JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri Anil Kumar Bajpai, learned counsel for applicant and learned AGA for State of U.P. None appeared on behalf of complainant despite the case having been called in revise. Since it is an old matter, hence, I proceed to decide this application after hearing aforesaid counsels. 2. Application No. 12606 of 2004 has been filed under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as "Cr.P.C.") by accused-applicant Mahesh Chandra Maheshwari with a prayer to quash summoning order dated 21.11.2000 and another order dated 15.11.2004 whereby objection filed by accused-applicant against order of summoning has been rejected. 3. Facts, in brief, giving rise to the Application No. 12606 of 2004 are that M/s Bhadohi Urban Co-operative Bank Limited (hereinafter referred to as “Co-operative Bank”) advanced a loan to applicant for a running medical shop. In discharge of aforesaid loan, applicant issued cheques No. 823486 and 823487 dated 29.03.2007 for Rs.50,000/-, each, in favour of Co-operative Bank drawn on Union Bank of India, Varanasi. Cheques were deposited by Co-operative Bank for collection on 24.08.2000 but Union Bank returned the same vide Memo dated 24.08.2000 with the remark that fund was insufficient in the account of applicant. In substance, both cheques were dishonoured. Notice was given by Co-operative Bank to applicant on 06.09.2000 which was returned on 14.09.2000 as unclaimed. Complaint was filed by Co-operative Bank on 31.10.2000 whereafter Magistrate recorded statements of complainant and witnesses under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. and summoned accused-applicant for trial for an offence under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1881”). Accused-applicant filed objection to the summoning order dated 21.11.2000 on the ground that he has nothing to do with M/s Hedes Multi Facets since he is not the proprietor of the said firm and as per address given, there existed a firm in the name of Maheshwari & Maheshwari since 1975 which is a joint family business and accused-applicant is not the owner of said firm also. He further said that he had not taken any loan from Co-operative Bank in his name. He further said that he had not taken any loan from Co-operative Bank in his name. Loan, in fact was advanced to one Ajita Prasad Pandey son of late Kailash Nath Pandey, resident of village Bhawanipur, Police Station Gopi Ganj, District Ravidas Nagar who has taken loan by forging documents in the name of applicant and, therefore, applicant is not liable to pay any amount. He also raised objection that complaint was not maintainable having been filed by Assistant Manager who was not authorized by any Letter of Authorization or Resolution of Board of Directors of Co-operative Bank. He also contended that proceedings were initiated beyond the period prescribed under Section 138(b) of Act, 1881, inasmuch as, dishonoured cheques were returned to complainant on 24.08.2000, notice was issued on 06.09.2000 which was received back unclaimed on 14.09.2000 but complaint was filed on 31.10.2000, hence, it was barred by period of limitation prescribed under Section 142(b) of Act, 1881. 4. Said objection was rejected by Chief Judicial Magistrate concerned vide order dated 15.10.2004. Sri Bajpai, placed reliance on a Supreme Court's judgment in M/s Sil Import USA Vs. M/s Exim Aides Silk Exporters, Banglore 1999 (4) SCC 567 in support of his contention that complaint is barred by time. 5. In the connected case i.e. Application No. 12605 of 2004, similar complaint has been filed wherein also summoning order was issued on 21.11.2000 and objection of accused-applicant was rejected on 15.10.2004. Here, in connected case, cheque no. 823489 dated 30.03.2000 was issued for a sum of Rs.2,60,000/- which was returned by Union Bank of India with the remark that fund was insufficient in the account of applicant vide Memo dated 25.08.2000. Here also, notice was issued by complainant on 06.09.2000 which was returned unclaimed on 14.09.2000 and complaint was filed on 31.10.2000. 6. Sri Anil Kumar Bajpai, learned counsel appearing in both the matters, states that complaints were filed beyond the period prescribed under Section 142(b) of Act, 1881, therefore, are not maintainable. Since both the matters can be considered together and Sri Bajpai, has advanced submissions on this aspect collectively, hence, both are being decided by this common judgment. 7. 6. Sri Anil Kumar Bajpai, learned counsel appearing in both the matters, states that complaints were filed beyond the period prescribed under Section 142(b) of Act, 1881, therefore, are not maintainable. Since both the matters can be considered together and Sri Bajpai, has advanced submissions on this aspect collectively, hence, both are being decided by this common judgment. 7. To consider the question of limitation as argued by learned counsel for applicant, Sections 138 and 142 of Act, 1881, as existed then i.e. on 31.10.2000, are relevant, hence, both are reproduced as under:- “138 Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account. —Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provisions of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may be extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both: Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless— (a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier; (b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. Explanation.— For the purposes of this section, “debt or other liability” means a legally enforceable debt or other liability.” “142 Cognizance of offences — Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)- (a) no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque; (b) such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138. (c) no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable under section 138.” (Emphasis added) 8. As per complaint, following dates are relevant: Date Events 24.08.2000 Cheques were submitted for collection by complainant-Co-operative Bank. 24.08.2000 Union Bank of India, Main Branch, Varanasi vide Memo of date informed Bombay Mercantile Co-operative Bank Limited, Nai Sadak, Varanasi that sufficient funds are not available in the account of applicant. .. M/s Bombay Mercantile Co-operative Bank Limited, Nai Sadak, Varanasi thereafter returned said cheques unpaid to Co-operative Bank. 06.09.2000 Registered notice sent to applicant demanding amount of dishonoured cheque after informing the factum of dishonouring of cheques by Union Bank of India. 14.09.2000 Notice received unclaimed from Postal Department by Co-operative Bank. 15.09.2000 Complainant informed applicant orally also about non-payment of cheque by Bank and demanded money. 31.10.2000 Complaint filed in the Court of Judicial Magistrate Ist, Gyanpur, Bhadohi registered as Criminal Case No. 435 of 2000 and 436 of 2000. 9. Section 138, proviso, Clause (a) of Act, 1881 is apparently satisfied. Cheques were presented to Union Bank within valid period for its collection. Notice required to be issued for demand vide proviso Clause (b) of Section 138 of Act, 1881 within 15 days of receipt of information from Bank regarding return of cheques as unpaid was also given. The date of notice is 06.09.2000. Thus, aforesaid requirement is also satisfied and notice was issued within the period prescribed in Clause (b), proviso to Section 138 of Act, 1881. Now, Clause (c) proviso to Section 138 of Act, 1881 gives 15 days' time from the date of receipt of notice by addressee to make payment. 10. In the present case, notice returned unclaimed and received by complainant on 14.09.2000. Now, Clause (c) proviso to Section 138 of Act, 1881 gives 15 days' time from the date of receipt of notice by addressee to make payment. 10. In the present case, notice returned unclaimed and received by complainant on 14.09.2000. If this date is taken to be due service of notice by accused-applicant then 15 days' time would expire on 29.09.2000. 11. In K. Bhaskaran Vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan and Others 1999 (7) SCC 510 , it was held that if a notice is returned by sender as unclaimed, such date would be commencing date in reckoning the period of 15 days contemplated in Clause (c) to proviso of Section 138 of Act, 1881. Since payment could have been made upto 29.09.2000 but when it is not made, cause of action arose on 30.09.2000. 12. The term “month” has not been defined in Act, 1881 but it is defined in Section 3(35) of General Clauses Act, 1897 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1897”)and reads as under:- “(35) “month” shall mean a month reckoned according to the British calendar.” (Emphasis added) 13. The definition of “month” in Act, 1897, therefore, talks of a month of British Calendar i.e. January, February etc. 14. There are 12 months in a British Calendar wherein 7 months have 31 days; 4 months have 30 days and one month has 28 days except leap year when it has 29 days. Therefore, number of days in the month varies. 15. Thus, one aspect is “whether it should be number of days or corresponding month irrespective of number of days which has to be taken for the purpose of Section 142(b) of Act, 1881”. Secondly, “if it is number of days i.e. 30 or 31 then whether it will include the day when cause of action has arisen”. For example, if we take 30 days by including the date of cause of action, it will expire on 29.10.2000 but if we take it 31 days then it will expire on 30.10.2000. Secondly, “if it is number of days i.e. 30 or 31 then whether it will include the day when cause of action has arisen”. For example, if we take 30 days by including the date of cause of action, it will expire on 29.10.2000 but if we take it 31 days then it will expire on 30.10.2000. However, if the date of cause of action is excluded then period of month will commence from 01.10.2000 and if it goes with the definition of month in Act, 1897 then 31.10.2000 was well within the period of one month as contemplated under Section 142(b) of Act, 1881 but if it is taken to be 30 days, it will be contrary to term “month” since legislature has not mentioned days but it has used the term “month”. 16. In this backdrop, I would proceed to consider first “whether for computing period of limitation under Section 142(b), the date when cause of action arose in the present case i.e. 30.09.2000 would be included or not”. 17. Counsel for applicant has relied on a Supreme Court's judgment in M/s Sil Import USA (supra) which obviously supports his submission but I find that this question was later considered by a Larger Bench in ECON Antri Ltd. Vs. Rom Industries Ltd. and Others 2014 (11) SCC 769 ; Since there was another decision taking contrary view in Saketh India Limited and Others Vs. India Securities Limited 1999 (3) SCC 1 , therefore, reference was made for considering correctness of aforesaid judgment by a Larger Bench and it was considered by a Bench of three Judges in ECON Antri Ltd. (supra). 18. Upholding view taken in Saketh India Limited and Others (supra), Larger Bench said, where a particular time is given from a certain date within which act has to be done, the day of the date of cause of action is to be excluded. 19. Consequently, Larger Bench held that M/s Sil Import USA (supra) does not lay down correct law and upheld view taken in Saketh India Limited and Others (supra). Para-25 of ECON Antri Ltd. (supra) reads as under:- “25. Having considered the question of law involved in this case in proper perspective, in light of relevant judgments, we are of the opinion that Saketh lays down the correct proposition of law. Para-25 of ECON Antri Ltd. (supra) reads as under:- “25. Having considered the question of law involved in this case in proper perspective, in light of relevant judgments, we are of the opinion that Saketh lays down the correct proposition of law. We hold that for the purpose of calculating the period of one month, which is prescribed under Section 142(b) of the N.I. Act, the period has to be reckoned by excluding the date on which the cause of action arose. We hold that SIL Import USA does not lay down the correct law. Needless to say that any decision of this Court which takes a view contrary to the view taken in Saketh by this Court, which is confirmed by us, do not lay down the correct law on the question involved in this reference. The reference is answered accordingly. ” (Emphasis added) 20. Learned counsel for applicant in the present case has relied on a judgment which has already been overruled by Supreme Court. In my view, this is an attempt to mislead the Court. It was not expected from a counsel of such a long standing that he would cite an overruled judgment. 21. Be that as it may, since complaint in the present case, was filed within one month i.e. October, 2000, after excluding 30.09.2000, the day when cause of action arose, it cannot be said that complaint is ex-facie barred by time provided in Section 142(b) of Act, 1881. 22. No other point has been argued. 23. Accordingly, both the applications are hereby rejected. 24. Interim orders, if any, stand vacated.