JUDGMENT : C.S. DIAS, J. 1. An order holding that leave of the Court is not necessary to institute a petition for divorce, after the expiry of one year from the date of marriage, is under challenge in this appeal. 2. The respondent in this appeal filed O.P.No.2166 of 2017 before the Family Court, Ernakulam, to annul his marriage with the appellant by a decree of nullity or in the alternative to dissolve his marriage with the appellant by a decree of divorce. 3. The kernel of the facts is: the respondent got acquainted with the appellant through Facebook. The respondent took the appellant for outings and had physical relationship with her. In due course, the appellant expressed her desire to marry the respondent, but he snubbed her. The appellant on discovering that the respondent was intending to get married to another woman, threatened to commit suicide. On 08.09.2016, Sub-Inspector of Police, Udayamperoor Police Station, directed the respondent and his father to meet him in connection with a complaint filed by the appellant that the respondent had sexual harassed her. The Police Officer used swear words and commanded the respondent to marry the appellant, or else he would register a criminal case against the respondent and his relatives and get them incarcerated. Consequently, due to the threat and coercion of the appellant, in connivance with the Police, on 07.11.2016, the marriage between the respondent and the appellant was soleminised before the Marriage Officer, Thripunithura, under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 (for brevity referred to as "Act"). The appellant and the respondent have never cohabitated. The respondent prayed that a decree of nullity or in the alternative a decree of divorce may be passed dissolving his marriage with the appellant. 4. The petition was presented before the Family Court on 03.11.2017. The appellant and the respondent were referred for counselling. After the conciliation proceedings failed, the case was adjourned for the written objection of the appellant. 5. The appellant then filed I.A.No.3498 of 2019, challenging the maintainability of the petition, on the ground that the respondent had not obtained leave of the Court as provided under Section 29 of the Act, since the petition was presented before the expiry of one year from the date of marriage. 6. 5. The appellant then filed I.A.No.3498 of 2019, challenging the maintainability of the petition, on the ground that the respondent had not obtained leave of the Court as provided under Section 29 of the Act, since the petition was presented before the expiry of one year from the date of marriage. 6. The respondent filed an objection to the application, inter alia, contending that there is no prohibition either in the Family Courts Act or the Code of Civil Procedure, which bars the filing of a petition for a decree of nullity with an alternative prayer for divorce. But, it was due to an inadvertent oversight that the application seeking leave was not filed along with the petition. The omission is only a curable irregularity. The cruelty inflicted by the appellant has caused exceptional depravity and severe hardship to the respondent. Although the Court had directed the appellant to file her objection to the petition, she has not filed her objection even after four posting dates. Nonetheless, the respondent has filed a separate application seeking ex-post-facto leave, which may be allowed. 7. Along with the above application, the appellant also filed I.A.No.3499 of 2019, seeking an order to direct the respondent to pay alimony pendente lite at the rate of Rs.21,800/-per mensum. The respondent filed I.A.No.7380 of 2019, seeking ex post facto leave to present the petition. 8. The learned Judge of the Family Court consolidated and jointly heard the above-numbered three applications. By a common order dated 19.12.2019, the Family Court dismissed I.A.No.3498 of 2019, holding that even though leave was not sought for at the time of presentation of the petition, as the statutory time period of one year has elapsed, there is no necessity to return the petition, and the alternative prayer for divorce is maintainable. I.A.No.7380 of 2019 filed by the respondent was dismissed as infructuous. The appellant's application for alimony pendente lite was partly allowed, by directing the respondent to pay the appellant Rs.10,000/-as monthly alimony. 9. It is aggrieved by the order in I.A.No.3498 of 2019, holding that the alternative prayer for divorce is maintainable, this appeal is filed. 10. Heard Sri.George Sebastian, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri.V.K.Balachandran, learned counsel for the respondent. 11. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that the impugned order passed by the Family Court is erroneous and wrong. It is aggrieved by the order in I.A.No.3498 of 2019, holding that the alternative prayer for divorce is maintainable, this appeal is filed. 10. Heard Sri.George Sebastian, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri.V.K.Balachandran, learned counsel for the respondent. 11. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that the impugned order passed by the Family Court is erroneous and wrong. The respondent, by seeking ex-post-facto leave, has acknowledged that the petition was premature. Equally, as the Family Court has dismissed the respondent's application as infructuous, it is axiomatic that the bar under Section 29 stands attracted. Therefore, the impugned order may be set aside, and the petition be dismissed. He relied on the decision of this Court in Arish Rajan v.Jitha Raj [ 2019 (4) KHC 861 (DB)] to fortify his contention. 12. The learned counsel for the respondent defended the impugned order. He argued that as the petition is predominantly filed seeking a decree of nullity with only an alternative relief for divorce, there is no necessity to seek leave under Section 29 of the Act. He asserted that, once the petition was taken on file without a leave petition, leave is deemed to be granted. The application seeking the dismissal of the petition is unsustainable in law because as per Section 29 of the Act, the Court can only defer passing of the judgment, which establishes that the provision is directory. Besides the above contentions, the one year time period has already elapsed, and the respondent out of abundant caution has filed an application seeking leave, which the Court dismissed as infructuous. Thus, the impugned order passed by the Family Court is legal and justifiable. 13. The points that emerge for consideration in this appeal are (i) Whether the Family Court was justified in entertaining the petition without an application for leave as stipulated under the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 29 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954. (ii) Whether a petition seeking a decree of divorce, presented within one year from the date of marriage can be dismissed for want of leave under the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 29 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954. 14. As the above points are entwined, we are considering them together. 15. Section 29 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, reads as follows: "29. 14. As the above points are entwined, we are considering them together. 15. Section 29 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, reads as follows: "29. Restriction on petition for divorce during first one year after marriage.- (1) No petition for divorce shall be presented to the District Court unless at the date of the presentation of the petition one year has passed since the date of entering the certificate of marriage in the Marriage Certificate Book Provided that the District Court may, upon application being made to it, allow a petition to be presented before one year has passed on the ground that the case is one of exceptional hardship suffered by the petitioner or of exceptional depravity on the part of the respondent, but if it appears to the District Court at the hearing of the petition that the petitioner obtained leave to present the petition by any misrepresentation or concealment of the nature of the case, the District Court may, if it pronounces a decree, do so subject to the condition that the decree shall not have effect until after the expiry of one year from the date of the marriage or may dismiss the petition without prejudice to any petition which may be brought after the expiration of the said one year upon the same, or substantially the same, facts as those proved in support of the petition so dismissed. (2) In disposing of any application under this section for leave to present a petition for divorce before the expiration of one year from the date of the marriage, the District Court shall have regard to the interests of any children of the marriage, and to the question whether there is a reasonable probability of a reconciliation between the parties before the expiration of the said one year. 16. By Act 68 of 1976 (w.e.f 27.05.1976), the Legislature amended Sec.29 of the Act, by reducing the time period restricting the presentation of a petition for divorce from three years to one year from the date of expiry of marriage. The pith for incorporating the section is to discourage a spouse from taking legal recourse to snap the marital bond in a hasty and irrational manner. The pith for incorporating the section is to discourage a spouse from taking legal recourse to snap the marital bond in a hasty and irrational manner. Yet, the Court if it is satisfied, that the petitioner has suffered exceptional hardship or there is exceptional depravity on the part of the respondent, and after considering the interest of any children in the marriage, and whether there is a reasonable probability of a reconciliation between the parties before the cessation of the said one year, decide to grant leave to present the petition. Only when it appears to the Court, at the time of hearing the petition, that the petitioner has obtained leave to present the petition by any misrepresentation or concealment, the Court may, if it pronounces a decree, do so subject to the condition that the decree shall not have effect until after the expiry of one year from the date of the marriage or may dismiss the petition without prejudice to any petition being brought after the expiration of the one year period. Therefore, it is palpable that the leave of the Court is necessary, to present a petition before the expiry of one year from the date of marriage. 17. The High Court of Bombay in Mr.X v. Mrs.Y [II(2010) DMC 182], interpreting Section 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, which stands in pari materia with Section 29 of the Special Marriage Act, held thus: "6………….It is obvious from a bare reading of the section that the petition can be presented before the expiry of one year from the date of marriage, by obtaining leave of the Court. In any case, the proviso suggests that a decree obtained within one year on the basis of a defective bone, even one obtained by misrepresentation does not invalidate the decree ipso facto; but the Court has a discretion to order that the decree shall become effective after a year. A defect in the nature of leave granted by the Court is a mere irregularity which the trial Court may not act upon. The Appellate Court certainly has a wide discretion to refuse to interfere on such a ground……….." 18. The High Court of Allahabad in Archi Agarwal and another v. Principal Judge, Family Court, Lucknow [2019 SCC Online All 4086], again while interpreting Section 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, held as follows: "10. The Appellate Court certainly has a wide discretion to refuse to interfere on such a ground……….." 18. The High Court of Allahabad in Archi Agarwal and another v. Principal Judge, Family Court, Lucknow [2019 SCC Online All 4086], again while interpreting Section 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, held as follows: "10. On a plain reading of the said section, it is apparent that the said section is on the statute book with a specific purpose of preventing hasty recourse to judicial process for dissolution of marriage and for the parties to aim at reconciliation and make effort to save their marriage. However, it also cannot be disregarded that the proviso to the said section gives the discretion to the Court to allow the party to present a petition for divorce before expiry of one year period from the date of marriage on being satisfied that the case is of extreme depravity on the part of the respondent or extreme hardship to the petitioner. Even subsection (2) of Section 14 of the Act provides leave for presentation of petition before the expiry of one year period. Hence, it cannot be said that the presentation of petition of divorce before the expiry of one year is completely barred as the proviso comes to the rescue of exceptional cases giving them room and it is a decision to be made by the Court on the merits of the case. Hence, the learned trial court fell in grave error in proceeding on the premise that the petition cannot be permitted to be presented before period of one year from the date of marriage" 19. It is undisputed that the marriage was solemnised on 07.11.2016 and that the petition was presented in Court on 03.11.2017, i.e., five days before the expiry of the one year statutory time period. The appellant filed I.A.No.3498 of 2019, challenging the maintainability of the petition, only on 17.06.2019, i.e., one and half years after the petition was presented. In the meantime, before the consideration of I.A.No.3498 of 2019, the respondent filed I.A.No.7380 of 2019, under Section 29 of the Act, seeking ex post facto leave. 20. The appellant filed I.A.No.3498 of 2019, challenging the maintainability of the petition, only on 17.06.2019, i.e., one and half years after the petition was presented. In the meantime, before the consideration of I.A.No.3498 of 2019, the respondent filed I.A.No.7380 of 2019, under Section 29 of the Act, seeking ex post facto leave. 20. On an appreciation of the language in Section 29 of the Act and the interpretation given in afore cited decisions to an analogous provision i.e., Sec.14 of the Hindu Marriage Act, we are of the firm opinion that, to present a petition for divorce before the expiry of one year from the date of marriage, leave of the Court has to be obtained, as contemplated under Section 29 of Act, even if the prayer for divorce is an alternative relief; if not, the Court has the discretion to order the decree to be effective only after one year from the date of the marriage, and in case the petitioner has obtained leave by misrepresentation or concealment, the Court may also dismiss the petition. Nevertheless, on a literal interpretation of the above provision, a petition for divorce cannot be dismissed for want of leave under Section 29 of the Act, other than following the procedure provided under the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 29 of the Act. We hold that the decision of this Court in ArishRajanv.Jitha Raj (supra)is inapplicable to the facts of this case, as it was a case declining the appellant's prayer for leave to amend the pleadings for incorporating an alternative prayer for divorce. 21. We would observe that, it is incumbent on the Family Court(s) to scrutinise all petitions filed before it, before issuing process to the opposite party, as per the mandate under Rule 7 of the Family Court (Procedure) Rules, 1989; which reads as follows:- "7. Preliminary Examination.— (i) Before issuing any process to the opposite party the Judge shall scrutinise the plaint, petition or application, and may discuss the matter with the petitioning party and after such advice as he thinks fit and may defer the issue of the process for the time being. The Judge may associate any social welfare organization or other persons mentioned in Section 5 of the Act for this purpose. The Judge may associate any social welfare organization or other persons mentioned in Section 5 of the Act for this purpose. (ii) If the plaint, petition or application has to be proceeded with, the notice shall be issued to the respondent intimating the date and time fixed for appearance in person." 22. The Family Court ought to have scrutinised the petition and directed the respondent to seek leave for sustaining the alternative prayer for divorce, before issuing process to the appellant. But then, the Court did not pass a decree before the expiry of one year from the date of marriage, which is the sole prohibition under Section 29 of the Act. Similarly, as the appellant did not seek leave at the time of filing of the petition, the question of misrepresentation or concealment does not arise. The appellant filed I.A.No.3498 of 2019, only on 17.06.2019, i.e., one and half years after the petition was presented and nearly two and half years after the marriage, by which time there was no statutory bar to proceed with the petition, including the passing of judgment. Given the above findings, we hold that there is no error in the order dismissing I.A.No.3498 of 2019. In the result, we uphold the order of the Family Court and dismiss the . The parties shall bear their costs.