JUDGMENT Madhumati Mitra, J. - These two writ petitions have been preferred by the Union of India and its officials challenging the legality and correctness of similarly worded orders dated May 9, 2019 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Calcutta Bench, Kolkata (hereinafter the Tribunal) in O.A. No.385 of 2017 and O.A. No.350 of 2016. By the orders impugned, the Tribunal allowed the original applications of the respondent no.1 in W.P.C.T.No.112 of 2019, Shri Uday Chand Majumdar, and the respondent no.1 in WPCT 113 of 2019, Shri Prasenjit Mukherjee, by quashing the orders of minor penalty imposed on them as well as the orders of the appellate authority affirming the same. The respondents in the original applications (hereinafter the writ petitioners) were directed by the Tribunal to refund the entire amounts recovered by them from the original applicants, preferably within one month from the date of receipt of copies of the said orders. 2. On 07.02.2020, this Bench had observed that identical issues being involved in both the writ petitions, the same would be taken up together for hearing and consideration. 3. Before dealing with the rival submissions of the parties, it would be appropriate to set out the facts of both the writ petitions briefly. 4. The applicant in O.A. No. 350/1016 of 2016, Shri Prasenjit Mukherjee (hereinafter Prasenjit) approached the Tribunal questioning the legality of an order of minor penalty which was imposed following disciplinary proceedings initiated against him. He had been proceeded against under Rule 16 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 [(hereinafter the CCS (CCA) Rules] vide memo No. FB/B-2/2012/Disc.-N/11 dated January 28, 2015. It was alleged that Prasenjit while discharging functions as P.A., Howrah H.O., during the period from January 1, 2011 to January 27, 2015, posted SB withdrawal voucher (SB-7) for Rs.55,000/-. It was found that the said amount of Rs.55,000/- was withdrawn with the signature of one K.S. Srivastava, other than the actual depositor. It was also alleged that Prasenjit had neglected and failed to check withdrawal of such amount of Rs.55,000/- properly. It was found that the said amount of Rs.55,000/- was withdrawn with the signature of one K.S. Srivastava, other than the actual depositor. It was also alleged that Prasenjit had neglected and failed to check withdrawal of such amount of Rs.55,000/- properly. The statement of imputation of misconduct framed against Prasenjit reveals that he did not check the withdrawal voucher of Rs.55,000/- in respect of Howrah R.S.S.O. SB A/C.No.888799 and he did not compare the signature of the depositor on the said withdrawal voucher (SB-7) with the specimen in the application card, as required under Rule 38 of the Post Office Savings Bank Manual Volume 1. Had he checked the said withdrawal voucher (SB-7) properly and compared the signature of the depositor on the withdrawal voucher (SB-7) with the specimen in the application card (SB-3), then the irregularities would have been detected much earlier and misappropriation of Government money to the tune of Rs.41,51,375.00/- committed by one Bijoy Krishna Naskar, Ex. SPM, Howrah R.S.S.O. could have been prevented. 5. On 06.02.2015, Prasenjit approached the Sr. Superintendent of Post Offices (the disciplinary authority) with his response (Annexure-A2 to the original application),. He asked for copies of relevant documents for raising defence as the alleged incident occurred in the year 2011 and he was not in a position to recollect the incident properly. On June 15, 2015, the Sr. Superintendent of Post Offices, being the disciplinary authority observed that the response (Annexure-A2) of Prasenjit was not at all convincing. Accordingly, the disciplinary authority punished Prasenjit and imposed a penalty of Rs.3,00,000/- (Annexure-A3 to the original application). Prasenjit challenged the order of the disciplinary authority imposing penalty on him by preferring an appeal under the provision of rule 23(ii) of the CCS (CCA) Rules to the Director of Postal Services, South Bengal Region on June 26, 2015. In his appeal, Prasenjit specifically stated that he neither committed fraud nor was involved in the alleged fraud committed by the said Bijoy Krishna Naskar while he worked as SPM, Howrah R.S.S.O. and the imposition of penalty was not justified. 6. On September 03, 2015, the appellate authority affirmed the penalty imposed by the disciplinary authority and dismissed the appeal preferred by Prasenjit. 7. 6. On September 03, 2015, the appellate authority affirmed the penalty imposed by the disciplinary authority and dismissed the appeal preferred by Prasenjit. 7. The applicant in O.A. No.350/385 of 2017, Shri Uday Chand Majumdar (hereinafter Uday) being dissatisfied with the order of imposition of a penalty of recovery of Rs.7,19,880/-, in circumstances more or less similar to Prasenjit, approached the Tribunal challenging the legality of the said order. It was alleged that Uday had failed to check the SB withdrawal voucher (SB-7) dated December 18, 2010 for Rs.61,023/- of Howrah R.S.S.O. in connection with SB Account No.887323 and due to his failure to check the withdrawal voucher properly, the irregularities were not detected. Had he checked the said withdrawal voucher being SB-7 properly and pointed out the irregularity, then the said irregularities could have been informed to the Sr. Post Master, Howrah H.O. and the Sr. Superintendent of Post Office, Howrah Division, Howrah-1 for necessary enquiries to be initiated much earlier and misappropriation of Government money to the tune of Rs.41,51,375.00/- committed by the said Bijoy Krishna Naskar, Ex. SPM, Howrah R.S.S.O. could have been averted. Uday submitted a response stating that the imputation did not mention the date when the concerned SB withdrawal voucher (SB-7) in respect of Howrah R.S.SB A/C No.887323 dated December 18, 2010 was checked by him as P.A., SBCO, Howrah and also did not mention the date in the imputation when the same was handed over to him. Uday also stated that the charge-sheet did not mention the date of alleged incident and the full particulars of the said incident. Vide Order dated December 11, 2014, the disciplinary authority punished Uday and imposed a penalty of recovery of Rs.7,19,880/- from him. Aggrieved thereby, Uday invoked the provision of rule 23 of the CCS (CCA) Rules 1965 and preferred an appeal to the appellate authority. The order imposing penalty was affirmed by the appellate authority, leading to dismissal of the appeal preferred by Uday. 8. Aggrieved thereby, Uday invoked the provision of rule 23 of the CCS (CCA) Rules 1965 and preferred an appeal to the appellate authority. The order imposing penalty was affirmed by the appellate authority, leading to dismissal of the appeal preferred by Uday. 8. From the materials placed on record as well as upon consideration of the submissions made by learned counsel appearing for the rival parties, it is clear that the orders penalizing Prasenjit and Uday and directing recovery of money for the loss caused to the Government by them in course of discharge of their official duties comes within the purview of minor penalty as contained in Rule 11(iii) of the CCS (CCA) Rules. 9. A plea was raised by the writ petitioners earlier that the original applications were heard by a judicial member of the Tribunal (Single Bench) although the same ought to have been heard by a Division Bench comprising of a judicial member and an administrative member as the matter involved imposition of minor penalty in connection with disciplinary proceedings. Such issue was taken up for consideration as preliminary issue and disposed of on December 23, 2019 by a speaking order. The contention was overruled. 10. In both the cases, the delinquent employees had been charged of violation of rule 3(1)(i), 3(1)(ii) and 3(1)(iii) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 and penalized in one case to the tune of Rs.7,19,880/- and in the other to the tune of Rs.3,00,000/- on the finding that they were guilty of negligence in discharge of their official duties. Both the employees were asked to pay the penalty amount by way of instalments. 11. From Annexure-A1 (pages 101 to 102) to the original application 350/385/2017 filed by Uday as well as from Annexure A-1 (pages 79 to 80) to the original application of Prasenjit, it is revealed that due to their alleged negligence in performance of official duties the said Bijoy Krishna Naskar, Ex. SPM, Howrah R.S.S.O. committed misappropriation of Government money to the tune of Rs.41,51,375/-. 12. SPM, Howrah R.S.S.O. committed misappropriation of Government money to the tune of Rs.41,51,375/-. 12. In paragraph 7 of the judgment dated May 9, 2019 passed in connection with O.A.350/385/2017, the Tribunal observed as under: "Strangely, I notice that for the alleged negligence in checking the SB withdrawal voucher of Rs.61,023/- the applicant has been penalized with a huge recovery of Rs.7,19,880/- without even justifying the manner in which the respondent authorities apportioned his liability in the commission of alleged fraud. The applicant has alleged that the charge of negligence was a vague and indefinite one which rendered the penalty an illegality as in absence of a direct connection with the fraud there was no reasonable basis to proceed against him." 13. In its judgment dated May 9, 2019 in OA 350/1016/2016, the Tribunal also observed as follows: "Strangely, I notice that for the alleged negligence in failing to detect non-accounting of withdrawal amount of Rs.55,000/- the applicant has been penalised with a huge recovery of Rs.3,00,000 without even justifying the manner in which the Respondent authorities apportioned his liability in the commission of alleged fraud. The manner in which he has been held responsible could neither be comprehended nor countenanced." 14. While quashing the orders of penalty imposed by the disciplinary authority, since affirmed by the appellate authority, the Tribunal inter alia placed reliance on the decisions in O.K. Bhardwaj Vs. Union of India & Ors., (2001) 9 SCC 180 , Inspector Prem Chand Vs. Govt. of N.C.T of Delhi & Ors, (2007) 4 SCC 566 , Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar Vs. Union of India & Ors., (1999) 7 SCC 409 , as well as several decisions of other tribunals. 15. The impugned judgments have been assailed by Mr. Bose, learned counsel for the writ petitioners on various grounds. He forcefully contends on their behalf that the delinquent employees had been charged for dereliction of duties and the proceedings initiated against them were related to minor penalty; hence, the question of holding a formal enquiry to find out the degree of their involvement did not arise. Mr. Bose further contends that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the orders of penalty imposed by the disciplinary authority, which were subsequently affirmed by the appellate authority. Emphasis is laid by Mr. Mr. Bose further contends that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the orders of penalty imposed by the disciplinary authority, which were subsequently affirmed by the appellate authority. Emphasis is laid by Mr. Bose on rule 16 of the CCS (CCA) Rules and it is submitted that the disciplinary authority acted within its authority, which excludes holding of an inquiry as contemplated in sub-rules (3) to (23) of rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules before imposition of minor penalty for recovery. Mr. Bose further contends that the Tribunal failed to understand the dictum of the Supreme Court in O.K. Bhardwaj (supra) in its true perspective and committed an error in quashing the penalty imposed on the delinquent employees. 16. The alternative contention of Mr. Bose is that even if this Bench were inclined to hold that a formal enquiry ought to have been conducted against the delinquent employees, the Tribunal fell in error in not granting liberty to the writ petitioners to resume the proceedings from the stage of conducting enquiry. 17. Based on the above, Mr. Bose has prayed for appropriate orders. 18. Mr. Roy, learned counsel appearing for Prasenjit and Uday relied on O.K. Bhardwaj (supra) and contended that the issue involved in the writ petitions is no longer res integra. Since Prasenjit and Uday had denied and disputed the material allegations in the charge-sheet and investigation of factual issues were involved, the writ petitioners could not have avoided a formal enquiry and imposed penalty on them which, though characterised as minor, not only adversely affects their financial interests but also casts a stigma on them. 19. Insofar as the alternative submission of Mr. Bose is concerned, Mr. Roy contends that the alleged incidents are close to a decade old. It would, thus, not be in the fitness of things to grant any liberty to the writ petitioners, as prayed for by Mr. Bose. 20. The short questions that arise for determination in both the writ petitions are, (i) whether an enquiry is essential before imposing minor penalty on a delinquent employee when charges are factual in nature and the material allegations touching the facts, which form the plinth of the imputation of misconduct, are denied by the delinquent employees in their responses to the charge-sheets? In other words, could an enquiry be dispensed with on facts and in the circumstances on the ground that orders of minor penalty had been imposed and, therefore, there was no obligation on the part of the disciplinary authority to hold formal enquiry against the delinquent employees? The other question, should the first question be answered in favour of Prasenjit and Uday, is whether the writ petitioners should be granted the liberty as prayed for by Mr. Bose on their behalf? 21. We have gone through all the decisions cited at the bar. Law on the point of necessity to hold an enquiry into the conduct of a delinquent employee is quite explicit. 22. In O.K. Bhardwaj (supra), the Supreme Court had the occasion to deal with a similar question and was pleased to observe as under: "Even in the case of a minor penalty an opportunity has to be given to the delinquent employee to have his say or to file his explanation with respect to the charges against him. Moreover, if the charges are factual and they are denied by the delinquent employee, an enquiry should also be called for. This is the minimum requirement of the principle of natural justice and the said requirement cannot be dispensed with." (emphasis supplied) 23. Reliance placed by Mr. Bose on paragraph 5 of the decision in Food Corporation of India, Hyderabad Vs. A. Prahalada Rao, (2001) 1 SCC 165 , does not advance the cause of the writ petitioners too far. It cannot be overlooked that the Supreme Court while interfering with the decision of the High Court impugned before it had the occasion to observe that if in a given case the discretion conferred on the disciplinary authority by the relevant regulations is misused or is exercised in an arbitrary manner, it is open to challenge before an appropriate forum. The ratio of the decision, as this Bench understands, is that mere denial of the charges by the delinquent employee may not lead to the conclusion that a formal enquiry should be held in all cases but if the discretion conferred not to hold an enquiry is misused or exercised arbitrarily, such an exercise would be subject to judicial review and each case has to be decided on its own facts. 24. Uday in his response addressed to the Sr. 24. Uday in his response addressed to the Sr. Superintendent of Post Offices dated November 4, 2014 in connection with the proposal for taking action against him under rule 16 of the CCS (CCA) Rules raised disputes on the factual score [see: paragraphs 6 and 9]. He disputed that he was entrusted with the work, which he allegedly failed to perform. Having raised such a point, the minimum that was expected of the disciplinary authority was to refer to the documentary evidence to prove the incorrectness of Uday''s plea and to show, in black and white, that he was indeed so entrusted. From the order passed by the disciplinary authority dated December 11, 2014, what we find is that the factual issues raised by Uday were not dealt with. The disciplinary authority simply mentioned "the argument of the charged official is not convicting at all." 25. Similarly, Prasenjit in his response dated June 11, 2015 stated that from the copy of the passbook supplied to him it was found that the withdrawal of Rs.55,000/- dated March 10, 2011 from the SB Account No.888799 was not available and there was no scope for a Ledger PA to compare the transaction with the entries of the passbook. He also specifically stated that he was denied reasonable opportunity of being heard as the objection register in question was not made available to him, which was the main and only document to prove or disprove the charge. 26. In both the cases, the charges levelled against the delinquent employees were based on facts. The delinquent employees did not admit the charges; in fact, they denied the allegations. If the allegations are denied by the delinquent employee, it is needless to mention that the burden of proving the truth of those allegations lies on the disciplinary authority. 26. In both the cases, the charges levelled against the delinquent employees were based on facts. The delinquent employees did not admit the charges; in fact, they denied the allegations. If the allegations are denied by the delinquent employee, it is needless to mention that the burden of proving the truth of those allegations lies on the disciplinary authority. An enquiry into the allegations, in such circumstances as these where the charges are denied to the extent that entrustment of job/assignment on a particular day is disputed or a vital document advantageous to the delinquent employee is not made available to him, thereby resulting in breach of natural justice, it is incumbent for the disciplinary authority to either pass the final order of minor penalty by referring to any extant document entrusting such job/assignment or if such document is not available, to initiate a formal enquiry and have the allegations proved through witnesses having direct knowledge of what had transpired in connection with the factual matter, before any penal action is taken. Issues raised by the delinquent employees in their responses were not dealt with by the disciplinary authority in the manner law required him to deal. The disciplinary authority simply mentioned that the grounds taken by the charged officers were not convincing. That was his conclusion, i.e. "what", without such conclusion resting on reasons, i.e. "why". The due process had to be adopted which, unfortunately, was thrown to the winds; and there is no hesitation to hold that discretion in these cases were exercised arbitrarily by the disciplinary authority which the appellate authority too failed to correct. 27. In the present cases, this Bench has no manner of doubt that both Uday and Prasenjit were denied proper and reasonable opportunity of defending themselves by reason of no formal enquiry having been initiated by their disciplinary authority, and thereby they have suffered severe prejudice. 28. There is, thus, no reason to interfere with the orders passed by the Tribunal on the original applications interfering with the orders of penalty. 29. However, there is substance in the submission of Mr. Bose that the disciplinary authority of the delinquent employees ought to be permitted to hold enquiry into the charges giving due regard to the seriousness of the allegations, viz. financial implications. 29. However, there is substance in the submission of Mr. Bose that the disciplinary authority of the delinquent employees ought to be permitted to hold enquiry into the charges giving due regard to the seriousness of the allegations, viz. financial implications. The Tribunal, in the considered view of this Bench, should have granted liberty to the writ petitioners to proceed against Uday and Prasenjit from the stage of appointment of enquiry officer and to take the proceedings to its logical conclusion. 30. For the reasons aforesaid, these writ petitions succeed in part. 31. The orders of the tribunal setting aside the penalty imposed on Uday and Prasenjit are maintained. However, the writ petitioners shall be free to initiate regular departmental inquiry against Uday and Prasenjit by appointing enquiry officer(s). If a decision to that effect is taken, the proceedings shall resume from the stage till after submission of response by Uday and Prasenjit to the chargesheets. 32. Since the incidents are somewhat old, there can be no doubt that if at all it is decided to proceed against Uday and Prasenjit, the writ petitioners shall not waste much time and complete the disciplinary proceedings initiated against them within the shortest possible time but obviously after extending due, adequate and reasonable opportunity of defence to them. 33. The writ petitions stand disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs. 34. Photostat copy of this order duly counter-signed by the Assistant Court Officer, shall be retained with the records of W.P.C.T.113 of 2019.