JUDGMENT : S. Manikumar, J. Instant writ appeal is filed against the judgment in W.P(C). No.15233 of 2017 dated 19.11.2019, by which the writ court declined to issue a writ of mandamus and directed M/s. India Info line Finance Ltd., respondent No.2, to release/handover possession of the vehicle BHARAT BARZ 1217C bearing registration No.KL-40 L-7178 to the petitioner forthwith. Writ court further declined to issue any direction to the Regional Transport Officer, respondent No.5, not to transfer registration of the vehicle in favour of respondent No.2, or any person working for it. Further direction sought was for directing the Station House Officer, respondent No.1, to take necessary measures for restoring possession of the vehicle BHARAT BARZ 1217C bearing registration No.KL-40 L-7178 to the petitioner. 2. Though the appellant has sought for the above directions, holding that the final award dated 13.04.2017 has to be challenged only before the court of competent jurisdiction and that when an alternate remedy is available, writ petition under Article 226 is not maintainable, writ petition has been dismissed. Being aggrieved, instant appeal is filed. 3. Short facts leading to appeal are as under : Petitioner is the registered owner of the vehicle BHARAT BARZ 1217C bearing registration No.KL-40 L-7178. He availed a vehicle loan from the 2nd respondent finance company and hypothecated the vehicle for the loan amount. After obtaining Exhibit-P2 order under Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, behind the back of the petitioner, M/s. India Info line Finance Ltd., respondent No.2, took possession of the above said vehicle with the aid of the Station House Officer, Malappuram, respondent No.1, and the Receiver appointed by 3rd respondent, the sole Arbitrator. According to the petitioner, he is aggrieved by the interim order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal and enforced without following the procedure under the Code of Civil Procedure. Petitioner has already remitted Rs.7.5 lakhs towards the total amount of Rs.13 lakhs and the term of loan is also not over. The 2nd respondent has collusively and clandestinely obtained an order from the 3rd respondent, that too, without serving any notice to the petitioner. The 2nd respondent has already taken possession of the vehicle through the receiver appointed by the 3rd respondent, with the aid of police. The 2nd respondent has collusively and clandestinely obtained an order from the 3rd respondent, that too, without serving any notice to the petitioner. The 2nd respondent has already taken possession of the vehicle through the receiver appointed by the 3rd respondent, with the aid of police. Possession of the vehicle by enforcing the order of Arbitral Tribunal without intervention of the Civil Court, has to be treated as violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The 2nd respondent is also proceeding to obtain fresh R.C for the said vehicle through their agents from the 5th respondent. In the above circumstances, the petitioner left with no other alternative remedy other than to approach this Court to restore possession of the vehicle to him and to prevent the Regional Transport Officer, Perumbavoor, respondent No.5, from issuing fresh R.C. Book for the vehicle belonging to the petitioner, who had remitted his hard earned money for the same, has filed the writ petition. 4. Instant appeal is filed on the grounds, inter alia, that the learned single Judge has omitted to consider the established legal position that action of any authority, which is ultravires, can always be questioned before this Court by taking recourse to Article 226 of the Constitution of India, notwithstanding the availability of an alternative remedy. 5. Going through the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, we deem it fit to consider a few provisions, which are extracted hereunder: “Section 5 states: 5. Extent of judicial intervention.-Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, in matters governed by this Part, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this Part. Section 37 states: 37. Appealable orders.- (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders (and from no others) to the Court authorized by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order, namely: (a) refusing to refer the parties to arbitration Under Section 8; (b) granting or refusing to grant any measure Under Section 9; (c) setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award Under Section 34. (2) An appeal shall also lie in a Court from an order granting of the arbitral tribunal.- (a) accepting the plea referred in Sub-section (2) or Sub-section (3) or Section 16; or (b) granting or refusing to grant an interim measure Under Section 17. (2) An appeal shall also lie in a Court from an order granting of the arbitral tribunal.- (a) accepting the plea referred in Sub-section (2) or Sub-section (3) or Section 16; or (b) granting or refusing to grant an interim measure Under Section 17. (3) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under this section, but nothing in this Section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.” 6. Though Mr. V.A. Ajmal, learned counsel for the appellant, has submitted that the impugned judgment is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, writ petition itself is maintainable, we are not in agreement with the said submission for the reason that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically held that writ petition challenging an award is not maintainable. Reliance placed on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal [ (2014) 1 SCC 603 ], is a general proposition of law, but on the very same issue, as to whether an Arbitral Award could be challenged in a writ petition, the Hon'ble apex Court in SBP & Co v. Patel Engineering Ltd. & Anr reported in AIR 2006 SC 450 , at paragraphs 44 and 45, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as follows: “44. It is seen that some High Courts have proceeded on the basis that any order passed by an arbitral tribunal during arbitration, would be capable of being challenged under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. We see no warrant for such an approach. Section 37 makes certain orders of the arbitral tribunal appealable. Under Section 34, the aggrieved party has an avenue for ventilating his grievances against the award including any in-between orders that might have been passed by the arbitral tribunal acting under Section 16 of the Act. The party aggrieved by any order of the arbitral tribunal, unless has a right of appeal under Section 37 of the Act, has to wait until the award is passed by the Tribunal. This appears to be the scheme of the Act. The arbitral tribunal is after all, the creature of a contract between the parties, the arbitration agreement, even though if the occasion arises, the Chief Justice may constitute it based on the contract between the parties. This appears to be the scheme of the Act. The arbitral tribunal is after all, the creature of a contract between the parties, the arbitration agreement, even though if the occasion arises, the Chief Justice may constitute it based on the contract between the parties. But that would not alter the status of the arbitral tribunal. It will still be a forum chosen by the parties by agreement. We, therefore, disapprove of the stand adopted by some of the High Courts that any order passed by the arbitral tribunal is capable of being corrected by the High Court under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. Such an intervention by the High Courts is not permissible. 45. The object of minimizing judicial intervention while the matter is in the process of being arbitrated upon, will certainly be defeated if the High Court could be approached under Article 227 of the Constitution of India or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against every order made by the arbitral tribunal. Therefore, it is necessary to indicate that once the arbitration has commenced in the arbitral tribunal, parties have to wait until the award is pronounced unless, of course, a right of appeal is available to them under Section 37 of the Act even at an earlier stage.” 7. That apart, Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 provides for Recourse Against Arbitral Awards. Section 34 reads as under: “34. Application for setting aside arbitral award. —(1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3). That apart, Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 provides for Recourse Against Arbitral Awards. Section 34 reads as under: “34. Application for setting aside arbitral award. —(1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3). (2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if— (a) the party making the application furnishes proof that— (i) a party was under some incapacity, or (ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law for the time being in force; or (iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or (iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration: Provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the arbitral award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or (v) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of this Part from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with this Part; or (b) the Court finds that— (i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law for the time being in force, or (ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India. “Explanation 1.—For the avoidance of any doubt, it is clarified that an award is in conflict with the public policy of India, only if,— (i) the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption or was in violation of section 75 or section 81; or (ii) it is in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law; or (iii) it is in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or justice. Explanation 2.—For the avoidance of doubt, the test as to whether there is a contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law shall not entail a review on the merits of the dispute. (2A) An arbitral award arising out of arbitrations other than international commercial arbitrations, may also be set aside by the Court, if the Court finds that the award is vitiated by patent illegality appearing on the face of the award: Provided that an award shall not be set aside merely on the ground of an erroneous application of the law or by reappreciation of evidence. (3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal: Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter. (4) On receipt of an application under sub-section (1), the Court may, where it is appropriate and it is so requested by a party, adjourn the proceedings for a period of time determined by it in order to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings or to take such other action as in the opinion of arbitral tribunal will eliminate the grounds for setting aside the arbitral award. “(5) An application under this section shall be filed by a party only after issuing a prior notice to the other party and such application shall be accompanied by an affidavit by the applicant endorsing compliance with the said requirement. (6) An application under this section shall be disposed of expeditiously, and in any event, within a period of one year from the date on which the notice referred to in sub-section (5) is served upon the other party.” 8. Besides, on the aspect of availability of alternative remedy under a Statute and approaching the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in a catena of decisions reiterated the legal position. Besides, on the aspect of availability of alternative remedy under a Statute and approaching the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in a catena of decisions reiterated the legal position. Few decisions of the Court declining to entertain a writ petition filed challenging awards are as hereunder: “(i) In Thansingh Nathmal v. Superintendent of Taxes ( AIR 1964 SC 1419 ), the Hon'ble Apex Court adverted to the rule of self-imposed restraint that the writ petition will not be entertained if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and observed as follows: "The High Court does not therefore act as a court of appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal, to correct errors of fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction under Article 226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided by statute for obtaining relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal, or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute, the High Court normally will not permit by entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the machinery created under the statute to be bypassed, and will leave the party applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set up." (ii) In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. and Another v. State of Orissa and Others [ (1983) 2 SCC 433 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: “It is now well recognised that where a right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute only must be availed of. This rule was stated with great clarity by Willes, J. in Wolverhampton New Water Works Co. v. Hawkesford, (1859) 6 CBNS 336 at p. 356 in the following passage: "There are three classes of cases in which a liability may be established founded upon statute.... But there is a third class, viz., where a liability not existing at common law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it .....the remedy provided by the statute must be followed, and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class. The form given by the statute must be adopted and adhered to." The rule laid down in this passage was approved by the House of Lords in Neville v. London Express Newspaper Ltd., 1919 AC 368: (1918-19) ALL ER Rep.61 (HL) and has been reaffirmed by the Privy Council in Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v. Gordon Grant and Co., 1935 AC 532 and Secretary of State v. Mask and Co., AIR 1940 PC 105 . It has also been held to be equally applicable to enforcement of rights, and has been followed by this Court throughout. The High Court was therefore justified in dismissing the writ petitions in limine.” (iii) In Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India [ (1997) 5 SCC 536 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus: “So far as the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art.226 -or for that matter, the jurisdiction for this Court under Art.32 - is concerned, it is obvious that the provisions of the Act cannot bar and curtail these remedies. It is, however, equally obvious that while exercising the power under Art.226/Art.32, the Court would certainly take note of the legislative intent manifested in the provisions of the Act and would exercise their jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of the enactment.” (iv) In Harbanslal Sahnia and Anr. v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and Anr. reported in AIR 2003 SC 2120 , Lahoti, J (as His Lordship then was), relied upon Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks ( AIR 1999 SC 22 ) observing that in an appropriate case, in spite of availability of the alternative remedy, the High Court may still exercise its jurisdiction in at least three contingencies : (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights: (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice; or (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. (v) In ABL International Ltd. and Anr. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Limited and Ors. reported in (2004) 3 SCC 553 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that in certain cases even a disputed question of fact be gone into by the court entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, held as follows: “28. (v) In ABL International Ltd. and Anr. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Limited and Ors. reported in (2004) 3 SCC 553 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that in certain cases even a disputed question of fact be gone into by the court entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, held as follows: “28. However, while entertaining an objection as to the maintainability of a writ petition under Art.226 of the Constitution of India, the court should bear in mind the fact that the power to issue prerogative writs under Art.226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provisions of the Constitution. The High Court having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. The Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions in the exercise of this power [See: Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Ors. [ 1998 (8) SCC 1 ]. And this plenary right of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ will not normally be exercised by the Court to the exclusion of other available remedies unless such action of the State or its instrumentality is arbitrary and unreasonable so as to violate the constitutional mandate of Art.14 or for other valid and legitimate reasons, for which the court thinks it necessary to exercise the said jurisdiction.” (vi) In M.D., Army Welfare Housing Organisation v. Sumangal Services Pvt. Ltd. ( AIR 2004 SC 1344 ), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus: “An Arbitral Tribunal is not a Court of law and its functions are not judicial functions and the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator being confined by the four-corners of the agreement, he passed only such an order which may be subject matter of reference.” (vii) A Hon'ble three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in State of H.P. And Ors. v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd. and Anr. ( AIR 2005 SC 3936 ), referring to Harbanslal Sahnia (supra) held as follows: “.........There are two well recognised exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of statutory remedies. v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd. and Anr. ( AIR 2005 SC 3936 ), referring to Harbanslal Sahnia (supra) held as follows: “.........There are two well recognised exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of statutory remedies. First is when the proceedings are taken before the forum under a provision of law which is ultra vires, it is open to a party aggrieved thereby to move the High Court for quashing the proceedings on the ground that they are incompetent without a party being obliged to wait until those proceedings run their full course. Secondly, the doctrine has no application when the impugned order has been made in violation of the principles of natural justice. We may add that where the proceedings itself are an abuse of process of law the High Court in an appropriate case can entertain a writ petition. 25. Where under a statute there is an allegation of infringement of fundamental rights or when on the undisputed facts the taxing authorities are shown to have assumed jurisdiction which they do not possess can be the grounds on which the writ petitions can be entertained. But normally, the High Court should not entertain writ petitions unless it is shown that there is something more in a case, something going to the root of the jurisdiction of the officer, something which would show that it would be a case of palpable injustice to the writ petitioner to force him to adopt the remedies provided by the statute.” (viii) In S.B.P. & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. & Another, [ (2005) 8 SCC 618 ]. Hon'ble Supreme Court while interfering with an order passed by an Arbitral Tribunal under Article 226/227 of the Constitution held as follows:- “45. It is seen that some High Courts have proceeded on the basis that any order passed by an arbitral tribunal during arbitration, would be capable of being challenged under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution. We see no warrant for such an approach. Section 37 makes certain orders of the arbitral tribunal appealable. Under Section 34, the aggrieved party has an avenue for ventilating his grievances against the award including any in-between orders that might have been passed by the arbitral tribunal acting under Section 16 of the Act. We see no warrant for such an approach. Section 37 makes certain orders of the arbitral tribunal appealable. Under Section 34, the aggrieved party has an avenue for ventilating his grievances against the award including any in-between orders that might have been passed by the arbitral tribunal acting under Section 16 of the Act. The party aggrieved by any order of the arbitral tribunal, unless has a right of appeal under Section 37 of the Act, has to wait until the award is passed by the Tribunal. This appears to be the scheme of the Act. The arbitral tribunal is, after all, a creature of a contract between the parties, the arbitration agreement, even though, if the occasion arises, the Chief Justice may constitute it based on the contract between the parties. But that would not alter the status of the arbitral tribunal. It will still be a forum chosen by the parties by agreement. We, therefore, disapprove of the stand adopted by some of the High Courts that any order passed by the arbitral tribunal is capable of being corrected by the High Court under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution. Such an intervention by the High Courts is not permissible. 46. The object of minimizing judicial intervention while the matter is in the process of being arbitrated upon, will certainly be defeated if the High Court could be approached under Article 227 of the Constitution of India or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against every order made by the arbitral tribunal. Therefore, it is necessary to indicate that once the arbitration has commenced in the arbitral tribunal, parties have to wait until the award is pronounced unless, of course, a right of appeal is available to them under Section 37 of the Act even at an earlier stage.” (emphasis supplied) (ix) In Nivedita Sharma v. Cellular Operators Association of India and Others [(2011) 14 SCC 337], the Hon'ble Supreme Court after referring to several judgments, held thus: “11. We have considered the respective arguments/ submissions. We have considered the respective arguments/ submissions. There cannot be any dispute that the power of the High Courts to issue directions, orders or writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto and prohibition under Article 226 of the Constitution is a basic feature of the Constitution and cannot be curtailed by parliamentary legislation -L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261 . However, it is one thing to say that in exercise of the power vested in it under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court can entertain a writ petition against any order passed by or action taken by the State and/or its agency/instrumentality or any public authority or order passed by a quasi-judicial body/authority, and it is an altogether different thing to say that each and every petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution must be entertained by the High Court as a matter of course ignoring the fact that the aggrieved person has an effective alternative remedy. Rather, it is settled law that when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation.” (x) In Dilip Kumar and Ors. v. The Union of India and Ors. (11.09.2018 -PATNAHC) : MANU/BH/2171/2018, the High court of Patna held as follows: “Sub-section 7 of Section 20-F of the Railways Act, 1989 provides that the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is applicable in every arbitration under the Act. Further, under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, there is provision to challenge the award of the Arbitrator before the Court. Therefore, apparently, the petitioners have got statutory remedy. Moreover, the Writ Court cannot go into the disputed question of fact as to whether the land is residential or commercial nor the Writ Court can enter into appreciation of evidence in this regard. Hence, this writ application is devoid of any merit. Therefore, apparently, the petitioners have got statutory remedy. Moreover, the Writ Court cannot go into the disputed question of fact as to whether the land is residential or commercial nor the Writ Court can enter into appreciation of evidence in this regard. Hence, this writ application is devoid of any merit. Accordingly, it stands disposed of with liberty to the petitioners to approach the appropriate forum under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, if so advised within the time of limitation, which shall be counted from the date of this order.” (emphasis supplied) (xi) In Deep Industries Limited v. Oil And Natural Gas Corporation [(2019) 17 SCALE 85], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: “Given the aforesaid statutory provision (Section 5 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996.) and given the fact that the 1996 Act repealed three previous enactments in order that there be speedy disposal of all matters covered by it, it is clear that the statutory policy of the Act is that not only are time limits set down for disposal of the arbitral proceedings themselves but time limits have also been set down for Section 34 references to be decided. Most significant of all is the non-obstante clause contained in Section 5 which states that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, in matters that arise under Part I of the Arbitration Act, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this Part. Section 37 grants a constricted right of first appeal against certain judgments and orders and no others. Further, the statutory mandate also provides for one bite at the cherry, and interdicts a second appeal being filed (See Section 37(2) of the Act). This being the case, there is no doubt whatsoever that if petitions were to be filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution against orders passed in appeals under Section 37, the entire arbitral process would be derailed and would not come to fruition for many years. At the same time, we cannot forget that Article 227 is a constitutional provision which remains untouched by the non-obstante clause of Section 5 of the Act. At the same time, we cannot forget that Article 227 is a constitutional provision which remains untouched by the non-obstante clause of Section 5 of the Act. In these circumstances, what is important to note is that though petitions can be filed under Article 227 against judgments allowing or dismissing first appeals under Section 37 of the Act, yet the High Court would be extremely circumspect in interfering with the same, taking into account the statutory policy as adumbrated by us herein above so that interference is restricted to orders that are passed which are patently lacking in inherent jurisdiction.” 9. In the case of special enactment like the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore and Another v. Mathew K.C. reported in (2018) 3 SCC 85 , at paragraphs 15 to 18, held as follows: “15. It is the solemn duty of the Court to apply the correct law without waiting for an objection to be raised by a party, especially when the law stands well settled. Any departure, if permissible, has to be for reasons discussed, of the case falling under a defined exception, duly discussed after noticing the relevant law. In financial matters grant of ex-parte interim orders can have a deleterious effect and it is not sufficient to say that the aggrieved has the remedy to move for vacating the interim order. Loans by financial institutions are granted from public money generated at the tax payers expense. Such loan does not become the property of the person taking the loan, but retains its character of public money given in a fiduciary capacity as entrustment by the public. Timely repayment also ensures liquidity to facilitate loan to another in need, by circulation of the money and cannot be permitted to be blocked by frivolous litigation by those who can afford the luxury of the same. The caution required, as expressed in Union Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon [ (2010) 8 SCC 110 ], has also not been kept in mind before passing the impugned interim order: "46. It must be remembered that stay of an action initiated by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities for recovery of taxes, cess, fees, etc. The caution required, as expressed in Union Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon [ (2010) 8 SCC 110 ], has also not been kept in mind before passing the impugned interim order: "46. It must be remembered that stay of an action initiated by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities for recovery of taxes, cess, fees, etc. seriously impedes execution of projects of public importance and disables them from discharging their constitutional and legal obligations towards the citizens. In cases relating to recovery of the dues of banks, financial institutions and secured creditors, stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of such bodies/institutions, which (sic will) ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of the nation. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in such matters. Of course, if the petitioner is able to show that its case falls within any of the exceptions carved out in Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad ( AIR 1969 SC 556 ), Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks [ (1998) 8 SCC 1 , and Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. [ (2003) 2 SCC 107 , and some other judgments, then the High Court may, after considering all the relevant parameters and public interest, pass an appropriate interim order." 16. The writ petition ought not to have been entertained and the interim order granted for the mere asking without assigning special reasons, and that too without even granting opportunity to the Appellant to contest the maintainability of the writ petition and failure to notice the subsequent developments in the interregnum. The opinion of the Division Bench that the counter affidavit having subsequently been filed, stay/modification could be sought of the interim order cannot be considered sufficient justification to have declined interference. 17. We cannot help but disapprove the approach of the High Court for reasons already noticed in Dwarikesh Sugar Industries Ltd. v. Prem Heavy Engineering Works (P) Ltd. and Another, [ (1997) 6 SCC 450 ], observing: "32. 17. We cannot help but disapprove the approach of the High Court for reasons already noticed in Dwarikesh Sugar Industries Ltd. v. Prem Heavy Engineering Works (P) Ltd. and Another, [ (1997) 6 SCC 450 ], observing: "32. When a position, in law, is well settled as a result of judicial pronouncement of this Court, it would amount to judicial impropriety to say the least, for the subordinate Courts including the High Courts to ignore the settled decisions and then to pass a judicial order which is clearly contrary to the settled legal position. Such judicial adventurism cannot be permitted and we strongly deprecate the tendency of the subordinate Courts in not applying the settled principles and in passing whimsical orders which necessarily has the effect of granting wrongful and unwarranted relief to one of the parties. It is time that this tendency stops." 18. The impugned orders are therefore contrary to the law laid down by this Court under Art.141 of the Constitution and unsustainable. They are therefore set aside and the appeal is allowed.” 10. In ICICI Bank Ltd. v. Umakanta Mohapatra and Others reported in 2018 (13) SCALE 724, the Hon'ble Apex Court reaffirmed the legal position that High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, relating to matters coming under the purview of SARFAESI Act, 2002, where a statutory remedy is available by filing an application under Section 17 of the said Act. In the light of the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the aspect of alternative remedy, decisions holding that writ petition filed challenging an award is not maintainable, and the statutory provisions, extracted above, we hold that the writ petition seeking for a writ of mandamus is not maintainable in the absence of challenge to the award/order of the Arbitral Tribunal in the manner known to law. Accordingly, the writ appeal is dismissed.