JUDGMENT The Detention order No. 23/DMS/PSA/2019 dated 10.08.2019 passed by the District Magistrate, Shopian whereby Mohd. Latief Shergojri has been detained under Clause (a-i) Sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the Public Safety Act with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State. The detenu-Mohd. Latief Shergojri has assailed the said order through his brother. 2. The detenu has challenged the order of detention on the grounds; that (i) the allegations reflected in the grounds of detention are vague, non-existent and no prudent man can make representation against such grounds and passing of the detention order on these grounds alone makes the detention un-justified and unreasonable and the same is required to be quashed. The impugned order of detention, thus, suffers from total non-application of mind on the part of the detaining authority. (ii) the detenu was already in custody at the time of passing of the impugned order of detention in FIR No. 09/2019, for which he had neither applied for bail nor bail was granted, thus, the detaining authority has not mentioned any compelling reasons to pass the order of detention. The order of detention, as such, is bad and liable to be quashed on this ground also. (iii) the impugned order of detention again suffers from un-explained delay. The last alleged activity of the detenu was on 03.05.2019 and the detaining authority had passed order of detention on 10.08.2019, thus, there is no justification for the three months delay in passing of the impugned order of detention. (iv) the grounds of detention reflect that the activities of the detenu were prejudicial to the maintenance of Public Order, however, the order of detention had been passed with a view to prevent the detenu from acting in any manner which is prejudicial to the security of the State/Country. This reveals total non-application of mind on the part of the detaining authority, hence the detention is bad in law. (v) the respondents have not furnished all the material relied upon by the detaining authority, while passing the order of detention and this has prevented the detenu from making an effective representation, thereby violated his right under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. (v) the respondents have not furnished all the material relied upon by the detaining authority, while passing the order of detention and this has prevented the detenu from making an effective representation, thereby violated his right under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. (vi) the detenu is not English literate person and he only understands Kashmiri and Urdu language, however, neither grounds were explained to the detenu in the language, he understands nor the translated copies of the same were provided to him. This has prevented from making an effective representation which has resulted in violation of his right as enshrined under Article-22(5) of the Constitution of India which makes the detention order vitiated. 3. Mr. M. A. Chashoo, learned Additional Advocate General has filed counter affidavit and has also produced the detention record. It is submitted that the detenu was detained after following all the statutory requirements and complied with constitutional guarantees by the Detaining Authority. All the material relied upon by the detaining authority were furnished to the detenu and the same was explained to him in the language, he understands. The detention of the detenu was approved in terms of section 15 of the J&K Public Safety Act and the case of the detenu was referred to the Advisory Board for opinion. The Advisory Board after considering all the material placed before it, in terms of Section 16 of the Act has held that there is sufficient cause of detention of the detenu. 4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 5. The impugned detention order has also been assailed on the ground that the impugned detention order had been passed on both expressions “acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State” and “acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of Public Order” which reflects total non-application of mind by the Detaining Authority and, as such, the detention is vitiated. Reliance in this regard has been placed in G. M. Shah v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, 1980 AIR 494, wherein, the Court while considering section 8 of the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act has held that: “It may be noted that whereas the order of detention stated that it had been passed with a view to preventing the detenu “from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order”, in the last paragraph of the grounds furnished to the detenu, it was stated that “your remaining at large is prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and also to the security of the State”. The relevant part of section 8 of the Act under which the order of detention is passed reads: “8. Detention of certain persons.-(1) The Government may- (a) if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to- (i) the security of the State or the maintenance of the public order, or (ii) the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community; or. (b) .... ... ... ... ... ... ... .. it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. (2) Any of the following officers namely:- (i) Divisional Commissioners, (ii) District Magistrates, may, if satisfied as provided in sub- clauses (i) and (iii) of clause (a) of sub-section (1), exercise the powers conferred by the said sub-section. ... ... ... ... ... ... .. it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. (2) Any of the following officers namely:- (i) Divisional Commissioners, (ii) District Magistrates, may, if satisfied as provided in sub- clauses (i) and (iii) of clause (a) of sub-section (1), exercise the powers conferred by the said sub-section. (3) For the purpose of sub- section (1),- (a) “acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State” means making preparations for using, or attempting to use, or using or instigating, inciting, provoking or otherwise abetting the use of force, to overthrow or overawe the Government established by law in the State; (b) “acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order” means- (i) promoting, propagating or attempting to create, feelings of enmity or hatred or disharmony on grounds of religion, race, caste, community, or region; (ii) making preparations for using, or attempting to use, or using, or instigating, inciting, provoking, otherwise abetting the use of force where such preparation, using, attempting, instigating, inciting, provoking or abetting, disturbs or is likely to disturb public order; (iii) attempting to commit, or committing, or instigating, inciting, provoking or otherwise abetting the commission of, mischief within the meaning of section 425 of the Ranbir Penal Code where the commission of such mischief disturbs, or is likely to disturb public order; (iv) attempting to commit, or committing, or instigating, inciting, provoking or otherwise abetting the commission of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term extending to seven years or more, where the commission of such offence disturbs, or is likely to disturb public order.” The expressions “law and order”, “public order” and “security of the State” are distinct concepts though not always separate. Whereas every breach of peace may amount to disturbance of law and order, every such breach does not amount to disturbance of public order and every public disorder may not prejudicially affect the “security of the State”. Whereas every breach of peace may amount to disturbance of law and order, every such breach does not amount to disturbance of public order and every public disorder may not prejudicially affect the “security of the State”. This is borne out from the observations made by Patanjali Sastri, J. in the decision of this Court in Romesh Thappar v. The State of Madras which are as follows:- “As Stephen in his Criminal Law of England observes: Unlawful assemblies, riots, insurrections, rebellions, levying of war, are offences which run into each other and are not capable of being marked off by perfectly defined boundaries. All of them have in common one feature, namely that the normal tranquility of a civilized society is in each of the cases mentioned disturbed either by actual force or at least by the show and threat of it.” Though all these offences thus involve disturbances of public tranquility and are in theory offences against public order, the difference between them being only a difference of degree, yet for the purpose of grading the punishment to be inflicted in respect of them they may be classified into different minor categories as has been done by the Indian Penal Code. Similarly, the Constitution, in formulating the varying criteria for permissible legislation imposing restrictions on the fundamental rights enumerated in article 19(1), has placed in a distinct category those offences against public order which aim at undermining the security of the State or overthrowing it, and made their prevention the sole justification for legislative abridgement of freedom of speech and expression, that is to say, nothing less than endangering the foundations of the State or threatening its overthrow could justify curtailment of the rights to freedom of speech and expression, while the right of peaceable assembly “sub- clause (b)” and (c) right of association “sub-clause (c) “may be restricted under clauses (3) and (4) of Article 19 in the interests of “public order,” which in those clauses includes the security of the State. The differentiation is also noticeable in Entry 3 of List III (Concurrent List) of the Seventh Schedule, which refers to the “security of a State” and “maintenance of public order” as distinct subjects of legislation. The differentiation is also noticeable in Entry 3 of List III (Concurrent List) of the Seventh Schedule, which refers to the “security of a State” and “maintenance of public order” as distinct subjects of legislation. The Constitution thus requires a line to be drawn in the field of public order or tranquillity marking off, may be, roughly, the boundary between those serious and aggravated forms of public disorder which are calculated to endanger the security of the State and the relatively minor breaches of the peace of a purely local significance, treating for this purpose differences in degree as if they were differences in kind.” As observed by Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was) in Dr. Ram Manohar - Lohia v. State of Bihar & Ors. one has to imagine three concentric circles, in order to understand the meaning and import of the above expressions. ‘Law and order’ represents the largest circle within which is the next circle representing “public order” and the smallest circle represents “security of State”. It is then easy to see that an act may affect law and order but not public order just as an act may affect public order but not security of State. It is in view of the above distinction, the Act defines the expressions “acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State” and “acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order” separately. An order of detention made either on the basis that the detaining authority is satisfied that the person against whom the order is being made is acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or on the basis that he is satisfied that such person is acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order but which is attempted to be supported by placing reliance on both the bases in the grounds furnished to the detenu has to be held to be an illegal one vide decisions of this Court in Bhupal Chandra Ghosh v. Arif Ali & Ors. and Satya Brata Ghose v. Arif Ali & Ors. The order of detention is, therefore, liable to be quashed and the detenu is entitled to be set at liberty. The petition is accordingly allowed.” 6. and Satya Brata Ghose v. Arif Ali & Ors. The order of detention is, therefore, liable to be quashed and the detenu is entitled to be set at liberty. The petition is accordingly allowed.” 6. Thus, the Detaining Authority can detain a person under preventive detention whose activities are prejudicial to the security of the State or maintenance of public order. The Detaining Authority has to record its satisfaction on activities prejudicial either on maintenance of Public Order or on Security of the State. The detention order on both the grounds, would be illegal and, thus, the detention is vitiated. 7. It is also contended that the detenu has also said that he has not been furnished all the material relied upon by the Detaining Authority, while passing the impugned order of detention. 8. Perusal of the record reveals that the detenu was furnished contents of PSA warrant (01 leaf), Notice (01 leaf), Grounds of detention (04 leaves), Copy of FIR s (02 leaves) in total eight leaves and same were read over and explained to the detenu in the language which he fully understands. The impugned order of detention dated 10.08.2019 was passed on the basis of dossier which was placed before the detaining authority by the SSP, Shopian and the same had been provided to the detenu, as such, the detenu had not been prevented from making an effective representation in terms of the Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. The omission to provide the same has prevented the detenu from making any effective representation as contemplated under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India and Section 13 of the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act. The detenu cannot make an effective representation unless the detenu had been apprised of all the material considered by the Detaining Authority, while passing of the detention order. 9. In Sophia Ghulam Mohd. Bham v. State of Maharashtra and others, AIR 1999 SC 3051 , the Apex Court observed as under:- “… The right to be communicated the grounds of detention flows from Article 22(5) while the right to be supplied all the material on which the grounds are based flows from the right given to the detenu to make a representation against the order of detention. A representation can be made and the order of detention can be assailed only when all the grounds on which the order is based are communicated the detenu and the material on which those grounds are based are also disclosed and copies thereof are supplied to the person detained, in his own language…..” 10. This apart the Detaining Authority has not shown any compelling reasons for passing the order of detention when it is admitted by the respondents that the detenu was already in custody, in the absence of which this detention is vitiated. Thus, there is no sufficient compliance with the requirement of law for providing the detenu with the constitutional safeguards. 11. In view of the aforesaid discussions, there is no need to advert to other grounds raised in this petition. This petition is allowed, impugned detention order No. 23/DMS/PSA/2019 dated 10.08.2019 of Mohd Latief Shergojri S/o Mohd Ismail Shergojir is quashed. Accordingly, the respondents are directed to release the detenu from the custody forthwith, if he is not required in any other case. 12. Disposed of in the aforesaid terms. 13. Let the detention record be returned back to learned counsel for the respondents by the Registry.