JUDGMENT : Gopinath. P., J. The only question arising for our consideration in the above Writ Appeal is this; Should Rule 75(5) of Chapter XIVA of the Kerala Education Rules (for short 'K.E.R') be read as placing any embargo on a teacher facing disciplinary proceedings from engaging a lawyer when the Manager is represented by a lawyer in the proceedings before the Educational authorities ? 2. The appellant is the Manager of an aided Lower Primary School. Disciplinary proceedings were initiated by him against the 1st respondent. In enquiry proceedings before the Assistant Educational Officer, the appellant (Manager) was being represented by an Advocate. The request made by the st respondent for engaging an Advocate was turned down by the Assistant Educational Officer on the ground that the Rule 75(5) of Chapter XIVA of the Kerala Education Rules specifically prohibited the engagement of a lawyer by the teacher facing the proceedings. The said order of the Assistant Educational Offier was confirmed by the District Educational Officer. The 1st respondent, therefore, preferred W.P.(C)No.13053/2014 (out of which this appeal arises) inter alia challenging the provisions of Rule 75(5) of Chapter XIVA KER and seeking a declaration that she was entitled to be represented by a lawyer of her choice in the enquiry proceedings. A learned Single Judge of this Court, relying on the various judgments of the Apex Court and this Court, took the view that the provisions of Rule 75(5) cannot be relied upon to contend that even in cases where the Manager is represented by an Advocate, the delinquent teacher cannot be so represented. The learned Single Judge held that, if such a view is taken of Rule 75(5), the Rule would be arbitrary and discriminatory. The learned Single Judge therefore declared that Rule 75(5) can create an interdiction regarding engagement of a lawyer only where the Manager is not so represented. This appeal is filed challenging the aforesaid judgment of the learned Single Judge. 3. On a consideration of the matter, we cannot but hold, that the view taken by the learned Single Judge regarding the scope of Rule 75(5) of Chapter XIVA of KER is correct in law and warrants no interference whatsoever. This appeal is filed challenging the aforesaid judgment of the learned Single Judge. 3. On a consideration of the matter, we cannot but hold, that the view taken by the learned Single Judge regarding the scope of Rule 75(5) of Chapter XIVA of KER is correct in law and warrants no interference whatsoever. The decisions cited before the Learned Single Judge, by the learned counsel for the 1st respondent, support the view that where the employer engages a legal practitioner it would be a violation of Natural Justice to deny the same right to the employee. We need not refer to all those judgments, in detail, but we note that in Port of Bombay v. Dilipkumar Raghavendranath Nadkarni, (1983) 1 SCC 124 it was categorically held:- “We concern ourselves in this case with a narrow question whether where in such a disciplinary enquiry by a domestic tribunal, the employer appoints Presenting-cum-Prosecuting Officer to represent the employer by persons who are legally trained, the delinquent employee, if he seeks permission to appear and defend himself by a legal practitioner, a denial of such a request would vitiate the enquiry on the ground that the delinquent employee had not been afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself, thereby vitiating one of the essential principles of natural justice.” “....................A man of the establishment dons the robe of a Judge. It is held in the establishment office or a part of it. Can it even be compared to the adjudication by an impartial arbitrator or a court presided over by an unbiased Judge?. The Enquiry Officer combines the judge and prosecutor rolled into one. Witnesses are generally employees of the employer who directs an enquiry into misconduct. This is sufficient to raise serious apprehensions. Add to these uneven scales, the weight of legally trained minds on behalf of employer simultaneously denying that opportunity to delinquent employee. The weighted scales and tilted balance can only be partly restored if the delinquent is given the same legal assistance as the employer enjoys. Justice must not only be done but must seem to be done is not a euphemism for courts alone, it applies with equal vigour and rigour to all those who must be responsible for fair play in action. Justice must not only be done but must seem to be done is not a euphemism for courts alone, it applies with equal vigour and rigour to all those who must be responsible for fair play in action. And a quasi-judicial tribunal cannot view the matter with equanimity on inequality of representation.” The equally strong (if not prevalent) view is the oft quoted expression of law in N. Kalindi v. Tata Locomotive & Engg. Co. Ltd. - AIR 1960 SC 914 . Please also see Brooke Bond (India) (P) Ltd. v. S. Subba Raman -(1961) 2 LLJ 417 (SC); Dunlop Rubber Co. (India) Ltd. v. Workmen - AIR 1965 SC 1392 ; Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Ltd. v. Ram Naresh Tripathi - (1993) 2 SCC 115 ; Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Maharashtra General Kamgar Union - (1999) 1 SCC 626 ; Cipla Ltd. v. Ripu Daman Bhanot - (1999) 4 SCC 188 ; National Seeds Corporation Limited v. K.V. Rama Reddy - (2006) 11 SCC 645 & Railway Protection Force v. K. Raghuram Babu - (2008) 4 SCC 406 . Kalindi (supra) held;- “Accustomed as we are to the practice in the courts of law to skilful handling of witnesses by lawyers specially trained in the art of examination and cross-examination of witnesses, our first inclination is to think that a fair enquiry demands that the person accused of an act should have the assistance of some person, who even if not a lawyer may be expected to examine and cross-examine witnesses with a fair amount of skill. We have to remember, however, in the first place that these are not enquiries in a court of law. It is necessary to remember also that in these enquiries, fairly simple questions of fact as to whether certain acts of misconduct were committed by a workman or not only fall to be considered, and straightforward questioning which a person of fair intelligence and knowledge of conditions prevailing in the industry will be able to do will ordinarily help to elicit the truth. It may often happen that the accused workman will be best suited, and fully able to cross-examine the witnesses who have spoken against him and to examine witnesses in his favour.” In this case we are concerned with a situation where the provisions of the Rule in question specifically prohibit representation through a legal practitioner. It may often happen that the accused workman will be best suited, and fully able to cross-examine the witnesses who have spoken against him and to examine witnesses in his favour.” In this case we are concerned with a situation where the provisions of the Rule in question specifically prohibit representation through a legal practitioner. Though the Rules are silent regarding the right of the management to have representation through a legal practitioner we feel that we can and we must read down the provisions of Rule 75(5) to ensure that it is not arbitrary or discriminatory. We are in complete agreement with the finding of the learned Single Judge that Rule 75(5) of Chapter XIVA of KER would be arbitrary and discriminatory if it were to be interpreted as creating an absolute embargo on the teacher facing disciplinary proceedings from engaging a legal practitioner even in cases where the management is so represented. It is settled law that provisions such as the aforesaid Rule 75(5) can be read down to ensure that its provisions are in conformity with Article 14 of the Constitution of India. [ See Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, In re, 1941 SCC OnLine FC 3 : AIR 1941 FC 72; DTC v. Mazdoor Congress 1991 Supp (1) SCC 600; Cellular Operators Assn. of India v. TRAI, (2016) 7 SCC 703 and Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019) 8 SCC 416 .] We notice from these decisions that the words in a statute or subordinate legialation can be read down if “..........general words used in a statute or regulation can be confined in a particular manner so as not to infringe a constitutional right.” The provisions of the aforesaid Rule 75(5) can be so confined to hold that Rule 75(5) of Chapter XIVA of the Kerala Education Rules prohibits the engagement of services of a legal practitioner by a teacher facing disciplinary proceedings only in circumstances where the manager is not so represented. In that view of the matter this Court need not declare the Rule as it stands now to be unconstitutional, which we would be required to do if we feel that its operation cannot be confined in the manner indicated above. 4. Today when the matter is taken up for consideration, Sri. In that view of the matter this Court need not declare the Rule as it stands now to be unconstitutional, which we would be required to do if we feel that its operation cannot be confined in the manner indicated above. 4. Today when the matter is taken up for consideration, Sri. M.P. Ashok Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant would state that the Manager does not intend to continue the engagement of a lawyer in the enquiry proceedings against the 1st respondent. He would, therefore, urge that the 1st respondent, should not be permitted to engage a lawyer in the disciplinary proceedings before the Educational Authorities. 5. Sri. Elvin Peter, learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent states that the present stand of the management cannot in any manner prevent his client from engaging a lawyer of her choice for the reason that the appellant cannot be permitted to take conflicting stands at different stages of the litigation. He invites our attention to the judgment of a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Suzuki Parasrampuria Suitings Pvt. Ltd. v. The Official Liquidator of Mahendra Petrochemicals Ltd. (in Liquidation) and others - (2018) 10 SCC 707 to contend that the appellant cannot be permitted to change his stand, after having asserted before the learned Single Judge that he intends to engage a lawyer to represent him in the disciplinary proceedings. We would notice that, on facts, the judgment of the Supreme Court referred to above was a case where the appellant therein, had initially taken a stand before the Company Judge that it was a secured creditor under the SARFAESI Act and after such claim was rejected by the Company Judge resiled from its earlier stand and, contrary to its own pleadings, contented that it had never sought the status of a secured creditor under the SARFAESI Act. Referring to the judgment in Amar Singh v. Union of India [ (2011) 7 SCC 69 ], the Supreme Court held that, though a litigant can take different stands at different times, he or she cannot be permitted to take contrary stands in the same case. It was also held that “A party cannot be permitted to approbate and reprobate on the same facts and take inconsistent shifting stands.” 6. We are of the view that the present case stands on completely different footing. It was also held that “A party cannot be permitted to approbate and reprobate on the same facts and take inconsistent shifting stands.” 6. We are of the view that the present case stands on completely different footing. This is a case where the Manager had initially decided that he would be represented in the disciplinary proceedings through a lawyer. The learned Single Judge, taking note of this fact, held that, in such circumstances, the delinquent teacher cannot be denied the chance to be represented by a lawyer. The decision to engage a lawyer and thereafter deciding not to engage a lawyer cannot be taken to be a contradictory or inconsistent stand in the same case. We are therefore of the view that the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Suzuki Parasrampuria Suitings Pvt. Ltd's case (supra) does not apply to the facts of this case. 7. In the light of our findings and considering the stand of the appellant (Manager) we dispose of this Writ Appeal in the following manner:- (i) We read down the provisions of Rule 75(5) of Chapter XIVA of the Kerala Education Rules and hold that the said Rule prohibits the engagement of services of a legal practitioner by a teacher facing disciplinary proceedings only in circumstances where the Manager is not so represented and uphold the view of the Learned Single Judge that any other interpretation would render the Rule arbitrary and discriminatory; (ii) We record the statement of the appellant (Manager) that he does not intend to avail of the services of a lawyer in the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the 1st respondent teacher at the stage of enquiry before the Educational Authorities. We hold that as long as the Manager does not engage the services of a lawyer in the disciplinary proceedings, the 1st respondent cannot insist that she should be permitted to engage a lawyer. In the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.