JUDGMENT : A.P. THAKER, J. 1. The present appeal is preferred by the accused appellant who has been convicted by Additional Sessions Judge and 9th Fast Track Judge, Rajkot in Sessions Case No. 133 of 2004 whereby the accused came to be held guilty under Section 306, 498(A), 323 of the IPC. The sentence of rigorous imprisonment of 5 years and a fine of Rs. 1000/- and in default simple imprisonment of 2 months and, offence under Section 306, imprisonment of 2 years and fine of Rs. 500/- and in default simple imprisonment of one month for offence under Section 498(A) rigorous whereas no separate sentence has been passed for the offence under Section 323 of the IPC. 2. The brief facts of the prosecution case is that on 21.8.2004, the accused appellant has visited the house of the deceased and scolded the deceased as to why she has not prepared food and abused her which was disliked by the deceased and on account of use of abusive language by the accused, the deceased poured kerosene upon her and her 4 months daughter, due to which she succumbed to injuries on late night. It is the case of the prosecution that the deceased was brought to the hospital wherein the treatment was given and her FIR was registered by the concerned Police and dying declaration was also recorded by Executive Magistrate. 2.1 On the basis of such evidence, the investigation was started and the Investigating Officer has arrested the accused and recorded the statement of the neighbours and brother of the deceased as well as other witnesses and drawn panchnama. After having found the evidence against the accused, charge-sheet was filed before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class. 2.2 One of the offence being exclusively triable by the Sessions Judge, the learned Magistrate has committed the case to the Sessions Court, wherein, it was registered as Sessions Case No. 133 of 2004. 2.3 The learned Sessions Judge has framed charge against the accused at Exh.5. The accused has denied having committed of any offence and pleaded for trial. 2.2 One of the offence being exclusively triable by the Sessions Judge, the learned Magistrate has committed the case to the Sessions Court, wherein, it was registered as Sessions Case No. 133 of 2004. 2.3 The learned Sessions Judge has framed charge against the accused at Exh.5. The accused has denied having committed of any offence and pleaded for trial. 2.4 The prosecution has produce the following oral and documentary evidence to substantiate the charge, as under:- Oral Evidence: PW No. Name Relation Exhibit PW-1 Jaypalsinh Manubha Rickshaw driver-neighbour Exh.10 PW-2 Mayursinh Gambhirsinh Neighbour Exh.11 PW-3 Bipin Jamnadas Neighbour Exh.12 PW-4 Dawood Jalalbhai Neighbour Exh.13 PW-5 Harunsha Rehmansha Neighbour Exh.14 PW-6 Muktaben Devraj Rector Exh.15 Extract of Sishumangal Sanstha Exh.16 PW-7 Lalitbhai Virjibhai Brother of the deceased Exh.17 PW-8 Manglaben Batukbhai Neighbour Exh.18 PW-9 Harpalsinh Jagatsinh Neighbour Exh.19 PW-10 Dayalal Raghavbhai Medical Officer, Civil Hospital, Rajkot Exh.20 PW-11 Nirmalsinh Digvijaysinh Police Witness Exh.26 PW-12 Dayabhai Danabhai Police Witness Exh.28 PW-13 Hasmukh Bhaktiram Dy. Mamlatdar and Executive Magistrate Exh.31 PW-14 Dharmendrasinh Takhubha PSI Exh.40 Documentary Evidence: S. No. Documents Exhibit 1 Postmortem Note Exh.23 2 Cause of Death Certificate Exh.24 3 Medical Case papers Exh.25 4 Extract of Station Diary Exh.27 5 Extract of Station Diary Exh.29 6 Extract of Station Diary Exh.30 7 Dying Declaration Exh.33 8 PM Note Exh.35 9 Depute Order Exh.41 10 Complaint Exh.42 11 Report of Scientific Officer Exh.45 12 Panchnama of scene of incident Exh.55 13 Inquest Panchnama Exh.56 14 Inquest Panchnama Exh.58 15 Closing purshis Exh.60 3. After closure of the evidence of the prosecution, the learned trial Court has recorded the further statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. wherein, the accused has denied having committed any offence and taken the stand that the deceased was staying separately from her in-laws and she is innocent. 4. After hearing both the sides, ultimately the learned trial Court has passed the judgment of conviction and sentence as referred to hereinabove. 5. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said judgment the appellant-accused has preferred this Appeal. 6. Heard learned advocate Mr. Ashish Dagli for the Appellant and Ms. Jirga Jhaveri, learned APP for the State. Perused the material on record as well as citations cited at bar. 7. Learned advocate Mr. 5. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said judgment the appellant-accused has preferred this Appeal. 6. Heard learned advocate Mr. Ashish Dagli for the Appellant and Ms. Jirga Jhaveri, learned APP for the State. Perused the material on record as well as citations cited at bar. 7. Learned advocate Mr. Dagli for the appellant-accused has vehemently submitted that in this case, the independent witnesses have turned hostile and they have not supported the case of the prosecution as to the harassment being meted out by the present accused to the deceased. While referring to the evidence of oral witnesses, learned advocate has also submitted that there is consistent statement by the neighbours that the accused is residing separately from the house of the accused and there is a distance of 3½ km between their houses. While referring the FIR as well as dying declaration, it has been submitted by the learned advocate for the appellant that the same is not inspiring confidence and in view of the yadi sent to the Executive Magistrate there is an eraser on the point that the patient is unconscious. That the factum of lodging FIR as well as dying declaration by the deceased is doubtful. 8. Learned advocate has also invited the attention to evidence on record, and has submitted that there is no evidence regarding harassment and therefore the conviction as made by the learned trial Court is not sustainable in the eyes of law. The learned advocate has also submitted that in the present case the Doctor who has made the endorsement has not been examined by the prosecution and this fact also suggest that eraser made in the endorsement of doctor is creating doubt as to whether the patient was really conscious or not. He has also submitted that on reading of the evidence in entirety, it appears that there is no cogent evidence to connect the accused with the alleged offence under Section 498(A), 306 and 323 of the IPC. By relying on the following decisions, the learned advocate for the appellant submitted to set aside the impugned order of the trial Court. He has also submitted that on reading of the evidence in entirety, it appears that there is no cogent evidence to connect the accused with the alleged offence under Section 498(A), 306 and 323 of the IPC. By relying on the following decisions, the learned advocate for the appellant submitted to set aside the impugned order of the trial Court. In the alternative, he has submitted that if the Court comes to the conclusion that there is evidence under Section 498(A), then, in that case, considering the age of the accused and the fact that the son of the deceased is also looked after by the present accused, the sentence undergone by her may be considered as sufficient sentence. 9. He has prayed to pass order accordingly: (1) State of Gujarat vs. Bharatbhai Balubhai Lad and Others, (2006) 1 GLR 514 (2) Ramesh Kumar vs. State of Chhatisgarh, AIR 2001 SC 3837 (3) Swamy Prahladdas vs. State of M.P. and Another, 1995 Supp (3) SCC 438 10. Learned APP Ms. Jhaveri for the State has vehemently submitted that FIR and dying declaration of the deceased are trustworthy and the learned trial Court has properly appreciated the evidence on record and has not committed any error of facts and law in convicting the present accused. According to her submission, the impugned judgment of the learned trial Court is sustainable in the eyes of law and does not warrant any interference. 10.1 While referring to the deposition of the brother of the deceased, Rector and the Investigating Officer as well as the Executive Magistrate, she has submitted that there is consistency in facts narrated regarding the harassment given by the accused to the deceased and due to that the deceased has died pouring kerosene on herself and set herself ablaze. It is also contended that the contradiction arose in the evidence of the neighbor is proved by the prosecution in the evidence of the Investigating Officer. She has also contended that the defence side has not examined any witness nor has produced any evidence. She has also stated that in view of the contents of the FIR and the dying declaration wherein the deceased has clearly indicated the fact as to why she had committed suicide, needs to be believed as true. While reading both the documents, it is submitted by learned APP Ms. She has also stated that in view of the contents of the FIR and the dying declaration wherein the deceased has clearly indicated the fact as to why she had committed suicide, needs to be believed as true. While reading both the documents, it is submitted by learned APP Ms. Jhaveri that the contents of the FIR and dying declaration clearly suggest that due to the harassment by the present accused, the deceased was compelled to commit suicide as well as pouring kerosene on her 4 months daughter. 11. Regarding the decisions cited by the learned advocate Mr. Ashish Dagli for the appellant-accused, the learned APP Ms. Jirga Jhaveri has submitted that all the decisions are not applicable to the factual aspects of the present matter, considering different facts in both the cases. She has also relied on the decision in case of Jatinder Kumar vs. State of Haryana, 2019 SCC 1628 as well as the decision of the Supreme Court’s five Judges Bench in the case of Laxman vs. State of Maharashtra, (2002) SCC 710 and has submitted that considering the factual aspect of the present case, when there is corroborative evidences in the nature of the Executive Magistrate, brother and police witness, the impugned order of the learned trial Court cannot be termed as perverse. According to her submission, the learned trial Court has properly convicted the accused and passed proper sentence on her. The learned APP has prayed to dismiss the appeal. 12. In rejoinder, learned advocate for the accused has submitted that even on perusal of the entire evidence, it has come on record that there is endorsement of the Doctor that at the relevant time that the deceased was unconscious and that fact has been erased and it creates doubt as to whether the contents of the FIR and dying declaration are true or not. He has contended that there is no direct evidence regarding harassment to the deceased by the accused. The learned advocate for the appellant accused has prayed to allow the appeal. 13. In case of Swamy Prahladdas vs. State of M.P. and Another (supra) in that matter, the accused was charged with offences punishable under Section 306 of IPC. He has contended that there is no direct evidence regarding harassment to the deceased by the accused. The learned advocate for the appellant accused has prayed to allow the appeal. 13. In case of Swamy Prahladdas vs. State of M.P. and Another (supra) in that matter, the accused was charged with offences punishable under Section 306 of IPC. While dealing with the factual aspect, the Supreme Court has observed that in the first place, it is difficult, in the facts and circumstances, to come to even a prima facie view that what was uttered by the Appellant was ever to instigate the deceased to commit suicide. Those words are casual in nature which are often employed in the heat of the moment between quarrelling people. The said act does not reflect the requisite mens rea on the assumption that these words will be carried out in all events. The fact that the deceased had plenty of time to weigh the pros and cons of the act by which he ultimately end his life. It cannot be said that the suicide of the deceased was direct result of the words uttered by the Appellant. 14. In case of Ramesh Kumar vs. State of Chhatisgarh (supra) the Court in Para-21, 22 has observed as under: “21. In State of West Bangal vs. Orilal Jaiswal, (1994) 1 SCC 73 , this Court has cautioned that the Court should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end the life by committing suicide. If it transpires to the Court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the Court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty. 22. Sections 498-A and 396 IPC are independent and constitute different offences. 22. Sections 498-A and 396 IPC are independent and constitute different offences. Though, depending on the facts and circumstances of an individual case, subjecting a woman to cruelty may amount to an offence under Section 498-A and may also, if a course of conduct amounting to cruelty is established leaving no other option for the woman except to commit suicide, amount to abetment to commit suicide. However, merely because an accused has been held liable to be punished under Section 498-A IPC it does not follow that on the same evidence he must also and necessarily be held guilty of having abetted the commission of suicide by the woman concerned. Evidential value of the two writings contained in diary Article A is that of dying declarations. On the principle underlying admissibility of dying declaration in evidence that truth sits on the lips of a dying person and the Court can convict an accused on the basis of such declaration where it inspires full confidence, there is no reason why the same principle should not be applied when such a dying declaration speaking of the cause of death exonerates the accused unless there is material available to form an opinion that the deceased while making such statement was trying to conceal the truth either having been persuaded to do so or because of sentiments for her husband.” 15. In case of State of Gujarat vs. Bharatbhai Balubhai Lad and Others (supra) while referring the series of judgment pertaining to Section 32 of the Evidence Act as well as Section 498(A), 107 and 306, the Division Bench of this Court has observed as under: “12. It is settled principles of law so far as Section 498-A IPC is concerned that to constitute an offence of cruelty as explained under Section 498-A of IPC, willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit the suicide should be cogently established to hold the accused persons guilty of the said offence. In the instant case, there was no demand for dowry nor abetment of suicide nor cruelty to the deceased is established. Some unhappy note/incident during the short married life between the husband and the wife cannot be the circumstance to constitute an offence of cruelty or harassment within the meaning of Section 498-A IPC. 13. In the instant case, there was no demand for dowry nor abetment of suicide nor cruelty to the deceased is established. Some unhappy note/incident during the short married life between the husband and the wife cannot be the circumstance to constitute an offence of cruelty or harassment within the meaning of Section 498-A IPC. 13. The law so far as Section 498-A IPC is concerned needs to be examined considering the following two decisions of the Supreme Court: (i) Gananath Patnayak vs. State of Orissa, 2002 SCC (Criminal) 461 (ii) Inderpal vs. State of M.P. 2002 Cri. L.J. 926 14. The ratio of both the decisions is to the effect that all the statements made by the deceased to her family members regarding the alleged harassment and cruelty meted towards her would fall within the purview of hearsay evidence. It is an admitted fact that none of the witnesses examined by the prosecution have said that they have with their eyes seen the accused persons assaulting the deceased or treating her with cruelty. All the witnesses have deposed on the strength of the information which the deceased used to provide when she used to come at her parental home. Such a statement is not admissible in evidence for the offence punishable under Section 498-A of IPC and has to be termed as being only a hearsay evidence. 15. Section 32 of the Evidence Act is an exception to the hearsay rule and deals with the statements or declarations by a person, since dead, relating to the cause of his or her death or the circumstances leading to such death. If a statement which otherwise is covered by the hearsay rule does not fall within the exceptions of Section 32 of the Evidence Act, the same cannot be relied upon for finding the guilt of the accused persons for the offence punishable under Section 498-A of IPC.” 16. On perusal of the decision of 5 Judges bench of the Supreme Court, in case of Laxman vs. State of Maharashtra (supra) it is found that while referring to its earlier decision the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with the provisions of Section 32 of the Evidence Act in Para-3 as under: “3. On perusal of the decision of 5 Judges bench of the Supreme Court, in case of Laxman vs. State of Maharashtra (supra) it is found that while referring to its earlier decision the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with the provisions of Section 32 of the Evidence Act in Para-3 as under: “3. The juristic theory regarding acceptability of a dying declaration is that such declaration is made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every hope of this world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced and the man is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak only the truth. Notwithstanding the same, great caution must be exercised in considering the weight to be given to this species of evidence on account of the existence of many circumstances which may affect their truth. The situation in which a man is on death bed is so solemn and serene, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his statement. It is for this reason the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Since the accused has no power of cross-examination, the court insist that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its truthfulness and correctness. The court, however has to always be on guard to see that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. The court also must further decide that the deceased was in a fit state of mind and had the opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Normally, therefore, the court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitnesses state that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the declaration, the medical opinion will not prevail, nor can it be said that since there is no certification of the doctor as to the fitness of the mind of the declarant, the dying declaration is not acceptable. A dying declaration can be oral or in writing and in any adequate method of communication whether by words or by signs or otherwise will suffice provided the indication is positive and definite. A dying declaration can be oral or in writing and in any adequate method of communication whether by words or by signs or otherwise will suffice provided the indication is positive and definite. In most cases, however, such statements are made orally before death ensues and is reduced to writing by someone like a magistrate or a doctor or a police officer. When it is recorded, no oath is necessary nor is the presence of a magistrate is absolutely necessary, although to assure authenticity it is usual to call a magistrate, if available for recording the statement of a man about to die. There is no requirement of law that a dying declaration must necessarily be made to a magistrate and when such statement is recorded by a magistrate there is no specified statutory form for such recording. Consequently, what evidential value or weight has to be attached to such statement necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. What is essentially required is that the person who records a dying declaration must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind. Where it is proved by the testimony of the magistrate that the declarant was fit to make the statement even without examination by the doctor the declaration can be acted upon provided the court ultimately holds the same to be voluntary and truthful. A certification by the doctor is essentially a rule of caution and therefore the voluntary and truthful nature of the declaration can be established otherwise.” 17. In case of Jatinder Kumar vs. State of Haryana (supra) there was a case of commission of offence under Section 304-B, 498(A) of the IPC for the suicidal death of wife of the Appellant. In that judgment, in Para-7 and 8 the Apex Court has observed and held as under: “7. But the view of the Court reflected in that judgment that seeking financial assistance would not per se constitute demand for dowry has been rejected by a later judgment of a three-judge Bench of this Court in the case of Rajinder Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2015) 6 SCC 477 . Upon considering the case of Appasaheb (supra) and certain other authorities, it was held in the case of Rajinder Singh (supra): “20. Upon considering the case of Appasaheb (supra) and certain other authorities, it was held in the case of Rajinder Singh (supra): “20. Given that the statute with which we are dealing must be given a fair, pragmatic, and common sense interpretation so as to fulfil the object sought to be achieved by Parliament, we feel that the judgment in Appasaheb's case followed by the judgment of Vipin Jaiswal do not state the law correctly. We, therefore, declare that any money or property or valuable security demanded by any of the persons mentioned in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, at or before or at any time after the marriage which is reasonably connected to the death of a married woman, would necessarily be in connection with or in relation to the marriage unless, the facts of a given case clearly and unequivocally point otherwise.” 8. It was also held in the Rajinder Singh (Supra) that the expression “soon” is not to be construed as synonymous with “immediate.” The observation of the three-judge Bench of this Point is: “23. We endorse what has been said by these two decisions. Days or months are not what is to be seen. What must be borne in mind is that the word "soon" does not mean "immediate." A fair and pragmatic construction keeping in mind the great social evil that has led to the enactment of Section 304-B would make it clear that the expression is a relative expression. Time lags may differ from case to case. All that is necessary is that the demand for dowry should not be stale but should be the continuing cause for the death of the married woman under Section 304-B.” 18. Considering the aforesaid legal aspects and contention raised by both the sides and on perusal of the evidence on record, it transpires that there is no dispute regarding suicide committed by the deceased by pouring kerosene upon herself and set herself ablaze. It is also not in dispute that at that time she has also poured kerosene upon her daughter of aged about 4 months and set her also ablaze. 19. Now, so far as the dispute is regarding whether there was any harassment by the present accused, due to which she was instigated by the accused to commit suicide. It is also not in dispute that at that time she has also poured kerosene upon her daughter of aged about 4 months and set her also ablaze. 19. Now, so far as the dispute is regarding whether there was any harassment by the present accused, due to which she was instigated by the accused to commit suicide. On perusal of the evidence in shape of neighbours namely Jaypalsinh Manubhani PW-1 at Exh.10, Mayursinh Gambhirsinh, PW-2, at Exh.11, Bipin Jamnadas, PW-3, at Exh.12, Dawood Jalabhai, PW-4, at Exh.13, Harunasha Rehmansha, PW-5, at Exh.14, Manglaben Batukbhai, PW-8, at Exh.18, Harpalsinh Jagatsinh, PW-9, at Exh.19, it appears that all these witnesses have not supported the basic version of the prosecution regarding the harassment being meted out to the deceased by the accused on the date of incident. 20. It appears from the evidence of Jaypalsinh Manubha Parmar, PW-1, at Exh.10, that in his cross-examination on behalf of the accused he had admitted that he is residing near the residence of the deceased and as the treatment of the deceased was going on in the hospital he had gone there by rickshaw and the deceased was residing separately from her in-laws and there is a distance of 3 to 3½ kms between two houses and there was good relationship between deceased and her mother-in-law. He has denied having any knowledge regarding torture administered by the accused. 21. Mayursinh Gambhirsinh Gohel, PW-2, at Exh.11, has also stated the same facts in his evidence. The witness Bipin Jamnadas, PW-3, at Exh.12 has also stated that he does not know as to how the deceased got fire and he has not narrated anything before the Police. The witness Dawood Jalabhai, PW-4, at Exh.13, has also stated the same fact and has not supported the case of the prosecution, however, he has admitted that he is residing adjacent to the house of the deceased. 22. Harunasha Rehmansha, PW-5, at Exh.14 has also not supported the prosecution versions regarding his going to the house of the deceased and came to know regarding the incident thereof. He has specifically stated in his Chief-examination that the deceased, Father-in-law and mother-in-law are residing separately and he has not heard anything regarding the quarrel between the deceased and the present accused. He has specifically stated in his Chief-examination that the deceased, Father-in-law and mother-in-law are residing separately and he has not heard anything regarding the quarrel between the deceased and the present accused. He has also stated in his cross-examination that relationship between the deceased and her in-laws were co-ordial and has not heard anything regarding any quarrel between them. He has also stated that deceased was residing separately from her in-laws. He has no knowledge about the incident happened on the day. 23. Muktaben Devrajbhai Radadiya, PW-6, at Exh.15, has stated that she is Rector of the “Shri Shisumangal” Institute at Junagadh and the deceased and her brother were studying in the same Institution and she got married with son of present accused and the deceased has not reported them that there was quarrel between them in her family life. Thereafter, she went to the matrimonial house and was residing separately. She has also stated that on 22.8.2004, she got the information on telephone that the deceased along with her daughter has injured due to burn injuries and they were shifted to the hospital and thereafter she went to the death ceremony. She has also produced the copy of the register. 23.1 During her cross-examination on behalf of accused, she has admitted that there is no name of her institution at Exh.16 which is reduced in writing on behalf Shri Shishumangal Institution. She admitted that the deceased had not informed her regarding quarrel in her family or any torture from her in-laws. She has also stated the distance between the house of the deceased and the in-laws is almost 1½ km. 24. The witness Lalitbhai Virjibhai Pithwa, PW-7, at Exh.17, who is brother of the deceased has categorically stated that he and her sister were residing in “Shishumangal Institution” and the marriage of her sister was arranged by the said Institution. He got the information regarding the incident from the Institution and had gone Rajkot and there he got information about death of the deceased and her 4 months daughter. He has also stated that the alleged incident has happened prior to 3 months of his deposition and initially the deceased was residing in joint family and thereafter they were staying separately from joint family and were residing separately. 24.1 He has specifically stated in his Chief-examination that he does not know the cause of the incident. He has also stated that the alleged incident has happened prior to 3 months of his deposition and initially the deceased was residing in joint family and thereafter they were staying separately from joint family and were residing separately. 24.1 He has specifically stated in his Chief-examination that he does not know the cause of the incident. He has admitted in his cross-examination that as he is serving in the Court, he knows every legal aspect and though he came to know that there is offence having occurred, he did not file any complaint. 25. The witness Manglaben Batukbhai Makwana, PW-8, at Exh.18 has categorically stated that she is residing near the house of the deceased and as there was shouting near the house of the deceased Ushaben, she went there and at that time sister-in-law of the deceased had informed her to inform the husband of the deceased who is staying at Ashapuranagar and, therefore, she has no knowledge regarding happening of the incident. 26. Harpalsinh Jagatsinh Zala, PW-9, at Exh.19 has stated the same facts which are narrated by the other witnesses regarding the separate residence of the deceased from the in-laws and the facts of distance between the two house. 27. It appears from the evidence of Dr. Dahyabhai Raghavbhai Dadhani, PW-10, at Exh.20, has stated that he has performed the Postmortem of the dead body and as a Panel Doctor, Mr. M.C. Chavda was with him. The Postmortem was carried out on 22.08.2004 at 11.20 p.m. at night and was completed at 00.20 hrs on 23.08.2004 and found that the deceased was having 90% burns and therefore, there was no sign found of any physical torture or injury on her body. According to him, the cause of death was due to shock due to extensive burn injuries. 27.1 During his cross-examination he has admitted that if there is burn of more than 50% on the body, the patient goes in shock and the condition of the patient would be serious for 24 hours to 48 hours. It is also stated that there was 3rd and 4th degree burns on the body of the deceased and the entire body was having burn injuries. He has also stated that due to burn injuries, the patient might be in conscious condition or might not be in conscious condition and that depends on the mental strength of the patient. 28. It is also stated that there was 3rd and 4th degree burns on the body of the deceased and the entire body was having burn injuries. He has also stated that due to burn injuries, the patient might be in conscious condition or might not be in conscious condition and that depends on the mental strength of the patient. 28. Witness Nirmalsinh Digvijaysinh Zala, PW-11, at Exh.26 has deposed that he was PSO at the Police Station and at that time he received telephone from ASI Mr. Mahipatsinh regarding admission of the patient in unconscious condition who has suffered injuries due to burns and she has been admitted to the burns ward. He has also stated that the contents to the effect was written in the Station Diary. He has stated that the deceased has one daughter and one son and she was residing separately from her in-laws. Thereafter he has registered the offence after making entry in relevant register and handed over the investigation to Mr. B.B. Jadeja. 29. Witness Dayabhai Danabhai Makwana, PW-12, at Exh.28, has stated that when he was PSO in concerned Police Station at about 20:00 hrs he had received Janvajog entry from Government Hospital and accordingly he has recorded the same in the relevant register. He has admitted in his cross-examination, that when he received the Yadi, Exh.29, it was written therein that Ushaben was in unconscious condition. 30. Witness Hasmukhbhai Bhaktiram Gondalia, PW-13, at Exh.31, has stated that on 21.8.2004 he was serving as Dy. Mamlatdar and Executive Magistrate and he has received Police yadi for recording the dying declaration of the deceased who has been admitted in the burns ward, having burns injuries. He has stated that he has received the same on 21.8.2004 at 11.00 p.m. at night. According to him, therefore, he went to the hospital and contacted the concerned Doctor and after taking necessary endorsement from the Doctor to the effect that the patient is conscious and thereafter he had recorded the dying declaration at 12.30 p.m. According to him, he has enquired from the deceased by way of question and answer and dying declaration was completed at late night by 12.50 hrs and has obtained thumb impression of the deceased and the same was identified by himself. While narrating the dying declaration, he has stated that the patient was in conscious position and he has obtained endorsement of the Doctor to that effect on the dying declaration. 30.1 During his cross-examination, on behalf of accused, he has denied the suggestion that he has recorded the so-called dying declaration on 22.8.2004 at late night at 12.30 hrs and completed by 12.50 hrs. He has admitted that he has not inquired from the Doctor as to the endorsement made by the Doctor on the yadi Exh.31. He has admitted that correction has been made on the endorsement of the Doctor wherein it was admitted that he has not inquired about such eraser. He has denied the suggestion that the patient was not in fit state of mind and she could not speak due to burn injuries. He has stated that the date as mentioned in the dying declaration is correct. 31. Witness Dharmendrasinh Vaghela, PW-14, at Exh.40, has stated that on 21.8.2004 he was serving with the concerned Police Station and he got the Janjog Entry No. 558/2004 from the PSO. He started investigation and drawn the panchnama of the scene of offence and has recorded statement of various persons and as the daughter of deceased had died in the incident, he has filed criminal case under Section 302 of the IPC against deceased. He has also contended that initially there was FIR under Section 498(A) and after the death of the deceased, Section 306 of the IPC was added and necessary report was sent to the concerned Court. He has arrested the accused and upon completion of investigation, he has placed the charge-sheet before the trial Court. During deposition, he has referred to the statements of the witnesses i.e. neighbours, who have not supported the case of the prosecution. 31.1 During his cross-examination on behalf of accused, he has admitted that offence was of visitation of senior officer. However, in this case no senior officer had visited the place. He has also admitted that he has recorded the statement of brother of the deceased and that of the rector. Both have stated that they have come to know about the incident on 22.8.2004. However, in this case no senior officer had visited the place. He has also admitted that he has recorded the statement of brother of the deceased and that of the rector. Both have stated that they have come to know about the incident on 22.8.2004. He has admitted that the dying declaration of the deceased has not been carried out on 22.8.2004 at about 9.15 p.m. He has admitted that the place and time is not narrated in the FIR which is mandatory. He has stated that the entire body upto the palms of both the hands and legs of the victim were having bandage. 32. Now, the entire case of the prosecution is based solely on the sole dying declaration of the deceased. It is well settled that if dying declaration is reliable and trustworthy, there is no need of corroborative evidence to support the case. The important ingredients for evaluation of dying declaration is that it should not be tutored by any one. Further, there is no need of endorsement of the Doctor on the dying declaration if Executive Magistrate has satisfied himself that the patient is in conscious state of mind. To obtain the medical endorsement with regard to consciousness of the patient is a rule of prudence only and not rule of law. If, the dying declaration is trustworthy and reliable then in such case, whether there is endorsement of Doctor on the dying declaration is immaterial. Further, every case has to be decided on its own merits. 33. On perusal of the evidence on record, it clearly transpires that the neighbours have not supported the prosecution version. The evidence of the Investigating Officer is based on the hearsay evidence. Not only that, it also transpires from the evidence of the rector and brother of the deceased that the deceased had never made complaint to the rector regarding the harassment. The brother has also specifically stated that he has no knowledge as to why his sister has committed suicide. It transpires from the record that there is an endorsement at Exh.32 put up by the concerned Doctor that patient is conscious. It is also found that initially there was word used “unconscious” and then the word “un-consious” has been erased. It also transpires that the dying declaration is recorded on 22.8.2004 between 12.30 and 12.50 night. Now, the deceased has died on 21.8.2004. It is also found that initially there was word used “unconscious” and then the word “un-consious” has been erased. It also transpires that the dying declaration is recorded on 22.8.2004 between 12.30 and 12.50 night. Now, the deceased has died on 21.8.2004. The question has raised to the Executive Magistrate that he has mentioned the date as 22.8.2004 and that date is true. Now against this, as per evidence of the Police witness and documentary evidence, the deceased has already died prior to 22.8.2004. Thus, on overall consideration of the factual aspect and the circumstances, it appears that some correction has been made on the endorsement of the Doctor regarding consciousness. On considering the entire evidence on record, it transpires that the accused and the deceased were residing separately and there was distance of more than 3 km. 34. Even if it is believed that at the time of dying declaration, deceased was in conscious condition then also, it appears that on the date of incident, the accused had gone to the house of the deceased only for providing food to her and has asked her daughter-in-law as to why she has not prepared the food. Thus, mere asking the deceased regarding not preparing the food, cannot be treated as harassment to the deceased. The evidence on record is not cogent and reliable regarding alleged harassment. Further, there is no trustworthy evidence to substantiate the version of the prosecution that the accused herein has instigated the deceased to commit suicide. 35. On perusal of the impugned judgment, it appears that the learned trial Court has not considered all these aspects in its proper perspective and has committed serious error of facts and law in convicting the accused. Therefore, on re-appreciation of the evidence on record, it clearly transpires that there is no cogent, consistent and reliable evidence to connect the present accused with the charges levelled against her. Therefore, the impugned judgment is not sustainable in the eye of law and same warrants interference. 36. This appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge and 9th Fast Track Judge, Rajkot in Sessions Case No. 133 of 2004 dated 1.1.2005, is hereby quashed and set aside. The appellant-accused is acquitted of all the charges levelled against her. Fine, if any paid, be refunded to the accused. Bail bond, if any, stands cancelled. The impugned judgment and order passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge and 9th Fast Track Judge, Rajkot in Sessions Case No. 133 of 2004 dated 1.1.2005, is hereby quashed and set aside. The appellant-accused is acquitted of all the charges levelled against her. Fine, if any paid, be refunded to the accused. Bail bond, if any, stands cancelled. Record and Proceedings be sent back to the concerned trial Court forthwith.