JUDGMENT : Bechu Kurian Thomas, J. This writ petition is filed challenging Ext.P5 order issued by the first respondent rejecting an application under Order I Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure for impleading the petitioners in a proceeding initiated under Section 57 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 (Hereinafter referred to as, the HR & CE Act). 2. It is the case of the petitioners that they are members of a large family called Chekkura Puthalathu Poothady Illam, which is also known as Panoly Tharavadu and that they have a family temple which conducts temple festivals for which there are organised festival committees. It is alleged by the petitioners that at the instance of certain persons, who have vested political interests, Ext.P1 complaint was filed with ulterior motives and even though the Deputy Commissioner under the HR & CE Act has no right to take over a family temple, he has treated Ext.P1 representation as one under Section 57 of the HR & CE Act and numbered it as OA.No.9/2018. Pursuant to such action, a Notification was issued by the first respondent and objections were called for, for the purpose of inquiring into the representation in exercise of the powers under Section 57 of the HR & CE Act. It is averred in the writ petition that some persons who are nearby residents of the temple have filed objections against the representation, while some of the family members who are already parties in O.A.No.9/2018 filed application before the first respondent seeking stay of all further proceedings in OA.No.9/2018 till a decision is taken in a suit initiated as OS.No.339/2018 pending before the Munsiff Court, Koothuparamba. It is alleged that the said application was rejected. 3. While so, on coming to know about the proceedings in OA.No.9/2018, petitioners filed a petition under Order I Rule 10 of the CPC as IA.No.3/2020 seeking to implead themselves in the enquiry under Section 57 of the HR & CE Act. The impleading petition is produced as Ext.P4. According to the writ petitioners, their application for impleading has been rejected by a non-speaking order. The said order is produced as Ext.P5 and as mentioned earlier, it is impugned in this writ petition. 4. We heard Sri.M.P.Ashok Kumar, the learned counsel for the petitioners as also Sri.Laxmi Narayan, the learned Standing Counsel for the Malabar Devaswom Board. 5. According to the writ petitioners, their application for impleading has been rejected by a non-speaking order. The said order is produced as Ext.P5 and as mentioned earlier, it is impugned in this writ petition. 4. We heard Sri.M.P.Ashok Kumar, the learned counsel for the petitioners as also Sri.Laxmi Narayan, the learned Standing Counsel for the Malabar Devaswom Board. 5. Sri.M.P.Ashok Kumar, the learned counsel for the petitioners vehemently contended that the order rejecting the impleading petition is perverse and warrants interference by this Court since they are necessary parties in the proceedings and will be subjected to irreparable loss and hardships. Expanding on the scope of Order I Rule 10 (2), he relied upon the decisions in Prem Kumar v Sree Narayanan Bhaktha Paripalana Yogam, [ 2018 (1) KLT 944 ], Pankajbhai Rameshbhai Zalavadiya v. Jethabhai Kalabhai Zalavandiya [ (2017) 9 SCC 700 ], Thomson Press (India) Ltd. v. Nanak Builders And Investors Pvt. Ltd & Others [ (2013) 5 SCC 397 ] and Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and Others [ (1992) 2 SCC 524 ]. 6. We have considered the contentions raised and we find no reason to interfere with the order impugned. 7. The only reason mentioned in Ext.P4 impleading petition is that, the existing administration of the temple is carried out by the members of the Tharavadu and that petitioners are necessary parties. No other averments have been made justifying their application to implead. The said application has been rejected by the first respondent after finding that the proceedings under Section 57 (a) of the HR & CE Act is in its final stages and that evidence is almost completed and that in such circumstances, there is no reason to implead another party. It is also observed that the impleading petition is belated. 8. On perusal of Ext.P4 application, it can be understood that petitioners have no case that for an effectual and complete adjudication of the questions involved in the suit, they are necessary parties. Such an averment is patently absent in the application. The petitioners' only case is that they are essential parties. We do not agree. 9. 8. On perusal of Ext.P4 application, it can be understood that petitioners have no case that for an effectual and complete adjudication of the questions involved in the suit, they are necessary parties. Such an averment is patently absent in the application. The petitioners' only case is that they are essential parties. We do not agree. 9. Even though there is a complete lack of pleading in Ext.P4 application as regards the necessity of the petitioners to be in the party array, we attempted to appreciate the nature and the manner in which petitioners' absence would prejudice either the petitioners' or even the members of their family. In such an attempt, we find from Ext.P5 that petitioners' family members including his sister, brother and others related to his family are already on the party array before the 1st respondent, though curiously, they are not arrayed as parties here. All contentions, as relating to the family or to the nature or otherwise of the Temple, could certainly be projected and brought to the consideration of the 1st respondent through the persons already existing on the party array. Petitioners have no case that the persons who are already on the party array are acting contrary to the interests of the family. In such circumstances, we do not think that presence of the petitioners are essential for an effectual and complete adjudication of all the questions involved in the proceedings. 10. The power of the court under Order I Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to add parties to a suit is quite wide and the provision is susceptible to a liberal interpretation. The exercise of discretion to add a party is governed by the words "to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit". Parliament has in its wisdom framed the provision in such a manner that in order to adjudicate upon any question involved in the suit, if the presence of a person is essential, then the Court must have that power, at any stage of the proceedings, either upon an application or otherwise to add such party. However, this conferment of wide power upon the court cannot be interpreted to mean that if any person comes, at any point of time, with an application for impleading, the same must necessarily be allowed. However, this conferment of wide power upon the court cannot be interpreted to mean that if any person comes, at any point of time, with an application for impleading, the same must necessarily be allowed. Such an interpretation would harm the scope and purport of the provision. 11. The primary object of Order I Rule 10(2) is that, a person, whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding, must of necessity be added as a party. Though preventing multiplicity of actions is not an object of the provision, incidentally, the provision will have the effect of preventing multiple proceedings. Preventing multiplicity of proceedings is certainly a desirable consequence of Order I Rule 10(2), albeit, it not being its main objective. What makes the person a necessary party, is not merely that he has relevant evidence to adduce on some of the issues involved in the lis, as that would only make him a necessary witness, but it is that, without his presence, complete and final adjudication is impossible. Where a person applies to be made a party what the Court ought to see is whether there is anything in the suit which cannot be determined owing to his absence or whether there would be prejudice by his not being added as a party. Rule 10(2) cannot be read as requiring that all person who are likely to have any sort of right, title or interest in respect of the subject matter of a suit should be made parties thereto. 12. Viewed in the above precepts, it can be found that the discretion to add a party under Order I Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure will depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case guided by the above factors. While exercising that discretion, the court must of necessity be guided by the following factors : (a) whether the party sought to be added is a necessary party or not, (b) Whether his presence would enable the Court to effectually and completely adjudicate all questions involved in that case, (c) Whether his absence would lead to multiplicity of proceedings and (d) Whether impleading a party serves no purpose other than delaying the proceedings. 13. 13. In the decision relied upon by the petitioners as reported in Premkumar's case (supra), referring to the scope of powers, this Court has held as follows :- “15. Order I Rule 10(2) of the Code provides that the Court may, at any stage of the proceedings either upon or without an application of either party, order that any person, whose presence may be necessary, in order to enable the Court to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added it is well settled law that the question of addition of parties is a matter of judicial discretion to be exercised taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of each. 16. A necessary party is one without whom no order can be made effectively while a proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceedings. The procedure under Order I Rule 10 of the Code shall always be adopted where it is really necessary for a complete adjudication of the questions involved in the suit. A person may be impleaded in the proceedings, though no relief may be claimed against him, if his presence is necessary for a complete and final adjudication o the questions involved therein. But, the provision under Order I Rule 10 of the Code cannot be resorted to where there is no need for adding new parties for effectually and completely adjudicating the questions involved in the suit.” 14. The decisions cited at the Bar in Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and Others [ (1992) 2 SCC 524 ], Thomson Press (India) Ltd. v. Nanak Builders And Investors Pvt. Ltd & Others [ (2013) 5 SCC 397 ] and Pankajbhai Rameshbhai Zalavadiya v. Jethabhai Kalabhai Zalavandiya [ (2017) 9 SCC 700 ] apart from Premkumar's case (supra) as extracted above, postulates that, impleading of a party under Order I Rule 10(2) need be carried out only when presence of that party is absolutely necessary for an effective and complete adjudication of the questions involved. 15. 15. After gauging the factual situation arising in the case, we hold that petitioners are not necessary parties to the proceeding under Section 57A of the Act and that petitioners are not necessary to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the proceedings. We also hold that the absence of petitioners as parties in the proceedings will not lead to any multiplicity of proceedings, especially since, proceedings under Section 57(a) of the HR & CE Act is in the nature of an inquiry and not adversarial. We also find that the application has been filed belatedly. Since we have already found that the petitioners have no case, even in their pleadings, that their presence is necessary for an effective and complete adjudication of the questions involved in the proceedings and also since we find that the petitioners' interest can be well protected and the questions arising in the proceeding be effectually and completely adjudicated upon by the persons who are already on the party array, we find no reason to interfere with Ext.P5. In the result, this writ petition is dismissed and in the nature of the facts and circumstances of the case without costs.