ORDER : Shree Chandrashekhar, J. The appellants; Parmeshwar Singh @ Prameshwar Singh in Criminal Appeal (D.B.) No.130 of 2011 and Punit Singh in Criminal Appeal (D.B.) No.211 of 2011, have challenged the judgment of conviction dated 31.01.2011 under section 302/34 and section 201 of the Indian Penal Code and the order of sentence of imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.5000/- under section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code and RI for two years under section 201 of the Indian Penal Code dated 02.02.2011 passed against them in Sessions Case No. 17 of 1995. 2. The informant of this case is daughter-in-law of Tejni Devi. On the basis of her fardbeyan which was recorded on 19.08.1994, Barkatha P.S. Case No. 45 of 1994 was registered against the appellants under section 302/201 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. After the investigation a charge-sheet was filed and the appellants have faced the trial on the charge of committing murder of Tejni Devi and causing disappearance of her dead body. 3. During the trial, the prosecution has examined three witnesses; informant is PW-1. 4. The learned Sessions Judge after reproducing testimony of the prosecution witnesses has held that there is no doubt on complicity of the accused persons in crime. 5. The records of Sessions Case No. 17 of 1995 would reflect that the Investigating Officer, the Public Prosecutor and the learned Sessions Judge have failed to discharge their statutory duty. Seven witnesses were cited by the prosecution in the charge-sheet in support of its case against the accused persons, however, during the trial only two of them have been examined. PW-3 is a formal witness and he was not a witness named in the charge-sheet, but how he has been produced during the trial is not clear from the records. After PW-2 was examined on 16.09.1999 trial in Sessions Case No. 17/95 was pending for examination of the prosecution witnesses for more than six years; on 18.12.2006 PW-3 has been examined by the prosecution. Ms. Saumya Pandey, the learned Amicus states that the trial in Sessions Case No. 17 of 1995 has remained pending for over fifteen years and after granting forty-one opportunities to the prosecution for producing its witnesses the prosecution’s evidence was closed on 03.01.2011. Ms. Saumya Pandey, the learned Amicus states that the trial in Sessions Case No. 17 of 1995 has remained pending for over fifteen years and after granting forty-one opportunities to the prosecution for producing its witnesses the prosecution’s evidence was closed on 03.01.2011. Non-bailable warrants were issued against three of the chargesheeted witnesses and letters to the police authorities were issued by the court, however, why non-bailable warrants could not be executed is not recorded in the orders passed by the learned Sessions Judge. There were two Investigating Officers who have taken over charge of the investigation in this case, however, both were not examined during the trial. 6. In a Sessions trial it is very important that the Investigating Officer remains present during the trial. Lord Jenkins, C.J., in “Ram Ranjan Roy Vs. Emperor” reported in (1915) ILR 42 Cal 545, has observed that it is the duty of the prosecution to examine all material witnesses. The investigating officer must remain present during the trial and it is his duty to keep the witnesses present during the trial on the date when the case is fixed for evidence has been emphasised by the Supreme Court in “Shailendra Kumar Vs. State of Bihar” reported in (2002)1 SCC 655 , thus: 9. “----------------It was the duty of the Sessions Judge to issue summons to the investigating officer if he failed to remain present at the time of trial of the case. The presence of investigating officer at the time of trial is must. It is his duty to keep the witnesses present. If there is failure on the part of any witness to remain present, it is the duty of the court to take appropriate action including issuance of bailable/ nonbailable warrants, as the case may be. It should be well understood that the prosecution cannot be frustrated by such methods and victims of the crime cannot be left in a lurch.” 7. In “Ram Chandra Vs. State of Haryana” reported in AIR 1981 SC 1036 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that if a criminal court is to be an effective instrument in dispensing justice, the presiding Judge must cease to be a spectator and mere recording machine. In “T.C. Mathai Vs. District & Sessions Judge, Thiruvananthapuram” reported in (1999) 3 SCC 614 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed, thus: “8. In “T.C. Mathai Vs. District & Sessions Judge, Thiruvananthapuram” reported in (1999) 3 SCC 614 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed, thus: “8. The work in a court of law is a serious and responsible function .The primary duty of a criminal court is to administer criminal justice. Any lax or wayward approach, if adopted towards the issues involved in the case, can cause serious consequences for the parties concerned ----------.” 8. It is also a matter of grave concern that a sessions case in which two persons have faced the trial on the charge of committing murder and causing disappearance of the dead body was concluded after examining only three witnesses and out of which only one is a material witness. To prove a fact no particular number of witnesses is required to be examined and as held by the Supreme Court in a catena of judgments conviction of an accused can be recorded on the basis of testimony of a solitary eye-witness if the evidence of a witness is of such sterling quality that it leaves no doubt on complicity of an accused in the crime. It is not necessary to seek corroboration, but then, if a doubt arises on a part of testimony of a solitary eye-witness the courts would seek corroboration [refer, “Lallu Manjhi v. State of Jharkhand” reported in (2003) 2 SCC 401 ]. 9. The informant claims that she is an eye-witness. She says that in the morning at about 8:00 a.m. on 19.08.1994 she was near a well adjoining her house. At that time the accused persons came there, assaulted her mother-in-law, lifted her through a lathi and had gone towards the river. The accused persons are related to her. Punit Singh is uncle-in-law and Parmeshwar Singh is cousin-in-law of Tejni Devi. The informant has followed them towards the river. She says that the accused persons cut into pieces the dead body of her mother-in-law and thrown the corpse in the river. During her cross-examination, she has admitted that there are about twenty houses in her village and co-villager Hiraman Singh resides on the northern side of her house whereas on eastern side there are houses of Jagdish Mahto and others. She says that these persons, however, did not come to the place of occurrence but Bulaki Mahto has arrived there immediately. During her cross-examination, she has admitted that there are about twenty houses in her village and co-villager Hiraman Singh resides on the northern side of her house whereas on eastern side there are houses of Jagdish Mahto and others. She says that these persons, however, did not come to the place of occurrence but Bulaki Mahto has arrived there immediately. None of these witnesses including Bulaki Mahto has been examined by the prosecution. According to the informant, her husband was also not present in the house and about three days before the occurrence he had gone to Calcutta but no one from the vicinity has come forward to support her on this point. The informant has claimed that she had sent information to her husband through Kishun Mahto, but he has also not been produced during the trial. She has further stated that she had sent information through son of the choukidar and her brother-in-law as well as mukhia had also reached the place of occurrence but neither the son of the choukidar nor the mukhia or her brother-in-law Tulsi Singh was examined by the prosecution. The incident has happened in the early morning. It was month of August and it is not a case set up by the prosecution that it was raining or dark at that time. In these circumstances, non-examination of any person from the vicinity or the material witnesses such as Bulaki Mahto and Prem Mahto whose statement was recorded by the Investigating Officer during the investigation create a doubt on claim of the informant that she has seen the appellants committing murder of her mother-in-law. 10. The dead body of Tejni Devi was not found. The informant during her examination has tried to offer an explanation by saying that it was thrown in a stormy river but no sign of murder has been seen anywhere and no evidence of death of Tejni Devi has been produced during the trial. The law on absence of corpus delicti is well-settled. To prove a charge of murder it is not necessary to produce the corpus rather what is required of the prosecution is that if clinching evidence, direct or circumstantial, is produced during the trial which would establish death of a person, conviction of an accused on the charge under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code can be recorded. To prove a charge of murder it is not necessary to produce the corpus rather what is required of the prosecution is that if clinching evidence, direct or circumstantial, is produced during the trial which would establish death of a person, conviction of an accused on the charge under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code can be recorded. The law on the subject has been summarized by the Supreme Court in “Rishipal Vs. State of Uttarakhand” reported in “ (2013) 12 SCC 551 ”, thus: “14. In the absence of corpus delicti what the court looks for is clinching evidence that proves that the victim has been done to death. If the prosecution is successful in providing cogent and satisfactory proof of the victim having met a homicidal death, absence of corpus delicti will not by itself be fatal to a charge of murder. Failure of the prosecution to assemble such evidence will, however, result in failure of the most essential requirement in a case involving a charge of murder. That is precisely the position in the case at hand. There is no evidence either direct or circumstantial about Abdul Mabood having met a homicidal death. The charge of murder leveled against the appellant, therefore, rests on a rather tenuous ground of the two having been last seen together to which aspect we shall presently advert when we examine whether the two being last seen together is proved as a circumstance and can support a charge of murder.”………………………………….. 19. It is true that the tell-tale circumstances proved on the basis of the evidence on record give rise to a suspicion against the appellant but suspicion howsoever strong is not enough to justify conviction of the appellant for murder. The trial court has, in our opinion, proceeded more on the basis that the appellant may have murdered the deceased Abdul Mabood. In doing so the trial court overlooked the fact that there is a long distance between “may have” and “must have” which distance must be traversed by the prosecution by producing cogent and reliable evidence. No such evidence is unfortunately forthcoming in the instant case. The legal position on the subject is well settled and does not require any reiteration. The decision of this Court have on numerous occasions laid down the requirements that must be satisfied in cases resting on circumstantial evidence. No such evidence is unfortunately forthcoming in the instant case. The legal position on the subject is well settled and does not require any reiteration. The decision of this Court have on numerous occasions laid down the requirements that must be satisfied in cases resting on circumstantial evidence. The essence of the said requirement is that not only should the circumstances sought to be proved against the accused be established beyond a reasonable doubt but also that such circumstances form so compete a chain as leaves no option for the court except to hold that the accused is guilty of the offences with which he is charged. The disappearance of deceased Abdul Mabood in the present case is not explainable as sought to be argued before us by the prosecution only on the hypothesis that the appellant killed him near some canal in a manner that is not known or that the appellant disposed of his body in a fashion about which the prosecution has no evidence except a wild guess that the body may have been dumped into a canal from which it was never recovered.” 11. Both the Investigating Officers were not examined during the trial. Mr. A.K. Kashyap, the learned senior counsel who has appeared in these cases on the request of the court has submitted that in absence of the Investigating Officer the accused persons were deprived of an opportunity to elicit answer from him on non-examination of the material witnesses, absence of corpus delicti and failure to seize the material object such as the crime weapon. In “Lahu Kamlakar Patil and another Vs. State of Maharashtra” reported in (2013) 6 SCC 417 , the Supreme Court has held that it is not that non-examination of the Investigating Officer by itself would cause prejudice to an accused, but then, there are certain circumstances where examination of the Investigating Officer becomes vital and in a case in which testimony of the solitary eye-witness hinges upon quality of the corroborative evidence, non-examination of the Investigating Officer would certainly cause prejudice to an accused during the trial. In Sessions Case No. 17 of 1995, no material was produced by the prosecution which could have connected the appellants with the crime; only fardbeyan and the formal First Information Report were tendered in evidence. 12. In Sessions Case No. 17 of 1995, no material was produced by the prosecution which could have connected the appellants with the crime; only fardbeyan and the formal First Information Report were tendered in evidence. 12. In the above facts, we find that on the basis of the evidence laid by the prosecution in Sessions Case No. 17 of 1995 the prosecution has not been able to prove the place of occurrence, manner of occurrence and participation of the appellants in the crime and, therefore, we hold that the prosecution has failed to prove the charge under section 302/34 and section 201 of the Indian Penal Code against the appellants. 13. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction of Parmeshwar Singh @ Prameshwar Singh who is the appellant in Criminal Appeal (D.B.) No.130 of 2011 and Punit Singh who is the appellant in Criminal Appeal (D.B.) No.211 of 2011under section 302/34 and section 201 of the Indian Penal Code dated 31.01.2011 and the order of sentence of imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.5000/- under section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code and RI for two years under section 201 of the Indian Penal Code dated 02.02.2011 passed by the learned Additional District & Sessions Judge, FTC No.2, Hazaribagh in Sessions Case No. 17/95 are set-aside. 14. The appellants, above-named, are acquitted of the criminal charges framed against them in Sessions Case No. 17/95. 15. Mr. Arun Kumar Pandey, the learned APP states that the appellants, above-named, are in custody. 16. Accordingly, Parmeshwar Singh @ Prameshwar Singh who is the appellant in Criminal Appeal (D.B.) No.130 of 2011 and Punit Singh who is the appellant in Criminal Appeal (D.B.) No.211 of 2011 shall be set free forthwith, if not required in connection to any other criminal case. 17. In the result, Criminal Appeal (D.B.) No.130 of 2011 and Criminal Appeal (D.B.) No.211 of 2011 are allowed. 18. We record our appreciation for good gesture of Mr. A.K. Kashyap, the learned senior counsel and the able assistance rendered by Ms. Saumya Pandey, the learned Amicus. They shall be paid fee and reimbursed for the expenses incurred by them. 19. Let lower court records be transmitted to the court concerned, forthwith.