Mohit Kumar Shah, J. – The present writ petition has been filed for quashing order No. 217 dated 17.05.2018, communicated to the petitioner vide Memo dated 17.05.2018 as also the office order contained in Order no. 18 dated 17.05.2018, whereby and whereunder the Agreement bearing No. 103/SBD/2015-16, executed between Infrastructure Development Authority and the petitioner herein, has been terminated and the petitioner has been blacklisted for three years under Clause 11(ka) (ii) and the earnest money deposited by the petitioner has been forfeited. The petitioner has further prayed for directing the respondents to pay the outstanding amount for the work executed as per the BOQ as also clear the payment with regard to the additional/extra work and items, apart from making payment of the security deposit and EMD with interest @ 10% per annum. 2. The brief facts of the case according to the petitioner are that a notice inviting tender, bearing no. 12/Ten/IDA/14 was published in the daily newspaper ‘Hindustan’, Patna Edition on 20.09.2014 for execution and completion of work namely "storm water drainage of Hajipur Industrial Area and EPIP", at an estimated cost of Rs. 1866.652 lacs, to be completed within 18 months. The last date for submission of application for issuance of tender form was 14.10.2014 and the date and time for opening tender bid was fixed as 16.10.2014 at 3.30 pm. The petitioner had submitted his tender and was finally selected as the successful bidder inasmuch as the petitioner had agreed to execute the work at 4.14% below the estimated cost of the Bill of Quantity and as such, the contract value was fixed at Rs. 17,74,30,637.75 inclusive of non-scheduled items. Thereafter, an agreement dated 31.07.2015 was executed in between the petitioner and the In-charge Director (Project & Implementation) Infrastructure Development Authority, Patna. According to the agreement, the work entrusted to the petitioner was to be completed within 18 months, although the letter of acceptance was issued on 02.02.2015 itself. After execution of the agreement and on deposit of Security Amount/Performance Guarantee, the Executive Engineer (BOT) issued a letter dated 03.08.2015 calling upon the petitioner to start execution of work and make available the bar chart etc. and the same was made a part of the agreement, as such, the period of 18 months for completion of work has to be counted w.e.f. 03.08.2015. and the same was made a part of the agreement, as such, the period of 18 months for completion of work has to be counted w.e.f. 03.08.2015. It is stated that though the Executive Engineer, vide letter dated 14.09.2015, had again issued certain directions, however on account of reasons beyond the control of the petitioner, the petitioner could not start work in as much as it was stopped by the local administration from executing the work on account of meeting of the Prime Minister on 16.10.2016 and fixing of the place of strong room pertaining to the ongoing election work at EPIP, thus the petitioner had duly communicated these facts to the respondents vide letter dated 12.10.2015. 3. It is the further case of the petitioner that during the course of execution of the work, the petitioner had faced several hindrances besides stoppage of work for about three and half months on account of the dispute raised by the industrialists regarding the level of drain in industrial area and casting of slab. The petitioner was then called upon to furnish detailed reasons for the delay in execution of the work whereupon, the petitioner had submitted a detailed report containing the reasons for delay in executing the project, copy whereof can be found at Annexure-5 to the writ petition. The petitioner is stated to have, from time to time, by various communications, pointed out the difficulty in execution of the work including such extra and additional work which did not find place in the approved estimate or as part of Bill of Quantity (BOQ), however, the respondent authorities did not pay any heed to the problems being faced by the petitioner in execution of the work. It has been further stated that the officials including the Junior Engineer (Electrical) and the Assistant Engineer and Executive Engineer of BIADA along with the Incharge Director of the respondent as also the officer of the Consultant firm namely M/s Shiva Consultancy Pvt. Ltd. had also submitted their report pointing out various infirmities in the estimate as also in the BOQ, nonetheless, no step whatsoever was taken by the respondent no. 2 for redressal of the grievances of the petitioner. 2 for redressal of the grievances of the petitioner. In fact the design and drawing of the drainage, trench and other related work was modified by the Consultant which also consumed considerable time and during this period the petitioner could not proceed with execution of the work, resulting in further delay. Again, a joint meeting of nine persons was held on 21st June, 2016 in the office of respondent no. 2, wherein the officers of BIADA, representatives of the Consultant firm as also the representatives of the petitioner firm were present and in the said meeting, various problems being faced by the petitioner in execution of the work were discussed. The detailed discussions, as incorporated in the proceedings of the said meeting, duly drawn up and signed by all the 9 members who had participated in the said meeting would show that in the estimate as also in BOQ, no approach slab had been provided for and in fact, this was one of the reasons for agitation and stoppage of work by the industrialists of the said area. Thus it is pointed out that undisputedly, such item of work, as aforesaid, did not form part of the project/BOQ, hence the petitioner was not liable to execute such extra work, since for such Extra work a written permission of the Consultant in charge, operating the contract, was necessary which had in fact never been given by the Authority operating the work. It is also submitted that one other problem being faced by the petitioner was regarding the water level of the area resulting in the petitioner being forced to undertake huge de-watering job before undertaking casting / PCC work for construction of the drainage, but unfortunately, the de-watering work was not included in the estimate or BOQ and the same fell under the Extra work category for which written order was given belatedly, however, no payment was made although the petitioner had submitted the Running Account Bill (RAB) for the work executed including the de-watering work. 4. The further case of the petitioner is that on account of high water level in the area, despite resorting to de-watering process, there was accumulation of huge quantity of water, on account of which it became impossible for the petitioner to execute the work. The petitioner is also stated to have faced acute problem due to non-availability of sand. 4. The further case of the petitioner is that on account of high water level in the area, despite resorting to de-watering process, there was accumulation of huge quantity of water, on account of which it became impossible for the petitioner to execute the work. The petitioner is also stated to have faced acute problem due to non-availability of sand. Subsequently, the then Managing Director of the respondent no. 2 had asked the petitioner to submit a fresh bar chart, which the petitioner had submitted on 25th July, 2016 in the office of respondent no. 2. On verification of the various notings and proceedings of the relevant File no. 08/02/Tech/IA/15, it would appear that the then Managing Director, after considering the bar chart submitted by the petitioner, had passed certain orders and according to the information of the petitioner, the then Managing Director had ordered that in the first phase, only the work at EPIP should be executed. It is stated that although the then Managing Director had not issued any specific order to execute the work, only at the EPIP area, nonetheless, as per oral order of the Executive Engineer, operating the contract, the petitioner was restricted to executing work within that particular area. This restriction had created further hindrances in execution of the project, as a whole. 5. Thereafter, a letter dated 21.04.2017 was issued by the respondents, threatening the petitioner that he would be debarred from the work, however the petitioner had given suitable reply vide his letter dated 26.04.2017. The petitioner had then placed his grievances before the respondent-Managing Director and had requested for resolving the problems, whereafter, as desired by the Director (P&I), the petitioner had again submitted an Affidavit with a specific undertaking to complete the work before the next rainy season. The petitioner had also submitted a fresh Work Programme/ Bar Chart along with the letter dated 14.07.2017, but it appears that without considering the problems being faced by the petitioner and requests made by the petitioner, the respondent no. 3 directed the respondent nos. 4 and 5 to punish the petitioner, whereafter, all of a sudden, the petitioner was served with a show cause notice vide letter no. 3 directed the respondent nos. 4 and 5 to punish the petitioner, whereafter, all of a sudden, the petitioner was served with a show cause notice vide letter no. 1391/Tech dated 26.07.2017, by which the Executive Engineer (Tech.) threatened to terminate the agreement and further take steps under Clause 11(ka)(ii) of the Bihar Contractors Registration Rules, 2007 by blacklisting the petitioner to recover the amount and also to institute a First Information Report for prosecution of the petitioner. It is submitted that the said show cause notice was/is wholly illegal, arbitrary and without the authority of law in as much as the Executive Engineer has got no authority to issue such a show cause notice and the same can only be issued by the Consultantin- charge. The petitioner had then submitted a short show cause reply dated 04.08.2017 and also a detailed supplementary show cause reply dated 30.08.2017 against the proposed action of cancellation of the agreement, blacklisting, institution of FIR etc., however, the respondent Director (Project and Implementation), Infrastructure Development Authority, vide office order no. 20 dated 04.09.2017, by a cryptic and an unreasoned order rejected the show cause reply submitted by the petitioner, cancelled the agreement in question, blacklisted the firm of the petitioner under Clause 11(ka)(ii) of the Bihar Registration Rules, 2007 and forfeited the Security Deposit and EMD of the petitioner firm. The said order dated 04.09.2017 was challenged before this Court in CWJC no. 13601 of 2017 and a co-ordinate Bench of this Court by a judgment dated 14.03.2018 had quashed the aforesaid order dated 04.09.2017 and the matter was remanded back to the Director (Project and Implementation), Infrastructure Development Authority, Patna to pass orders afresh in accordance with law. The petitioner had then submitted a representation dated 26.05.2018 before the respondent no. 4, however the respondent no. 4 did not give any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and instead issued an office order no. 217 dated 17.05.2018, whereby and whereunder the agreement of the petitioner firm has been terminated, the firm of the petitioner has been blacklisted for 03 years and the earnest money as also the security deposit has been forfeited. 6. 4 did not give any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and instead issued an office order no. 217 dated 17.05.2018, whereby and whereunder the agreement of the petitioner firm has been terminated, the firm of the petitioner has been blacklisted for 03 years and the earnest money as also the security deposit has been forfeited. 6. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the agreement dated 31.07.2015 was first of all, executed in the midst of rainy season for the work namely ‘storm water drainage of Hajipur Industrial Area and EPIP’, creating hindrance for the petitioner firm to start work. Apart from the hindrance on account of rainy season, other hindrances had also hampered the work of the petitioner firm, as has been detailed hereinabove in the preceding paragraphs. The learned Senior Counsel submits that Estimate itself was defective, Design of outlet and Drawing was not made available and consequently, the agency which had prepared the Estimate was blacklisted vide office order no. IDA/QO/27/18 dated 16.01.2018 on account of complete drawings having not been submitted at a time, the Estimates being defective and the said agency namely M/s Shia Consultancy Services Pvt. Ltd. having not cooperated in completion of the work. It is further submitted that a new consultant namely M/s Kapoor and Associates was appointed vide letter no. 437/PDA dated 09.03.2018 by the order of the Executive Engineer (PDA) and it was directed to prepare PPR/DPR of the remaining work of Storm Water Drainage. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has referred to the Noting dated 10.01.2017, made in File no. 06/BOT/06/ IDA/16, which clearly points out to the defects in the DPR, Design and the Estimate of work, which are reproduced herein below: – “(a) There was no provision of Wall shuttering, local sand filling for Drain, Brick Flat Soling, Excavation of slushy mud, shorting etc., which has been included in the revised Estimate. (b) There was no provision of Gate Culvert in the original estimate, which was directed to be executed later on by the Administrative of IDA. There was no provision of PCC road to connect Electrical Sub Station, which was included later on in the Estimate. (c) There is no provision of Change Over and Battery Charging Set for connection of DG Set in Main Panel, which was later on included in the Estimate. There was no provision of PCC road to connect Electrical Sub Station, which was included later on in the Estimate. (c) There is no provision of Change Over and Battery Charging Set for connection of DG Set in Main Panel, which was later on included in the Estimate. (d) There was provision of Street light, but no provision of electric pole, which were included later on in the estimate. (e) The estimated cost of the work was Rs. 184586280.00, but the revised estimate is Rs. 231212612.00, which is more than 25.26% additional. After adding other charged in revised estimate, the total revised estimate come to Rs. 261597710, which exceeds by 58.64%.” 7. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that admittedly, new drawing has not been approved till date, nonetheless the respondents forced the petitioner firm to do additional work of extra item to the tune of Rs. 2.85 crore, however payment is being denied to the petitioner firm in absence of new estimate having been approved. In this regard, it is submitted that the factum of extra work having been performed by the petitioner firm and payments thereof having not been made, has been admitted in paragraph no. 40 of the counter affidavit filed by the respondents no. 2 to 5. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that a bare perusal of paragraph no. 33 of the writ petition would show that a sum of Rs. 1.76 crore, pertaining to the scheduled items, are due for payment. 8. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has drawn the attention of this Court to the show cause notice dated 26.07.2017 issued to the petitioner herein by the Executive Engineer (Tech), Infrastructure Development Authority, which refers to four issues namely termination of agreement, blacklisting in terms of Clause 11(Ka)(ii) of the Bihar Contractor Registration Rules, 2007, recovery of money and institution of FIR, however the show cause issued to the petitioner firm, nowhere speaks about forfeiture of Security Deposit and EMD. It is further submitted that the aforesaid show cause notice dated 26.07.2017 is wholly arbitrary, illegal and without the authority of law. The Executive Engineer has got no authority to issue such a notice intimating about decision to blacklist the petitioner contractor, who is registered as a Class-I Contractor, even under the General Conditions of Contract. It is further submitted that the aforesaid show cause notice dated 26.07.2017 is wholly arbitrary, illegal and without the authority of law. The Executive Engineer has got no authority to issue such a notice intimating about decision to blacklist the petitioner contractor, who is registered as a Class-I Contractor, even under the General Conditions of Contract. It is the Consultant-in-charge and not the Executive Engineer, who is empowered to issue show cause notice and no provision exists to show that the Executive Engineer was empowered to exercise the power of the Consultant-in-charge. It is pointed out that the petitioner was registered as a class-I Contractor with the respondent no. 2 in the year, 2013, as per order of the Managing Director and only after approval of the Managing Director, the Registration Certificate was issued by the Director (P & I), Infrastructure Development Authority, thus it is crystal clear that in accordance with Clause 11(ga) of the Bihar Infrastructure Rules, the right to demote, suspend and place in lower Class of Contractor, is vested with the authority empowered to register such contractor and/ or superior authority of such registering officer or authority, but the show cause, in the present case, has been issued by Executive Engineer and that too in terms of Bihar Contractors’ Registration Rules, 2007, which are not even statutory Rules and cannot be applied since the same have not been adopted by the respondents. 9. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner firm has further submitted that the order passed by the respondent no. 4 i.e. the Director (Project and Implementation), Infrastructure Development Authority dated 04.09.2017 has stood quashed by a judgment dated 14.03.2018 passed in CWJC no. 13601 of 2017, hence the same has become non-existent, whereafter the impugned order dated 17.05.2018 has been passed by the respondent no. 4 herein i.e. the Director (Project & Implementation), Infrastructure Development Authority, thus the same has to be tested as to whether it is legally sustainable or not. The learned Senior counsel for the petitioner has referred to the written submissions filed in the present case on behalf of the petitioner and has submitted that certain facts are required to be taken note of which would clearly demonstrate that the impugned order dated 17.05.2018 has been passed as per the desire and dictate of the respondent no. 3, without an independent application of mind by the respondent no. 4. 3, without an independent application of mind by the respondent no. 4. The facts referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the written submission filed before this Court, are as follows: – “(I) The petitioner obtained detail noting of the file under RTI, 2005, Ann-P-17 at page 127, and also by yet another letter. Now furnishing the details the petitioner had got communication that the respondent no. 4 proposed an Order and in fact a draft order was prepared but same was placed before the respondent no. 3 vide his Notings dated 13.04.2018, the said proposed order and Letter are at pages-337-336 and 338-340 of File no. 06/09/BOT/IDA/ 2015. (II) That was referred vide notings dated 07.05.2018, again from noting dated 09.05.2018 of the Executive Engineer a revised order was prepared and was referred to M.D., respondent no. 3 and thereafter, on the same day that revised order was placed before the MD, respondent no. 3, that is apparent from noting dated 17.05.2018 and thereafter, again by the noting dated 17.05.2018, the impugned order was issued. (III) It is clear and an admitted fact that Ann P/15 order was issued as per desire of respondent no. 3, the Managing Director. The petitioner has made statement on oath in paragraph 28 of the writ application and counter affidavit has been filed under the signature of the respondent no. 5. The Executive Engineer who has come out with a plea in paragraph no. 36 of the counter affidavit that is a procedure of putting a draft to the senior official who may accept it or direct to amend it. So, the allegations made by the petitioner are now an admitted fact and on this ground alone, the order is bad and fit to be quashed and cancelled.” 10. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, referring to the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Commissioner of Police vs. Govardhan Das, reported in AIR 1952 SC 16 , the one rendered in the case of The Purtabpore Co. Ltd. vs. Cane Commissioner of Bihar and Others reported in AIR 1970 SC 1896 as also the one rendered in the Rafale case dated 10.04.2019, passed in Review Petition (Criminal) no. 46 of 2019 in Writ Petition (Criminal) no. Ltd. vs. Cane Commissioner of Bihar and Others reported in AIR 1970 SC 1896 as also the one rendered in the Rafale case dated 10.04.2019, passed in Review Petition (Criminal) no. 46 of 2019 in Writ Petition (Criminal) no. 298 of 2018 and the one rendered in the case of Chief Information Commissioner vs. The State of Manipur, reported in (2011) 15 SCC 1 , has submitted that the public order must be publicly made and the person affected has the right to know with precision, the authority of the person making the order and the Courts can very well see beyond the order passed by the authority to find out as to whether the said authority has abdicated his authority or not and the document, officially and legally made available to the petitioner can be used by him to protect his contractual, legal and fundamental right, especially after coming into force of the R.T.I. Act, 2005. 11. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the aforesaid impugned order dated 17.05.2018 is also perverse and not in accordance with law, inasmuch as in the show cause notice issued to the petitioner dated 26.07.2017, there was no whisper about forfeiture of EMD, nonetheless by the impugned order dated 17.05.2018, the Security Deposit and EMD deposit of the firm have also been forfeited. In this regard, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has referred to a judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Gorkha Security Services vs. Govt. (NCT of Delhi), reported in (2014) 9 SCC 105 , paragraphs no. 19 and 20 are reproduced herein below: – “(19) The Central issue, however, pertains to the requirement of stating the action which is proposed to be taken. The fundamental purpose behind the serving of Show Cause Notice is to make the noticee understand the precise case set up against him which he has to meet. This would require the statement of imputations detailing out the alleged breaches and defaults he has committed, so that he gets an opportunity to rebut the same. Another requirement, according to us, is the nature of action which is proposed to be taken for such a breach. This would require the statement of imputations detailing out the alleged breaches and defaults he has committed, so that he gets an opportunity to rebut the same. Another requirement, according to us, is the nature of action which is proposed to be taken for such a breach. That should also be stated so that the noticee is able to point out that proposed action is not warranted in the given case, even if the defaults/breaches complained of are not satisfactorily explained. When it comes to black listing, this requirement becomes all the more imperative, having regard to the fact that it is harshest possible action. (20) The High Court has simply stated that the purpose of show cause notice is primarily to enable the noticee to meet the grounds on which the action is proposed against him. No doubt, the High Court is justified to this extent. However, it is equally important to mention as to what would be the consequence if the noticee does not satisfactorily meet the grounds on which an action is proposed. To put it otherwise, we are of the opinion that in order to fulfil the requirements of principles of natural justice, a show cause notice should meet the following two requirements viz: (i) The material/ grounds to be stated on which according to the Department necessitates an action; (ii) Particular penalty/action which is proposed to be taken. It is this second requirement which the High Court has failed to omit. We may hasten to add that even if it is not specifically mentioned in the show cause notice but it can be clearly and safely be discerned from the reading thereof, that would be sufficient to meet this requirement.” 12. The learned Senior counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the respondents have no authority to pass an order of blacklisting in terms of the Bihar Contractors Registration Rules, 2007, inasmuch as the same is neither a legislative enactment under Article 205 of the Constitution of India nor a statutory rule under Section 166(3) of the Constitution of India nor a Circular approved by the Government nor has been published in the official gazette, hence the same does not have any force of law. In this connection, the learned Senior Counsel has relied upon a judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Rajasthan vs. Harla, reported in AIR 1951 SC 467 . It is further submitted that the guidelines relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents for the purposes of deriving source of power to blacklist the petitioner firm is of no use and has got no force of law, inasmuch as these guidelines can only be used for the purposes of internal guidance, however the respondent no. 2, being not a Government Department, has got no authority of law to promulgate a law effecting the fundamental rights of the citizen under para III of the Constitution of India. It is submitted that Article 13 of the Constitution of India defines law and Article 13 (2) thereof, prohibits the framing of law affecting part III of the Constitution even by the State Legislature, hence the Executive has got no such power. It is further submitted, by relying upon a Constitution Bench judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Mohindra Singh Gill and another vs. the Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and others, reported in AIR 1978 SC 851 , that the validity of an order made by a statutory officer is to be judged by the reasons so mentioned therein and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. 13. It is further submitted that delay and slow progress of work has been occasioned on account of various kinds of hindrances, not within the control of the petitioner. These hindrances are like force major clause. The fact is that respondents no. 3 to 5 are the officers who are responsible for delay in as much as the tender was issued on 20.09.2014, it was finalized in the month of July, 2015, LOI was then issued on 03.08.2015, allowing 18 months time to the petitioner to execute the work, knowing full well that the site was not clear, estimates and drawing had not been finalised, the local people did not allow to execute work during the election of 2015-16, no coarse sand was available, even the consultant was blacklisted for not supplying drawings and the design was changed mid way, therefore, the petitioner was not ever allowed to execute the work peacefully. The respondents neither made payments for the extra work undertaken by the petitioner nor made payments of the admitted amounts, causing shortage of working capital. 14. The learned Senior counsel for the petitioner has also contended that a party to the contract may terminate the contract but cannot be judge of its own cause nor is empowered to punish the other party until the other party has been held responsible for breach, duly determined by a forum or court. In this regard, the learned Senior counsel has referred to a judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court, reported in 2011 (5) SCC 758 (J.G. Engineers (P) Ltd. vs. Union of India, (2011) 5 SCC 758 ), paragraphs 18 to 20 whereof, are reproduced herein below: – "18. Thus what is made final and conclusive by Clauses (2) and (3) of the agreement, is not the decision of any authority on the issue whether the contractor was responsible for the delay or the Department was responsible for the delay or on the question whether termination/rescission is valid or illegal. What is made final, is the decisions on consequential issues relating to quantification, if there is no dispute as to who committed breach. That is, if the contractor admits that he is in breach, or if the arbitrator finds that the contractor is in breach by being responsible for the delay, the decision of the Superintending Engineer will be final in regard to two issues. The first is the percentage (whether it should be 1% or less) of the value of the work that is to be levied as liquidated damages per day. The second is the determination of the actual excess cost in getting the work completed through an alternative agency. The decision as to who is responsible for the delay in execution and who committed breach is not made subject to any decision of the respondents or its officers, nor excepted from arbitration under any provision of the contract. 19. In fact the question whether the other party committed breach cannot be decided by the party alleging breach. A contract cannot provide that one party will be the arbiter to decide whether he committed breach or the other party committed breach. That question can only be decided by only an adjudicatory forum, that is, a court or an Arbitral Tribunal. 20. A contract cannot provide that one party will be the arbiter to decide whether he committed breach or the other party committed breach. That question can only be decided by only an adjudicatory forum, that is, a court or an Arbitral Tribunal. 20. In State of Karnataka vs. Shree Rameshwara Rice Mills [ (1987) 2 SCC 160 ] this Court held that adjudication upon the issue relating to a breach of condition of contract and adjudication of assessing damages arising out of the breach are two different and distinct concepts and the right to assess damages arising out of a breach would not include a right to adjudicate upon as to whether there was any breach at all. This Court held that one of the parties to an agreement cannot reserve to himself the power to adjudicate whether the other party has committed breach. This Court held: (SCC p. 164, paras 7-8) “7. … Even assuming for argument's sake that the terms of Clause 12 afford scope for being construed as empowering the officer of the State to decide upon the question of breach as well as assess the quantum of damages, we do not think that adjudication by the officer regarding the breach of the contract can be sustained under law because a party to the agreement cannot be an arbiter in his own cause. Interests of justice and equity require that where a party to a contract disputes the committing of any breach of conditions the adjudication should be by an independent person or body and not by the other party to the contract. The position will, however, be different where there is no dispute or there is consensus between the contracting parties regarding the breach of conditions. In such a case the officer of the State, even though a party to the contract will be well within his rights in assessing the damages occasioned by the breach in view of the specific terms of Clause 12. 8. We are, therefore, in agreement with the view of the Full Bench that the powers of the State under an agreement entered into by it with a private person providing for assessment of damages for breach of conditions and recovery of the damages will stand confined only to those cases where the breach of conditions is admitted or it is not disputed.” 15. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the impugned order dated 17.05.2018 is not only malafide in law rather the same is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, inasmuch as the petitioner was neither given an opportunity of hearing nor the same is in consonance with the judgment dated 14.03.2018 passed by a coordinate Bench of this Court in CWJC no. 13601 of 2017 i.e. in the earlier round of litigation. Finally, the learned Senior counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner has got no other efficacious or alternative remedy, inasmuch as not only the impugned show cause notice dated 26.07.2017 is without jurisdiction but furthermore, the impugned order dated 17.05.2018 has been passed on dictates and direction of the Managing Director i.e. the respondent no. 3 who has infringed the legal rights of the petitioner herein and moreover, the respondent no. 4 has abdicated his power to the respondent no. 3, hence there is no question of any appeal. It is further submitted that there is no provision for arbitration in the agreement in question dated 31.07.2015. The learned Senior counsel, relying on the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and others reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1 and the one reported in (2010) 11 SCC 186 (Zonal Manager, Central Bank of India vs. Devi Ispat Limited and others), has submitted that an alternative remedy is not a bar for exercise of jurisdiction by this Court. 16. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents no. 2 to 5 has submitted that the respondent- Infrastructure Development Authority (herein after referred to as the "IDA"), Bihar, Patna is an authority established under the Bihar State Infrastructure Development Enabling Act, 2006 for rapid development of physical and social infrastructure and for attracting private sector participation in designing, financing, construction, operation and maintenance of infrastructure projects in the State having its office at Patna. The learned counsel for the respondents no. The learned counsel for the respondents no. 2 to 5 has submitted that the basic facts are not in dispute, however it is submitted that there has been no delay on the part of the respondent-IDA and as per the agreement, the Contractor had to invest minimum capital up to 25% of the agreement amount but up to the date of closing of the agreement, the petitioner had executed only 25% of the work and the respondent IDA had paid a sum of Rs. 4.042 crores against the works executed by the petitioner firm. It is submitted that the petitioner has miserably failed to complete even the work of EPIP within the stipulated period i.e. upto the month of April, 2017 despite the fact that the respondent-IDA had made available all the vetted drawings to the petitioner on 27.08.2015 itself and some modified maps were also sent to the petitioner on 15.12.2015. It is stated that as far as stoppage of work on account of Prime Minister’s visit as also due to election period and on account of non-availability of sand is concerned, extra time was granted to the petitioner to complete the work, however despite several follow-ups by the respondents, the petitioner firm failed to complete the work in question. In fact, several letters were written to the petitioner for accelerating the work and completing the same, however the petitioner had defaulted miserably, whereafter, a final warning letter dated 21.04.2017 was issued to the petitioner, requesting it to comply with the earlier letters issued to it and complete the work, failing which the petitioner firm would be debarred from participating in the future tenders/ contracts. The petitioner had then submitted an affidavit dated 14.07.2017, wherein revised and fresh Bar-Chart was submitted, and it was undertaken that all the works would be completed before 30th August, 2018, however the same was not accepted by the respondents. 17. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent-IDA has submitted that the Director (Project & Implementation), I.D.A., in the impugned order dated 17.05.2018, has given point by point reasoned analysis about the issues raised by the petitioner as also about the slow progress of work being executed by the petitioner, in the following terms: – “(a) The respondent had provided the project site to the petitioner on 03.08.2015. Some issues relating to stoppage of work were also resolved in the meeting dated 09.10.2015 but the petitioner has not completed the work as per the revised work schedule. (b) In the joint meeting held on 09.10.2015, only level of drain was decided. The work was stopped only for 15 days. Thereafter, the revised work program was submitted. But the work progress was very slow and not as per the revised work program. (c) After the joint meeting of 09.10.2015, the complete EPIP area was provided to the petitioner. (d) The petitioner was required to examine and inspect the site before submission of tender as per para 7 of the tender. (e) The petitioner has not done any productive work for construction of sump. (f) The work item of Gate Culvert was not mentioned in the drawing earlier. It was added later, but the provision of item RCC & steel was given in the BOQ in the drain item. The petitioner was paid for this item of gate culvert. (g) Under para 4(7) of the order passed by the Director (P & I) it has been clarified that only 25% of the total work has been completed by the petitioner against which payment of Rs. 387.50 lakh has been made to it. The extra items executed by the petitioner can only be calculated after the revision of BOQ. The security has been forfeited against the blacklisting order. There is no record with the respondent about the other materials like tools and plants, Ductile iron pipe, pump, stone chips etc. (h) The Respondent has been given ample time to complete the whole work upto December 2017, but the petitioner has not even completed the work of EPIP upto 04.09.2017. The respondent has paid the 3rd running Bill, however, the further payment has been withheld for risk and cost calculation and on account of blacklisting of the firm. The extra items executed by the petitioner can only be calculated after the revision of BOQ. (i) The respondent was provided the project site on 03.08.2015. Some issues relating to stoppage of work were also resolved in the meeting dated 09.10.2015. The respondent has been given ample time to complete the whole work upto December, 2017, but the petitioner has not completed even the work of EPIP upto 04.09.2017. Thus, the petitioner has also not completed the work as per the revised work schedule. Some issues relating to stoppage of work were also resolved in the meeting dated 09.10.2015. The respondent has been given ample time to complete the whole work upto December, 2017, but the petitioner has not completed even the work of EPIP upto 04.09.2017. Thus, the petitioner has also not completed the work as per the revised work schedule. (j) The petitioner executed only 25% of storm water drainage construction work in the Industrial area and EPIP Hajipur. The whole work should have been completed upto December, 2017, but the petitioner has completed only 25% of the work. ” 18. The learned counsel for the respondent-IDA has further submitted that the respondent Infrastructure Development Authority (IDA) Bihar, Patna is an authority established under the Bihar State Infrastructure Development Enabling Act, 2006 (herein after referred to as the Act, 2006), for carrying out the purpose of the said Act, 2006. The authority in exercise of the power conferred under Section 66 R/w Section 10 (XXIX) of the said Act, 2006, has enacted the IDA (Financial, Services and Technical) Regulations, 2007 (herein after referred to as the Regulations, 2007), which has also been published in the official gazette of the State of Bihar vide notification dated 02.01.2018. Under Regulation 8 of Schedule-II of the Regulations, 2007 (bearing the heading “Technical Regulations of the Infrastructure Development Authority, Bihar, 2007"), the Board of Directors of IDA, in their 15th meeting, adopted the standard bidding document used by the Building Construction department, with some changes in the nomenclature and under Regulations 7, it has been provided that the IDA may adopt PWD/RCD code. In this connection, reference has been made to Regulation 7, which is reproduced herein below: – “7. Empanelment of Contractors. – The Authority may evolve its own norms for empanelment/enlisting of contractors/ construction firms. It may take guidance from the enlistment norms adopted by the RCD. It may exempt agencies/ contractors empanelled with RCD/CPWD/ GOI/NHAI/GOI/PSUs and other State Governments and their PSUs from separate registration requirements provided that after the work is allotted to the said agency/ contractor shall have to be get registered with the Authority.” 19. It may take guidance from the enlistment norms adopted by the RCD. It may exempt agencies/ contractors empanelled with RCD/CPWD/ GOI/NHAI/GOI/PSUs and other State Governments and their PSUs from separate registration requirements provided that after the work is allotted to the said agency/ contractor shall have to be get registered with the Authority.” 19. It is further submitted that in pursuance to the aforesaid Regulation 7, of Schedule II of the aforesaid Regulations, 2007, the Board of Directors of IDA, has prepared guidelines for enlistment of super contractors and contractors to be empanelled, for execution of Civil construction work under the authority and the said guidelines were prepared on the basis of the Enlistment of Contractors Rules, 2007, being followed by the Road Construction Department, Government of Bihar. The said guidelines were then been placed in the 14th meeting of the Board of Directors of IDA, held on 05.06.2009, vide Agenda no. 10 and upon considering the said agenda, the Board of Directors of IDA had opined for legal vetting of the said guidelines. After necessary compliance, the Enlistment Rules for empanelment of Contractors with IDA were placed before the Board of Directors of IDA, in their 16th meeting held on 03.12.2009, vide Agenda no. 4, whereafter the same was approved, after discussions. The said Guidelines were named as Infrastructure Development Authority Contractors Guideline, 2009. The learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to Clause 10 of the said Guidelines, 2009 which deals with blacklisting and suspension and the same also provides for an appeal against the order of punishment of blacklisting/ suspension, before the Managing Director of I.D.A. Clause 10 of the Infrastructure Development Authority Contractors Guideline, 2009 are reproduced herein below: – “ Black-Listing and Suspension: – (a) Contractors registered in any of the classes shall be liable for black-listing or demotion to a lower class or suspension for a specified period if he personally or any partner of the firm or company, or any of its directors or employee or representative commits any of the following malpractices : – (i) Indiscipline behavior with any officer or employee of the client/ IDA (ii) Failure to abide by conditions of Agreement and standing instructions therein during execution of work. (iii) Creating law & order problem in Government office during receipt of tender papers, opening of tenders or any work related thereto; (iv) Subletting any work without consent of the department to another contractor or any other individual (v) Threatening or attacking any officer or employee of the IDA. (vi) Selling Government material like Cement, Steel and Bitumen etc. (vii) On submission of false or forged security as earnest money (viii) On failure to execute the agreement within the stipulated period after allotment of work if repeated more than once. (ix) On being convicted for any criminal activity. (x) participating in or boycotting tenders by forming a cartel. (b) Before black-listing or suspension of any contractor, he shall be given an opportunity to show cause. The contractor has to respond within 15 days of the notice otherwise unilateral action will be taken by IDA. (c) The order for black-listing/ suspension shall be passed by the officer who is competent to register the contractor or by the officer under whom the registering officer works. (d) The contractor can file an appeal within 30 days against the punishment for black-listing/ suspension before Managing Director, IDA. (e) Blacklisting on the basis of action taken by other Departments also.” It is stated that the Board of Directors of IDA has approved Guidelines for registration/ empanelment of contractors and laid down other norms. It is also submitted that the petitioner has been registered as a Class-I contractor by the Director (Project & Implementation), I.D.A. i.e. the respondent no. 4 herein and the said respondent no. 4 has passed the impugned order dated 17.05.2018, blacklisting the petitioner herein as per Clause 10C of the aforesaid Guidelines, 2009, according to which the respondent no. 4 is the competent authority to pass the impugned order of blacklisting, thus there is neither any infirmity nor any illegality. In this connection, the Ld. Counsel has referred to Cl. 10 (c) of the Infrastructure Development Authority Contractors Guideline, 2009, which is reproduced herein below: – "(c) The Order for blacklisting/ suspension shall be passed by the officer who is competent to register the contractor or by the officer under whom the registering officer works." 20. The learned counsel for the respondents no. 2 to 5 has also referred to Regulation 8 of Schedule II of the Regulations, 2007 which reads as follows: – “Standard bidding documents. The learned counsel for the respondents no. 2 to 5 has also referred to Regulation 8 of Schedule II of the Regulations, 2007 which reads as follows: – “Standard bidding documents. – The authority may make its own standard bidding document or may adopt any other document in practice with any State Government/ GOI. ” 21. The learned counsel for the respondents no. 2 to 5 has also referred to Regulation 8 of Schedule II of the Regulations, 2007 which reads as follows: – “Standard bidding documents. – The authority may make its own standard bidding document or may adopt any other document in practice with any State Government/ GOI. ” 21. The learned counsel for the respondents no. 2 to 5 has further relied upon Clause 14 of the Standard Bid Document, which reads as follows: – “CLAUSE 14 If Contractor : (i) At any time makes default in proceeding with the works or any part of the work with the due diligence and continues to do so after a notice in writing of 7 days from the Consultant-In- Charge, or (ii) Commits default to comply with any of the terms and conditions of the contract and does not remedy it or take effective steps to remedy it within 7 days after a notice in writing is given to him in that behalf by the Consultant-In-Charge, or (iii) fails to complete the works or items of work with individual dates of completion, on or before the date (s) of completion, and does not complete then within the period specified in a notice given in writing in that behalf by the Consultant-in-Charge, or (iv) shall offer or give or agree to give to any person working at IDA on contract/ deputation or to any other person on his behalf any gift or consideration of any kind as an inducement or reward for doing or forbearing to do or for having done or forborne to do any action relation to the obtaining or execution of this or any other contract for Government, or (v) shall enter into a contract with IDA in connection with which commission has been paid or agreed to be paid by him or to his knowledge, unless the particulars of any such commission and the terms of payment thereof have been previously disclosed in writing to the Competent Authority/Consultant-In-Charge, or (vi) shall obtain a contract with Government as a result of wrong tendering or other non-bonafide methods of competitive tendering, or (vii) being an individual, or if a firm, any partner thereof shall at any time be adjudged insolvent or have a receiving order or order for administration of his estate made against him or shall take any proceedings for liquidation or composition (other than a voluntary liquidation for the purpose of amalgamation or reconstruction) under any insolvency Act for the time being in force or make any conveyance or assignment of his effects or composition or arrangement for the benefit of his creditors or purport so to do, or if any application be made under any Insolvency Act for the time being in force for the sequestration of his estate or if a trust deed be executed by him for benefit of his creditors, or (viii) being a company, shall pass a resolution or the Court shall make an order for the winding up of the company, or a receiver or manager on behalf of the debenture holders or otherwise shall be appointed or circumstances shall arise which entitle the Court or debenture holders to appoint a receiver or manager, or (ix) shall suffer an execution being levied on his goods and allow it to be continued for a period of 21 days, or (x) assigns, transfers, sublets (engagement of labour on a piece-work basis or of labour with materials not to be incorporated in the work, shall not be deemed to be subletting) or otherwise parts with or attempts to assign, transfer sublet or otherwise parts with the entire works or any portion thereof without the prior written approval of the Competent Authority. The Competent Authority may, without prejudice to any other right or remedy which shall have accrued or shall accrue hereafter to Government, by a notice in writing to cancel the contract as a whole or only such item of work in default from the contract. The Consultant-in-Charge shall on such cancellation by the Competent Authority have powers to (a) take possession of the site and any materials, constructional plant, implements stores etc. thereof, and/or (b) carry out the incomplete work by any means at the risk and cost of the contractor. On cancellation of the contract in full or in part, the Consultant-In-Charge shall determine what amount, if any, is recoverable from the contractor for completion of the works or part of the works or in case the works or part of the works is not to be completed, the loss of damage suffered by Government. In determining the amount, credit shall be given to the contractor for the value of the work executed by him up to the time of cancellation, the value of contractor’s materials taken over and incorporated in the work and use of plant and machinery belonging to the contractor. Any excess expenditure incurred or to be incurred by IDA in completing the works or part of the works or the excess loss or damages suffered or may be suffered by IDA as aforesaid after allowing such credit shall without prejudice to any other right or remedy available to IDA in law be recovered from any moneys due to the contractor on any account, and if such moneys are not sufficient the contractor shall be called upon in writing and shall be liable to pay the same within 30 days. If the contractor shall fails to pay the required sum within the aforesaid period of 30 days the Consultant-In-Charge shall have the right to sell any or all of the contractors unused materials, constructional plant, implements, temporary buildings, etc. and apply the proceeds of sale thereof towards the satisfaction of any sums due from the contractor under the contract and if thereafter there be any balance outstanding from the contractor, it shall be recovered in accordance with the provisions of the contract. Any sums in excess of the amounts due to Government and unsold materials, constructional plant, etc. and apply the proceeds of sale thereof towards the satisfaction of any sums due from the contractor under the contract and if thereafter there be any balance outstanding from the contractor, it shall be recovered in accordance with the provisions of the contract. Any sums in excess of the amounts due to Government and unsold materials, constructional plant, etc. shall be returned to the contractor, provided always that if cost or anticipated cost of completion by Government of the works or part of the works is less than the amount which the contractor would have been paid had he completed the works or part of the works, such benefit shall not accrue to the contractor. Thus, it is submitted that the impugned order dated 17.05.2018, passed by the respondent no. 4, is in accordance with the order dated 14.03.2018, passed by this Court in CWJC no. 13601 of 2017 and the same has been passed by the competent authority, having appropriate jurisdiction, against which the petitioner has a remedy of appeal. It is also submitted that the impugned order dated 17.05.2018 is a reasoned and a speaking order and has been passed in accordance with law, hence requires no interference by this Court. 22. The learned counsel for the respondent-I.D.A. has further submitted that admittedly, the progress of work of the petitioner firm had always been slack and a bare perusal of the writ petition would show that the petitioner has miserably failed to explain the unexplained delay in completing the work in question. It has been further submitted that disputed question of facts cannot be adjudicated in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in this regard, the learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon a judgment reported in (2015) 7 SCC 728 (Joshi Technologies International Inc. vs. Union Of India & Ors.), paragraph no 69 whereof is reproduced herein below : – 69. The position thus summarised in the aforesaid principles has to be understood in the context of discussion that preceded which we have pointed out above. As per this, no doubt, there is no absolute bar to the maintainability of the writ petition even in contractual matters or where there are disputed questions of fact or even when monetary claim is raised. As per this, no doubt, there is no absolute bar to the maintainability of the writ petition even in contractual matters or where there are disputed questions of fact or even when monetary claim is raised. At the same time, discretion lies with the High Court which under certain circumstances, it can refuse to exercise. It also follows that under the following circumstances, “normally”, the Court would not exercise such a discretion: 69.1. The Court may not examine the issue unless the action has some public law character attached to it. 69.2. Whenever a particular mode of settlement of dispute is provided in the contract, the High Court would refuse to exercise its discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution and relegate the party to the said mode of settlement, particularly when settlement of disputes is to be resorted to through the means of arbitration. 69.3. If there are very serious disputed questions of fact which are of complex nature and require oral evidence for their determination. 69.4. Money claims per se particularly arising out of contractual obligations are normally not to be entertained except in exceptional circumstances. 23. The learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that as far as the issue regarding legality of the show cause notice dated 26.07.2017 is concerned, Clause 3(a) of the agreement, executed in between the parties, in very clear terms requires the service of notice in writing to determine or rescind the contract. The forfeiture of earnest money deposit, security deposit and performance guarantee is a consequence of determination/rescinding of the contract. It is further submitted that the show cause notice dated 26.07.2017 clearly mentions about taking action for recovery of the amount, thus the plea of the petitioner that since the show cause notice dated 26.07.2017 does not speak about forfeiture of security money/EMD, the impugned order dated 17.05.2018, is illegal, is without any basis and fit to be rejected. It is further submitted that the petitioner is estopped from raising such pleas pursuant to rendering of the order dated 14.03.2018 by this Court, in the earlier round of litigation i.e. in CWJC no. 13601 of 2017, relevant portion whereof is reproduced herein below: – "3. Having heard the parties and on consideration of the materials on record, this Court finds merit in the submissions of the petitioner. In Kulja Industries (supra) it was observed as follows : – “25. 13601 of 2017, relevant portion whereof is reproduced herein below: – "3. Having heard the parties and on consideration of the materials on record, this Court finds merit in the submissions of the petitioner. In Kulja Industries (supra) it was observed as follows : – “25. Suffice it to say that "debarment" is recognised and often used as an effective method for disciplining deviant suppliers/contractors who may have committed acts of omission and commission or frauds including misrepresentations, falsification of records and other breaches of the regulations under which such contracts were allotted. What is notable is that the "debarment" is never permanent and the period of debarment would invariably depend upon the nature of the offence committed by the erring contractor.” 4. It would appear that the principles in regard to -* “debarment” and “blacklisting” would be the same in view of para 21 of the said judgment, wherein it has been observed as follows – “21. The legal position governing blacklisting of supplies in U.S.A. and U.K. is no different. In U.S.A. instead of using the expression “blacklisting” the term “debarring” is used by the statutes and the Courts.” 5. In the above view of the matter, the impugned order dated 04.09.2017 (Annexure-12) is hereby quashed and the matter remanded to the Director (Project & Implementation), Infrastructure Development Authority, Ist Floor, Udyog Bhawan, East of Gandhi Maidan, Patna – 800 004 (Respondent No. 4) to pass orders afresh after considering the aforesaid replies of the petitioner, pursuant to the show cause notice, before passing fresh orders in accordance with law. 6. The writ petition stands disposed of." 24. It is thus submitted that this Court vide the aforesaid Order dated 14.03.2018, passed in CWJC no. 13601 of 2017, had quashed the earlier impugned order dated 04.09.2017 and remanded the matter back to the Director (Project and Implementation), Infrastructure Development Authority, Patna to pass fresh orders after considering the reply of the petitioner and the said directions have been complied with in its true letter and spirit by passing of the order dated 17.05.2018, by the respondent no. 4, impugned in the present proceedings, which is also in accordance with Clause 3 and Clause 14 of the Standard Bidding Document under the head “Clauses of Contract”, which forms part of the agreement/ contract as also as per Clause 10(C) of the Infrastructure Development Authority Contractors Guidelines, 2009. 4, impugned in the present proceedings, which is also in accordance with Clause 3 and Clause 14 of the Standard Bidding Document under the head “Clauses of Contract”, which forms part of the agreement/ contract as also as per Clause 10(C) of the Infrastructure Development Authority Contractors Guidelines, 2009. It is stated that in the earlier round of litigation, the petitioner had not raised the issue of abdication of power, hence has waived his right to question the same in the present proceedings especially on the basis of certain information's made available to it under the Right to Information Act which is impermissible as per the mandate of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Central Board of Secondary Education and Another vs. Aditya Bandopadhyay and another reported in (2011) 8 SCC 497 , paragraphs no. 34 and 62 whereof, is reproduced herein below: – “34. It is thus now well settled that a provision barring inspection or disclosure of the answer books or re-evaluation of the answer books and restricting the remedy of the candidates only to re-totalling is valid and binding on the examinee. In the case of CBSE, the provisions barring reevaluation and inspection contained in Bye-law 61, are akin to Rule 104 considered in Maharashtra State Board [ (1984) 4 SCC 27 ]. As a consequence if an examination is governed only by the rules and regulations of the examining body which bar inspection, disclosure or reevaluation, the examinee will be entitled only for re-totalling by checking whether all the answers have been evaluated and further checking whether there is no mistake in the totalling of marks for each question and marks have been transferred correctly to the title (abstract) page. The position may however be different, if there is a superior statutory right entitling the examinee, as a citizen to seek access to the answer books, as information. 62. When trying to ensure that the right to information does not conflict with several other public interests (which includes efficient operations of the governments, preservation of confidentiality of sensitive information, optimum use of limited fiscal resources, etc.), it is difficult to visualise and enumerate all types of information which require to be exempted from disclosure in public interest. The legislature has however made an attempt to do so. The legislature has however made an attempt to do so. The enumeration of exemptions is more exhaustive than the enumeration of exemptions attempted in the earlier Act that is section 8 of Freedom to Information Act, 2002. The Courts and Information Commissions enforcing the provisions of RTI Act have to adopt a purposive construction, involving a reasonable and balanced approach which harmonises the two objects of the Act, while interpreting section 8 and the other provisions of the Act.“ Thus, it is submitted that the petitioner cannot claim by way of a right to use the document, officially and legally made available to it, to protect his contractual, legal and fundamental right, in the garb of R.T.I. Act, 2005 since the enforceability of the R.T.I. Act is not available to the petitioner in the present case, hence the documents made available to the petitioner at a subsequent stage i.e. after passing of the order dated 14.03.2018 by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in CWJC no. 13601 of 2017 cannot be used by the petitioner since the petitioner is estopped from raising such pleas at a belated stage. Even otherwise, if the plea of the petitioner that the respondent no. 4 has abdicated his powers while passing the impugned order dated 17.05.2018 is accepted for the sake of argument, it is submitted that the Managing Director i.e. the respondent no. 3 is well within his power of supervision under Clause 4.2 of Chapter IV of I.D.A. (Financial Service and Technical) Regulations, 2007. It is further submitted that the judgments relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel in the case of Gordhandas Bhanji (supra), The Purtabpore Co. Ltd. (supra), Chief Information Commissioner (supra) and the Rafel case (supra) have no relevance in the facts and circumstances of the present case and the said issue raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner is definitely governed by the Constitution Bench’s judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Bachittar Singh vs. the State of Punjab and another ( AIR 1963 SC 395 ), paragraphs no. 8 to 11 whereof, are reproduced herein below : – 8. What we have now to consider is the effect of the note recorded by the Revenue Ministers of Pepsu upon the file. We will assume for the purpose of this case that it is an order. 8 to 11 whereof, are reproduced herein below : – 8. What we have now to consider is the effect of the note recorded by the Revenue Ministers of Pepsu upon the file. We will assume for the purpose of this case that it is an order. Even so, the question is whether it can be regarded as the order of the State Government which alone as admitted by the appellant was competent to hear and decide an appeal from the order of the Revenue Secretary. Article 166(1) of the Constitution requires that all executive action of the Government of a State shall be expressed in the name of the Governor. Clause (2) of Art. 166 provides for the authentication of orders and other instruments made and executed in the name of the Governor. Clause (3) of that Article enables the Governor to make rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of the Government and for the allocation among the Ministers of the said business. What the appellant calls an order of the State Government is admittedly not expressed to be in the name of the Governor. But with that point we shall deal later, what we must first ascertain is whether the order of the Revenue Minister is an order of the State Government i.e., of the Governor. In this connection we may refer to R. 25 of the Rules of Business of the Government of Pepsu which reads thus: "Except as otherwise provided by any other Rule cases shall ordinarily be disposed of by or under the authority of the Minister in charge who may by means of Standing Orders give such directions as he thinks fit for the disposal of cases in the Department. Copies of such Standing Orders shall he sent to the Rajpramukh and the Chief Ministers." According to learned counsel for the appellant his appeal pertains to the department which was in charge of the Revenue Minister and therefore he could deal with it. His decision and order would according, to him be the decision and order of the State Government. On behalf of the State reliance was however, placed on R.34 which required certain classes of cases to be submitted to the Rajpramukh and the Chief Minister before the issue of orders. His decision and order would according, to him be the decision and order of the State Government. On behalf of the State reliance was however, placed on R.34 which required certain classes of cases to be submitted to the Rajpramukh and the Chief Minister before the issue of orders. But it was conceded during the course off the argument that a case of kind before us does not fall within that rule. No other provision bearing on the point having been brought to our notice we would, therefore, hold that the Revenue Minister could make an order on behalf of the State Government. 9. The questions, therefore, is whether he did in fact make such an order. Merely writing something on the file does not amount to an order. Before something amounts to an order of the State Government two things are necessary. The order has to be expressed in the name of the Governor as required by cl.(1) of Art. 166 and then it has to be communicated. As already indicated, no formal order modifying the decision of the Revenue Secretary was ever made. Until such an order is drawn up the State Government cannot in our opinion be regarded as bound by what was stated in the file. As long as the matter rested with him the Revenue Minister could well score out his remarks or minutes on the file and write fresh once. 10. The business of State is a complicated one and has necessarily to be conducted through the agency of a large number of officials and authorities. The Constitution therefore requires and so did the Rules of Business framed by the Rajpramukh of Pepsu provide, that the action must be taken by the authority concerned in the name of the Rajpramukh. It is not till this formality is observed that the action can be regarded as that of the State or here, by the Rajpramukh. We may further observe that, constitutionally speaking, the Minister is no more than an adviser and that the head of the State, the Governor or Rajpramukh, is to act with the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers. We may further observe that, constitutionally speaking, the Minister is no more than an adviser and that the head of the State, the Governor or Rajpramukh, is to act with the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers. Therefore until such advice is accepted by the Governor whatever the Minister or the Council of Ministers say in regard to a particular matter does not become the action of the State until the advice of the Council of Ministers is accepted or deemed to be accepted by the Head of the State. Indeed, it is possible that after expressing one opinion about a particular matter at a particular state of Minister or the Council of Ministers may express quite a different opinion, one which may be completely opposed to the earlier opinion. Which of them can be regarded as the 'order' of the State Government? Therefore, to make the opinion amount to a decision of the Government it must be communicated to the person concerned. In this connection we may quote the following from the judgment of this Court in the State of Punjab vs. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh, AIR 1961 SC 493 at p. 512. "Mr. Gopal Singh attempted to argue that before the final order was passed the Council of Ministers had decided to accept the respondent’s representation and to reinstate him, and that, according to him, the respondent seeks to prove by calling the two original orders. We are unable to understand this argument. Even if the council of Ministers had provisionally decided to reinstate the respondent that would not prevent the Council from reconsidering the matter and coming to a contrary conclusion later on until a final decision is reached by them and is communicated to the Rajpramukh in the form of advice and acted upon by him by issuing an order in that behalf to the respondent." Thus it is of the essence that the order has to be communicated to the person who would be affected by that order before the State and that person can be bound by that order. For, until the order is communicated to the person affected by it, it would be open to the Council of Ministers to consider the matter over and over against and, therefore, till its communication the order cannot be regarded as anything more than provisional in character. 11. For, until the order is communicated to the person affected by it, it would be open to the Council of Ministers to consider the matter over and over against and, therefore, till its communication the order cannot be regarded as anything more than provisional in character. 11. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the remarks or the order of the Revenue Minister, PEPSU are of on avail to the appellant. 25. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the materials on record as also considered the catena of decisions referred to by both the parties which have been detailed hereinabove in the preceding paragraphs. 26. This Court finds from the records that notice inviting tender was published by the respondent- Infrastructure Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as the "IDA") for execution and completion of work namely Storm Water Drainage, of Hajipur Industrial Area and E.P.I.P., which was to be completed within a period of 18 months. Shorn of the details, it would be relevant to state that the petitioner was finally selected and declared as a successful bidder especially since it had agreed to execute the work at 4.14% below the estimated cost of the bill of quantity. The letter of acceptance was issued in favour of the petitioner on 02.02.2015 and then the agreement is stated to have been executed in between the petitioner and the In-charge Director (P & I) of the Infrastructure Development Authority, Patna on 31.07.2015. In fact the petitioner had also undertaken to invest 25% of the value of work. The respondent-IDA had, upon deposit of security amount/ Performance Guarantee, called upon the petitioner to proceed with the work and to this effect, the petitioner was served with a notice dated 03.08.2015, hence even if the said date is taken into consideration, the period of 18 months was to end on 03.02.2017, within which time the petitioner had to complete the work. 27. At this juncture, it would suffice to state that allegations and counter- allegations have been levelled by both the parties. It is the allegation of the petitioner that there were teething problems in execution of the work from the very inception on account of various hindrances, as described hereinabove in the preceding paragraphs. 27. At this juncture, it would suffice to state that allegations and counter- allegations have been levelled by both the parties. It is the allegation of the petitioner that there were teething problems in execution of the work from the very inception on account of various hindrances, as described hereinabove in the preceding paragraphs. On the contrary, it is the allegation of the respondents that they had made available all the vetted drawings and modified maps by 27.08.2015 and had also resolved all the existing problems, as alleged by the petitioner herein, in the Joint Meeting held on 09.10.2015, nonetheless the progress of the work of the petitioner still remained very slack, which was repeatedly pointed out to the petitioner by the respondent authorities vide several communications of various dates in between 14.9.2015 to 16.03.2017 but the petitioner failed to increase the pace of the work and complete the work in question. It is the case of the respondent-IDA that a final warning letter dated 21.04.2017 was issued to the petitioner stating therein that despite several requests and directions, the working mode and manner of the petitioner had not improved, hence, it was being finally directed to comply with the earlier directions and complete the work, failing which it would be debarred from participating in future tenders. Thereafter, it appears that the petitioner had submitted a fresh Bar chart along with an affidavit, by its letter dated 14.07.2017 stating therein that the work would be completed by 30.06.2018. A show cause notice dated 26.07.2017 was then issued to the petitioner under Clause 14 of the agreement, seeking its reply as to why the agreement be not cancelled, the firm be not black-listed and appropriate action be not taken for recovery of the amount in question in view of breach of terms and conditions of the agreement in question as also for not completing the work in time as per the work programme, to which the petitioner had submitted its reply dated 04.08.2017 and a detailed supplementary show cause reply dated 30.08.2017, whereafter the respondent no. 4 i.e. the Director (Project & Implementation), IDA had passed an order dated 04.09.2017 whereby and whereunder, the agreement in question was cancelled, the petitioner firm had been blacklisted under Clause 11(ka)(ii) of the Bihar Registration Rules, 2007 and the Security Deposit and EMD of the petitioner firm had been forfeited. 4 i.e. the Director (Project & Implementation), IDA had passed an order dated 04.09.2017 whereby and whereunder, the agreement in question was cancelled, the petitioner firm had been blacklisted under Clause 11(ka)(ii) of the Bihar Registration Rules, 2007 and the Security Deposit and EMD of the petitioner firm had been forfeited. The said order dated 04.09.2017 was challenged by the petitioner before this Court in C.W.J.C. no. 13601 of 2017 and this Court by an order dated 14.03.2018 had disposed of the writ petition by quashing the aforesaid order dated 04.09.2017 and remanding the matter back to the Director (Project & Implementation), IDA to pass fresh orders after considering the replies of the petitioner, filed pursuant to the show cause notice issued by the respondent- IDA, primarily on the ground that the petitioner has been black-listed for an indefinite period. Thereafter, the respondent no. 4 i.e the Director (Project & Implementation), IDA, in compliance of the aforesaid order dated 14.03.2018, passed by this Hon'ble Court in C.W.J.C. no. 13601 of 2017, has passed a detailed, reasoned and self-speaking order dated 17.05.2018, whereby and whereunder the agreement in question, executed in between the IDA and the petitioner herein has been terminated and the petitioner has been black-listed for three years as also the security deposit and earnest money deposited by the petitioner, have been forfeited. 28. Now adverting to the issue raised by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner to the effect that the Executive Engineer has got no authority to issue the show cause notice dated 26.07.2017, inasmuch as the appropriate authority for issuing such show cause is the Consultant In-Charge and not the Executive Engineer, thus the said notice dated 26.07.2017 is itself arbitrary, illegal and without the authority of law, this Court finds that the said issue has never been raised by the petitioner firm either in its show cause reply dated 04.08.2017 or in its supplementary show cause reply dated 30.08.2017, filed in pursuance to the show cause notice dated 26.07.2017 and moreover the said issue has also not been raised before this Court in the earlier round of litigation which is apparent from the submissions made by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner and as recorded by a coordinate Bench of this Court in the earlier order dated 14.03.2018 passed in CWJC No. 13601 of 2017. In any view of the matter, this Court further finds that since a coordinate Bench of this Court by an order dated 14.03.2018 passed in CWJC No. 13601 of 2017 has in fact directed the Director (P & I), IDA to pass orders afresh, after considering the replies of the petitioner dated 04.08.2017 and 30.08.2017, filed pursuant to the show cause notice dated 26.08.2017, the petitioner is estopped from raising this issue for the simple reason that if it was not satisfied with the order dated 14.03.2018 passed by this Court in CWJC No. 13061 of 2017, it could have challenged the same before the learned Division Bench, however, instead the petitioner has chosen to be content with the same, thus this Court is of the opinion that at this juncture such frivolous issue regarding show cause notice itself being illegal, cannot be raised and the parties have to abide by the order dated 14.03.2018 passed by a coordinate Bench of this Court in CWJC No. 13601 of 2017, which has not been challenged by either of the parties, hence the Director (P & I), IDA was fully competent to pass orders afresh, after considering the aforesaid replies of the petitioner, filed pursuant to the show cause notice dated 26.07.2017 and accordingly this Court finds that the issue regarding legality/ illegality of the show cause notice dated 26.07.2017 does not arise for consideration in the present case, hence the said submission made on behalf of the petitioner has been noted only for the purposes of being rejected. In fact the learned senior counsel for the petitioner has himself submitted on behalf of the petitioner that since the earlier order dated 04.09.2017 passed by the Director (P & I), IDA has stood quashed by this Court by a judgment dated 14.03.2018 passed in CWJC No. 13601 of 2017, whereafter the impugned order dated 17.05.2018 has been passed by the Director (P & I), IDA, in pursuance to the aforesaid order of this Court dated 14.03.2018, the same has to be tested, as to whether it is legally sustainable or not and for the said purpose the learned senior counsel for the petitioner has referred to the detailed noting of the concerned file, received under RTI Act, 2005, to show that the impugned order dated 17.05.2018 has been issued as per the desire of the respondent no. 3 i.e. the Managing Director, IDA, hence the impugned order dated 17.05.2018 has been passed without independent application of mind by the Director (P & I), IDA resulting in abdication of power, thus on this ground alone the impugned order dated 17.05.2018 is fit to be set aside. In this regard, this Court finds that as per the provisions contained in clause 4.2 (Chapter-IV) of the Infrastructure Development Authority (Financial, Service & Technical), Regulations, 2007, framed in exercise of powers conferred under Section 66 read with Section 10 (xxix) of Bihar State Infrastructure Development Enabling Act, 2006, with the approval of the State Government, which has been notified in the Bihar Gazette vide notification dated 02.01.2008, the Managing Director is the executive head of the IDA and is responsible for proper administration of the affairs and funds of the IDA as well as for implementation of various activities of the authorities under the directions and guidance of the Chairman of IDA and for such effective discharge of function, he has been vested with the powers to exercise overall supervision over the officers and staff of the IDA as also over the activities of the IDA. This Court further finds that the reference of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner to certain notings of the file, which though are not on the record, to buttress the issue of abdication of power, as aforesaid, is also of no avail inasmuch as the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Bachhittar Singh (supra), has clearly held that notings in the file does not amount to an order and unless an order is communicated to a person who is to be effected by such order, neither the State nor such person can be bound by such notings, as such till its communication, such notings/order cannot be regarded as anything more than provisional in character, thus such notings in the file are of no avail. This Court further finds that neither there is any evidence nor any pleading in the writ petition to show that the Director (P & I), IDA has not applied his mind while passing the impugned order dated 17.05.2018 and in fact a bare perusal of the said order would show that the same is self speaking and a well reasoned order, showing appropriate application of mind by the authority who has passed the same. In this regard it would be relevant to refer to yet another judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Securities & Exchange Board of India vs. Prebon Yamani (India) Limited reported in (2015) 16 SCC 89 , paragraphs no. 10 & 16 whereof are reproduced herein below: – “10. Reliance has also been placed on letter dated 4.4.1999 issued by the Appellant to the Respondent, by which a certificate of registration was issued to the Respondent subject, inter alia, to condition (d) which provides that the Respondent and similarly situated entities shall pay the amount of fees for registration in the manner provided in SEBI (Brokers and Sub Brokers) Regulations, 1992. This letter also requested the Respondent to study the Rules and Regulations carefully. Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant contended that the Respondent could not claim “fee continuity” on the basis of internal file notings. Reliance has been placed on the well entrenched legal principle that estoppel has no efficacy against a statute. Sethi Auto Service Station vs. Delhi Development Authority 2009 (1) SCC 180 clarifies this position thus - 13. Thus, the first question arising for consideration is whether the recommendation of the Technical Committee vide minutes dated 17th May, 2002 for re-sitement of appellants petrol pumps constitutes an order/decision binding on the DDA? 14. It is trite to state that notings in a departmental file do not have the sanction of law to be an effective order. A noting by an officer is an expression of his viewpoint on the subject. It is no more than an opinion by an officer for internal use and consideration of the other officials of the department and for the benefit of the final decision-making authority. Needless to add that internal notings are not meant for outside exposure. Notings in the file culminate into an executable order, affecting the rights of the parties, only when it reaches the final decision-making authority in the department; gets his approval and the final order is communicated to the person concerned. 15. In Bachhittar Singh vs. The State of Punjab AIR 1963 SC 395 , a Constitution Bench of this Court had the occasion to consider the effect of an order passed by a Minister on a file, which order was not communicated to the person concerned. 15. In Bachhittar Singh vs. The State of Punjab AIR 1963 SC 395 , a Constitution Bench of this Court had the occasion to consider the effect of an order passed by a Minister on a file, which order was not communicated to the person concerned. Referring to the Article 166(1) of the Constitution, the Court held that order of the Minister could not amount to an order by the State Government unless it was expressed in the name of the Rajpramukh, as required by the said Article and was then communicated to the party concerned. The court observed that business of State is a complicated one and has necessarily to be conducted through the agency of a large number of officials and authorities. Before an action is taken by the authority concerned in the name of the Rajpramukh, which formality is a constitutional necessity, nothing done would amount to an order creating rights or casting liabilities to third parties. It is possible, observed the Court, that after expressing one opinion about a particular matter at a particular stage a Minister or the Council of Ministers may express quite a different opinion which may be opposed to the earlier opinion. In such cases, which of the two opinions can be regarded as the "order" of the State Government? It was held that opinion becomes a decision of the Government only when it is communicated to the person concerned. 16. To the like effect are the observations of this Court in Laxminarayan R. Bhattad and Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr. 2003 (3) SCR 409 , wherein it was said that a right created under an order of a statutory authority must be communicated to the person concerned so as to confer an enforceable right. ” 16. After considering the submissions of the learned Senior Counsel for both parties and appreciating the facts of the case, it is evident to us that as per Clause 4 of Schedule III, the Respondent was not an ‘entity’ as envisaged in the Regulations as would be entitled to “fee continuity” or exemption from payment of fees. The Regulation 4 clearly refers to a newly formed entity through conversion from either a sole proprietorship or a partnership to a limited Company, which alone has been bestowed the benefit of continuity. The Regulation 4 clearly refers to a newly formed entity through conversion from either a sole proprietorship or a partnership to a limited Company, which alone has been bestowed the benefit of continuity. Given that the Respondent is barred by the provisions, the Appellant’s internal file notings are of no consequence and the Appellant is not estopped from coming to a contrary conclusion. The Respondent’s argument that the Appellant experienced a change of heart after the issuance of the Circular dated 28.3.2002 is untenable, because if that was indeed what the Respondent believed, it would not have written a letter requesting fee continuity on 4.2.2002, a date prior to the issuance of the circular dated 28.3.2002. Thus, the Respondent has failed to prove that it believed it was granted fee continuity, in light of its letter to the Appellant requesting the same. Further, it appears to us that the Respondent was an entity quite distinct from Oracle, with the consequence that it would be bound to pay the fee in accordance with Schedule III, Clause (a) or (b) as the case may be, and would not be entitled to claim the advantage of Clause (c). In fact, this is the very understanding of the Respondent since fees were deposited by them under Clause (a) in sharp contradistinction of Clause (c).” Thus this Court finds, upon consideration of the aforesaid discussions and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bachhittar Singh (supra), Securities & Exchange Board of India vs. Prebon Yamani (India) Limited (supra) and Sethi Auto Service Station (supra) that the aforesaid issue raised by the petitioner regarding abdication of power by the Director (P & I), IDA, does not merit any consideration so as to persuade this Court to quash the impugned order dated 17.05.2018 on this ground. 29. 29. This Court further finds from a bare perusal of the exhaustive pleadings made by both the parties that admittedly allegations and counter allegations have been levelled by both the parties against each other and the present case admittedly involves serious disputed question of facts which are of complex nature and require leading of oral/documentary evidence, involving examination and cross-examination of witnesses, as such this Court finds that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the present case cannot be decided in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and it would be appropriate for the petitioner to resort to alternative remedy available to it. In this regard, it would be apt to refer to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Joshi Technologies International Inc. vs. Union of India (supra), paragraphs no. 70.3 to 70.11 and 71 whereof are reproduced herein below: – “70.3. Even in cases where question is of choice or consideration of competing claims before entering into the field of contract, facts have to be investigated and found before the question of a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution could arise. If those facts are disputed and require assessment of evidence the correctness of which can only be tested satisfactorily by taking detailed evidence, involving examination and cross-examination of witnesses, the case could not be conveniently or satisfactorily decided in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. In such cases the Court can direct the aggrieved party to resort to alternate remedy of civil suit, etc. 70.4. Writ jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 was not intended to facilitate avoidance of obligation voluntarily incurred. 70.5. Writ petition was not maintainable to avoid contractual obligation. Occurrence of commercial difficulty, inconvenience or hardship in performance of the conditions agreed to in the contract can provide no justification in not complying with the terms of contract which the parties had accepted with open eyes. It cannot ever be that a licensee can work out the license if he finds it profitable to do so: and he can challenge the conditions under which he agreed to take the license, if he finds it commercially inexpedient to conduct his business. 70.6. It cannot ever be that a licensee can work out the license if he finds it profitable to do so: and he can challenge the conditions under which he agreed to take the license, if he finds it commercially inexpedient to conduct his business. 70.6. Ordinarily, where a breach of contract is complained of, the party complaining of such breach may sue for specific performance of the contract, if contract is capable of being specifically performed. Otherwise, the party may sue for damages. 70.7. Writ can be issued where there is executive action unsupported by law or even in respect of a corporation there is denial of equality before law or equal protection of law or if can be shown that action of the public authorities was without giving any hearing and violation of principles of natural justice after holding that action could not have been taken without observing principles of natural justice. 70.8. If the contract between private party and the State/instrumentality and/or agency of State is under the realm of a private law and there is no element of public law, the normal course for the aggrieved party, is to invoke the remedies provided under ordinary civil law rather than approaching the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitutional of India and invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction. 70.9. The distinction between public law and private law element in the contract with State is getting blurred. However, it has not been totally obliterated and where the matter falls purely in private field of contract. This Court has maintained the position that writ petition is not maintainable. Dichotomy between public law and private law, rights and remedies would depend on the factual matrix of each case and the distinction between public law remedies and private law, field cannot be demarcated with precision. In fact, each case has to be examined, on its facts whether the contractual relations between the parties bear insignia of public element. Dichotomy between public law and private law, rights and remedies would depend on the factual matrix of each case and the distinction between public law remedies and private law, field cannot be demarcated with precision. In fact, each case has to be examined, on its facts whether the contractual relations between the parties bear insignia of public element. Once on the facts of a particular case it is found that nature of the activity or controversy involves public law element, then the matter can be examined by the High Court in writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to see whether action of the State and/or instrumentality or agency of the State is fair, just and equitable or that relevant factors are taken into consideration and irrelevant factors have not gone into the decision making process or that the decision is not arbitrary. 70.10. Mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen, in such a situation, may not by itself be a distinct enforceable right, but failure to consider and give due weight to it may render the decision arbitrary, and this is how the requirements of due consideration of a legitimate expectation forms part of the principle of nonarbitrariness. 70.11. The scope of judicial review in respect of disputes falling within the domain of contractual obligations may be more limited and in doubtful cases the parties may be relegated to adjudication of their rights by resort to remedies provided for adjudication of purely contractual disputes. 71. Keeping in mind the aforesaid principles and after considering the arguments of respective parties, we are of the view that on the facts of the present case, it is not a fit case where the High Court should have exercised discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. First, the matter is in the realm of pure contract. It is not a case where any statutory contract is awarded.” Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Joshi Technologies International Inc. First, the matter is in the realm of pure contract. It is not a case where any statutory contract is awarded.” Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Joshi Technologies International Inc. vs. Union of India (supra) and for the reasons mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, this Court holds that the present case is not a fit case where this Court is required to exercise its original, extraordinary and discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, hence the present petition is devoid of any merit. 30. At this juncture, it would be relevant to delve upon the law pertaining to the alternative remedy available to the petitioner. The State of Bihar has enacted the Bihar Public Works Contracts Disputes Arbitration Tribunal Act, 2008, Sections 8, 9 and 22 whereof are reproduced herein below: – “8. Act to be in addition to Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996. – Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, and of the provisions shall be in addition to and supplemental to Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 and in case any of the provision contained herein is construed to be in conflict with Arbitration Act, then the latter Act shall prevail to the extent of conflict. 9. Reference to Tribunal and making of award. – (1) Where any dispute arises between the parties to the contract, either party shall, irrespective of whether such contract contains an arbitration clause or not refer, within one year from the date on which the dispute has arisen, such dispute in writing to the Tribunal for arbitration in such form and accompanied by such documents or other evidence and by such fees, as may be prescribed. (2) On receipt of a reference under sub-section (10), the Tribunal may, if satisfied after such inquiry as it may deem fit to make, that the requirements under this Act in relation to the reference are complied with, admit such reference and where the Tribunal is not so satisfied, it may reject the reference summarily. (3) Where the Tribunal admits the reference under sub-section (2), it shall, after recording evidence if necessary, and after perusal of the material on record and on affording and opportunity to the parties to submit their argument, make an award or an interim award, giving its reasons therefor. (3) Where the Tribunal admits the reference under sub-section (2), it shall, after recording evidence if necessary, and after perusal of the material on record and on affording and opportunity to the parties to submit their argument, make an award or an interim award, giving its reasons therefor. (4) The Tribunal shall use all reasonable dispatch in entering on and proceeding with the reference admitted by it and making the award, and an endeavour shall be made to make an award within four months from the date on which the Tribunal had admitted the reference. (5) The award including the interim award made by the Tribunal shall, subject to an order, if any made under Section 12 or 13, be final and binding on the parties to the dispute. (6) An award including an interim award as confirmed or varied by an order, if any, made under Section 12 or 13 shall be deemed to be a decree within the meaning of Section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 of the principal Court of original jurisdiction within the local limits whereof the award or the interim award has been made and shall be executed accordingly. *** 22. Overriding effect of this Act. – Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, rule, order, scheme, or contract agreement entered into before or after commencement of this Act, any dispute as defined in Section 2(e) of this Act shall be regulated under the provisions of this Act, Rules and Regulations framed thereunder, and absence of arbitration clause in any contract agreement shall not have effect excluding any dispute from the purview of this Act.” 31. It would be apt to refer to a judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a case reported in (2018) 17 SCC 444 [: 2019 (1) BLJ 422 (SC)] (State of Bihar vs. Brahmaputra Infrastructure Ltd.), paragraphs no. 1 and 3 to 5 whereof are reproduced herein below: – “1. Leave granted. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The State is aggrieved by the appointment of arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the Central Act) on the ground that the said Act is excluded by the Bihar Public Works Contracts Disputes Arbitration Tribunal Act, 2008 (Bihar Act 21 of 2008) (the State Act). 3. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The State is aggrieved by the appointment of arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the Central Act) on the ground that the said Act is excluded by the Bihar Public Works Contracts Disputes Arbitration Tribunal Act, 2008 (Bihar Act 21 of 2008) (the State Act). 3. It is not in dispute that the parties have executed agreement dated 22.6.2012, providing for appointment of an arbitrator as per provisions of the Central Act. Relevant portion of Clause 25 of the said agreement is as follows: “The arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) or any statutory modification or re-enactment thereof and the rules made there under and for the time being in force shall apply to the arbitration proceeding under the clause.” 4. The scheme of Sections 8, 9 and 22 of the State Act shows that in the absence of an agreement stipulating the applicability of the Central Act, the State Act applies to works contracts. Since in the present cases, an arbitration agreement exists and stipulates applicability of the Central Act, the State Act will not apply. We, thus, do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned order. 5. The appeals are dismissed. It will, however, be open to the appellant State to move the High Court for change of arbitrator, if a case to this effect is made out on an objection of neutrality, as submitted by the learned counsel for the State.” 32. This Court further finds it profitable to refer to a judgment rendered by this Court, reported in AIR 2019 Patna 145 [: 2019 (4) BLJ 152] (Kamladitya Construction Pvt. Ltd. vs State of Bihar & Ors.), paragraphs no. 10 to 13 whereof are reproduced herein below: – “10. This Court further finds it profitable to refer to a judgment rendered by this Court, reported in AIR 2019 Patna 145 [: 2019 (4) BLJ 152] (Kamladitya Construction Pvt. Ltd. vs State of Bihar & Ors.), paragraphs no. 10 to 13 whereof are reproduced herein below: – “10. Thus, from a bare reading of the aforesaid judgment rendered in the case of Nilkamal Ltd. (supra), it is apparent that firstly in the present case pertaining to the State of Bihar, the Bihar Public Works Contract Dispute Arbitration Act, 2008 was not reserved for the asset of a President of India, hence, the same has not received the asset of the President of India, as provided for under Article 254 of the Constitution of India, secondly it is clear that in case of conflict between the State Act and the Central Act, Central Act would prevail in view of Section 8 of the Bihar Public Works Contract Dispute Arbitration Act, 2008, thirdly, only in cases where the agreement in between the parties is silent with regard to the arbitration being conducted in accordance with the provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 or in case there is specific stipulation of resolution of the dispute by reference to the State Tribunal, the parties would have a forum of Tribunal under the Bihar State Act, 2008 for resolution of the dispute. 11. 11. The aforesaid view expressed by the judgment dated 17.10.2014 rendered by this Court in the case of Nilkamal Ltd. (supra) was also expressed in a judgment dated 29.3.2017 passed in Request Case No. 45 of 2017 (M/s Brahmaputra Infrastructure Ltd. vs. The State of Bihar & Ors.), following the law laid down in the case of Nilkamal Ltd. (supra), however, the State Government had challenged the aforesaid judgment dated 29.3.2017 before the Hon'ble Apex Court and the Hon'ble Apex Court, by the aforesaid judgment dated 22.3.2018 has upheld the view taken by this Court in the case of Nilkamal Ltd. (supra) as also has upheld the judgment dated 29.3.2017 passed in the case of M/s Brahmaputra Infrastructure Ltd. (supra) by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court and has held that in cases where arbitration agreement exists and stipulates applicability of the Central Act, the Bihar Act, 2008 will not apply, however, in absence of an agreement stipulating the applicability of the Central Act, the Bihar Act, 2008 will apply to the works contract. This Court finds that there is no inconsistency in the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court dated 22.3.2018 passed in the case of Brahmaputra Infrastructure Ltd. (supra) and the one dated 8.3.2018 passed in the case of M.P. Rural Road Development Authority & Anr. vs. L.G. Chaudhary Engineers and Contractors, inasmuch as both the judgments are based on the provisions of the State Act of both the respective States as also have been rendered considering the fact that the M.P. Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 has received the presidential assent whereas the Bihar Public Works Contract Dispute Arbitration Act, 2008 has not received presidential assent. 12. In any view of the matter, judicial propriety and judicial discipline requires this Court to follow the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in identical matters and since the Hon'ble Apex Court by the aforesaid judgment dated 22.3.2018, rendered in the case of M/s Brahmaputra Infrastructure Ltd. (supra) has authoritatively laid down the law to be followed with regard to the recourse to be taken in case such as the present one, especially in paragraph-5 thereof, which has already been reproduced herein above in the preceding paragraph, the same is required to be followed in the present case as well. 13. 13. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of M/s Brahmputra Infrastructure Ltd. (supra), it is held that since the agreement in question dated 26.2.2015, governed by the provisions of the Standard Bidding document and Clause-25 of the General Condition of contract, provides for settlement of dispute and arbitration to be conducted in terms of the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the Bihar Public Works Contract Dispute Arbitration Act, 2008 will not apply and the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 will apply. Therefore, since the parties have agreed to resolve the disputes amongst them by taking recourse to the remedy available under Clause-25 of the agreement, i.e in terms of the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, this Court deems it fit and proper to recall the order dated 4.10.2018 passed in CWJC No. 19802 of 2018, whereby and whereunder the petitioner was directed to move the Bihar Public Works Contract Disputes Arbitration Tribunal, and grants liberty to the petitioner to take recourse to appropriate remedy available under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for appointment of an Arbitrator for resolving the dispute, which has arisen in between the parties. It is directed accordingly.” 33. A bare reading of the provisions of the aforesaid Bihar Public Works Contracts Disputes Arbitration Tribunal Act, 2008 as also taking into account the judgments rendered in the case of Brahmputra Infrastructure Limited (supra) and Kamladitya Construction Private Limited (supra), this Court is of the view that in absence of an agreement stipulating about reference of disputes to arbitration as per the Central Act i.e. the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, the aforesaid State Act would apply for the purposes of settlement of the disputes, hence the petitioner definitely has alternative remedy by way of approaching the Bihar Public Works Contracts Disputes Arbitration Tribunal, Patna for resolution/redressal of his disputes/grievances, emanating from the agreement/contract in question. Thus this Court finds that the submissions made by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner to the effect that there is no alternative remedy available to the petitioner save and except approaching this Hon’ble Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, does not merit any consideration inasmuch as the petitioner has got, not only the remedy of approaching the appropriate civil court of competent jurisdiction by filing a civil suit, but also the remedy of approaching the Bihar Public Works Contracts Disputes Arbitration Tribunal, Patna. As far as the issue of forfeiture of earnest money deposit and security deposit is concerned, this Court finds that such forfeiture is a consequential outcome/fallout of the termination of the agreement/contract in question, by the impugned order dated 17.05.2018, in terms of clause 3(a) of the clauses of contract, forming part of the general conditions of contract as also forming part of the agreement dated 31.07.2015, entered into between the IDA and the petitioner herein, which specifically provides that upon determination or rescission of the contract, the earnest money deposit, security deposit and the performance guarantee amount under the contract shall be liable to be forfeited. This Court thus finds that the forfeiture of earnest money/security deposit of the petitioner firm is a sequel to the termination of the agreement in question, hence its validity would be contingent to the adjudication and final verdict of the appropriate authority/court/tribunal, regarding the correctness of the order of termination dated 17.05.2018. In any view of the matter, this Court has taken note of the fact that by the show cause notice dated 26.07.2017, the petitioner firm was also called upon to file his reply to the show cause notice on the issue as to why action be not taken for recovery of various amounts. 34. In any view of the matter, this Court has taken note of the fact that by the show cause notice dated 26.07.2017, the petitioner firm was also called upon to file his reply to the show cause notice on the issue as to why action be not taken for recovery of various amounts. 34. Now, coming to the last issue raised by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner i.e. regarding blacklisting of the petitioner firm being illegal on the ground that the Executive Engineer was not empowered to issue show cause notice regarding blacklisting of the firm, it would suffice to state that the issue regarding validity of the show cause notice dated 26.07.2017 has already been discussed herein above in the preceding paragraphs and this Court has already concluded that the same does not merit any consideration, hence this Court finds that the petitioner has failed to show any procedural irregularity/illegality much less non-compliance of the principles of natural justice so as to warrant interference in the order of blacklisting of the petitioner herein for three years. The fact remains that a coordinate Bench of this Court by an earlier order dated 14.03.2018 passed in CWJC No. 13601 of 2017 had empowered the Director (P & I), IDA to pass orders afresh, and accordingly the said authority has passed the impugned order dated 17.05.2018. This Court further finds that the respondents IDA, after complying with the necessary procedure for framing of the contractors’ guidelines had formulated the Infrastructure Development Authority Contractors Guidelines, 2009, which have been approved by the Board of Director of IDA in pursuance to the power vested in it by virtue of Regulation-7 of Schedule-II of the IDA (Financial, Service & Technical) Regulation, 2007. Clause-10 of the said IDA Contractors Guidelines, 2009 contain the provisions regarding blacklisting and suspension and as per clause-10 (c) thereof, the officer who is competent to register the Contractor, has been authorized to pass the order of blacklisting/suspension. Therefore, in the present case, since the petitioner has been registered as class-I Contractor with the IDA by the Director (P & I), IDA and the impugned order of blacklisting dated 17.05.2018 has been passed by the said Director (P & I), IDA, the said authority was/is fully empowered and competent to have passed the blacklisting order, hence the same is impregnable. It is another matter that though under clause 10(d), the petitioner has a right to assail the blacklisting order within 30 days of passing of the same before the Managing Director, IDA, it has failed to avail the said remedy of Appeal. In any view of the matter, this Court would desist from making any comment on the merits of the case inasmuch as the same may prejudice the rights of the petitioner before the appropriate forum/court/tribunal. 35. In view of the discussions made herein above, this Court finds that the judgments referred to by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner and noted herein above are merely academic and not relevant in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 36. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case and for the reasons mentioned herein above in the preceding paragraphs, I do not find any merit in the present writ petition, hence the same stands dismissed, however, with liberty to the petitioner to avail such other appropriate remedies as are available to it under the law.