JUDGMENT : A.P. THAKER, J. 1. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 13.12.2002 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, 7th Fast Track Court, Junagadh in Sessions Case No. 78 of 1999 (hereinafter be referred to as “the Trial Court”), whereby the learned Additional Sessions Judge has convicted the accused for the offence punishable under Sections 306, 498A and 114 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years and fine of Rs. 1,000/- each, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment of four months for the offence under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code and rigorous imprisonment of one year and fine of Rs. 500/- each, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment of two months for the offence punishable under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, the appellant - accused have preferred present appeal. 2. Brief facts of the prosecution case is that the deceased Fatmaben was married with accused No. 1's son Yunush before five years of the incident. It is further the case of the prosecution that accused No. 1 is father-in-law and accused No. 2 and accused No. 3 are the sisters-in-law of the deceased Fatmaben. It is alleged that the present accused were torturing the deceased Fatmaben and due to the said torture, deceased-Fatmaben had committed suicide by pouring kerosene on her body and putting herself ablaze. It is the case of the prosecution that in her dying declaration, she had stated that the present appellants were torturing her and, therefore, she has taken such step and committed suicide. 3. On the basis of the said incident, the FIR came to be lodged for the offence punishable under Sections 498A, 306 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code against the accused and they were arrested. The Investigating Officer has recorded statements of the witnesses and collected necessary evidence against the accused. 4. After completion of investigation, the police has filed charge-sheet before the concerned Judicial Magistrate First Class for the alleged offences and, thereafter, as one of the offence being exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class has committed the case under Section 209 of the Criminal Procedure Code to the Court of Sessions wherein it was registered as Sessions Case No. 78 of 1999. 5. 5. The charge against the accused came to be framed by the Trial Court for the aforesaid offence. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and pleaded for trial. 6. To prove the case, the prosecution has examined the following witnesses:- PW-1 Dr. Sudhaben Kantilal Shah Medical Officer Exh.11 PW-2 Batuklal Jashmatbhai Makwana Dy. Mamlatdar and Executive Magistrate Exh.28 PW-3 Dr. Bhalchandra Narmadashankar Joshi Medical Officer Exh.31 PW-4 Ramsinbhai Maldebhai Panch Witness Exh.34 PW-5 Ikbalbhai Hasambhai Brother Exh.36 PW-6 Aminaben Kamalbhai Witness Exh.38 PW-7 Bilkisbanu Ismailbhai Sister Exh.39 PW-8 Shabir Ismailbhai Ghanchi Witness Exh.41 PW-9 Gurmaji Nemaji Barad Head Constable Exh.42 PW-10 Narotambhai Ramjibhai Police Head Constable Exh.46 PW-11 Indrasinh Natvarsinh P.S.I. Exh.52 7. The prosecution has also produced the following documentary evidence:- S. No. Particulars Exhibit 1 P.M. Note 15 2 Police report to be sent along with the dead-body for the postmortem 16 3 Inquest Panchnama 19 4 Panchnama of arrest to the accused and panchnama of the body of the accused 20 5 Medical Certificate (Fatmaben) 21 6 Forwarding note regarding muddamal sent to the FSL 22 7 Receipt FSL of receiving muddamal 23 8 Letter written to FSL 24 9 Forwarding letter of FSL 25 10 FSL Report 26 11 Dying Declaration of Fatmaben 30 12 Panchnama of scene of offence 35 13 Letter written by Fatmaben 37 14 Complaint/FIR 43 15 Station Diary 44 19 Statement of Fatmaben 47 20 Police Yadi 48 21 Yadi prepared by the Medical Officer 49 22 Police Yadi 50 23 Station Diary 51 24 Copy of Janvajog Entry No. 486/98 of Keshod Police Station 54 25 Police Yadi 55 8. After closure of the evidence, the statements of the accused under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 came to be recorded, wherein also, the accused have denied of having committed any offence and stated that they have been falsely implicated in the alleged offence. 9. After hearing both the sides and considering the evidence on record, ultimately, the Trial Court has convicted the accused for the offence under Sections 498A, 306 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code and, ultimately, passed the judgment and order of sentence as referred to hereinabove. 10. Heard Mr. U.M. Kharadi, learned advocate for the appellants and Ms. Shruti Pathak, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for respondent-State at length. 10. Heard Mr. U.M. Kharadi, learned advocate for the appellants and Ms. Shruti Pathak, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for respondent-State at length. Perused the materials placed on record and the impugned judgment and order of the Trial Court and decisions cited at the Bar. 11. Mr. Kharadi, learned advocate for the appellants-accused has, while narrating the relationship of the present accused with the deceased, submitted that the Trial Court has committed serious error of facts and law in convicting the accused. While referring to the entire evidence on record in the shape of oral as well as documentary evidence, Mr. Kharadi, learned advocate has submitted that the evidence on record does not suggest anything against the present accused regarding the torture by them to the deceased. He has submitted that initially, there was no case of the prosecution that the accused were demanding dowry, however, during the course of the Trial, the near relatives of the deceased have made improvement in their evidence. The factum of demand of dowry has been added in their version before the Trial Court. While inviting the attention of the Court to the evidence of near relatives, he has submitted that the so-called incident of theft is also added by such witness. According to him, even if that fact is believed to have been happened, then, also same was happened long before the commission of suicide by the deceased. According to him, there is no nexus between the alleged incident of theft and the commission of the suicide by the deceased. He has submitted that on perusal of the evidence of the near relatives, it appears that there is difference of time period mentioned by them and, therefore, that fact should not be taken into consideration. While referring to the various documents in the shape of dying declarations and history given to the doctor and in the FIR, he has submitted that there is no case made out by the prosecution for connecting the accused with the alleged crime. 11.1 Mr. Kharadi, learned advocate for the appellants-accused has submitted that no independent witnesses from the neighbour has been examined by the prosecution. He has submitted that the evidence of only near relative has been produced by the prosecution and such witnesses are interested witnesses and, therefore, their evidence should be strictly construed. 11.1 Mr. Kharadi, learned advocate for the appellants-accused has submitted that no independent witnesses from the neighbour has been examined by the prosecution. He has submitted that the evidence of only near relative has been produced by the prosecution and such witnesses are interested witnesses and, therefore, their evidence should be strictly construed. He has submitted that the deceased and her husband were residing separately and, therefore, the version of the prosecution ought not to have believed by the Trial Court. According to him, the Trial Court has failed to take into consideration all these aspects, while passing the impugned judgment and order. According to him, the impugned judgment and order is required to be set aside as it is not sustainable in the eyes of law. 11.2 Mr. Kharadi, learned advocate for the appellants has relied upon the following decisions:- 1. Amalendu Pal alias Jhantu vs. State of West Bengal, (2010) 1 SCC 707 2. Gangula Mohan Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2010) 1 SCC 750 3. Sharda vs. State of Rajasthan, (2010) 2 SCC 85 4. S.S. Chheena vs. Vijay Kumar Mahajan and Another, (2010) 12 SCC 190 5. Sampat Babso Kale and Another vs. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 4 SCC 739 6. Rajesh vs. State of Haryana, AIR 2019 SC 478 12. Ms. Shruti Pathak, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent-State has vehemently submitted that there is consistence evidence on record to show that the present accused have constantly harassed the deceased for not satisfying their dowry demand and making allegation of theft against the deceased. According to her version, there is consistence evidence in the form of evidence of near relatives. She has submitted that in the cases like present one neighbours may not be interested to come forward and to support the prosecution case. She has submitted that the evidence of near relative is consistence and there is no contradiction in it. While referring to entire evidence on record, learned APP has submitted that there are different type of dying declaration which includes history given before the doctor as well as complaint and the dying declaration. She has submitted that there are oral dying declaration which was narrated by the deceased to the near relatives. While referring to entire evidence on record, learned APP has submitted that there are different type of dying declaration which includes history given before the doctor as well as complaint and the dying declaration. She has submitted that there are oral dying declaration which was narrated by the deceased to the near relatives. While inviting the attention of this Court to the dying declaration, she has submitted that there is consistency in all these dying declaration to suggest that the present accused have tortured the deceased and due to their torture, she was fed up with her life and committed suicide. While reading the impugned judgment and order, she has submitted that the Trial Court has properly appreciated the evidence on record and has properly convicted the accused and has sentenced them. It is her version that no infirmity is found from the impugned judgment and order and the same is sustainable in the eyes of law. 12.1 Ms. Pathak, learned Additional Public Prosecutor has submitted that the decision relied upon by the learned advocate for the appellants are based on the facts of such cases, the same are not applicable to the facts scenario of the present case. She has submitted that when there are multiple dying declarations on record, those dying declarations cannot be discarded and cumulative effect of all such dying declarations has to be read and appreciated. She has submitted that considering the factual aspect of the present case, the presumption under Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act is to be raised against the accused and the same has been properly raised by the Trial Court. 12.2 Ms. Pathak, learned Additional Public Prosecutor has relied upon the following decisions:- 1. Gulzari Lal vs. State of Haryana, (2016) 4 SCC 583 2. Jagbir Singh vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2019) 8 SCC 779 3. Pawan Kumar vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2017) 7 SCC 780 13. In rejoinder, Mr. Kharadi, learned advocate for the appellants has submitted that the decisions relied upon by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor are based on different factual situation and, therefore, the same are not applicable to the facts of the present case. 14. It is well settled by catena of decisions that an Appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. 14. It is well settled by catena of decisions that an Appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. However, Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. 15. Further, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. Further, while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal, the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse. 16. Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the Appellate Court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the Appellate Court, in such circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether the accused is connected with the commission of the crime with which he is charged. 17. In the case of Gulzari Lal (supra), the Apex Court has held and observed in paras-14, 15, 16, 17, 21 and 22 as under:- “14. 17. In the case of Gulzari Lal (supra), the Apex Court has held and observed in paras-14, 15, 16, 17, 21 and 22 as under:- “14. The learned counsel further placed reliance on the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Tarachand Damu Sutar vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1962 SC 130 , wherein it was held as under: “21......A dying declaration is not to be believed merely because no possible reason can be given for accusing the accused falsely. It can only be believed if there are no grounds for doubting it at all.” 15. Further reliance has been placed on the judgment of this Court in Waikhom Yaima Singh vs. State of Manipur, (2011) 13 SCC 125 , wherein it was held as under: (SCC P. 130, Para 20) “20. There can be no dispute that the dying declaration can be the sole basis for conviction however, such a dying declaration has to be proved to be wholly reliable, voluntary and truthful and further that the matter thereof must be in fit medical condition to make it...” 16. The learned counsel further placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Nanhar vs. State of Haryana, (2010) 11 SCC 423 , wherein the Division Bench of this Court opined as under: (SCC P. 432, Para 33) “33.....The dying declaration should be such, which should immensely strike to be genuine and stating true story of its maker. It should be free from all doubts and on going through it, an impression has to be registered immediately in mind that it is genuine, true and not tainted with doubts....” 17. Further, the reliance was placed in the case of P. Mani vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2006) 3 SCC 161 , wherein the Division Bench of this Court held that: (SCC P.166, Para 14) “14. Indisputably conviction can be recorded on the basis of the dying declaration alone but therefore the same must be wholly reliable. In a case where suspicion can be raised as regards the correctness of the dying declaration, the court before convicting an accused on the basis thereof would look for some corroborative evidence. Suspicion, it is trite, is no substitute for proof. In a case where suspicion can be raised as regards the correctness of the dying declaration, the court before convicting an accused on the basis thereof would look for some corroborative evidence. Suspicion, it is trite, is no substitute for proof. If evidence brought on record suggests that such dying declaration does not reveal the entire truth, it may be considered only as piece of evidence in which event conviction may not be rested only on the basis thereof. The question as to whether a dying declaration is of impeccable character would depend upon several factors; physical and mental condition of the deceased is one of them....” 20. The question raised by the appellant on the issue that no blood stained earth was recovered from the place of crime is not relevant. On this count, the High Court has also noted the laxity on the part of the police and rightfully concluded that the conviction was valid in light of the statements made by the deceased and the witnesses. Further, reliance was placed on the case of Ram Avtar Rai and Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1985) 2 SCC 61 , wherein the Division Bench of this court held as under: “10. We agree with the High Court that the occurrence had taken place about 15 paces away from the house of the deceased and PW-1. It is true that bloodstained earth has not been recovered from the scene of occurrence by the investigating officer though as stated earlier, the deceased had sustained as many as 5 lacerated injuries besides a number of contusions and abrasion. From the failure of the investigating officer to recover blood stained earth from the scene of occurrence, it is not possible to infer that the occurrence had not taken place in front of the house of the deceased and PW-1. The evidence of PWs. 2 and 3 could not, therefore, be rejected as unreliable as has been done by the learned Sessions Judge. We agree with the High Court that as the occurrence had taken place in front of the house of the deceased PWs. 2 and 3 who are members of the family of the deceased and PW-1 are natural witnesses who would have come out of the house on hearing the alarm of the deceased who had received as many as 34 injuries...” 21. 2 and 3 who are members of the family of the deceased and PW-1 are natural witnesses who would have come out of the house on hearing the alarm of the deceased who had received as many as 34 injuries...” 21. We find no infirmities with the statements made by the deceased and recorded by the Head Constable Manphool Singh (PW-7). A valid dying declaration may be made without obtaining a certificate of fitness of the declarant by a medical officer. The law regarding the same is well-settled by this Court in the decision of Laxman vs. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 6 SCC 710 , wherein this Court observed thus: (SCC P.714, Para 3) “3. There is no requirement of law that a dying declaration must necessarily be made to a magistrate and when such statement is recorded by a magistrate there is no specified statutory form for such recording. Consequently, what evidential value or weight has to be attached to such statement necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. What is essentially required is that the person who records a dying declaration must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind. Where it is proved by the testimony of the magistrate that the declarant was fit to make the statement even without examination by the doctor the declaration can be acted upon provided the court ultimately holds the same to be voluntary and truthful. A certification by the doctor is essentially a rule of caution and therefore the voluntary and truthful nature of the declaration can be established otherwise.” 22. Further, clarity on the issue may be established by the judgment of this Court in the case of Paras Yadav vs. State of Bihar, (1999) 2 SCC 126 , wherein this Court addressed the question regarding the dying declaration that was not recorded by the doctor and where the doctor had not been examined to say that the injured was fit to give the statement. It has been held by this Court as under: (SCC P.130, Para 8) “8....In such a situation, the lapse on the part of the Investigating Officer should not be taken in favour of the accused, may be that such lapse is committed designedly or because of negligence. It has been held by this Court as under: (SCC P.130, Para 8) “8....In such a situation, the lapse on the part of the Investigating Officer should not be taken in favour of the accused, may be that such lapse is committed designedly or because of negligence. Hence, the prosecution evidence is required to be examined de hors such omissions to find out whether the said evidence is reliable or not.” 18. The aforesaid decision has been referred to in the case of Pawan Kumar vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (supra), wherein while relying upon further decisions, the Apex Court has held and observed in para-27 as under:- “27. In Atbir vs. Govt. (NCT of Delhi), (2010) 9 SCC 1 , the Court, after noting earlier judgments, has laid the following guidelines with regard to admissibility of the dying declaration: (SCC pp. 89, Para 22) “22. The analysis of the above decisions clearly shows that: (i) Dying declaration can be the sole basis of conviction if it inspires the full confidence of the court. (ii) The court should be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the statement and that it was not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. (iii) Where the court is satisfied that the declaration is true and voluntary, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. (iv) It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. (v) Where the dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity such as the deceased was unconscious and could never make any statement cannot form the basis of conviction. (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain all the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (viii) Even if it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. (ix) When the eyewitness affirms that the deceased was not in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, medical opinion cannot prevail. (viii) Even if it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. (ix) When the eyewitness affirms that the deceased was not in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, medical opinion cannot prevail. (x) If after careful scrutiny, the court is satisfied that it is true and free from any effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and consistent, there shall be no legal impediment to make it the basis of conviction, even if there is no corroboration.” 18.1 In the said decision, in para-29, the Apex Court has also referred to the decision in the case of Vijay Pal vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2015) 4 SCC 749 wherein the following observations have been made in paras-22 and 23:- “22. Thus, the law is quite clear that if the dying declaration is absolutely credible and nothing is brought on record that the deceased was in such a condition, he or she could not have made a dying declaration to a witness, there is no justification to discard the same. In the instant case, PW-1 had immediately rushed to the house of the deceased and she had told him that her husband had poured kerosene on her. The plea taken by the appellant that he has been falsely implicated because his money was deposited with the in-laws and they were not inclined to return, does not also really breathe the truth, for there is even no suggestion to that effect. 23. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that when the deceased sustained 100% burn injuries, she could not have made any statement to her brother. In this regard, we may profitably refer to the decision in Mafabhai Nagarbhai Raval vs. State of Gujarat, (1992) 4 SCC 69 wherein it has been held that a person suffering 99% burn injuries could be deemed capable enough for the purpose of making a dying declaration. The Court in the said case opined that unless there existed some inherent and apparent defect, the trial court should not have substituted its opinion for that of the doctor. The Court in the said case opined that unless there existed some inherent and apparent defect, the trial court should not have substituted its opinion for that of the doctor. In the light of the facts of the case, the dying declaration was found to be worthy of reliance.” 18.2 In the said decision, the Apex Court, while referring to many decisions relating to the provisions of Sections 107 and 306 of the Indian Penal Code, has held and observed in paras-33, 34, 36, 37 and 43:- “33. Section 306 IPC reads as under: “306. Abetment of suicide - If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.” 34. The word ‘abetment’ has not been explained in Section 306 IPC. In this context, the definition of abetment as provided under Section 107 IPC is pertinent. Section 306 IPC seeks to punish those who abet the commission of suicide of other. Whether the person has abetted the commission of suicide of another or not is to be gathered from facts and circumstances of each case and to be found out by continuous conduct of the accused, involving his mental element. Such a requirement can be perceived from the reading of Section 107 IPC. Section 107 IPC reads as under: “107. Abetment of a thing - A person abets the doing of a thing, who: First - Instigates any person to do that thing. Secondly - Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing. Thirdly - Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Explanation 1 - A person who, by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing. Explanation 1 - A person who, by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing. Illustration A, a public officer, is authorized by a warrant from a Court of Justice to apprehend Z. B, knowing that fact and also that C is not Z, wilfully represents to A that C is Z and thereby intentionally causes A to apprehend C. Here B abets by instigation the apprehension of C. Explanation 2 - Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act and thereby facilitate the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act.” “Abetment” thus, means certain amount of active suggestion or support to do the act. 36. The word “instigate” literally means to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do an act. A person is said to instigate another person when he actively suggests or stimulates him to an act by any means or language, direct or indirect, whether it takes the form of express solicitation or of hints, insinuation or encouragement. Instigation may be in (express) words or may be by (implied) conduct. 37. The word “urge forwards” means to advise or try hard to persuade somebody to do something, to make a person to move more quickly in the particular direction, specially by pushing or forcing such person. Therefore, a person instigating another has to “goad” or “urge forward” the latter with the intention to provoke, incite or encourage the doing of an act with a latter. In order to prove abetment, it must be shown that the accused kept on urging or annoying the deceased by words, taunts until the deceased reacted. A casual remark or something said in routine or usual conversation should not be construed or misunderstood as “abetment.” 43. Keeping in view the aforesaid legal position, we are required to address whether there has been abetment in committing suicide. A casual remark or something said in routine or usual conversation should not be construed or misunderstood as “abetment.” 43. Keeping in view the aforesaid legal position, we are required to address whether there has been abetment in committing suicide. Be it clearly stated that mere allegation of harassment without any positive action in proximity to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused that led a person to commit suicide, a conviction in terms of Section 307 IPC is not sustainable. A casual remark that is likely to cause harassment in ordinary course of things will not come within the purview of instigation. A mere reprimand or a word in a fit of anger will not earn the status of abetment. There has to be positive action that creates a situation for the victim to put an end to life.” 19. In the case of Jagbir Singh (supra), the Apex Court, while referring to the various decisions regarding dying declaration from paras-20 to 42, has highlighted the principles regarding dying declaration in paras-31 and 32, which reads as under:- “31. A survey of the decisions would show that the principles can be culled out as follows: 31.1. (i) Conviction of a person can be made solely on the basis of a dying declaration which inspires confidence of the court. 31.2. (ii) If there is nothing suspicious about the declaration, no corroboration may be necessary. 31.3 (iii) No doubt, the court must be satisfied that there is no tutoring or prompting. 31.4 (iv) The court must also analyse and come to the conclusion that imagination of the deceased was not at play in making the declaration. In this regard, the court must look to the entirety of the language of the dying declaration. 31.5 (v) Considering material before it, both in the form of oral and documentary evidence, the court must be satisfied that the version is compatible with the reality and the truth as can be gleaned from the facts established. 31.6 (vi) However, there may be cases where there are more than one dying declaration. If there are more than one dying declaration, the dying declarations may entirely agree with one another. There may be dying declarations where inconsistencies between the declarations emerge. The extent of the inconsistencies would then have to be considered by the court. The inconsistencies may turn out to be reconciliable. If there are more than one dying declaration, the dying declarations may entirely agree with one another. There may be dying declarations where inconsistencies between the declarations emerge. The extent of the inconsistencies would then have to be considered by the court. The inconsistencies may turn out to be reconciliable. 31.7 (vii) In such cases, where the inconsistencies go to some matter of detail or description but is incriminatory in nature as far as the accused is concerned, the court would look to the material on record to conclude as to which dying declaration is to be relied on unless it be shown that they are unreliable. 31.8 (vii) The third category of cases is that where there are more than one dying declaration and inconsistencies between the declarations are absolute and the dying declarations are irreconcilable being repugnant to one another. In a dying declaration, the accused may not be blamed at all and the cause of death may be placed at the doorstep of an unfortunate accident. This may be followed up by another dying declaration which is diametrically opposed to the first dying declaration. In fact, in that scenario, it may not be a question of an inconsistent dying declaration but a dying declaration which is completely opposed to the dying declaration which is given earlier. There may be more than two. 31.9 (ix) In the third scenario, what is the duty of the court? Should the court, without looking into anything else, conclude that in view of complete inconsistency, the second or the third dying declaration which is relied on by the prosecution is demolished by the earlier dying declaration or dying declarations or is it the duty of the court to carefully attend to not only the dying declarations but examine the rest of the materials in the form of evidence placed before the court and still conclude that the incriminatory dying declaration is capable of being relied upon? Our conclusion on multiple dying declarations 32. We would think that on a conspectus of the law as laid down by this court, when there are more than one dying declaration, and in the earlier dying declaration, the accused is not sought to be roped in but in the later dying declaration, a summersault is made by the deceased, the case must be decided on the facts of each case. The court will not be relived of its duty to carefully examine the entirety of materials as also the circumstances surrounding the making of the different dying declarations. If the court finds that the incriminatory dying declaration brings out the truthful position particularly in conjunction with the capacity of the deceased to make such declaration, the voluntariness with which it was made which involves, no doubt, ruling out tutoring and prompting and also the other evidence which support the contents of the incriminatory dying declaration, it can be acted upon. Equally, the circumstances which render the earlier dying declaration, worthy or unworthy of acceptance, can be considered.” 20. In the case of Amalendu Pal Alias Jhantu (supra), the Apex Court has held and observed in paras-12, 13 and 14 as under:- “12. Thus, this Court has consistently taken the view that before holding an accused guilty of an offence under Section 306 IPC, the Court must scrupulously examine the facts and circumstances of the case and also assess the evidence adduced before it in order to find out whether the cruelty and harassment meted out to the victim had left the victim with no other alternative but to put an end to her life. It is also to be borne in mind that in cases of alleged abetment of suicide there must be proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the allegation of harassment without their being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable. 13. In order to bring a case within the purview of Section 306 of IPC there must be a case of suicide and in the commission of the said offence, the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide must have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide. Therefore, the act of abetment by the person charged with the said offence must be proved and established by the prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC. 14. The expression ‘abetment’ has been defined under Section 107 IPC which we have already extracted above. Therefore, the act of abetment by the person charged with the said offence must be proved and established by the prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC. 14. The expression ‘abetment’ has been defined under Section 107 IPC which we have already extracted above. A person is said to abet the commission of suicide when a person instigates any person to do that thing as stated in clause firstly or to do anything as stated in clauses secondly or thirdly of Section 107 IPC. Section 109 IPC provides that if the act abetted is committed pursuant to and in consequence of abetment then the offender is to be punished with the punishment provided for the original offence. Learned counsel for the respondent-State, however, clearly stated before us that it would be a case where clause ‘thirdly’ of Section 107 IPC only would be attracted. According to him, a case of abetment of suicide is made out as provided for under Section 107 IPC.” 21. In the case of Gangula Mohan Reddy (supra), the Apex Court has held and observed in paras-7, 9, 16 and 17 as under:- “7. The word suicide in itself is nowhere defined in the Indian Penal Code, however its meaning and import is well known and requires no explanation. ‘Sui’ means ‘self’ and ‘cide’ means “killing” thus implying an act of self-killing. In short a person committing suicide must commit it by himself, irrespective of the means employed by him in achieving his object of killing himself. 9. This penalty was later distilled down to merely not providing a full Christian burial, unless the deceased could be proved to be of unsound mind. However, currently there is no punishment for suicide after the enactment of the Suicide Act, 1961 which proclaims that the rule of law whereby it was a crime for a person to commit suicide has been abrogated. 16. This court in Chitresh Kumar Chopra vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) 2009 (11) Scale 24 had an occasion to deal with this aspect of abetment. The court dealt with the dictionary meaning of the word "instigation" and "goading."\ The court opined that there should be intention to provoke, incite or encourage the doing of an act by the latter. Each person's suicidability pattern is different from the others. Each person has his own idea of self esteem and self respect. The court dealt with the dictionary meaning of the word "instigation" and "goading."\ The court opined that there should be intention to provoke, incite or encourage the doing of an act by the latter. Each person's suicidability pattern is different from the others. Each person has his own idea of self esteem and self respect. Therefore, it is impossible to lay down any straightjacket formula in dealing with such cases. Each case has to be decided on the basis of its own facts and circumstances. 17. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. The intention of the Legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this court is clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and this act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide.” 22. In the case of Sharda (supra), the Apex Court has held and observed in paras-24, 25 and 26 as under:- “24......The principle on which dying declarations are admitted in evidence is indicated in legal maxim: “Nemo moriturus proesumitur mentiri a man will not meet his Maker with a lie in his mouth.” It is indicative of the fact that a man who is on Criminal Appeal No. 699/2008 a death bed would not tell a lie to falsely implicate an innocent person. This is the reason in law to accept the veracity of her statement. It is for this reason, the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Besides, if the dying declaration is to be completely excluded in a given case, it may even amount to miscarriage of justice as the victim alone being the eyewitness in a serious crime, the exclusion of the statement would leave the court without a scrap of evidence. 25. Though a dying declaration is entitled and is still recognized by law to be given greater weightage but it has also to be kept in mind that accused had no chance of cross-examination. 25. Though a dying declaration is entitled and is still recognized by law to be given greater weightage but it has also to be kept in mind that accused had no chance of cross-examination. Such a right of cross-examination is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath. This is the reason, generally, the court insists that the dying declaration should be such which inspires full confidence of the court of its correctness. The court has to be on guard that such statement of deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, prompting or product of imagination. The court must be further satisfied that deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailants. Once the court is satisfied that the aforesaid requirement and also to the fact that declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. 26. It is not an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence.” 23. In the case of S.S. Chheena (supra), the Apex Court has endorsed its earlier view taken in the case of Gangula Mohan Reddy vs. State of A.P. (2010) 1 SCC 750 . 24. In the case of Sampat Babso Kale (supra), the Apex Court has held and observed in para-15 as under:- “14. No doubt, a dying declaration is an extremely important piece of evidence and where the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is truthful, voluntary and not a result of any extraneous influence, the Court can convict the accused only on the basis of a dying declaration. We need not refer to the entire law but it would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in the case of Sham Shankar Kankaria vs. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 13 SCC 165 held as follows: “11. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its correctness. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its correctness. The court has to be on guard that the statement of deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. The court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence.” 25. In the case of Rajesh (supra), the Apex Court has held and observed in paras-8, 9 and 10 as under:- “8. Conviction under Section 306 IPC is not sustainable on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused, which led or compelled the person to commit suicide. In order to bring a case within the purview of Section 306 IPC, there must be a case of suicide and in the commission of the said offence, the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide must have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide. Therefore, the act of abetment by the person charged with the said offence must be proved and established by the prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC. Amalendu Pal alias Jhantu vs. State of West Bengal, (2010) 1 SCC 707 . 9. The term instigation under Section 107 IPC has been explained in Chitresh Kumar Chopra vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) as follows: “16. Amalendu Pal alias Jhantu vs. State of West Bengal, (2010) 1 SCC 707 . 9. The term instigation under Section 107 IPC has been explained in Chitresh Kumar Chopra vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) as follows: “16. Speaking for the three-Judge Bench in Ramesh Kumar Case (2001) 9 SCC 618 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1088, R.C. Lahoti, J. (as His Lordship then was) said that instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do “an act.” To satisfy the requirement of “instigation” though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes “instigation” must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. Where the accused had, by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct, created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide, in which case, an “instigation” may have to be inferred. A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow, cannot be said to be instigation. 17. Thus, to constitute “instigation” a person who instigates another has to provoke, incite, urge or encourage the doing of an act by the other by “goading” or “urging forward.” The dictionary meaning of the word “goad” is “a thing that stimulates someone into action; provoke to action or reaction” (see Concise Oxford English Dictionary) “to keep irritating or annoying somebody until he reacts” (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 7th Edn).” 10. Words uttered in a fit of anger or omission without any intention cannot be termed as instigation. Praveen Pradhan vs. State of Uttaranchal, (2012) 9 SCC 734 .” 26. Considering the aforesaid proposition of law as laid down by the Apex Court, on perusal of the oral and documentary evidence, it appears that Dr. Sudhaben Kantilal Shah, PW-1 at Exhibit 11 has deposed that at the relevant time, she was serving as Medical Officer in Civil Hospital, Junagadh and on 07.12.1998, she received police yadi from the Junagadh “B” Division Police Station that Fatmaben W/o Yunus Allarakha, who sustained burn injury, was brought to the hospital and during the treatment she died at 17.05 hours and the said yadi was for performing the postmortem of the dead-body of the deceased. She has deposed that she received copy of the panchnama and other documents along with the yadi. She has stated that she along with Dr. Gondaliay A.N. carried out the postmortem of the dead-body, which was started from 9.00 pm and completed it at 10.30 pm. She has deposed that the dead-body was of the woman, aged about 25 years and there was no any clothes on the dead-body and smell of kerosene was coming out from the dead-body. She has narrated that there was no injury found on the dead-body, but there was first and second degree burn injury found on the dead-body and it was found that except the sole portion, the entire body was having one burnt injury and it was 83% of body. She has deposed that all the burn injuries were anti-mortem. While narrating the conditions of the various organs, she has deposed that patient has died due to extensive burn injury. 26.1 During her cross-examination, she has admitted that if there was 83% extensive burn injury on the patient, then, it could be treated as serious. She has also admitted that if any person sustained burn injury, then, the process of rigor mortis starts immediately and in such conditions, the mental stability of the patient would be affected and it is possible that the patient might be conscious for sometime and might be unconscious for certain time. She has admitted that she cannot be opined as to whether the burn injury was happened due to the accident or due to the suicide. 27. At this juncture, it is pertinent to note that as per the Medical Certificate issued by the Medical Officer, C.H.C. Keshod, there was 95% burns over the body and initially, the deceased was treated by the Medical Officer, Keshod. However, except Medical Certificate, no medical papers of C.H.C. Keshod are produced. 28. On perusal of the evidence of Batuklal Jashmatbhai Makwana, PW-2 at Exhibit 28, it appears that he has deposed that at the relevant time, he was serving as Deputy Mamlatdar and Executive Magistrate at Collector Office, Junagadh. He has deposed that on 07.12.1998, he received D.O. Letter addressed by Junagadh “B” Division Police Station for taking dying declaration of Fatmaben, who has been admitted in the Civil Hospital due to burn injuries. He has deposed that on 07.12.1998, he received D.O. Letter addressed by Junagadh “B” Division Police Station for taking dying declaration of Fatmaben, who has been admitted in the Civil Hospital due to burn injuries. According to him, he has received the D.O. Letter at 15.45 hours, which is produced at Exhibit 28. He has deposed that thereafter, he went to Civil Hospital, Junagadh and met Dr. Joshi, who was on duty and after identifying the victim, he has inquired from the patient regarding what has happened to the deceased. According to him, the patient was conscious enough and was giving reply to him. He has deposed that he has taken the necessary endorsement of the doctor that the patient was in conscious condition. While narrating the general question which he has asked and to which the patient has answered accordingly, he has stated that the deceased has told him that she has no any grievance against her husband and her husband was giving her proper treatment and prior to the incident, she was pregnant and her father-in-law has threatened her to kill and her sisters-in-law were instigating her father-in-law and due to that she was feeling uncomfortable since last three days prior to the incident and on account of that she committed suicide. He has deposed that he has asked the patient as who were there at the time of incident, to which, the deceased has stated that nobody was present there in the room, however, her mother-in-law and sisters-in-law were sleeping in the adjacent room. He has deposed that thereafter, he has obtained right thumb impression of the deceased on the dying declaration which was completed at 15.50 hours and the doctor has put his endorsement on the dying declaration that the patient was in conscious condition. 28.1 During his cross-examination, he has stated that the entire body of the patient was burnt and due to burn injury, she was shouting. He has deposed that when he took the dying declaration of the victim, her relatives were present there. He has deposed that whenever, he was asking the question to the patient, she was giving reply peacefully. 28.2 This witness has produced the dying declaration at Exhibit 30 wherein there is endorsement of the doctor regarding consciousness of the patient. It also appears from the documents that there is right hand thumb impression of the deceased. 29. He has deposed that whenever, he was asking the question to the patient, she was giving reply peacefully. 28.2 This witness has produced the dying declaration at Exhibit 30 wherein there is endorsement of the doctor regarding consciousness of the patient. It also appears from the documents that there is right hand thumb impression of the deceased. 29. On perusal of the evidence of Dr. Bhalchandra Narmadashankar Joshi, PW-3 at Exhibit 31, it appears that he has deposed that in 1998, he was serving as Medical Officer, Civil Hospital, Junagadh and on 07.12.1998 at bout 2.45 pm, when he was on duty, Fatmaben resident of Keshod was brought in the hospital in burnt condition and she was referred to from the Government Hospital, Keshod along with the refer note. The refer note is produced at Exhibit 32. He has deposed that he has taken history from the patient wherein she has stated that as her father-in-law was threatening her that he would kill her and during her pregnancy period, her sisters-in-law have harassed her, she herself has ablazed. He has deposed that the patient was in conscious condition and her entire body was burnt except the sole part and her private part was also burnt. He has deposed that thereafter, he has informed the police for recording the dying declaration and accordingly, in his presence the Executive Magistrate has recorded the dying declaration. According to him, he has introduced the doctor to the patient and during recording of dying declaration from the beginning till the end the deceased was in conscious condition and, therefore, he has made endorsement at Exhibit 30. According to him, at the time of recording dying declaration, he, patient and Executive Magistrate were present and after recording of the dying declaration, he himself has, after examining the patient made an endorsement that the patient was conscious during the entire period of recording the dying declaration. He has deposed that when the patient has given history, at that time no treatment was started. 29.1 During his cross-examination, he has deposed that the patient has died on the same day at 5.05 pm i.e. within one and half to two hours, after her admission in the hospital. He has deposed that there were 99% burn injury over the body of the deceased and due to that she has died. 29.1 During his cross-examination, he has deposed that the patient has died on the same day at 5.05 pm i.e. within one and half to two hours, after her admission in the hospital. He has deposed that there were 99% burn injury over the body of the deceased and due to that she has died. He has deposed that he cannot say as to what type of treatment was administered to the patient in the hospital, Keshod. He has deposed that as soon as the patient was admitted in the hospital, they have started treatment and injunctions were given to her which were pain killer in nature and due to administration of such injunctions, there might be some sedition. He has admitted that on dying declaration at Exhibit 30, he has not made an endorsement that the patient was in fit state of mind. He has denied the suggestion that when the dying declaration was recorded, the patient was unconscious and the history was given by the relatives of the patient. 30. On perusal of the evidence of Ramsihbhai Maldebhai, PW-4 at Exhibit 34, it appears that he has deposed that on 08.12.1998, he was called upon by the Keshod Police for preparing panchnama of place of occurrence and at that time, another panch was Kasambhai Ranabhai. While narrating the contents of the panchnama, he has supported the case of the prosecution and has deposed that there was a house and it was two storied and on upper part, there was residence and on ground floor, there were shops and there were four rooms situated on northern side, out of which in one room, the incident took place wherein the black mark was found on the floor, wall, fans etc. and there were pieces of polyester clothes and from which, the smell of kerosene was noticed. He has deposed that necessary articles thereof were seized by the police and there was also one stove and one matchstick box was also there. He has deposed that the panchnama was read over to them and, thereafter, both of them put their signature. The panchnama is produced at Exhibit 35. 30.1 During his cross-examination, he has deposed that he knew accused Allarakha and there was residential house in the farm. He has deposed that the panchnama was read over to them and, thereafter, both of them put their signature. The panchnama is produced at Exhibit 35. 30.1 During his cross-examination, he has deposed that he knew accused Allarakha and there was residential house in the farm. He has deposed that the present accused i.e. Allarakha, his wife and two daughters were residing in the farm house and the panchnama was carried out in the house which has been occupied by Allarakha's son Yunus. He has deposed that the other sons of Allarakha were also residing separately. 31. On perusal of the evidence of Ikbalbhai Hasambhai, PW-5 at Exhibit 36, it appears that he has deposed that the deceased Fatmaben was his sister and she was married with Yunus, son of accused No. 1. He has deposed that after marriage, his sister was residing in joint family in matrimonial home. According to him, prior to four years of the incident, at that time, when he was present at his Tea Hotel, he was informed by one Imtiyaz that a telephone call was received to the effect that Fatmaben has got burn injury and, therefore, he, Aminaben and mother called at Keshod. He has deposed that when they reached near bridge of Ozat river, they have seen that an ambulance was coming from opposite direction and a car of his brother-in-law coming behind the ambulance and, therefore, they turned their car immediately and reached at Government Hospital, Junagadh. He has deposed that after reaching at the hospital, he has asked his deceased sister as to why she has taken such steps. According to him, she has stated him that due to harassment on the part the accused side, she herself poured kerosene and set her ablaze. According to him, when he inquired from Fatmaben in the hospital, at that time, he himself, his mother, Aminaben, Farida, Sabira and the mother-in-law and father-in-law were present there. He has deposed that at that time, the father-in-law and mother-in-law did not speak anything. Thereafter, his sister expired at 5.00 pm and after postmortem, they brought dead-body at Keshod. 31.1 He has deposed that prior to two months of happening of the incident, his sister Fatmaben has given birth to daughter namely Najhiya and at that time, she was residing with them at Junagadh. Thereafter, his sister expired at 5.00 pm and after postmortem, they brought dead-body at Keshod. 31.1 He has deposed that prior to two months of happening of the incident, his sister Fatmaben has given birth to daughter namely Najhiya and at that time, she was residing with them at Junagadh. He has deposed that prior to 20 days of the death of his sister, he has received telephone call from his elder sister Bilkisben that the quarrel was going on in the matrimonial home of Fatmaben and allegation of theft of Rs. 4,000/- was levelled against her and, therefore, he went to the matrimonial home of the deceased and has talked with his brother-in-law and the accused and at that time, his sister told him that the false allegation of theft of money has been made against her. According to him, at that time, his brother-in-law has stated that there was no theft of money and, thereafter, after negotiation, he (brother-in-law) left his sister Fatmaben at his home and at that time, she resided eight days at their home. He has deposed that the deceased has told him that she did not want to go her matrimonial home as the constant quarrel was going on. He has deposed that the deceased has written a chit (letter) to her sister Bilkisben and Bilkisben has, in turn, given to him. He has produced the same at Exhibit 37. 31.2 During his cross-examination, he has admitted that there was no mentioned as to whom the chit at Exhibit 37 was addressed and no name of Fatmaben was written and all the pages were loose pages. He has deposed that his sister was studied upto 12th Standard in Girls High School. He has admitted the fact that he has narrated before the police regarding the chit. He has admitted that it was not so happened that Fatmaben has directly sent a chit to him. He has denied the suggestion that there is no handwriting of the deceased in the chit. He has denied the fact that whatever stated in the chief-examination is false one. He has admitted that there are four brothers of his brother-in-law and all are residing separately. He has deposed that when he reached to the Government Hospital, Junagadh, he found that the body of his sister was entirely burnt. 32. He has denied the fact that whatever stated in the chief-examination is false one. He has admitted that there are four brothers of his brother-in-law and all are residing separately. He has deposed that when he reached to the Government Hospital, Junagadh, he found that the body of his sister was entirely burnt. 32. On perusal of the evidence of Aminaben Kamalbhai, PW-6 at Exhibit 38, it appears that she has narrated the same facts which are narrated by her brother. In addition to that, she has also deposed that the deceased has told her that as the accused were demanding TV, Refrigerator etc. and taunting her, she committed suicide. She has also narrated the fact of theft of Rs. 4000/- levelled against the deceased. 32.1 During her cross-examination, she has admitted that the incident of so-called theft of Rs. 4000/- has happened almost one and half years prior to the incident. She has admitted that she received telephone call from Shabbir son of Bilkisben to the effect that Fatmaben has caught fire while preparing food. She has admitted that the fact of demand of TV, Refrigerator etc., she has not narrated in her police statement and other facts which she has narrated on the line of her brother, are also not stated before the police. 33. On perusal of the evidence of Bilkisben Ismailbhai, PW-7 at Exhibit 39, it appears that she has deposed on the same line of above two witnesses. She has stated that Fatmaben has sent a chit of 4-5 pages in a note book through her neighbour and, thereafter, she has handed over it to her brother Iqbal. While referring to chit at Exhibit 37, she has deposed that the handwriting of that chit is of her deceased sister. 33.1 During her cross-examination, she has admitted that during her leisure time, deceased was reciting the verses of Quran. While referring to the note book at Exhibit 40, she has admitted that the handwriting in this note book is of her sister Fatmaben. She has admitted that the police has recorded her statement, at that time, the police has not saw the chit at Exhibit 37 to her. 34. While referring to the note book at Exhibit 40, she has admitted that the handwriting in this note book is of her sister Fatmaben. She has admitted that the police has recorded her statement, at that time, the police has not saw the chit at Exhibit 37 to her. 34. On perusal of the evidence of Shabir Ismailbhai Ghanchi, PW-8 at Exhibit 41, it appears that he has deposed that on the date of incident, he was serving at Kiran Auto Mobile, Keshod and at that time, he heard shouting from the house of the deceased and, therefore, he went there and found that his uncle (masa) Yunus was unconscious condition and there were many persons and Yunus's two sisters and his mother were present there and Fatmaben was found having burnt injury on body and, thereafter, he informed his mother and due to that his mother has informed the mother of Fatmaben and, thereafter, they all reached to the hospital at Keshod and, thereafter, she was brought to the Government Hospital at Junagdh. He has deposed that during the treatment, Fatmaben died and after getting dead body of the deceased cremation was done at Keshod. He has stated that the deceased Fatmaben was telling the facts regarding mental torture being administered to his sister. 35. On perusal of the evidence of Surmaji Nemaji Barad, PW-9 at Exhibit 42, it appears that he has deposed that at the relevant time, he was serving at Keshod Police Station and at that time, at 22.45 hours, he received a complaint which was recorded by the police constable Natha Madha, Junagadh “B” Police Station and accordingly, he has entered the same in the register and it was registered as C.R. No. I-285/98 for the offence under Sections 306, 498A and 114 and necessary entry was made in the station diary. While producing all these documents, he has deposed that he has handed over the investigation to PSI Shri I.N. Jadeja. He has also informed the higher officer. 35.1 During his cross-examination, he has deposed that from 07.12.1998 at 20.00 hours to 08.12.1998 at 8.00 hours, he was on duty. 36. While producing all these documents, he has deposed that he has handed over the investigation to PSI Shri I.N. Jadeja. He has also informed the higher officer. 35.1 During his cross-examination, he has deposed that from 07.12.1998 at 20.00 hours to 08.12.1998 at 8.00 hours, he was on duty. 36. On perusal of the evidence of Narotambhai Ramjibhai, PW-10 at Exhibit 46, it appears that he has deposed in his evidence that in the year 1998, he was serving as Police Head Constable in Junagadh “B” Division Police Station and he was present at Civil Hospital, Junagadh and in the meanwhile, he got message from the Medical Officer to the effect that Fatmaben resident of Keshod has been admitted in the hospital having burn injury. According to him, he met Dr. B.N. Joshi and, thereafter, he found the patient in conscious condition, he recorded the complaint as has been narrated by the patient and obtained her thumb impression on the complaint. He has deposed that thus, the patient was literate, but, she was not in a proper condition to sign it and, therefore, her thumb impression was taken on FIR. He has stated that meanwhile, Fatmaben died and, therefore, the inquest panchnama was prepared and postmortem was carried out by the doctor and he has sent all these documents to Keshod Police Station. 36.1 During his cross-examination, he has deposed that he received information at 15.15 hours. He has deposed that he has not mentioned the time on the alleged FIR. He has admitted that before recording the complaint, he has not obtained any medical certificate from the doctor regarding consciousness of the patient. He has admitted that he has recorded the complaint after five minutes of recording of the dying declaration. He has deposed that he has not inquired from the patient that what she has narrated in the dying declaration given to the Mamlatdar. He has admitted that the patient was completely burnt. He has deposed that when he reached to the hospital, no relatives of the deceased were present. He has deposed that when he has recorded the complaint of the deceased, the Mamlatdar has already left the place. He has admitted that the patient was completely burnt. He has deposed that when he reached to the hospital, no relatives of the deceased were present. He has deposed that when he has recorded the complaint of the deceased, the Mamlatdar has already left the place. He has denied the suggestion that at the time of recording of the complaint, she was not in good state of mind and he has lodged the complaint falsely at the behest of near relatives of the deceased and has obtained thumb impression of somebody else in the FIR. He has denied the suggestion that he has concocted document. 37. On perusal of the evidence of Indrasinh Natvarsinh, PW-11 at Exhibit 52, it appears that he has deposed that in the year 1998, when he was serving as PSI in Keshod Police Station, the investigation was handed over to him by the concerned PSO and accordingly, he has recorded the panchnama of the scene of offence as well as recorded the statement of the witnesses and arrested the accused and also get necessary documentary evidence on record from the FSL and as there was sufficient evidence against the accused, he has filed the charge-sheet. He has deposed that he has seized the chit at Exhibit 37. 37.1 During his cross-examination, he has admitted that the chit at Exhibit 37 was produced before him on the pretext that it was written by the deceased. He has admitted that he has not recorded the statement of the deceased when she was alive. He has deposed that during his investigation, he has recorded the statements of the neighbour. He has denied the fact that at the relevant time, the in-laws of the deceased were residing separately in the farm. The contents of the contradiction of witness Iqbal has also brought on record during his cross-examination. 38. Now, on considering the aforesaid entire evidence on record, it transpires that the near relatives of the deceased have tried to narrate the additional facts in their evidence which they have not stated before the police. It appears from the record that the near relatives are heavily relied upon the so-called chit at Exhibit 37. However, the note book, which is produced at Exhibit 40 if compared with the Exhibit 37, it appears that the handwriting of both documents are not identical and the same are different. It appears from the record that the near relatives are heavily relied upon the so-called chit at Exhibit 37. However, the note book, which is produced at Exhibit 40 if compared with the Exhibit 37, it appears that the handwriting of both documents are not identical and the same are different. It is admitted by the sister of the deceased that the handwriting of the deceased in the note book at Exhibit 40 is that of the deceased who has studied upto 12th Standard. Against this, if the handwriting at Exhibit 37 is perused, it clearly transpires that the handwritings on both the documents at Exhibit 37 and 40 are not of the same person. 39. It also appears from the record that the prosecution is relying upon the various dying declarations which are in the form of the FIR, dying declaration before the Executive Magistrate and oral dying declaration before the near relative. At this juncture, it is pertinent to note that the deceased was, initially, treated at Keshod Hospital which is reflected from the medical certificate given by the doctor, while referring the patient to the Junagadh Government Hospital. Therefore, it is quite possible that the first and important document in the shape of history or anything would have been available with the Keshod hospital where the primary treatment was administered to the deceased. However, for whatever reason best known to the prosecution, the said important documents are not brought on record and it is concealed. It also appears from the history in the shape of medical papers, complaint and the version of the relatives, one of the ground of torture is regarding the allegation of the theft of Rs. 4,000/- leveled against the deceased. However, on perusal of the entire evidence on record, it clearly appears that the so-called incident has occurred before one and half years prior to the present incident. Thus, there is no proximity of such allegation for the commission of the suicide by the deceased. At the same time, it also appears from the evidence that there is allegation against the sisters-in-law is to the effect that when the deceased was pregnant, she was being harassed by them. Therefore, in the interregnum period from delivery to the commission of the suicide is not immediate. At the same time, it also appears from the evidence that there is allegation against the sisters-in-law is to the effect that when the deceased was pregnant, she was being harassed by them. Therefore, in the interregnum period from delivery to the commission of the suicide is not immediate. Thus, there is no proximity with the cause of action, commission of suicide with harassment at the time of delivery period. 40. On perusal of the entire evidence on record, it appears that the so-called dying declarations are not trustworthy and the relatives have given parrot type story in their evidence. It also comes on record that the deceased and her husband were residing separately. It appears from the record that the entire body was having burnt injury. As various dying declarations of the deceased are doubtful and the relatives have tried to put up false chit of the deceased with a view to rope the accused with the alleged crime and considering the conduct of the witnesses, it is not safe to rely on such evidence and the alleged plea. 41. On perusal of the impugned judgment and order of the Trial Court, it appears that the Trial Court has not appreciated all these facts and has committed serious error of facts and law in convicting the accused and sentencing them. The impugned judgment and order of the Trial Court is not sustainable in the eyes of law and the same deserves to be interfered with. 42. In view of the above, the present appeal is liable to be allowed and accordingly, the present appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order dated 13.12.2002 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, 7th Fast Track Court, Junagadh in Sessions Case No. 78 of 1999 is hereby quashed and set aside. The appellants-original accused are acquitted from the charges levelled against them for the offence under Sections 306, 498A and 114 of the Indian Penal Code. Fine, if any, paid by the appellants-accused to be refunded to them. Bail bond, if any, stands cancelled. Record and Proceedings to be sent back to the Trial Court forthwith.