court's power under Section 33-C(2) like that of the Executive Courts power to interpret the decree for the purpose of its execution. 22. In Bombay Gas Company Ltd. v. Gopal Bhiva and others, 1964 (3) SCR 709 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, the proceedings contemplated by Section 33-C(2) are analogous to execution proceedings and the Labour Court, like Executing Court in the execution proceedings governed by the Code of Civil Procedure, would be competent to interpret the award on which the claim is based. It is obvious that the power of the Executing Court is only to implement the adjudication already made by a decree and not to adjudicate a disputed claim which requires adjudication for its enforcement in the form of degree. The Executing Court, after the decree has been passed, is however competent to interpret the decree for the purpose of its implementation. 23. In The Central Bank of India Ltd. v. P.S. Rajagopalan etc., 1964 (3) SCR 140 , the Court considered maintainability of proceedings under Section 33-C(2) of the Act in a claim made by the workmen on the basis of the Sastry Award. 23. In The Central Bank of India Ltd. v. P.S. Rajagopalan etc., 1964 (3) SCR 140 , the Court considered maintainability of proceedings under Section 33-C(2) of the Act in a claim made by the workmen on the basis of the Sastry Award. The employer disputed the claim of the workmen on several grounds including the applicability of Section 33-C(2) of the Act. It was urged that since the applications involved interpretation of the Sastry Award, they were outside the purview of Section 33-C(2), as interpretation of awards or settlements is expressly provided in Section 36-A. This objection was rejected. The Court pointed out the difference in the scope of Section 36-A and Section 33-C(2) indicating that the distinction lies in the fact that Section 36-A is not concerned with the implementation or execution of the award whereas that is the sole purpose of Section 33-C(2); while Section 33-C(2) deals with the cases of implementation of individual rights of workmen falling under its provisions. Section 36-A deals merely with the interpretation of the award, where a dispute arises between the workmen and the employer and the appropriate Government is satisfied that the disputes deserves to be resolved by reference under Section 36-A. In this context, the Apex Court also indicated that the power of the Labour Court in a proceeding under Section 33-C(2) being akin to that of the Executing Court, the Labour Court is competent to interpret the award or settlement on which a workman bases his claim under Section 33-C(2), like the power of the Executing Court to interpret the decree for the purpose of execution. Relevant extract from the decision is as under: "Besides, there can be no doubt that when the Labour Court is given the power to allow an individual workman to execute or implement his existing individual rights, it is virtually exercising execution powers in some cases, and it is well settled that it is open to the Executing Court to interpret the decree for the purpose of execution. It is, of course, true that the executing Court cannot go behind the decree, nor can it add to or subtract from the provision of the decree. These limitations apply also to the Labour Court; but like the executing Court, the Labour Court would also be competent to interpret the award or settlement on which a workman bases his claim under Section 33-C(2). These limitations apply also to the Labour Court; but like the executing Court, the Labour Court would also be competent to interpret the award or settlement on which a workman bases his claim under Section 33-C(2). Therefore, we feel no difficulty in holding that for the purpose of making the necessary determination under Section 33-C(2), it would, in appropriate cases, be open to the Labour Court to interpret the award or settlement on which the workman's right rests." (at Pages 154-155) This decision itself indicates that the power of the Labour Court under Section 33-C(2) extends to interpretation of the award or settlements on which the workman's right rests, like the Executing Court's power to interpret the decree for the purpose of execution, where the basis of the claim is referable to the award or settlement, but it does not extend to determination of the dispute of entitlement or the basis of the claim, if there is no prior adjudication or recognition of the same by the employer. 24. In Chief Mining Engineer East India Coal Co. Ltd. v. Rameshwar and others, 1968 (1) SCR 140 , it was held that the right to the benefit which is sought to be computed under Section 33-C(2) must be an existing one, that is to say, already adjudicated upon or provided for. The propositions on the question as to the scope of Section 33-C(2) deducible from the earlier decisions of this Court were summarized and they include the following namely: "(1) The legislative history indicates that the Legislature, after providing broadly for the investigation and settlement of disputes on the basis of collective bargaining, recognized the need of individual workmen of a speedy remedy to enforce their existing individual rights and therefore inserted Section 33-A in 1950 and Section 33-C in 1956. These two sections illustrate cases in which individual workmen can enforce their rights without having to take recourse to Section 10(1) and without having to depend on their union to espouse their case. xxx xxx xxx *Section 33-C which is in terms similar to those in Section 20 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 is a provision in the nature of an executing provision. xxx xxx xxx *Section 33-C which is in terms similar to those in Section 20 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 is a provision in the nature of an executing provision. xxx xxx xxx (5) Section 33-C(2) takes within its purview cases of workmen who claim that the benefit to which they are entitled should be computed in terms of money even though the right to the benefit of which their claim is based is disputed by their employers. It is open to the Labour Court to interpret the award or settlement on which the workmen's right rests. xxx xxx xxx *Though the Court did not indicate which cases other than those under sub-section (1) would fall under sub-section (2), it pointed out illustrative cases which would not fall under sub-section (2) viz., cases which would appropriately be adjudicated under Section 10(1) or claims which have already been the subject-matter of settlement to which Sections 18 and 19 would apply. *Since proceedings under Section 33-C(2) are analogous to execution proceedings and the Labour Court called upon to compute in terms of money the benefit claimed by a workman is in such cases in the position of an executing Court, the Labour Court like the executing Court in execution proceedings governed by the Code of Civil Procedure, is competent under Section 33-C(2) to interpret the award or settlement where the benefit is claimed under such award or settlement and it would be open to it to consider the plea of nullity where the award is made without jurisdiction." (at Pages 142-144) 25. After stating the propositions, the decision proceeds to state as under: "It is clear that the right to the benefit which is sought to be computed must be an existing one, that is to say, already adjudicated upon or provided for and must arise in the course of and in relation to the relationship between an industrial workman and his employer...." 26. From the judgments of the Apex Court it is clear that the right to the benefit which is sought to be computed under Section 33-C(2) must be an existing one, that is already adjudicated upon or provided for. From the judgments of the Apex Court it is clear that the right to the benefit which is sought to be computed under Section 33-C(2) must be an existing one, that is already adjudicated upon or provided for. The Apex Court held that the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to decide the entitlement and then proceed to compute the benefit so adjudicated on that basis in exercise of its power under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. It is only for implementation of an adjudicated or recognized right of the employee, the power under Section 33-C(2) can be invoked. 27. In the instant case, admittedly, the application is for a relief under Section 33-C(2). There was no prior adjudication of the issue-difference in minimum wages. There was only a settlement under Section 12(3) of the Act, pursuant to which the employee accepted the difference of minimum wage to his satisfaction. There was nothing to be implemented as the employee received the amount agreed upon, which fact is not disputed. Further, the claim made before the Labour Court was disputed by the employer. Therefore, adjudication on the said issue now by the Labour Court and then awarding the amount, in my view, is beyond the scope of Section 33-C(2) of the Act. 28. Having regard to the above, the relief granted, namely, payment of difference of minimum wages, is liable to be set aside and the same is accordingly set aside. 29. The other issue, which requires consideration, is reinstatement into service. The case of the respondent/workman is that without issuing any notice and paying any compensation, as required under Section 25-F of ID. Act, the services of the workman was terminated, which is illegal. 30. 29. The other issue, which requires consideration, is reinstatement into service. The case of the respondent/workman is that without issuing any notice and paying any compensation, as required under Section 25-F of ID. Act, the services of the workman was terminated, which is illegal. 30. Section 25-F reads as under: "Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen" 25-F. No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until- * the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; * the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months; and * notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette." 31. The primary question is, whether the workman satisfies the requirement of being in continuous service for not less than one year under the employer. It is to be noted here that no evidence has been adduced to prove the same. The documents, which are placed on record, do not conclusively establish that the workman was in continuous service for a period of not less than one year with the employer. 32. In between General Manager Area 1, R.G. Division v. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal and another, 2003 (6) ALD 481 (DB) : 2004 I LLJ 136, the Division Bench of this Court, while considering this issue, held as under: "There is no controversy whatsoever that both the appellant-management and respondent-workman have not adduced any evidence, nor any submissions were made by them before the Tribunal. The Tribunal having noticed the same observed that it has no other alternative except to record a finding from the claim statement and counter filed by the parties." 33. The Tribunal having noticed the same observed that it has no other alternative except to record a finding from the claim statement and counter filed by the parties." 33. In Surendranagar District Panchayat v. Jethabhai Pitamberbhai, 2005 SCC (L&S) 1167, the Apex Court, while referring to the authority, in Mohan Lal v. Management of Bharat Electronics Ltd., (1981) 3 SCC 225 , held that before a workman can claim retrenchment not being in consonance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, he has to show that he has been in continuous service of not less than one year with the employer who had retrenched him from service. 34. In Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani, (2002) 3 SCC 25 , this Court held that, in our opinion the Tribunal was not right in placing the onus on the management without first determining on the basis of cogent evidence that the respondent had worked for more than 240 days in the year preceding his termination. It was the case of the claimant that he had so worked but this claim was denied by the appellant. It was then for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked for 240 days in the year preceding his termination. Filing of an affidavit is only his own statement in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to the conclusion that a workman had, in fact, worked for 240 days in a year. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record of appointment or engagement for this period was produced by the workman. On this ground alone, the award is liable to be set aside. 35. In Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and another, (2004) 8 SCC 161 ; Municipal Corporation, Faridabad v. Shri Niwas, (2004) 8 SCC 195 and MP. Electricity Board v. Hariram, (2004) 8 SCC 246 , the Apex Court has reiterated the principal that the burden of proof lies on the workman to show that he had worked continuously for 240 days in the preceding one year prior to his alleged retrenchment and it is for the workman to adduce evidence apart from examining himself to prove the factum of his being in employment of the employer." 36. From the judgments referred to above (no contra judgments produced), it is clear that evidence has to be produced by the workman to show that he worked continuously for a period of not less than one year with the employer and the burden of proving the same lies on the workman. As observed earlier, in the instant case, no such effort was made and the documents so marked do not establish the same. 37. Apart from that, it is also to be noticed that there was a settlement under Section 12(3) of ID. Act, pursuant to which the workman received all his monitory benefits, to his full satisfaction. Having accepted all the benefits, including gratuity, bonus etc., the respondent-workman cannot now turn around and say that his termination was illegal, without challenging the settlement/conciliation. Having regard to the above, issuing a notice etc., would not arise, as he voluntarily settled the issues with the employer and left the company. 38. Further, if really he was aggrieved by the acts of his employer; there is no justification for him to wait for six years before initiating the impugned proceedings. It appears that he waited till the disciplinary proceedings initiated against him are withdrawn pursuant to settlement under Section 12(3) of the Act and thereafter bounced back seeking various reliefs. 39. Having regard to the aforesaid findings, the writ petitions are allowed setting aside the award dated 31.5.2000 made in MP No. 41 of 1990; award dated 31.5.2000 made in ID No. 45 of 1992; award dated 31.5.2000 made in ID No. 36 of 1992; award dated 31.5.2000 made in MP No. 42 of 1990; and award dated 31.5.2000 made in MP No. 44 of 1990, respectively, on the file of Labour Court, Guntur. No order as to costs. 40. Consequently, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed.