JUDGMENT : R.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. The appellants have challenged the legality of the order dated 22.8.2019, passed by the Judge, Family Court, L.B. Nagar, R.R. District in I.A. No. 1336 of 2019 in GWOP No. 28 of 2019. By the said order, the learned Family Court has rejected the application filed by the appellants under Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C. seeking dismissal of the plaint filed by the respondent, Smt. Geeta Siva Tejaswi Teegavarapu, wherein the respondent had sought the custody of her minor child, Master Venkata Ashrit under Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (‘the Act’ for short). 2. Briefly, the facts of the case are that in 2006, the appellant No. 1, Mr. Venkata Sriramam Konduri went, and settled in the United States of America. The appellant No. 1 and the respondent got married on 8.2.2014 at Ahobila Mutt, Tirumala, Andhra Pradesh in accordance with the Hindu rites and customs. After the marriage, on 10.4.2014, both the appellant No. 1 and the respondent moved to United States. The couple resided at 3103, Stone Water, Glen LN Cary, NC 27519. During their stay, and during their wedlock, on 28.5.2018, a son, Venkata Ashrit was born at the Duke Medical Centre, North Carolina. Since the child was born in the United States, he became a United States citizen by naturalization. 3. However, after the birth of the son, for reasons best known to the parties, certain disputes erupted between the appellant No. 1 and the respondent. Apprehending that the respondent may remove the child from his custody, on 15.10.2018, the appellant No. 1 initiated a child custody proceeding before the District Court, County of Wake, North Carolina, U.S.A. By order dated 15.10.2018, the learned District Court granted a temporary emergency, and exclusive legal and physical custody of the minor child to the appellant No. 1. The learned District Court further directed that the minor child should not be removed by either party from the County of Wake pending hearing. As the differences continued to mount between the appellant No. 1 and the respondent, on 21.10.2018, the respondent left United States alongwith her mother while leaving the minor child in the appellants' care. 4. According to the appellants, since the minor child had to undergo the tonsure ceremony, on 19.3.2019, the child was sent to India alongwith his parental grandmother, Mrs. 4. According to the appellants, since the minor child had to undergo the tonsure ceremony, on 19.3.2019, the child was sent to India alongwith his parental grandmother, Mrs. Konduri Naga Maheshwari, the appellant No. 3 before this Court. 5. Coming to know that the child has been brought to India by the appellant No. 3, the respondent filed a petition under Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, before the learned Family Court for seeking the custody of the minor child, Venkat Ashrit, and for restraining the appellants from removing the child from the jurisdiction of the Family Court in Hyderabad. On 4.5.2019, the learned Family Court passed an ad interim injunction order in favour of the respondent thereby restraining the appellants from removing the child from the jurisdiction of the Family Court, R.R. District. Moreover, by order dated 16.5.2019, the learned Family Court directed the appellants to surrender the passport of the minor child within a period of two weeks. 6. Since the appellants were aggrieved by the initiation of the custody proceeding before the learned Family Court, the appellants filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C. wherein they challenged the very jurisdiction of the learned Family Court to try to suit. The appellants contended that since the minor child was not the “ordinary resident” of Hyderabad, was a permanent resident of County of Wake, North Carolina the learned Family Court did not have the jurisdiction to try the suit. However, by the order dated 22.8.2019, the learned Family Court dismissed the said application. Hence, this appeal before this Court. 7. Mr. Prabhjit Jauhar, the learned Counsel for the appellants, has raised the following contentions before this Court: Firstly, Order VII Rule 11 (d) CPC clearly states that a plaint may be rejected if the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law. 8. Secondly, according to Section 9(1) of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (‘the Act’ for short), an application with respect to the guardianship of the person of a minor shall be made to the District Court having jurisdiction “in the place where the minor ordinarily resides.” Therefore, the District Court would have the jurisdiction if and only if the minor were “ordinarily residing” within the jurisdiction of the District Court. But in the present case, the minor child was not “ordinarily residing” within the jurisdiction of the learned Family Court. Hence, the application filed under the Act was not maintainable, as it was barred by Section 9 of the Act. 9. Thirdly, relying on the case of Smt. Jeewanti Pandey vs. Kishan Chandra Pandey, (1981) 4 SCC 517 , the learned Counsel has emphasized that in order to give jurisdiction, on the ground of “residence”, something more than a temporary stay is required. It must be more or less of “a permanent character” and of such a nature that the Court in which the respondent is sued, is “his natural forum.” For, the expression “resides” means to make an abode for a considerable time; to dwell permanently, or for a length of time or to have a settled abode for a time. However, the residency cannot be imputed if there is a temporary visit to a place. 10. Fourthly, undoubtedly, the parties were residing in the United States from 2014 till 2019 i.e. for a five long years. While the parties were living in North Carolina, the minor child was born in America on 28.5.2018. By the sheer fact of his birth in the United States, the child is a citizen of the United States. Therefore, the child happens to be a permanent resident of the United States. Moreover, the child was brought to India for performance of a religious ceremony, namely tonsuring of the head. Therefore, his stay in Hyderabad was for a temporary period, and not for a permanent period. Hence, it cannot be said that the minor resides ordinarily in Hyderabad. Therefore, the learned Family Court at Hyderabad would not have the jurisdiction to try the case. Therefore, the plaint ought to have been rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC. 11. Fifthly, the respondent has, in fact, approached the learned Family Court with unclean hands. For, in her petition, the respondent nowhere revealed that by order dated 15.10.2018 the District Court, Wake County, North Carolina had passed an ad interim order in favour of the appellant No. 1 while giving him the temporary custody of the child. Therefore, the custody petition deserves to be dismissed on this ground alone. 12. For, in her petition, the respondent nowhere revealed that by order dated 15.10.2018 the District Court, Wake County, North Carolina had passed an ad interim order in favour of the appellant No. 1 while giving him the temporary custody of the child. Therefore, the custody petition deserves to be dismissed on this ground alone. 12. Lastly, relying on the case of Lahari Sakhamuri vs. Sobhan Kodali, 2019 (5) ALD 85 (SC) : (2019) 7 SCC 311 and on the case of Yashita Sahu vs. State of Rajasthan, 2020 (2) ALD 35 (SC), the learned Counsel has pleaded that the former case not only arose from an order passed by the High Court for the State of Telangana and for the State of Andhra Pradesh, but also has a similar factual foundation as the present one. In the case of Lahari Sakhamuri's case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court summarized the law on the issue of child custody in cases where the parents are residing in a foreign country; where children are born in a foreign country, where the parents and/or the children have become citizens of a foreign country; and where the child is brought to India and a custody dispute with regard to the child begins in India. Dealing with these factual foundations, the issue whether in such circumstances, a custody petition can be filed by either of the parents in India or not has been dealt with. 13. In the case of Lahari Sakhamwi's case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court was' dealing with two orders passed by the High Court for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh, namely the first order whereby the High Court had concluded that the Family Court had no jurisdiction to hear a custody petition since the child therein were not ordinarily residing within Hyderabad. And secondly, while dealing with a habeas corpus petition filed by the father, Sobhan Kodali, the High Court directed the mother to handover the custody of the children to the father so that the children could be returned back to the United States. 14. Similar issued had also arisen in the case of Yashita Sahu's case (supra), wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court again directed that the custody of the child should be handed over to the father so that the child could be taken back to the foreign country. 14. Similar issued had also arisen in the case of Yashita Sahu's case (supra), wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court again directed that the custody of the child should be handed over to the father so that the child could be taken back to the foreign country. According to the learned Counsel, the present case is squarely covered by the two judgments. Hence, he heavily relied on the same. 15. On the other hand, Mr. D. Madhava Rao, the learned Counsel for the respondent, relying on the case of Ruchi Majoo vs. Sanjeev Majoo, 2011 (5) ALD 19 (SC) : AIR 2011 SC 1952 , has pleaded that the said case also dealt with the issue of child custody wherein the couple was residing in the United States, the mother and the child came back to India and a custody petition was filed in a Delhi Court. Therefore, the issue before the Apex Court was whether the order passed by the High Court of Delhi holding that the Courts at Delhi had no jurisdiction to entertain a custody petition filed by the mother, was legally justified or not? While dealing with the issue, the Apex Court clearly opined that, in fact, the Courts at Delhi did have the jurisdiction to hear the custody petition. Therefore, the Apex Court set aside the impugned order passed by the High Court of Delhi. Similar is the issue in the present case. Therefore, the learned Family Court was justified in holding that it does have the jurisdiction to hear the petition. Hence, the learned Family Court was justified in dismissing the application filed by the appellants under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. 16. Secondly, the learned Counsel for the appellant is unjustified in claiming that the respondent has approached the learned Family Court with unclean hands. Since the order dated 15.10.2018 was never served upon the respondent, the respondent had no knowledge about the existence of the said order. Moreover, the respondent had clearly stated in her application before the learned Family Court that she was informed by the American police that her husband had filed a case against her. Therefore, the respondent had revealed all the relevant facts before the learned Family Court. 17. Thirdly, it is the appellant No. 1 who has violated the order passed by the District Court, Wake County, North Carolina. Therefore, the respondent had revealed all the relevant facts before the learned Family Court. 17. Thirdly, it is the appellant No. 1 who has violated the order passed by the District Court, Wake County, North Carolina. For, according to the order dated 15.10.2018 passed by the District Court, it had debarred the removal of the child from United States except by the parties therein. However, the child was brought not by appellant No. 1, the father, but by the grandmother of the child, i.e. appellant No. 3. Therefore, the appellants, who have violated the said order, cannot be permitted to take the benefit of the very same order, and claim that the custody of the child was given to the appellant No. 1 by the learned District Court, in County of Wake. 18. Fourthly, the learned Family Court is justified in holding that the issue of jurisdiction is a mixed question of fact and law which will require a complete trial before the said issue can be decided in favour of either of the parties. Therefore, the learned Counsel has supported the impugned order. 19. Lastly, although the appellants claim that the child was sent for performing the tonsure ceremony, according to the respondent, the child was sent for better up-keeping. For, the appellant No. 1, being a single parent, could not take care of a one and half year old child in the absence of the mother. Therefore, in fact, the child was sent back to India for being looked after by the grandparents. Hence, the intention of the parties was that the child should stay in India. Therefore, the child is an ordinary resident of Hyderabad. Hence, the learned Family Court, R.R. District would have the necessary jurisdiction to try the case. 20. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties, perused the impugned order, and examined the record submitted by the parties. 21. The contentions raised by both the learned Counsel are highly misplaced. The learned Counsel for the appellant has vehemently argued, on the basis of Section 9 of the Guardians and Wards Act, that the learned Family Court does not have the jurisdiction to try the suit. However, neither the learned Counsel for the appellant, nor the learned Counsel for the respondent, nor the learned Family Court has noticed the fact that the suit for child custody is not filed under the Guardians and Wards Act. However, neither the learned Counsel for the appellant, nor the learned Counsel for the respondent, nor the learned Family Court has noticed the fact that the suit for child custody is not filed under the Guardians and Wards Act. In fact, the said suit is filed under Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Therefore, the provisions of the Guardians and Wards Act are inapplicable to the present case. Hence the submissions, based on Section 9 of the Guardians and Wards Act, are misplaced. 22. Moreover, since the suit was filed under Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act before the learned Family Court, the issue is whether the learned Family Court has the jurisdiction to try the suit under the Family Court Act or not? 23. Section 7(1)(g) of the Family Court Act, clearly defines the jurisdiction of the Family Court, as under: Section 7. Jurisdiction - (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a Family Court shall: (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a Family Court shall: (a) xxx xxx xxx (b) xxx xxx xxx (c) xxx xxx xxx (d) xxx xxx xxx (e) xxx xxx xxx (f) xxx xxx xxx (g) a suit or proceeding in relation to the guardianship of the person or the custody of, or access to, any minor. 24. Thus, under the above provision the Family Court would have the jurisdiction to entertain an application under the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. 25. Further, according to Section 8 of the Family Court Act, once a Family Court is established, then the jurisdiction of other civil Court is ousted. Furthermore, Section 10 of the Family Court Act permits the Family Court to proceed according to the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. Hence, the issues about the institution of the suit and the jurisdiction of the Court would necessarily have to be examined in light of the relevant provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. 26. Section 9 of the C.P.C. bestows jurisdiction upon the civil Courts to hear civil suits, unless there is an express or implied bar to trying of a civil suit. Moreover, according to Section 20 of the C.P.C. a suit shall be instituted either at the place where the defendant resides, or where the cause of action, or a part of cause of action arises. Moreover, according to Section 20 of the C.P.C. a suit shall be instituted either at the place where the defendant resides, or where the cause of action, or a part of cause of action arises. In the present case, the child, at the relevant time, was in the custody of the appellant Nos. 2 and 3. Appellant Nos. 2 and 3 are residing in Hyderabad. They were arrayed as defendants before the Family Court. Therefore, the suit could be filed against the appellant Nos. 2 and 3 in the Family Court situated in Hyderabad. Further, since the child, at the relevant time, was also in Hyderabad, the issue with regard to the custody of the child, the cause of action, also arose in Hyderabad. Therefore, the concerned Family Court in Hyderabad would have the jurisdiction to try the suit. 27. The learned Counsel for the appellant has strenuously relied upon the case of Lahari Sakhamuri's case (supra). However, the reliance on the said judgment is equally misplaced. For, in the said case, the application for seeking the custody of the children was filed under the Guardians and Wards Act. Hence, the discussion and the finding with regard to the jurisdiction of the Court centered around the scope and ambit of Section 9 of the Guardians and Wards Act. However, as pointed out above, in the present case the petition has not been filed under the Guardians and Wards Act, but under the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act Hence, the discussion with regard to the ambit and scope of Section 9 of the Guardians and Wards Act, valid as it is, is not germane to the issue of jurisdiction under the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, or under the Family Court Act. Each Act has to be read per force within its own ambit and scope. Thus, the decision pronounced by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in relationship to another Act is not germane to the present case. 28. Similarly, the learned Counsel for the respondent has relied upon the case of Ruchi Majoo's case (supra), but even the said case was under the Guardians and Wards Act. Hence, even the said case does not rush to the rescue of the respondent. 29. In the impugned order the learned Family Court has missed the wood for the trees. 28. Similarly, the learned Counsel for the respondent has relied upon the case of Ruchi Majoo's case (supra), but even the said case was under the Guardians and Wards Act. Hence, even the said case does not rush to the rescue of the respondent. 29. In the impugned order the learned Family Court has missed the wood for the trees. The learned Family Court has noticed that the entire thrust of the appellants' plea was with regard to the fact that the minor was not “ordinarily residing” in Hyderabad. But the issue with regard to the “ordinary residence of the minor” is irrelevant while entertaining a petition under the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. The issue is foreign to the said Act. Therefore, the learned Family Court has failed to see the controversy in the proper perspective under the relevant law. 30. Since the learned Family Court has misapplied itself, this Court has no other option but to set aside, the impugned order dated 22.8.2019, and to remand the case back to the learned Family Court with the direction to decide the application filed by the appellants under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. within a period of two months from the date of receiving the certified copy of this judgment. Needless to say, the parties shall be free to raise their respective contentions before the learned Family Court. Furthermore, the Family Court shall not be influenced by the opinion of this Court expressed hereinabove. 31. With these directions, the appeal is hereby disposed of. Miscellaneous petition, pending if any, shall stand closed. There shall be no order as to costs.