ORDER : 1. The present appeal filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent by the appellant-original petitioner assailing order dated 26.09.2019 passed in Misc. Civil Application No. 2 of 2019 and Misc. Civil Application No. 3 of 2019 in Special Civil Application No. 2204 of 2009, as well as the original order dated 10.06.2019 passed by the learned Single Judge. 2. The facts in brief are that the appellant-original petitioner by invoking extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has assailed the order passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, dated 25.04.2019, in Reference (LCA) No. 1886 of 2003, and sought the incidental relief. 3. It appears that after presenting the petition before this Court, hearing has not been cooperated by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, as a result of which, the learned Single Judge was constrained to pass the following order: “1. Though called out, none appears for the petitioner. Learned counsel for the respondent has drawn attention of this Court to following three orders; Order dated 27.06.2018: “In the morning, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has sought adjourned and the matter was adjourned to 19.7.2018. However, learned counsel for the respondent has put in appearance and he has informed that the other side has sought adjournment without their consent. Since the adjournment is granted, the matter cannot be taken up today. However, it will be taken on 9.7.2018 and no further adjournment shall be granted.” Order dated 31.07.2018. The specific order was passed on 27.06.2018 against the adjournment in this matter. Despite this order, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has once again moved leave note. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent opposed the adjournment, however, in the interest of justice, this matter is now adjourned to 03.08.2018. It is made clear that in case, learned counsel for the petitioner is not available on the next date of hearing, the matter will be proceeded and stay, if any, granted in favour of the petitioner shall stand automatically vacated. Order dated 03.08.2018. “A specific order was passed on 31.7.2018 that no further adjournment shall be granted in this case, despite this order, learned counsel for the petitioner has not turned up when this case is taken up. Hence, dismissed for non prosecution. Rule is discharged. Order dated 03.08.2018. “A specific order was passed on 31.7.2018 that no further adjournment shall be granted in this case, despite this order, learned counsel for the petitioner has not turned up when this case is taken up. Hence, dismissed for non prosecution. Rule is discharged. Interim relief, if any, stands vacated.” 2. First two orders would indicate the reluctance of the Court to adjourn the matter after noting non-cooperation by the petitioner’s counsel for the hearing of the matter and the last order dismissed the matter for want of prosecution. 3. The matter came to be restored on the petitioner’s application. However, the past conduct is reiterated by the learned counsel for the petitioner by remaining absent even today. This Court has no other option but to dismiss the matter once again. Accordingly, the matter is dismissed. 4. On account of non-cooperation from the petitioner, the matter could not be proceeded and the Court is constrained to invest the public time in passing numerous orders from time to time. This calls for the cost upon the petitioner. Accordingly, the cost quantified at Rs. 10,000/- (Ten thousand) shall be borne by the petitioner. If the cost is not paid within a week of service of this order on the petitioner, the same shall be recovered in accordance with the provisions of Gujarat Land Revenue Code. On deposit of the cost; it shall be remitted to Gujarat Legal Service Authority.” 3.1. A bare reading of the order passed by the learned Single Judge has indicated that there was non cooperation on the part of the learned advocate representing the petitioner, which has led, rather, constrained the learned Single Judge to dismiss the petition. On account of such, the learned Single Judge was constrained to impose costs of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand only) to be borne by the petitioner and if the said costs is not paid within a period of one week, then the same shall be recovered under the provisions of the Gujarat Land Revenue Code. 3.2. This order, as soon as being noticed by the appellant-petitioner, it appears that simultaneous requests have been made, one for the purpose of extending time to deposit costs imposed by the Court and consequently, restoration of the main Special Civil Application, which was dismissed for want of prosecution. 3.2. This order, as soon as being noticed by the appellant-petitioner, it appears that simultaneous requests have been made, one for the purpose of extending time to deposit costs imposed by the Court and consequently, restoration of the main Special Civil Application, which was dismissed for want of prosecution. In the said application, the appellant has projected the difficulties which have been faced by the learned advocate, on account of which, the proceedings were not properly allowed, but the learned Single Judge, found that the restoration application is not preferred within a period of 30 days and no explanation for delay, is projected. As a result of which, the learned Single Judge dismissed the application by passing the order on 26.09.2019, which reads as under: 1. These applications have been respectively preferred for extension of time for deposit of the cost imposed by this Court upon the applicant by the previous order and the restoration of the Special Civil Application No. 2204 of 2009 which was dismissed by order dated 10.06.2019. 2. From the rival submissions, it appears that there was one more Misc. Civil Application No. 1 of 2019 seeking restoration of the Special Civil Application abovereferred which was also dismissed for want of prosecution by order dated 22.08.2019. Without seeking restoration thereof, this application is made for restoration of the captioned Special Civil Application. Both the above applications would be debarred under Section 67(1) of the Gujarat High Court Rules, 1993, in absence of explanation of delay as contemplated in the provision. The period of limitation for restoration is 30 days and this application is preferred beyond the period of 30 days without seeking the restoration as abovestated as also without explaining the delay. These applications, therefore, cannot be entertained. Hence, rejected. 4. Today, when the matter is taken up for hearing, learned advocate for the appellant, unconditionally, has submitted that the appellant-petitioner is ready and willing to deposit the amount of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand only) forthwith, but has requested that merit may not be sacrificed as according to him, there appears to be a good case on merit. 4. Today, when the matter is taken up for hearing, learned advocate for the appellant, unconditionally, has submitted that the appellant-petitioner is ready and willing to deposit the amount of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand only) forthwith, but has requested that merit may not be sacrificed as according to him, there appears to be a good case on merit. It has further been submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant – petitioner that on account of the difficulties which have been projected, the learned Single Judge ought to have adopted liberal view, especially, when the appellant is ready to proceed with the matter as and when the same be fixed by the learned Single Judge. 5. Mr. Prabhakar Upadyay, learned counsel has further submitted that it is settled position of law that on account of fault on the part of the learned advocate, litigant may not be allowed to suffer and as such by referring to two decisions delivered by the Apex Court, a request is made before us to set aside the impugned order by granting the relief as prayed for. 5.1. Mr. Upadyay, learned counsel has pressed into service the decisions delivered by the Apex Court one in the case of Rafiq vs. Munshilal, AIR 1981 SC 1400 and another in the case of Ram Kumar Gupta and Others vs. Har Prasad and Another, 2010 (1) SCC 391 and has submitted that the appellant is ready and willing to proceed ahead with the matter, if one chance be given in the larger interest of justice. 6. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner and having gone through the material on record, we found that the submissions made by the learned advocate for the appellant is sufficient enough to extend one additional opportunity to meet with the merit of the case, which would meet the ends of justice. We are accordingly, inclined to allow the reliefs which are sought before us. 6.1. While coming to this conclusion, we would like to observe the following observations of the Apex Court referred to in the above decisions so as to see that no prejudice take place on account of fault on the part of the learned advocate. The said relevant observations, we deem it proper to quote hereinafter: “3. 6.1. While coming to this conclusion, we would like to observe the following observations of the Apex Court referred to in the above decisions so as to see that no prejudice take place on account of fault on the part of the learned advocate. The said relevant observations, we deem it proper to quote hereinafter: “3. The disturbing feature of the case is that under our present adversary legal system where the parties generally appear through their advocates, the obligation of the parties is to select his advocate, brief him, pay the fees demanded by him and then trust the learned advocate to do the rest of the things. The party may be a villager or may belong to a rural area and may have no knowledge of the court's procedure. After engaging a lawyer, the party may remain supremely confident that the lawyer will look after his interest. At the time of the hearing of the appeal, the personal appearance of the party is not only not required but hardly useful. Therefore, the party having done everything in his power to effectively participate in the proceedings can rest assured that he has neither to go to the High Court to inquire as to what is happening in the High Court with regard to his appeal nor is he to act as a watchdog of the advocate that the latter appears in the matter when it is listed. It is no part of his job. Mr. A.K. Sanghi stated that a practice has grown up in the High Court of Allahabad amongst the lawyers that they remain absent when they do not like a particular Bench. Maybe he is better informed on this matter. Ignorance in this behalf is our bliss. Even if we do not put our seal of imprimatur on the alleged practice by dismissing this matter which may discourage such a tendency, would it not bring justice delivery system into disrepute. What is the fault of the party who having done everything in his 511 power and expected of him would suffer because of the default of his advocate. If we reject this appeal, as Mr. A.K. Sanghi invited us to do, the only one who would suffer would not be the lawyer who did not appear but the party whose interest he represented. If we reject this appeal, as Mr. A.K. Sanghi invited us to do, the only one who would suffer would not be the lawyer who did not appear but the party whose interest he represented. The problem that agitates us is whether it is proper that the party should suffer for the inaction, deliberate omission, or misdemeanour of his agent. The answer obviously is in the negative. Maybe that the learned advocate absented himself deliberately or intentionally. We have no material for ascertaining that aspect of the matter. We say nothing more on that aspect of the matter. However, we cannot be a party to an innocent party suffering injustice merely because his chosen advocate defaulted. Therefore, we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court both dismissing the appeal and refusing to recall that order. We direct that the appeal be restored to its original number in the High Court and be disposed of according to law. If there is a stay of dispossession it will continue till the disposal of the matter by the High Court. There remains the question as to who shall pay the costs of the respondent here. As we feel that the party is not responsible because he has done whatever was possible and was in his power to do, the costs amounting to Rs.200/should be recovered from the advocate who absented himself. The right to execute that order is reserved with the party represented by Mr. A.K. Sanghi. 15. In view of our discussions made herein above, we are, therefore, of the view that both the orders, namely, the order of rejection of the application for restoration as well as the application for dismissal of the writ application for non prosecution are liable to be set aside. Accordingly, both the orders are set aside and the writ petition is restored to its original file. 16. However, considering the facts and circumstances and length of the matter being kept pending in court, we restore this writ application subject to the condition that the appellants shall deposit and pay a sum of Rs. 10,000/- as costs to the respondent within two months from the date of filing of a copy of this order in the High Court. 17. 10,000/- as costs to the respondent within two months from the date of filing of a copy of this order in the High Court. 17. We make it clear that in the event, the amount of cost, as indicated above, is not deposited within the time specified herein, the appeals shall stand dismissed and the impugned orders shall stand affirmed. In the event, the cost, as indicated, is deposited within the time specified herein above, the High Court is requested to dispose of the writ petition at an early date preferably within three months from the date of deposit of the amount by the appellants in the High Court.” 7. In view of the aforesaid proposition of law which has been laid down and in view of the fact that the costs imposed upon the appellant of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand only), we feel it proper to restore the proceedings without calling upon the respondent herein, with a further clarification that this would be a final opportunity to the appellant. In view of the aforesaid situation, we are of the view that if the period of deposit is extended upto 20.01.2020 with a simultaneous permission then to apply for recalling of the original order, the same would meet the ends of justice. Accordingly, we hereby dispose of the present appeal on the following line. 7.1. Time to deposit an amount of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand only), which condition which is reflecting in order dated 10.06.2019, is hereby extended only upto 20.01.2020. 7.2. Upon such deposit only, the appellant is permitted to apply for recalling of the order so as to make request to the learned Single Judge to hear the main matter on merit and as and when such application for recalling is made after complying the aforesaid conditions, we request the learned Single Judge to consider the restoration request sympathetically. 8. Accordingly, the appeal is disposed of. 9. In view of the order passed in the main appeal, the connected civil application also stands disposed of.