JUDGMENT : SHAJI P.CHALY, J. Writ petitioner claims to be a trade unionist representing the employees of various industrial establishments, including establishments wherein the appropriate Government is the Central Government, and is said to be conducting cases on behalf of the members of the trade union in the Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals in the State of Kerala in representative capacity and is actively involved in the collective bargaining process under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 2. The writ petition is filed seeking a writ of quo warrantoor any other appropriate writ, order or direction calling upon 2nd respondent i.e., V.Vijayakumar, Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Ernakulam, to explain under what authority he is holding the post of Presiding Officer, and a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside Ext.P4 order passed by the Government of India, Ministry of Labour and Employment, New Delhi dated 1st November, 2018, appointing 2nd respondent as Presiding Officer in Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Ernakulam, for a period of 5 years with effect from the date of assumption of charge of the post or upto the age of 65 years, whichever is earlier. However, it is made clear in the said order that, the appointment of Sri. V. Vijayakumar shall be regulated in terms of Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal and other Authorities (Qualifications, Experience and Other conditions of Service of Members) Rules, 2017, hereinafter called, 'Rules 2020', and would be subject to the final outcome of W.P.(C)No.279 of 2017 and other connected petitions pending before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. 3. The case projected by the petitioner is that the post to which the 2nd respondent is appointed is a public office created under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, hereinafter called, “Act, 1947”. Act, 1947 prescribes the qualification for appointment to the post of Presiding Officer-Labour Court and Industrial Tribunals. 3. The case projected by the petitioner is that the post to which the 2nd respondent is appointed is a public office created under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, hereinafter called, “Act, 1947”. Act, 1947 prescribes the qualification for appointment to the post of Presiding Officer-Labour Court and Industrial Tribunals. Accordingly, the qualification to the post of Presiding Officer-Labour Court prescribed under section 7(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is as follows: “he is or has been a Judge of a High Court; or a District Judge or an Additional District Judge for a period of not less than three years; has held any judicial office in India for not less than seven years; or has been the Presiding Officer of a Labour Court constituted under any provincial Act or State Act for not less than five years; or is/has been a Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (Central) or Joint Commissioner of the State Labour Department, having a degree in law with minimum of seven years' experience in the labour department including three years of experience as Conciliation Officer; or is an officer of Indian Legal Service in Grade III with three years' experience in the grade.” 4. According to the petitioner, 2nd respondent lacks the aforesaid qualifications prescribed under Section 7(3) of Act, 1947, and Ext.P4 order evinces that the qualification of the 2nd respondent as Additional Provident Fund Commissioner of Employees Provident Fund Organization has been reckoned for appointment to the post of Presiding Officer of Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Ernakulam. 5. Therefore, the sum and substance of the contention advanced is that, in the absence of the qualification as mandated in section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, 2nd respondent is unqualified to hold the post of Presiding Officer of Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court . 6. Second respondent has filed a detailed counter affidavit refuting the allegations and claims and demands raised by the petitioner. Among other contentions, it is stated that, 1st respondent had vide its letter dated 10.8.2017, addressed to the Secretaries in the Central Ministries/Departments and the Chief Secretaries in all the States/Union Territories, sought for a panel, of names of officers fulfilling the eligibility, entitlement and requirement, mentioned in the aforesaid letter, for appointment to the post of Presiding Officer of Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court in various places including Ernakulam, evident from Exhibit R2(a). Along with Ext.R2(a) letter, the notification issued by the Central Government publishing the Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal and Other Authorities (Qualification, Experience and other Conditions of Service of Members) Rules, 2017, by which the eligibility and constitution of Search Committee members and Presiding Officers of various Tribunals including the Central Government Industrial Tribunal as modified, was also enclosed, evident from Ext. R2(b). 7. The case of the 2nd respondent is that on the date of issuance of both Exts. R2(a), and R2(b) Rules, 2nd respondent was holding the post of Additional Central Provident Fund Commissioner (Head Quarters). Therefore, the 2nd respondent had the qualification and other requirements prescribed in Ext.R2(b) for appointment as the Presiding Officer of Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court. Accordingly Second respondent submitted an application to the post through the Central Provident Fund Commissioner, Employees' Provident Fund Organisation, evident from Ext.R2(c) application and Ext.R2(d) bio-data. 8. The paramount contention advanced by the 2nd respondent is that, 2nd respondent is fully qualified in accordance with Ext.R2(b) modified Rules issued by the Ministry of Finance, Government of India dated 1st June, 2017. As per Ext.R2(b) Rules, the qualification prescribed for appointment as the Presiding Officer of Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court constituted by the Central Government under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) is as follows: “A person shall not be qualified for appointment as Presiding Officer unless he.- (a) is or has been or qualified to be a Judge of a High Court or (b) he has, for a period of not less than three-years, been a District Judge or an Additional District Judge; or (c) is a person of ability, integrity and standing and having special knowledge of and professional experience of not less than twenty years in economics, business, commerce, law, finance, management, industry, public affairs, administration, labour relations, industrial disputes or any other matter which in the opinion of the Central Government is useful to the Industrial Tribunal.” 9. Therefore, it is submitted that the 2nd respondent having been qualified, as directed in Ext.R2(e) dated 25.1.2018, attended the interaction held on 13.2.2018 with the Search-cum Selection Committee constituted as per Ext.R2(b) Rules and accordingly 2nd respondent was appointed as Presiding Officer of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court. 10. Therefore, it is submitted that the 2nd respondent having been qualified, as directed in Ext.R2(e) dated 25.1.2018, attended the interaction held on 13.2.2018 with the Search-cum Selection Committee constituted as per Ext.R2(b) Rules and accordingly 2nd respondent was appointed as Presiding Officer of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court. 10. Anyhow, Ext.R2(b) modified rules issued by the Central Government was under challenge before the Apex Court in W.P.(C) No.279 of 2017 and other connected writ petitions, and as per Ext.P3 order dated 9.2.2017, it was directed by the Apex Court that all appointments to be made in pursuance to the selection made by the Interim Search-cum-selection committee shall abide by the conditions of service as per old Acts and Rules and again that all selections made by the aforementioned interim selection committee and the consequential appointment of all the selectees as Chairman/Judicial/Administrative members shall be for a period as has been provided in the old Act and Rules, with again making the aforesaid directions applicable for selection of the Chairpersons and the Judicial/Administrative/Technical/Expert Members for all tribunals. 11. Thereafter, Apex Court modified Ext.P3 order whereby in respect of Central Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, Debts Recovery Tribunal and Central Administrative Tribunal, National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission and Appellate Tribunal for Electricity, the selection process was directed to be completed, clarifying again that the same will not be affected by Ext.P3 order dated 9.2.2018, evident from Ext.R2(f). Therefore, according to the 2nd respondent, 2nd respondent is continuing in the post on the basis of the directions issued by the Apex Court during the pendency of the writ petitions. 12. First respondent Union of India has also filed a detailed statement justifying the stand adopted in the selection process prescribed as per Ext.R2(b) modified Rules and it is also submitted that the appointments are made in terms of the modification made in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 by adding new section 7(d), which provides that, qualifications, appointment, term of office, salaries and allowances and other terms and conditions of service of Presiding Officer of the Industrial Tribunal appointed by the Central Government under section 7-A(1-A) of the ID Act shall be governed by provisions of section 184 of Finance Act, 2017. It was accordingly that the Finance Ministry notified the Rules, 2017, which came into force on and with effect from 1.6.2017. It was accordingly that the Finance Ministry notified the Rules, 2017, which came into force on and with effect from 1.6.2017. Therefore, the sum and substance of the contention advanced by the 1st respondent is that, the 1st respondent was fully justified in appointing the Search Committee and conducting selection in accordance with Rules. 13. An additional affidavit is also filed by the 2nd respondent reiterating the stand adopted and also producing a copy of the Finance Act, 2017 (No.7 of 2017), which has received the assent of the President of India on 31st March, 2017. 14. We have heard learned counsel for petitioner, Smt. A.K.Preetha, Smt. C.G.Preetha appearing for the Union of India, Sri. P.K.Aravindakshan Pillay appearing for 2nd respondent and perused the pleadings and documents on record. 15. The discussion of facts made above would make it clear that the contention put forth by the petitioner is relying upon the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 with respect to the qualification prescribed for appointment of Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum Labour Court. However, the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act was modified by incorporating section 7(d) consequent to the introduction of the Finance Act, 2017, whereby a modified qualification is prescribed by which the 2nd respondent became qualified for appointment. Section 7-D reads thus: “7-D. Qualifications, terms and conditions of service of Presiding Officer:- Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the qualifications, appointment, term of office, salaries and allowances, resignation and removal and other terms and conditions of service of the Presiding Officer of the Industrial Tribunal appointed by the Central Government under sub-section (1) of section 7A, shall, after the commencement of Part XIV of Chapter VI of the Finance Act, 2017 (7 of 2017), be governed by the provisions of section 184 of that Act. Provided that the Presiding Officer appointed before the commencement of Part XIV of Chapter VI of the Finance Act, 2017, shall continue to be governed by the provisions of this Act, and the rules made thereunder as if the provisions of section 184 of the Finance Act, 2017 had not come into force.” 16. Anyhow it is an admitted fact that the Finance Act, 2017 was under challenge before the Apex Court in Writ Petition (Civil) No.279/2017 and other connected writ petitions. Anyhow it is an admitted fact that the Finance Act, 2017 was under challenge before the Apex Court in Writ Petition (Civil) No.279/2017 and other connected writ petitions. During the pendency of the writ petitions, an interim order was passed, produced as Ext.P3 in the writ petition, whereby, according to the 2nd respondent, 2nd respondent was entitled to occupy the post. However, according to the writ petitioner, continuance of the 2nd respondent was not in accordance with the order passed by the Apex Court. 17. Anyhow, after threadbare consideration of the writ petitions, Ext.R2(b) rules as per Finance Act, 2017 was struck down by the Apex Court in Rojer Mathew vs South Indian Bank Ltd and Ors. [Civil Appeal No. 8588/2019 arising out of SLP No. 15804/2017, dated 13.11.2019] and has issued the following directions at paragraph 228: “228. In the light of the above discussion and our analysis, it is held that: (i) The issue and question of Money Bill, as defined under Article 110(1) of the Constitution and certification accorded by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha in respect of Part-XIV of the Finance Act, 2017 is referred to a larger Bench. (ii) Section 184 of the Finance Act, 2017 does not suffer from excessive delegation of legislative functions as there are adequate principles to guide framing of delegated legislation, which would include the binding dictums of this Court. (iii) The Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal and other Authorities (Qualifications, Experience and other Conditions of Service of Members) Rules, 2017 suffer from various infirmities as observed earlier. These Rules formulated by the Central Government under Section 184 of the Finance Act, 2017 being contrary to the parent enactment and the principles envisaged in the Constitution as interpreted by this Court, are hereby struck down in entirety. (iv) The Central Government is accordingly directed to reformulate the Rules strictly in conformity and in accordance with the principles delineated by this Court in R.K. Jain (supra), L. Chandra Kumar (supra), Madras Bar Association (supra) and Gujarat Urja Vikas Ltd. (supra) conjointly read with the observations made in the earlier part of this decision. (iv) The Central Government is accordingly directed to reformulate the Rules strictly in conformity and in accordance with the principles delineated by this Court in R.K. Jain (supra), L. Chandra Kumar (supra), Madras Bar Association (supra) and Gujarat Urja Vikas Ltd. (supra) conjointly read with the observations made in the earlier part of this decision. (v) The new set of Rules to be formulated by the Central Government shall ensure non-discriminatory and uniform conditions of service, including assured tenure, keeping in mind the fact that the Chairperson and Members appointed after retirement and those who are appointed from the Bar or from other specialized professions/services, constitute two separate and distinct homogeneous classes. (vi) It would be open to the Central Government to provide in the new set of Rules that the Presiding Officers or Members of the Statutory Tribunals shall not hold 'rank' and 'status' equivalent to that of the Judges of the Supreme Court or High Courts, as the case may be, only on the basis of drawing equal salary or other perquisites. (vii)There is a need-based requirement to conduct 'Judicial Impact Assessment' of all the Tribunals referable to the Finance Act, 2017 so as to analyse the ramifications of the changes in the framework of Tribunals as provided under the Finance Act, 2017. Thus, we find it appropriate to issue a writ of mandamus to the Ministry of Law and Justice to carry out such Judicial Impact Assessment' and submit the result of the findings before the competent legislative authority. (viii) The Central Government in consultation with the Law Commission of India or any other expert body shall re-visit the provisions of the statutes referable to the Finance Act, 2017 or other Acts as listed in para 174 of this order and place appropriate proposals before the Parliament for consideration of the need to remove direct appeals to the Supreme Court from orders of Tribunals. A decision in this regard by the Union of India shall be taken within six months. (ix) The Union Government shall carry out an appropriate exercise for amalgamation of existing Tribunals adopting the test of homogeneity of the subject matters to be dealt with and thereafter constitute adequate number of Benches commensurate with the existing and anticipated volume of work.” 18. (ix) The Union Government shall carry out an appropriate exercise for amalgamation of existing Tribunals adopting the test of homogeneity of the subject matters to be dealt with and thereafter constitute adequate number of Benches commensurate with the existing and anticipated volume of work.” 18. From finding No.(iii), it is quite evident and clear that, “The Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal and other Authorities (Qualifications, Experience and other Conditions of Service of Members) Rules, 2017” was found to be suffering from various infirmities as observed in the judgment and accordingly the Rules formulated by the Government of India under section 184 of the Finance Act, 2017 being contrary to the parent enactment and the principles envisaged in the constitution as interpreted by the Apex Court, was struck down in its entirety. 19. Consequently Central Government was directed to reformulate the rules strictly in conformity and in accordance with the Rules delineated by the court in R.K.Jain, L. Chandra Kumar, Madras Bar Council of India Association and Gujrat Urja Vikas Ltd. conjointly read with the observations made in the earlier part of the judgment. It is also directed that the new set of Rules to be formulated by the Central Government shall ensure non-discriminatory and uniform conditions of service, including assured tenure, keeping in mind the fact that the Chairperson and members appointed after retirement and those who are appointed from the Bar Council of India or from other specialised professions/services, constitute two separate and distinct homogeneous classes. 20. However, in order to regulate and manage the situation during the interim, at paragraph 229 the following interim relief was passed: “229. As the Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal and other Authorities (Qualification, Experience and other Conditions of Service of Members) Rules, 2017 have been struck down and several directions have been issued vide the majority judgment for framing of fresh set of Rules, we, as an interim order, direct that appointments to the Tribunal/Appellate Tribunal and the terms and conditions of appointment shall be in terms of the respective statutes before the enactment of the Finance Bill, 2017. However, liberty is granted to the Union of India to seek modification of this order after they have framed fresh Rules in accordance with the majority judgment. However, in case any additional benefits concerning the salaries and emoluments have been granted under the Finance Act, they shall not be withdrawn and will be continued. However, liberty is granted to the Union of India to seek modification of this order after they have framed fresh Rules in accordance with the majority judgment. However, in case any additional benefits concerning the salaries and emoluments have been granted under the Finance Act, they shall not be withdrawn and will be continued. These would equally apply to all new members.” 21. On a reading of the interim relief granted by the Apex Court, it is clear that, in view of the striking down of the Rules, 2017, it was directed that appointments to the Tribunal/appellate tribunal and the terms and conditions of appointment shall be in terms of the respective statutes before the enactment of the Finance Bill, 2017. 22. Therefore, Section 7(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 would apply, for the continuance of appointment of Presiding Officers and other members. It is an admitted fact that the 2nd respondent was not qualified in terms of section 7(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as it originally stood, and quoted above, i.e., before the enactment of the Finance Bill, 2017. 23. Anyhow, the 2nd respondent continued in service and is still continuing in service. Fact remains during the pendency of this writ petition, the Central Government has published the Rules as is directed by the Apex Court in the aforequoted judgment, in the gazette dated 12.2.2020 as per the powers conferred by section 184 of the Finance Act, 2017 called Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal and other Authorities (Qualifications, Experience and Other conditions of Service of Members) Rules, 2020 (hereinafter called 'Rules, 2020'). Rule 4 thereto prescribes the method of recruitment which read thus: “4. Method of recruitment.-(1) The Chairman, Chairperson, President, Vice-Chairman, Vice-Chairperson, Vice-President, Presiding Officer, Accountant Member, Administrative Member, Judicial Member, Expert Member, Law Member, Revenue Member, Technical Member or Member of the Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal or, as the case may be, Authority shall be appointed by the Central Government on the recommendation of a Search-cum-Selection Committee constituted for the Tribunal, appellate Tribunal or, as the case may be, Authority specified in column (4) of the said Schedule in respect of the Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal or as the case may be, Authority specified in column (2) of the said Schedule. (2) The Search-cum-Selection Committee shall determine its procedure for making its recommendation and, after taking into account the suitability, record of past performance, integrity as well as adjudicatory experience keeping in view the requirements of the Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal or, as the case may be, Authority, recommend a panel of two or three persons for appointment to each post. (3) No appointment of Chairman, Chairperson, President, Vice-Chairman, Vice-Chairperson, Vice-President, Presiding Officer, Vice-Presiding Officer, Accountant Member, Administrative Member, Judicial Member, Expert Member, Law Member, Revenue Member, Technical Member or Member of the Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal or Authorities shall be invalid merely by reason of any vacancy or absence in the Search-cum-Selection Committee. (4) Nothing in this rule shall apply to the appointment of Chairman, Chairperson, President, Vice-Chairman, Vice-Chairperson, Vice-President, Presiding Officer, Accountant Member, Administrative Member, Judicial Member, Expert Member, Law Member, Revenue Member, Technical Member or Member of the Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal or, as the case may be, Authority functioning as such immediately before the commencement of these rules.” 24. Therefore, relying upon Rule 4(4) above, it is submitted that nothing in the rule shall apply to appointment of Chairman, Chairperson, President, Vice Chairman, Vice Chairperson, Vice President, Presiding Officer, Accountant Member, Administrative Member, Judicial Member, Expert Member, Law Member, Revenue Member, Technical Member or Member of the Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal or as the case may be, authority functioning as such immediately before the commencement of these Rules, and since the 2nd respondent continued in service, by virtue of saving clause contained under rule 4(4), the 2nd respondent is entitled to continue in service. But it is significant to note that, as per schedule provided to Rule 2020, qualification is prescribed for appointment of Chairperson, Chairman, President, Vice Chairman, Vice President, Presiding Officer, Accountant Member, Administrative Member, Judicial Member, Expert Member or Technical Member or Member of various Tribunals. The qualification prescribed for Industrial Tribunal constituted by the Central Government under the Act, 1947 is as follows: “A person shall not be qualified for appointment as Presiding Officer, unless he,- (a) is, or has been , a Judge of a High Court; or (b) has, for a combined period of ten years, been a District Judge and Additional District Judge. The selection in accordance with the Rules is to be conducted by a Search -cum-Selection Committee for the post of Presiding Officer comprised of.- (1) Chief Justice of India or a Judge of Supreme Court nominated by him -Chairperson; (ii) Outgoing Presiding Officer of the National Industrial Tribunal -Member; (iii) Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Labour and Employment -Member; (iv) Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Commerce (Department of Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade) -Member.” 25. Therefore, on a reading of the Rules, 2020, it is explicit and evident that unless and until the Presiding Officer is having the requisite qualification in accordance with Rules, 2020, he is not entitled to continue in service. if that be so, the 2nd respondent who was not qualified as per act 1947 as it stood before amendment act 2017, was not entitled to continue in service in accordance with the interim order passed by the Apex Court on the disposal of the writ petitions, as is specified above. 26. Assuming even that the 2nd respondent was qualified in accordance with the Ext.R2(b) Rules, as per Finance Act, 2017, 2nd respondent has become disqualified in all respects since the Rules was struck down by the Apex Court. Even though various contentions was raised by the counsel for 2nd respondent relying upon rule 4(4), in our considered opinion, a person who was disqualified by virtue of the judgment of the Apex Court is not entitled to make any contentions relying upon rule 4(4) of Rules, 2020 because even according to the interim orders passed by the Apex Court, while striking down the Rules, 2017, it was specified and made clear that the qualification during the interregnum, of making the new rules as directed by the Apex Court, would be the rule prior to the Rules, 2017, which undoubtedly was Rule 7(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, by which the 2nd respondent admittedly was not qualified at all. It is also relevant to note that, petitioner has challenged an interim order passed by this Court on 08.02.2019, to defer the proceedings in the instant writ petition due to the pendency of writ petitions before the Apex Court by filing SLP (C) No. 9927 of 2019, it was remitted to this Court as per order dated 18.12.2019, in view of the judgment in Rojer Mathew (supra) for disposal on merits. 27. Taking into account the legal and factual situations discussed above, we are of the considered opinion that the 2nd respondent is not qualified to hold the post of the Presiding Officer of the Central Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labur Court, Ernakulam and has no authority to continue so, and accordingly petitioner is entitled to the writ of quowarrantoas sought for. Needless to say, necessary steps shall be taken by the 1st respondent to terminate the services of the 2nd respondent forthwith. There will be a consequential direction to the 1st respondent to take steps to conduct selection to the post in question by constituting the Search-cum-Selection Committee in accordance with Rules, 2020 at the earliest.