JUDGMENT Sanjay Dwivedi, J. - Since the pleadings are complete, with the consent of the parties, the matter is heard finally. 2. This petition has been filed by the petitioner under Article 227 of the Constitution of India seeking quashment of the order dated 05.10.2019 (Annexure-P/12) passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Gwalior in Appeal No.60/2019. 3. As per the facts of the case, the petitioner has filed an application on 24.09.2018 fulfilling all the requisite formalities under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the Rules made therein for grant of regular Interstatal State Carriage Permit on the route Pachmadhi to Nagpur via Matkuli, Tamia, Parasiya, Chhindwara, Umra Nala, Saonsar, Savner for one return trip daily before the respondent No.2. The other operators including respondent No.4 have also filed their applications for grant of regular Interstatal State Carriage Permit on the aforesaid route. After receiving all the applications, the respondent No.2 convened a meeting on 28.09.2018 and considered the applications which were total 19 in numbers for grant of Interstatal State Carriage Permit and finally, the application of the petitioner was found suitable and accordingly, permit was granted to the petitioner vide order dated 18.01.2019 (Annexure-P/3). The petitioner thereafter, moved an application on 31.01.2019 for issuance of permit fulfilling all the requirements but no action was taken by the respondent No.2. Therefore, the petitioner along with other bus operators who were granted the permit filed a writ petition being W.P. No.5867/2019 (Vineet Miglani and others Vs. State of M.P. and others) which was disposed of vide order dated 19.03.2019 and finally the respondent No.2 issued the Interstatal State Carriage Permit in favour of the petitioner for the period from 01.07.2019 till 30.06.2024. 4. Being aggrieved with the same, the respondent No.3 filed an appeal i.e. Appeal No.60/2019 before the Appellate Authority. The petitioner also submitted his reply to the memo of the appeal before the Appellate Authority denying all the averments made in the appeal. A copy of the reply is available on record as Annexure-P/9. After submitting the reply, the petitioner also filed an application under Order 41 Rule 27 of Code of Civil Procedure (for brevity, 'CPC') along with the relevant documents. A copy of the reply is available on record as Annexure-P/9. After submitting the reply, the petitioner also filed an application under Order 41 Rule 27 of Code of Civil Procedure (for brevity, 'CPC') along with the relevant documents. The Appellate Authority heard the appeal finally and rejected the application filed by the petitioner under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC and passed the order impugned on 05.10.2019 (Annexure-P/12) setting aside the order passed by the respondent No.2 and also directed that the permit be issued in the name of respondent No.3. 5. The petitioner therefore, has filed this instant petition challenging the order passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Gwalior on the ground that the Appellate Authority has illegally rejected the application submitted by the petitioner under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC without meting out the reasons mentioned therein. As per the petitioner, he has filed the relevant documents in respect of the objections raised by him in his reply therefore, the application ought to have been considered by the authority and without assigning any reasons, the same could not have been rejected. To support his contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a decision passed in W.P. 2278/2015 (M/s. S.K. Jain vs. Gas Authority of India Ltd.). The order passed by the Appellate Authority has also been assailed on the ground that the said authority has exercised the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India directing the respondent No.2 to issue permit in the name of respondent No.3 whereas in an appeal the Court has to consider the fact whether the order passed by the respondent No.2 was proper or not. For that purpose, the petitioner has also placed reliance upon the decision reported in parties being Sindh Transport Company Vs. State Transport Authority, M.P., Gwalior, (1989) MPLJ 831 and further in the case of V.D Balani Bus Service, Itarsi Vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, M.P., Gwalior, (1990) MPLJ 732 and also the order passed by this Court in M.P. No.428/2019 parties being The Bundelkhand Motor Transport Company Vs. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal, M.P., Gwalior. State Transport Authority, M.P., Gwalior, (1989) MPLJ 831 and further in the case of V.D Balani Bus Service, Itarsi Vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, M.P., Gwalior, (1990) MPLJ 732 and also the order passed by this Court in M.P. No.428/2019 parties being The Bundelkhand Motor Transport Company Vs. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal, M.P., Gwalior. It is also contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that merely because the respondent No.3 is having an experience for plying bus on the route from Pachmadhi to Nagpur, he could not be given weightage only on the basis of his experience and as such, the Appellate Authority should have considered the objections raised by the petitioner and also the documents filed by him along with the application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC. It is also contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that even otherwise granting temporary permit continuously is not a proper practice and the Court has so many occasions deprecating such practice directing that instead of extending the temporary permit a regular permit should be granted. As such, the counsel for the petitioner submits that adjudging merit only on the basis of experience and treating the same to be a sole criteria for granting permit is nothing but creating monopoly in old bus operators that would tantamount to create restrictions on new bus operators. In this regard, the petitioner has placed reliance upon a decision reported in ( Mithilesh Garg Vs. Union of India & others, (1992) AIR SC 443 ). 6. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.3 who is the contesting respondent has submitted the reply taking stand therein that the order passed by the respondent No.2/State Transport Authority granting permit in favour of the petitioner was only on the basis that the Bus model of the petitioner was of the year 2018 and the claim of the respondent No.3 was rejected as his vehicle model was of the year 2017. The order passed by the State Transport Authority was also criticized by the respondent No.3 saying that all the other relevant material have been ignored whereas the authority was under obligation to consider the applications with their comparative assessment taking note of the fact that the respondent No.3 was operating the bus on the said route for last more than six years and it should have also been considered by the authority that the respondent No.3 has also proposed the stand-by vehicle. As per the respondent No.3 he has provided a vehicle of sitting capacity which was more than that of the petitioner therefore, his application should have been given weightage instead of the petitioner's application. The learned counsel for he respondent No.3 have relied upon a decision reported in ( Surendra Mohan Chaurasiya Vs. State Transport appellate Authority, M.P., Gwalior, (1970) AIR M.P. 230 ) and has further placed reliance upon a decision reported in parties being Patiala Bus (Sirhind) Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Punjab and others, (1974) AIR SC 1174 . He has also placed reliance upon the order passed in L.P.A. No.4/1995 decided by the Gwalior Bench of the High Court in the case of Gulsan Transport Company Vs. Smt. Urmila Malviya & Others. The learned counsel has also stated that in pursuance to the order passed by the Appellate Authority, the permit has already been granted in favour of the respondent No.3. 7. Considering the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and perusal of the record, it is apparent from the order of the Appellate Authority that the authority has granted weightage to the experience as shown by the respondent No.3 saying that he was plying the vehicle on the route in question for last more than six years. The Appellate Authority, while considering the application submitted by the petitioner under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC, has observed that the documents filed by the petitioner along with the said application are not related to the objections raised by him in his reply therefore, those documents are not required to be taken on record by way of additional evidence. The Appellate Authority, while considering the application submitted by the petitioner under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC, has observed that the documents filed by the petitioner along with the said application are not related to the objections raised by him in his reply therefore, those documents are not required to be taken on record by way of additional evidence. The petitioner submitted that the weightage was being given to respondent No.3 only on the ground that he had an experience for plying the vehicle on the route in question whereas he was being granted the temporary permit for the route from Chhindwara to Nagpur but not on the route which was in question i.e., from Pachmadhi to Nagpur. As per the petitioner he has raised specific objection in his reply which has been filed on 12.09.2019 (Annexure- P/9). The documents which he has submitted along with the application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC were related to the contention raised by the petitioner in his reply and, therefore, they were material for adjudicating the issue and should have been taken as an additional evidence. Admittedly, considering the reply submitted by the petitioner to the appeal and looking to the order passed by the Appellate Authority, it is clear that the objection raised by the petitioner in his reply to the memo of appeal, there is no consideration of those objections by the Appellate Authority and the documents which have been filed along with the application are relevant for the purpose that as per the objections raised by the petitioner that temporary permit was being granted to the respondent No.3 for the route Chhindwara to Nagpur but not from Pachmadhi to Nagpur whereas the Appellate Authority has given weightage to the experience of the respondent No.3 as if he was plying the vehicle in the route in question but the vehicle was being plied by the respondent No.3 only to half of the route for which permit was being sought. 8. The judgment on which the petitioner has placed reliance regarding considering the application filed by him under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC in the case of M/s S.K. Jain (supra), the Court has observed as under :- "11. 8. The judgment on which the petitioner has placed reliance regarding considering the application filed by him under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC in the case of M/s S.K. Jain (supra), the Court has observed as under :- "11. This Court in ( Central Homeopathic & Biochemic Association Gwalior vs. State of MP, (2013) ILR(MP) 837 ), considered catena of judgments on the question of principle of natural justice and fair play in action. Paras 22 to 24 read as under:- "22. The legal position stated above makes it clear that whether impugned order is outcome of a quasi judicial act or an administrative act in both the situations, principles of natural justice and fair play in action were the requirement of law. In other words, the impugned order could have been passed only after following the principles of natural justice and fair play in action. Fairness is an integral part of good administration. In the present case, in the first round, the petitioners succeeded because despite filing reply by him, the respondent No. 2 opined that reply has not been filed. When it was found to be incorrect on perusal of record, this Court directed the respondent No. 2 proceed further from that stage. Now in the impugned order, the respondent No. 2 mentioned about factum of filing of reply but did not deal with the contentions and averments of the reply in his order/communication. He has given a finding, which is detriment to the petitioner and an elected body is ousted before completion of normal tenure. In my considered opinion, it has serious consequences on the petitioners and this order certainly falls within the ambit of "civil consequences". The requirement of principles of natural justice and fair play was to examine, deal with, consider and discuss the reply filed by the petitioner. In absence thereof, the impugned order runs contrary to principles of natural justice and fair play in action. 23. This is settled in law that principles of natural justice does not supplant the law but supplements the law. Its application may be excluded either expressly or by necessary implication ( Dr. Umrao Singh Chaudhary Vs. State of M.P. and another, (1994) 4 SCC 328 ). In Mohinder Singh Gill (supra), it is held by the Supreme Court that it is not permissible to interpret any statutory instrument so as to exclude natural justice. Its application may be excluded either expressly or by necessary implication ( Dr. Umrao Singh Chaudhary Vs. State of M.P. and another, (1994) 4 SCC 328 ). In Mohinder Singh Gill (supra), it is held by the Supreme Court that it is not permissible to interpret any statutory instrument so as to exclude natural justice. Unless the language of the instrument leaves no option to the Court. It is further observed that natural justice is so integral to the good government that the onus is on him who urges exclusion to make out why. 24. In the light of this legal position, in my opinion, the principles of natural justice are implicit and are required to be read into Section 32(4) of the Adhiniyam. In cases, whether after supplying the result of the enquiry, the Registrar receives the response of the society and if he intends to pass any order which affects the right of the society in any manner or which may entail civil consequences, the Registrar is bound to follow the principles of natural justice and fair play in action. Accordingly, he is under an obligation to deal with the stand of the party going to be effected in his order. In absence of thereof, the order would be an order without assigning any reason on the defence of the petitioners. The necessity to assign reason is emphasized by the Supreme Court in Kranti Associates Private Limited v. Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496 , in following words:- "(a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. (b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. (c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. (d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. (e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. (f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decisionmaking process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies. (g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts. (e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. (f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decisionmaking process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies. (g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts. (h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. (i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system. (j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. (k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. (l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or "rubber-stamp reasons" is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process. (m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision-making not only makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. (o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of "due process". 12. In the present case, the respondents have not applied mind on the reply submitted by the petitioner. They did not deal with the objection raised in the reply. The respondents are bound to deal with every aspect which is raised in the reply. 13. 12. In the present case, the respondents have not applied mind on the reply submitted by the petitioner. They did not deal with the objection raised in the reply. The respondents are bound to deal with every aspect which is raised in the reply. 13. Considering the aforesaid, the impugned order cannot be permitted to stand. The decision making process and the decision is totally vitiated and cannot sustain judicial scrutiny. This is also settled in law that reasons are heartbeat of conclusion. In absence of reasons, the conclusion cannot be permitted to stand." 9. Thus, I m of the opinion that the Appellate Authority has not considered the application and the documents filed by the petitioner along with the same asking that the same be treated to be an additional evidence. The Appellate Authority should have taken note of those documents to meet out the objections raised by the petitioner in his reply. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also contended that as per the order passed by the Appellate Authority, the authority not only considered the application of the petitioner and respondent No.3 and made comparative assessment but also directed the State Transport Authority to issue permit in favour of the respondent No.3 whereas it was obligatory for the Appellate Authority to consider the correctness of the order which was the subject matter of the appeal and to observe that the said order was not proper for the specific reason on which the Appellate Authority relied upon and matter should have been remitted back to the State Transport Authority to consider afresh and pass an appropriate order but here in this case, the Appellate Authority has exercised the power and issued mandate directing the authority to grant permit in favour of respondent No.3. 11. Considering the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the case of Sindh Transport Company (supra), the Full Bench of the High Court in paragraph-11 has observed as under :- "11. We may examine now the scope of appellate power under Section 64. 11. Considering the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the case of Sindh Transport Company (supra), the Full Bench of the High Court in paragraph-11 has observed as under :- "11. We may examine now the scope of appellate power under Section 64. When any person is aggrieved by refusal of permit or, in other words, by grant of permit to his adversary, he may appeal but the "decision" which the appellate authority can given in that appeal can be, and has to be, limited only to the legality or validity of the "refusal"; beyond that, no other "decision" can be given in the appeal in that regard to bind parties to the appeal or the authority granting the impugned permit. During the pendency of the appeal, the validity of the permit being challenged its operation may be suspended if facts and circumstances so warrant. Indeed, the respondent aggrieved by that order would not be remediless as it would be open to him to challenge even that suspension or stay of operation in a Writ Court. Where a discretion is vested in any Court or tribunal, it has been held in A. Lakshman Rao, AIR 1971 SC 186 , the discretion has to be exercised judicially and exercise of the discretion in an arbitrary or unjudicial manner is assailable in a higher Court. If the respondent is not aggrieved but is satisfied with a "stay order" passed in an appeal he cannot blame the appellate authority even if the "final" decision is belatedly rendered in the appeal in his favour. In any case, what is patently clear having regard to the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the appellate authority under Section 64 is that in finally disposing of the appeal, no direction can be made by that authority for extending the life of the permit impugned in that appeal so as to nullify the statutory exercise of deliberately limiting the life of the permit under Section 58. The "decision" made under Section 64 which would be "final" or binding cannot transgress the bounds of Section 58 as the Tribunal rendering the decision under the Act must act in accordance with, and not in violation of any provision of the Act. The "decision" made under Section 64 which would be "final" or binding cannot transgress the bounds of Section 58 as the Tribunal rendering the decision under the Act must act in accordance with, and not in violation of any provision of the Act. If the legislature has not vested wider power in the Tribunal to pass "any" order "it deemed fit" in disposing of the appeal is derogation of Section 58 and has deliberately conferred on it limited jurisdiction. Legislature's wisdom in that regard cannot be questioned by courts." The High Court also in the case of The Bundelkhand Motor Transport Company (supra) has directed that the Appellate Authority does not enjoy the power vested under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 12. Thus, in my opinion, the Appellate Authority should have allowed the application filed by the petitioner under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC and remitted the matter back to the State Transport Authority to consider the application afresh but instead of doing so, the Appellate Authority not only set aside the order of the State Transport Authority but also issued mandate for granting permit in favour of respondent No.3 whereas such power was not vested with the Appellate Authority. As such, the order passed by the Appellate Authority is not sustainable in the eye of law and therefore, the same is hereby set aside. 13. Accordingly, the petition filed by the petitioner is allowed directing the Appellate Authority to consider the application of the petitioner afresh taking note of the objections raised by the petitioner and pass an appropriate order thereof. The aforesaid exercise shall be completed within a period of three months from the date of submitting certified copy of this order. 14. The petition is accordingly allowed and disposed of.