ORDER : 1. These are the group of petitions preferred by both the sides where the company has preferred Special Civil Applications Nos. 19464/2017, 20731/2017, 20732/2017, 19462/2017, 20730/2017 and 20729/2017. 2. There are cross petitions filed by the employees which are Special Civil Application Nos. 2374/2018, 2375/2018, 2376/2018, 2377/2018, 2378/2018 and 2379/2018 respectively arising from the separate Reference Cases being Nos. 23/2006, 26/2006, 28/2006, 24/2006, 27/2006, 25/2006. 3. All these petitions and the cross petitions since involve identical questions of facts and law, they are being decided by this common order. For the purpose of adjudication, the brief facts are taken from Special Civil Application No. 2379 of 2018 as a lead matter from the group of employees where the employees will be addressed as the petitioners and the employer will be addressed as the respondent. 4. The present petition is filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India against the judgment and award dated 23.08.2017 passed in Reference (T) Case No. 25 of 2006 by the Labour Court, Junagadh, whereby the Court has party allowed the reference by directing the reinstatement of the employee without backwages and without continuity. 4.1. The petitioner joined the service of respondent company on 10.03.1997 as a helper and he continued his service till termination. The total period he has served is 4 years and 8 months. His oral termination came on 15.11.2001 allegedly without following due procedure. 4.2. The petitioner completed 240 days in each year and even in a year preceding his termination. Since his oral termination from service came, he alleged this to be in violation of provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the “ID Act”). 4.3. It is his explanation for late raising of dispute that he repeatedly had made requests to the company to reinstate him and he was orally assured. He was since in a need of job, he could not choose to challenge such order of termination. After waiting for a considerable period, when he was not taken back, he issued legal notice through the lawyer on 25.10.2005, where again, no response was given. Therefore, the employee was constrained to raise an industrial dispute which was referred to the Labour Court on 23.01.2006. 4.4. The petitioner filed statement of claim and the written statement was also filed by the respondent no.1 on issuance of notice. Therefore, the employee was constrained to raise an industrial dispute which was referred to the Labour Court on 23.01.2006. 4.4. The petitioner filed statement of claim and the written statement was also filed by the respondent no.1 on issuance of notice. Parties were permitted to adduce the evidences and they also submitted their written arguments. Eventually, the reference was decided allowing partly as mentioned herein above. 5. Aggrieved and dissatisfied by the judgment and award for not granting the back wages and also not allowing the continuity in the service, the petitioner is before this Court seeking following reliefs:- “(A) Quash and set aside the award dated 23.08.2017, passed by the learned Labour Court, Junagadh in Reference (T) Case No. 25/2006 to the extent of denying back-wages to petitioner, Annexure-A to this petition, and (B) Further be pleased to grant the relief as prayed for in Reference (T) Case No. 25/2006 qua backwages; and (C) Award the cost of petition; and (D) Pending admission and final disposal of this petition, the Honourable Court may be pleased to stay the implementation, execution and operation of impugned award dated 23.8.2017, passed by the Labour Court, Junagadh in Reference (T) Case No. 25/2006 qua denial of back-wages, Annexure-A to this petition, and/or (E) Grant any other relief or pass any other order, which the Honourable Court may consider as just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 6. As against that, the respondent is also aggrieved by this judgment and award, essentially on the ground that in case of similarly situated employees, the very Labour Court has granted lump-sum compensation where both the sides have challenged and eventually the parties have settled the dispute, however, it is not being cited as the precedent, but, according to the Respondent, there cannot be different approach for different set of employees. 6.1. According to the respondent, considering the total number of service period for which the petitioners have served as also the delay caused in raising the dispute, are two grounds why the Court should have allowed, if at all it was inclined to allow the reference by granting lump-sum compensation instead of reinstatement. Now, the machines in the company have become automated and many other persons have been employed, it is much difficult for the company also to accommodate these employees. Now, the machines in the company have become automated and many other persons have been employed, it is much difficult for the company also to accommodate these employees. Therefore, this respondent is before this Court in cross petition being Special Civil Application No. 20729 of 2017 seeking following reliefs:- “(A) Your Lordship may be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari or a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ order or direction to quash and set aside the impugned award passed by the Labour Court, Junagadh in Reference (LCJ) No. 25/2006. (B) Pending the hearing and final disposal of petition, Your Lordships may be pleased to stay the operation and implementation of the impugned award dated 23.08.2017 passed by the Labour Court, Junagadh in Reference (LCJ) No. 25 of 2006. (C) An ex-parte ad-interim relief in terms of prayer (B) above may kindly be granted; (D) Your Lordship may pass such other and further order or as may be deemed just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the present case.” 7. This Court has extensively heard learned advocate Ms. Harshal Pandya appearing with learned advocate Ms. Dhruvi Desai for the petitioners and learned advocate Ms. Khushbu Chhaya appearing for the respondents. 8. Learned advocate Ms. Pandya has argued fervently that in the statement of claim itself, the delay has been explained. These are the persons who hail from a socioeconomic strata where they are in dire need of finance and they do not have the courage to take up the dispute against the employer, more particularly, when they are desirous to continue the job. According to learned advocate Mr. Pandya, they are all young and desirous of doing service. They may have done some sundry jobs, but, that was insufficient to match the amount they used to get from the employer, which had been discontinued on account of action of the respondent. 8.1. She further has urged that not only 100% back wages should be a consequential order, once the reinstatement is granted, the Court ought to have taken care of the continuity of service. She has urged that on fact finding, unless the Court has not acted within its bounds, this Court is not to act as an appellate Court and interfere. 8.2. She has urged that on fact finding, unless the Court has not acted within its bounds, this Court is not to act as an appellate Court and interfere. 8.2. For the purpose of back wages and other submissions, she has relied on the following authorities of the Apex Court as well as this Court:- (a) Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.ED.) and Others [ (2013) 10 SCC 324 ]; (b) Tapash Kumar Paul vs. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited and Another [ (2014) 15 SCC 313 ]; (c) Devinder Singh vs. Municipal Council, Sanaur [ (2011) 6 SCC 584 ]; (d) Indian Rayon Industries Ltd. now known as Aditya Birla Nuvo Limited vs. Amarabhai Najabhai Chhatrodia and Another rendered by this Court in LPA No. 120 of 2016 in SCA No. 6763 of 2015; (e) Chandrakant G. Khagram vs. Manager rendered by this Court in SCA 1177 of 2003 and allied matters; (f) Zonal Manager State Bank of India vs. Modi Rajeshkumar Shantilal rendered by this Court in LPA No. 306 of 2008 in SCA No. 12285 of 2002; (g) Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi vs. Hindalco Industries Limited [ (2014) 11 SCC 85 ]; (h) Jasmer Singh vs. State of Haryana and Another [ (2015) 4 SCC 458 ]. 9. For and on behalf of the respondents, learned advocate Ms. Khushbu Chhaya has fervently urged that in a case like this where there is a limited number of service period performed by the employees and the time taken for initiating the dispute is quite delayed, the lump-sum compensation would have been a batter solution, if at all, the Court needed to grant any relief. She further has urged that in the present scenario, grant of reinstatement with back wages and continuity would be quite cumbersome for the company. She fairly admitted that the company is an on-going concerned and it also, as per the requirement of the market, has updated itself with the automation. 9.1. Learned advocate Ms. She further has urged that in the present scenario, grant of reinstatement with back wages and continuity would be quite cumbersome for the company. She fairly admitted that the company is an on-going concerned and it also, as per the requirement of the market, has updated itself with the automation. 9.1. Learned advocate Ms. Chhaya has relied upon various authorities to substantiate her version which are as follows:- (a) Indian Rayon Industries Ltd. vs. Bamaniya Lakhabhai Bhagvanjibhai, rendered by this Court in SCA No. 6351 of 2006; (b) B.S.N.L. vs. Bhurumal, rendered by the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 10957 of 2013 arising out of SLP No. 14572 of 2012; (c) Jagbir Singh vs. Haryana State Agriculture Marketing Board and Anr., rendered by the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 4334 of 2009 arising out of SLP No. 987 of 2009 [ 2009 (3) SCT 790 ]; (d) District Development Officer and Another vs. Satish Kantilal Amrelia, rendered by the Apex Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 19857-19858 of 2017 arising out of SLP (C) Nos.11956-11957 of 2015; (e) Port Officer vs. Raghubhai Govindbhai C/o Nayanbhai K. Joshi, rendered by this Court in LPA No. 2322 of 2017 and allied matters in SCA No. 2116 of 2009 and allied matters. (f) Senior Superintendent Telegraph (Traffic) Bhopal vs. Santosh Kumar Seal and Others, rendered by the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 3815 of 2010 arising out of SLP(C) No. 13994 of 2006. 10. In the group of petitions on the part of the employee, there are twofold grievances against the judgment and award. Firstly, that these employees had approached the machinery of the Labour Court after nearly four years from termination and secondly, their service is ranging from nearly 4 years and 8 months to 6 years. Therefore, the Court ought to have granted the lump-sum compensation and not allowed the reinstatement to any of these employees. Moreover, it is suggested that along the line of some of the employees in whose cases the Court granted lump-sum compensation, the cases of these employees ought to have been considered. Their delay itself is fetal to their case and that also should have weighed with the Court particularly when they are temporary employees. 11. Moreover, it is suggested that along the line of some of the employees in whose cases the Court granted lump-sum compensation, the cases of these employees ought to have been considered. Their delay itself is fetal to their case and that also should have weighed with the Court particularly when they are temporary employees. 11. In cross petitions moved by each of the employees, it is urged that this delay, at the best deny them the benefit for that period and that period should be treated as dias-non. It is further urged that once the reinstatement is granted, it has to be with the continuous service and also 100% back wages, since there had been no fault on the part of the employees. 12. So far as the aspect of delay is concerned, it is a trite law that the delay shall need to be explained by the workman who approaches at a belated stage. This Court has referred to the decision rendered in case of Mansinghbhai Chhaganbhai Bhojaviya vs. The Deputy Executive Engineer [SCA 20207/2019 and allied matters], where the delayed reference was made where the Apex Court in case of Prabhakar vs. Joint Director Sericulture Department and Another [ (2015) 15 SCC 1 ] has held that law of limitation does not apply to the industrial dispute. There is no period of limitation as prescribed. If the reference is made after lapse of considerable period, the Court should mould the relief by either granting reinstatement and denying back wages, fully or partially, or else, grant compensation denying reinstatement. 13. Here, in the instant case, merely on the ground of late approach to this Court after 4 years, the employee cannot be non-suited. In absence of any prescribed time limit, the delay requires to be explained by the employee at the time of approaching the Labour Court machinery. 14. The Court noticed in the statement of claim in Reference (T) Case No. 25 of 2006 at Exh. 6 where the petitioner has averred to have worked for 5 years continuously. According to him, his termination was contrary to the law and absolutely illegal. Since he was requiring the service, he frequently had requested the concerned officers and made oral request to take him back in the service. What all that he had been consoled with was that he would be conveyed the outcome since the matter was under consideration. According to him, his termination was contrary to the law and absolutely illegal. Since he was requiring the service, he frequently had requested the concerned officers and made oral request to take him back in the service. What all that he had been consoled with was that he would be conveyed the outcome since the matter was under consideration. However, for a long time, he was neither reinstated nor received any communication therefore, he eventually issued the notice on 25.10.2005. No reply was even given by the company, therefore, aggrieved by such conduct, he went to the Assistant Labour Commissioner who had referred the matter by way of a reference to the Labour Court. 14.1. It is further his grievance that his juniors have been continued in service and new employees also have been employed. At no point of time, the opportunity had been given to the petitioner which is a clear violation of Sections 25(F), (G) and (H) of the ID Act. 15. In the written statement, this has been denied by the Respondent. In examination in chief, the petitioner submits that he was appointed on 10.03.1997. He worked in different departments. His internal transfers were quite routine. The last he served was in spinning department. The nature of work in the industry is perennial. According to the petitioner, there was no appointment as a temporary helper. No appointment letter was either produced by the petitioner nor by the respondent. It is not in dispute that he continued to serve the company and the amount of wages was being paid in cash by drawing the play slip and this had continued for nearly five years. 15.1. In the cross-examination, he has agreed that he has filed his case after three years of termination. According to him, since the company assured him to be reinstated, he has filed the case belatedly. It was the Labour office who has assured him. He was naturally not aware as to who has been kept in his place as an employee. He also has further stated that there are six persons in his family, two children, his elder brother and his monthly expense was Rs. 3500/- and he was earning Rs. 30 to 40 every day after he was terminated. 15.2. He was naturally not aware as to who has been kept in his place as an employee. He also has further stated that there are six persons in his family, two children, his elder brother and his monthly expense was Rs. 3500/- and he was earning Rs. 30 to 40 every day after he was terminated. 15.2. One Shri Priyadarshi Revatdan Gadhavi has been examined for and on behalf of the respondent who agreed to the continuity of work in the department even after the services of the petitioners were terminated. He was unaware as to how many employees in the year 2001 were working and the services of how many employees have been terminated. He also further has agreed that there were pay slips prepared of the petitioners and they also had their provident fund accounts. He agreed that seniority list of casual workers also had been maintained so as to ensure that who joins the service last ,as per the principle of first come last go, should go first. 15.3. It is not in dispute that at the time of terminating their services, neither notice nor notice pay nor retrenchment compensation was granted. The compromise effected between the union and company also has not percolated to the employee. After terminating these persons, those who have died or retired, their heirs had been taken in service and not others. He agreed that there was no model standing order nor any reply to the notice. 16. This discussion above clearly establishes that the explanation of delay of four years in raising the dispute is well explained, in examination in chief. There is no cross examination, although, the respondent has touched the issue, but thereafter, no denial has been taken that the petitioner was wrongly or incorrectly stating that aspect. Having not taken the denial as also from appreciations of oral as well as documentary evidence, it establishes the fact that the petitioner succeeded in stating on the material aspect of explaining the delay and this, if is found plausible that, per-se, may not be the ground to deny the relief as mentioned in many of the authorities in this respect. At the best the Court can mould the relief if the delay is otherwise found satisfactorily explained. 17. At the best the Court can mould the relief if the delay is otherwise found satisfactorily explained. 17. Worthwhile would be to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in this regard, rendered in case of Prabhakar vs. Joint Director Sericulture Department and ors., reported in (2015) 15 SCC page 1:- 42. On the basis of aforesaid discussion, we summarise the legal position as under : An industrial dispute has to be referred by the appropriate Government for adjudication and the workman cannot approach the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal directly, except in those cases which are covered by Section 2A of the Act. Reference is made under Section 10 of the Act in those cases where the appropriate Government forms an opinion that ‘any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended’. The words ‘industrial dispute exists’ are of paramount importance unless there is an existence of an industrial dispute (or the dispute is apprehended or it is apprehended such a dispute may arise in near future), no reference is to be made. Thus, existence or apprehension of an industrial dispute is a sine qua non for making the reference. No doubt, at the time of taking a decision whether a reference is to be made or not, the appropriate Government is not to go into the merits of the dispute. Making of reference is only an administrative function. At the same time, on the basis of material on record, satisfaction of the existence of the industrial dispute or the apprehension of an industrial dispute is necessary. Such existence/apprehension of industrial dispute, thus, becomes a condition precedent, though it will be only subjective satisfaction based on material on record. Since, we are not concerned with the satisfaction dealing with cases where there is apprehended industrial dispute, discussion that follows would confine to existence of an industrial dispute. Dispute or difference arises when one party make a demand and other party rejects the same. It is held by this Court in number of cases that before raising the industrial dispute making of demand is a necessary pre-condition. In such a scenario, if the services of a workman are terminated and he does not make the demand and/or raise the issue alleging wrongful termination immediately thereafter or within reasonable time and raises the same after considerable lapse of period, whether it can be said that industrial dispute still exist. In such a scenario, if the services of a workman are terminated and he does not make the demand and/or raise the issue alleging wrongful termination immediately thereafter or within reasonable time and raises the same after considerable lapse of period, whether it can be said that industrial dispute still exist. Since there is no period of limitation, it gives right to the workman to raise the dispute even belatedly. However, if the dispute is raised after a long period, it has to be seen as to whether such a dispute still exists? Thus, notwithstanding the fact that law of limitation does not apply, it is to be shown by the workman that there is a dispute in praesenti. For this purpose, he has to demonstrate that even if considerable period has lapsed and there are laches and delays, such delay has not resulted into making the industrial dispute seized to exist. Therefore, if the workman is able to give satisfactory explanation for these laches and delays and demonstrate that the circumstances discloses that issue is still alive, delay would not come in his way because of the reason that law of limitation has no application. On the other hand, if because of such delay dispute no longer remains alive and is to be treated as “dead”, then it would be non-existent dispute which cannot be referred. Take, for example, a case where the workman issues notice after his termination, questioning the termination and demanding reinstatement. He is able to show that there were discussions from time to time and the parties were trying to sort out the matter amicably. Or he is able to show that there were assurances by the Management to the effect that he would be taken back in service and because of these reasons, he did not immediately raise the dispute by approaching the labour authorities seeking reference or did not invoke the remedy under Section 2A of the Act. In such a scenario, it can be treated that the dispute was live and existing as the workman never abandoned his right. In such a scenario, it can be treated that the dispute was live and existing as the workman never abandoned his right. However, in this very example, even if the notice of demand was sent but it did not evoke any positive response or there was specific rejection by the Management of his demand contained in the notice and thereafter he sleeps over the matter for number of years, it can be treated that he accepted the factum of his termination and rejection thereof by the Management and acquiesced into the said rejection. Take another example. A workman approaches the Civil Court by filing a suit against his termination which was pending for number of years and was ultimately dismissed on the ground that Civil Court did not have jurisdiction to enforce the contract of personal service and does not grant any reinstatement. At that stage, when the suit is dismissed or he withdraws that suit and then involves the machinery under the Act, it can lead to the conclusion that dispute is still alive as the workman had not accepted the termination but was agitating the same; albeit in a wrong forum. In contrast, in those cases where there was no agitation by the workman against his termination and the dispute is raised belatedly and the delay or laches remain unexplained, it would be presumed that he had waived his right or acquiesced into the act of termination and, therefore, at the time when the dispute is raised it had become stale and was not an ‘existing dispute’. In such circumstances, the appropriate Government can refuse to make reference. In the alternative, the Labour Court/Industrial Court can also hold that there is no “industrial dispute” within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act and, therefore, no relief can be granted. 18. So far as the question of judicial review of judgment and award of the trial Court is concerned, this Court, at this stage, is required to refer to the decision of the Apex Court delivered in case of Shalini Shyam Shetty and Another vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil [2010 AIR SCW 6387], which emphasizes upon this Court not to act as an appellate authority, but, to consider whether the trial Court has acted within its bounds. Apt would be to reproduce relevant findings for the ready reference:- “62. Apt would be to reproduce relevant findings for the ready reference:- “62. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, ‘within the bounds of their authority'. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India & others, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.” 19. The question that arises as to whether the Labour Court has exceeded the jurisdiction or acted within its bounds while deciding the reference between the parties. 19.1 The Court on the strength of the pleadings as well as documentary evidences and other materials available with it had framed three issues. Firstly, whether the petitioner has proved that he was serving as a temporary helper in the spinning department and without any valid reason his services came to be terminated on 15.10.2011 despite having served for 240 days every year as a continuous service, and, whether this is an illegal act of respondent which would entitle the petitioner his original post with back wages and continuity. Secondly, whether the respondent has proved that the appointment of the petitioner was on a temporary basis as required by the industry and on completion of a particular period, automatically his service came to an end and therefore, this action of the Respondent gets covered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the ID Act. And, thirdly, as to what is the final order. The trial Court answered the above three issues in this fashion, (1) partly in affirmation, (2) in negation and (3) as per final order. 19.2. And, thirdly, as to what is the final order. The trial Court answered the above three issues in this fashion, (1) partly in affirmation, (2) in negation and (3) as per final order. 19.2. The Court has extensively discussed the evidence adduced by the parties and also has employed the law to the facts, to answer all the issues as mentioned herein above. 20. This Court notices that it is in clear terms admitted that the spinning department has a perennial nature of work and the respondent also unambiguously answered that the work in the Industry has continued all through out. Again, there is no detail available with the company as to totally how many employees have worked with it. When being fully aware as to why the seniority list is necessary and the “last come first go” principle is also to be applied to any industry, the Court noticed that the seniority list has not been produced by the company, therefore, the trial Court has correctly held the breach of Sections 25(G) and (H) of the ID Act. 21. The Court below has in clear terms held that the workman who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer cannot be retrenched unless the employer fulfills its obligations under the provision of Section 25 F of the ID Act. The workman is required to complete 240 days in a year for this provision to be attracted. It has admitted also by the Respondent that there had been neither the fulfillment of requirement of one month’s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment which needs to expire nor in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of notice paid nor retrenchment compensation equivalent to 15 days’ average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months had been given at the time of terminating the services of the Petitioners. Extensive factual analysis has resulted into the Court arriving at a conclusion to hold the breach of Sections 25(F), (G) and (H) of the ID Act. No gross error much less any illegality could be found. 22. Extensive factual analysis has resulted into the Court arriving at a conclusion to hold the breach of Sections 25(F), (G) and (H) of the ID Act. No gross error much less any illegality could be found. 22. This would lead this Court to hold that extensive and elaborate findings, which have been arrived at, this Court finds that not only the Court below has acted within its bounds, but, it also appropriately examined the material adduced before it. The provisions of law also have been properly and aptly applied. 23. Resultantly, on the aspect of retrenchment being contrary to the provisions of the ID Act and the seniority list also having not been maintained resulting into the breach of Sections 25(G) and (H) of the ID Act, deserves non-indulgence. 24. The only aspect at this stage requires to be considered is, as to whether the back wages without continuity is required to be granted in case of these petitioners? 25. The decisions of the Apex Court in this regard are quite clear. It is not that in every matter, once the reinstatement is granted and the retrenchment is held to be violative of the provisions of law, the Court needs to grant 100% backwages. The host of the factors will need to be regarded by the Court for the said purpose. What is also vital is that once the evidence is adduced by the litigating party seeking to establish his subjective knowledge, the burden of proving that fact is upon him as per Section 106 of the Evidence Act. The amount the employee would have earned in the subsequent service or work and as to what was the short fall and once that burden is discharged, it is for the employer to discharge the burden to prove that what has been stated is not correct. 26. In the instant case, the petitioner has stated that he is having the huge responsibility of family and was earning only Rs. 30 to 40 per day. Taking even Rs. 40 per day and also it is to be more on a lower side, then also, it is non-match to the amount that he was getting at the time of his termination. 27. 30 to 40 per day. Taking even Rs. 40 per day and also it is to be more on a lower side, then also, it is non-match to the amount that he was getting at the time of his termination. 27. The question that arises as to whether in that eventuality, will there be a requirement for the Court to grant backwages 100% or some percentage or in wake of the delay in raising the reference, the Court need not grant any amount of backwages and treat that entire period as dias-non. 28. It is a matter of record that every petitioner has approached the trial Court belatedly by four years. It took about ten years for the trial Court to deliver the judgment and award. So in all, there are about 14 years have passed from the date of termination. It is neither the fault of the petitioner nor of the respondent for this delay in delivering the judgment. Neither of them could be allowed to suffer because of the time which has gone in the process. However, the petitioners are responsible for the late raising of the dispute, for which the law as has been well settled in case of Prabhakar (supra) that at the best they may be denied the relief for the period of delay and the relief can be moulded by this Court accordingly. Considering the reasonable amount of backwages and noticing that there has been virtually one third (1/3) of the income during the termination period, the Court is inclined to grant the backwages to the extent of 25% of the amount of salary, along with the fact that the period of four years shall be treated as dias-non which is the period from the date of termination of service till the date of filing of the reference. 29. Noticing the development and automation in the interregnum at the end of employer, the reinstatement on the post of the helper in spinning department shall be done within the period of six weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. 30. All the petitions are disposed of accordingly. Direct service is permitted.